

**Submission to the Justice and Home Affairs Committee Committee's Inquiry into
'Family Migration'**

Authors:

Professor Margaret Greenfields, Professor of Social Policy, ARU

Dr Eglé Dagilytė, Associate Professor in European Law and Society, ARU

Dr Nicola Gillin, Research Fellow, ARU, Veterans and Families Institute for Military Social Research

Dr Chantal Radley, Research Fellow, ARU

Dr Imranali Panjwani, Senior Lecturer in Law, ARU

Dr Anna Paraskevopoulou, Senior Lecturer in Human Resource Management and Leadership, ARU

Dr Nick Caddick, Associate Professor of Sociology, ARU, Veterans and Families Institute for Military Social Research

Dr David Smith, Associate Professor in Social Policy, ARU

Submitted on: 15 September 2022

Summary

This submission to the Inquiry builds on several past and ongoing research and consultancy projects that focus on the areas of family policy in relation to international migration. We do not attempt to respond to all questions, but only those areas within our personal knowledge and expertise.

In terms of **geographic coverage**, findings (differentiated within the text below by locality) relate to the UK-wide picture in terms of policy and reflects findings from studies undertaken across several regions (eg., Cambridgeshire, Lincolnshire, Essex, London and Kent). Our response also includes the perspectives of UK Armed Forces veterans who currently reside in their home countries due to an inability to acquire British citizenship/the right to remain in the UK after leaving service.

The **key contributions and proposals** in this submission relate to the following questions:

- i. Design of family migration law: questions 1, 2, 3.
- ii. How family migration policies affect society: question 6.
- iii. How migration policies affect families: question 7

A. Introduction

We are a multidisciplinary team from Anglia Ruskin University encompassing expertise in law, military social research, social work, sociology and social policy.

Individually and collectively, we are responsible for several **interdisciplinary research projects**, and here present pertinent findings and recommendations from projects especially relevant for the matters raised by this Inquiry. These findings constitute the scientific basis and evidence base for our consultation response. These studies include (in chronological order):

- Undocumented Workers' Transitions (2008-2009);¹
- Access to welfare benefits for EU/EEA Roma migrants in the UK after the 2014 benefit reforms (2015-2017);²

¹McKay, S., Markova, E. and Paraskevopoulou, A. (2011) *Undocumented Workers' Transitions: Legal Status, Migration, and Work in Europe*, Routledge: New York

Markova, E., Paraskevopoulou A., McKay, S. (2019), "Treading lightly: regularised migrant workers in Europe", *Migration Letters* 16(3):451-461

² Dagilytė, E. and Greenfields, M. (2015) United Kingdom welfare benefit reforms in 2013–2014: Roma between the pillory, the precipice and the slippery slope. *Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law*, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp.476-495. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2015.1121954>

Greenfields, M. and Dagilytė, E. (2018) 'I would never have come if we'd know it might be like this': On the (un) intended consequences of welfare governance of EU Roma migrants in Britain. *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 3.

<https://intersections.tk.mta.hu/index.php/intersections/article/view/447>

We included as relevant data and the findings from such projects of which we have knowledge, or where we have been more tangentially involved in consultative or advisory board roles ¹⁰, that help answer the consultation questions.

In addition, our consultation response also draws on **other data and literature in the public domain** that is pertinent to this Inquiry.

B. Design of family migration law

1. How does immigration law define a “family” and a “relative”? How have these definitions evolved over time? Are they consistent across immigration pathways? Do they reflect contemporary societal understandings of “family” and “relative”, in the UK and overseas?

Although we do not seek to answer this question in detail, we would note that particularly in relation to LGBTQI+ family members – particularly where there is no evidence of formal marriage, as may be impossible to prove, illegal or expose individuals to persecution the barrier to utilising family migration law may be particularly burdensome. Greenfields’ involvement as an advisory team member of the Heritage Lottery funded Rainbow Pilgrims project which explored the migration narratives and experiences of LGBTQI+ people who identified as members of a faith community (2016-2019) – and indeed her submission of evidence thereafter to asylum appeal hearings on behalf of a gay male participant in that research who was at risk of physical harm should they be required to their country of origin following the arrest and imprisonment of their long-term partner– highlighted that there is a tension between a claimant required to prove their relationship in order to seek reunification/family migration, and yet simultaneously potentially being exposed to significant harm if they are ‘discreet’ in a number of cultures and contexts (see further, research undertaken for the multi-national survey of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Claims of Asylum: A European human rights challenge (2016-2020)).¹¹

Similarly, the extended family patterns which may pertain to co-residence and extended and deep-rooted kin networks found across many prime ‘sending-country’ populations, cultures and communities may be outwith the commonly held understanding of ‘family’ and ‘relatives’ for the purposes of UK immigration law. This is especially problematic where there is lack of documentation considered appropriate to UK migration applications or legislation, or where family relationships may be entwined through multiple marriages, and for example where a series of family names are utilised by related individuals which can be confusing at best or at worst evidence of fraudulent claims by those tasked with reviewing migration claims. Evidence gathered for a study of the experiences of refugee and asylum seeking women’s experiences with legal and health services in the UK undertaken by a team member in partnership with a specialist legal NGO found that in several cases women reported significant barriers to establishing that children with whom they were travelling or other adult relatives with whom they sought reunification were related to them (for example a niece or nephew or young cousin who had lived with them prior to migration/their asylum journey), particularly if language barriers intervened in explaining complex

¹⁰ <https://www.rainbowpilgrims.com/> (Rainbow Pilgrims – the lives of LGBT+ migrants to the UK 2016-2019)

¹¹ Andrade et al, (2020) <https://www.sogica.org/database/andrade-danisi-dustin-ferreira-and-held-queering-asylum-in-europe-a-survey-report-2020/>

family ties which were very real and deep and meaningful to the applicant but which were seen to be unduly distant by immigration officials to comply with definitions of family membership.¹²

2. Does immigration law apply to every family the same? Do different rules apply to different circumstances? Are rules applied consistently in similar circumstances? What are the justifications for discrepancies? How do “mainstream” immigration pathways compare with “bespoke” ones introduced in response to geopolitical and refugee crises and how do the bespoke pathways compare with each other?

Our research in this area relates to impact of immigration law to families of three types of persons: undocumented migrants, Non-UK Armed Forces' members and European Roma migrants. We refer, too, to some emergent evidence from our ongoing study of post-Brexit migration and older EU migrants.¹³

2.1. Undocumented migrants

Family plays an important role in the decision to migrate, either for financial or personal reasons (as strongly found in Roma related research undertaken by team members where whole family/wider community migration was frequently practiced, particularly in relation to populations living in extremely excluded areas of East Europe.¹⁴ Families also play an important role in the host country, providing help with finding a job, accommodation (which may be shared with relatives or fellow migrants from their own locality/community) or settling into the new country. This is likely to be particularly pertinent for more excluded migrant workers or those with less social capital, poorer English language skills and frequently lack of transferable qualifications who may work within the service or field-labour employment sector.¹⁵

¹² Greenfields, M (2018), 'Participatory action research with refugee and asylum-seeking women' in Craig, G., (ed.) *Community Organising Against Racism: Race, Ethnicity and Community Development* Bristol, Policy Press; Greenfields, M. (2013) *Action Research with Refugee Women: Good Practice and Solutions to Community Participation*, London: IARS

¹³ Currently ongoing, funded by ARU. Principal Investigator is Dr David Smith, Co-Investigators: Professor Margaret Greenfields and Dr Eglé Dagilytė.

¹⁴ Dagilytė, E. and Greenfields, M. (2015) United Kingdom welfare benefit reforms in 2013–2014: Roma between the pillory, the precipice and the slippery slope. *Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law*, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp.476-495.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2015.1121954>

Greenfields, M. and Dagilytė, E. (2018) 'I would never have come if we'd know it might be like this': On the (un) intended consequences of welfare governance of EU Roma migrants in Britain. *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 3.

17520_Greenfields_M.pdf (guildhe.ac.uk)

¹⁵ Dagilytė, E. and Greenfields, M. (2015) United Kingdom welfare benefit reforms in 2013–2014: Roma between the pillory, the precipice and the slippery slope. *Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law*, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp.476-495. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2015.1121954> ;

Greenfields, M. and Dagilytė, E. (2018) 'I would never have come if we'd know it might be like this': On the (un) intended consequences of welfare governance of EU Roma migrants in Britain. *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 3.

<https://intersections.tk.mta.hu/index.php/intersections/article/view/447>

Greenfields, M., Smith, D., Dagilytė, E., Ramadan, S., Bright, J. (2019) The impact of migration in the Fenland area: a scoping report. Project Report. Rosmini Centre, Wisbech, UK. Available at:

<https://arro.anglia.ac.uk/id/eprint/704980/>

Despite the potential support from families however, undocumented migrants in particular experience particular disadvantages in terms of access to work, health and decent living conditions while resident in the UK and may be at particular risk of exploitation.¹⁶

Undocumented migrants are understood as individuals who have crossed borders illegally or have been smuggled or trafficked. However, migration paths are complex. Some individuals start their journey as documented and may then fall in undocumented status (for example when their residence permits expire). Others may be pushed into undocumented status because of strict immigration rules which do not allow them to work sufficient hours to support themselves or their families. Still others start as undocumented migrants, but subsequently acquire documented status through sregularisation programme or successful asylum claims. The Undocumented migrant status may therefore be perceived as a fluid social construct, as well as a legal 'fact' - this was reflected in the 2008-2009 undocumented workers study which captured these 'transitions' in status over time¹⁷.

In recent years, regularization programmes have become considerably more restrictive and status checks ever more regulated requiring significantly greater levels of documentation (see footnotes 2 and 14), in turn meaning that such individuals are becoming more marginalised, having an effect on the wellbeing of the whole family in relation to access to services or the means of life, including health, accommodation, employment and educational opportunities. Accordingly, migration laws are therefore being increasingly perceived of as unjust. Findings from the 2008-2009 study on undocumented workers,¹⁸ still pertinent today despite legislative changes, show that migration status often defines the family situation: family separation, often long term with impacts on children and older people's wellbeing; enduring disadvantage of undocumented migrants in order to send money back home; risks of essentially falling into bond labour to repay debts, or living in a constant fear of deportation. Individuals may also risk irregular migration in order to reunite with their family or become undocumented migrants following a visit to relatives, where the increasing level of financial requirements required to obtain spousal or family visas means that a legal route to formal reunification is precluded where sufficient income is not earned or cannot be proven - such as to meet stringent fiscal requirements¹⁹. It is, therefore, strongly argued by the team that it is important to provide greater protection to families of undocumented migrants to help them integrate in the local society and avoid destitution impacting children and vulnerable household members with no recourse to public funds.²⁰

¹⁶ JCWI (2021) *We are Here: Routes to regularisation for the UK's undocument population*. London: JCWI <https://www.jcwi.org.uk/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=5467543a-6e30-4e28-a39f-db48ffad6d3a>

¹⁷ McKay, S., Markova, E. and Paraskevopoulou, A. (2011) *Undocumented Workers' Transitions: Legal Status, Migration, and Work in Europe*, Routledge: New York

¹⁸ McKay, S., Markova, E. and Paraskevopoulou, A. (2011) *Undocumented Workers' Transitions: Legal Status, Migration, and Work in Europe*, Routledge: New York

¹⁹ Sirriyeh, A. (2017) <https://theconversation.com/broken-families-what-happens-to-couples-torn-apart-by-immigration-rules-73546>

²⁰ Markova, E., Paraskevopoulou A., McKay, S. (2019), "Treading lightly: regularised migrant workers in Europe", *Migration Letters* 16(3):451-461 <https://doi.org/10.33182/ml.v16i3.747> McKay, S., Markova, E. and Paraskevopoulou, A. (2011) *Undocumented Workers' Transitions: Legal Status, Migration, and Work in Europe*, Routledge: New York <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203810422> The Children's Society (2020) *A Lifeline for All* London: The Children's Society <https://www.childrenssociety.org.uk/information/professionals/resources/lifeline-for-all>

2.2 Non-UK Armed Forces and their families

The preliminary findings from an ongoing study undertaken by some members of this team *“Understanding and improving Non-UK Service and transition in the British Armed Forces”*²¹ (Report due for publication March 2023) suggest there is considerable variation within the non-UK Armed Forces population and their families in how immigration and visa laws apply. This variation often depends on the time at which they joined the service/arrived in the UK, their country of origin (and the availability of other bespoke immigration pathways that exist for their country) and the composition of their family.

2.2.1 Time of joining service

Given the changing nature of immigration law and policy over time, there are some issues that affect some cohorts of non-UK serving personnel, veterans and their families more than others, depending on when they joined or left service or arrived in the UK. There are a number of legacy issues that continue to affect non-UK veterans that may not apply to newly arrived serving personnel.

During our interviews, accounts were heard from earlier cohorts of Fijian serving personnel (now veterans) unaware of their right to apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) upon leaving service. Rather than informing them to their right to apply to settle in the UK, the Army facilitated and expedited their travel back to Fiji upon leaving, causing multiple issues that remain amongst ex-UK Armed Forces personnel in Fiji.

“They also gave, not only me, but my whole family a one-way ticket to Fiji. I still have itinerary and the costs... I believe I still have it at home. They were willing to pay over £9,000 to get all of us back to Fiji, instead of just... granting us to go back to the UK. And we wanted to stay in the UK as I said four of the children are British born. I'm still trying to get over what they did and for them to... to pay the £9,000 instead of just helping us... to settle” (Veteran in Fiji)

Veterans in Fiji have difficulty in accessing adequate health care, including for issues that were acquired during service, such as PTSD. UK-born children who are denied access to public services in the UK due to their parents being denied the opportunity to acquire British citizenship, can suffer further implications on their rights to access vital services such as banking and schooling upon return to their parent's home country.

“My son is now in Year Nine and one of the requirements from school is for them to open a bank account and I went there, they said ‘You can't because your son is British born’, he's like a foreigner here...We went to register them in school, they have a computer system...where they say that they're born in Britain. The head teacher turned around and told us that we have to pay £2,000 per term for each student that was born in the UK. But at the moment they're still basically illegal...in their own country” (Veteran in Fiji)

Visa fees were a frequent concern for non-UK serving personnel and their families and did not affect all non-UK families equally. More recent cohorts are having to pay significant amounts in family member ILR fees which are viewed as less affordable now than they were for those who have applied in the past. Earlier cohorts of non-UK personnel and their families were aware and

²¹ See under Section A

sympathetic to the visa costs to individuals and especially families that have applied in recent years and were appreciative of the ability to apply at a time when visa costs were considered to be reasonable in relation to their income and to the processing cost.

“the whole process of like being able to stay on and be with your family is just like... you need to spend to so much.....I mean £2,338 for like admin fee or whatever is being done... I just feel like it's just ridiculous” (Wife of a Ghanaian Serving Person)

The recent decision to waive ILR fees for veterans leaving with six years' service²² is likely to have a limited effect on the cost of visas for non-UK individuals and families given that many of our serving personnel participants were applying for British citizenship during service, and the visa waiver for ILR does not apply to family members whose costs are often considerable, especially if their children are not born in the UK. It was frequently suggested that ILR fees for family members could be lowered to be more affordable, or at the very least frozen.

“the paperwork is ok, but it's the... it's the fees. If they can cut it down a bit or you know to start off with... it's just going up and up” (Fijian Wife of a Serving Person)

The Minimum Income Requirement (MIR) was a proving to be a significant barrier for non-UK families and their ability to live together in the same country. This is another issue which is disproportionately affecting more recent cohorts of serving personnel and families (and hence more junior ranks and those that can least afford it), as opposed to those who arrived prior to the MIR being in place. The implications of this are discussed in further detail in Question 3.

2.2.2 Country of origin and service role

Unlike the bespoke immigration pathways for migrants who immigrate to the UK to fill public sector roles such as the Health and Care Worker visa, there is currently no bespoke immigration pathway available to those who migrate for the purpose of serving in the UK Armed Forces. We found that there was not one typical route into service and the UK amongst non-UK serving personnel, veterans and their family members. Circumstances were highly varied amongst our participants, with some additional barriers or facilitators to citizenship dependent on country of origin. Additional barriers to citizenship currently exist for those who join the Brigade of Gurkhas who need to transfer to another regiment following five years' service if they want to pursue citizenship²³, whereas others' route to citizenship can be facilitated through their access to parallel bespoke migration pathways such as the Hong Kong British National (Overseas) visa.

“I found out there are also other British National Overseas passports holders. They just recently applied for a citizenship and realised that we can skip the Life in the UK exam” (Hong Kong Serving Person)

The recent bespoke immigration pathway for Afghan interpreters: *Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP)* was used by a non-UK veteran to highlight the inconsistent facilitatory mechanisms that apply to those who have made considerable sacrifices in their service to the UK Armed Forces. The “High risk/imminent threat” category that prioritises applications for ‘Urgent relocation’ under the ARAP could also apply to some non-UK veterans and their families who have returned to their home country, yet no parallel categorisation of risk or official recognition of

²² [Visa fees scrapped for Non-UK Service Personnel - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/visa-fees-scrapped-for-non-uk-service-personnel)

²³ <https://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/54e6de9e0c383719802572b9005141ed/2cc21f75e7b34362802572ad005b4bfd?OpenDocument>

this issue exists for non-UK veterans applying through mainstream routes. Like interpreters in Afghanistan, non-UK veterans who have been unsuccessful in acquiring British citizenship are also at considerable risk if their home country is politically unstable and their service to the UK Armed Forces is discovered.

“I couldn’t bring any of my military kit back home with me because of the fear of the risk being seen as having a British role. Why is the Afghan interpreter so high on the agenda? We’ve got the same things happening in Zimbabwe and people just turn the other way”
(Zimbabwe Veteran)

The frequent changes to immigration law, and the variable immigration pathways and outcomes amongst non-UK serving personnel, veterans and their families makes it difficult for accurate, up-to-date support to be provided formally by the MoD and military charities, and informally through non-UK support networks. **We would suggest that a bespoke immigration pathway for serving personnel and their families is considered** as a means of providing clarity and expediency to the process. A bespoke visa may also have positive implications for non-UK personnel and their families who use civilian transportation hubs abroad and on deployment. Multiple accounts of negative, and sometimes traumatic experiences with immigration and foreign border force were given by non-UK personnel whose lack of visa caused significant impediments to their ability to travel.

“The amount of red tape...because I had a NATO travel order, I didn’t have a British passport and I didn’t have a visa either” (Trinidadian Service Person 1)

2.2.3 Composition of the family

Our research participants shared different experiences and attitudes towards existing visa processes and fees depending on the composition of their family. Whilst some families comprised of two working parents on good full-time salaries, some families were in less fortunate financial circumstances, making the process of saving for and paying for their immigration fees more challenging. There are known challenges that can impede military spouse employment such as frequent relocation²⁴ that also apply to non-UK spouses and partners. However, non-UK partners and spouses face additional challenges in their ability to secure work and hence contribute to family finances, including a lack of access to extended family childcare and professional qualifications that are not recognised in the UK.

“I’ve known so many wives staying behind to complete...their second year or their third year [of nursing school] when they get married. They come to the UK and find that they have to start from scratch, like you know work in a care home or something” (Gurkha Wife)

Couples that separate whilst in the UK have additional support and childcare needs but face challenges in accessing family support for this when extended family are prevented from coming to the UK to help.

²⁴ Godier-McBard, L., Caddick, N., Fossey, M. (2020) Confident, valued and supported: Examining the benefits of employment support for military spouses, *Military Psychology*, 32:3, 273-286, DOI: [10.1080/08995605.2020.1731251](https://doi.org/10.1080/08995605.2020.1731251)

“I went through a divorce many... a few years ago and... not just that, but getting my family over here at the time to support us going through that process at times proved challenging” (Jamaican Serving Person)

Serving personnel within blended families were also being given different visa decisions, causing family separation.

“So, we got all the information...after we married and I submitted the application for my wife and stepson...In November they approved my wife’s visa, rejected my stepson. So, what I meant is that my wife obviously could come to the UK, but my stepson would have had to remain in Jamaica because of their decision” (Trinidadian Service Person 2)

Partners having their applications rejected upon their anticipated move to the UK was also something that was noted by a Fijian whilst he was serving in Germany.

“Then we both applied at the same time, me and the missus. And then the missus got rejected, I got accepted, I got my military access and all that. And then we applied again, she got the ILR and then after that... after ILR I think it’s just... after six months we applied again for her naturalisation and then she got it” (Fijian Service Person)

The visa application process was not only considered complex and costly but was feared by some, due to the high stakes and additional financial burden that comes with having an application rejected.

“There’s this sort of like, people who get to the Home Office, like it’s this huge scary institution. Like everything you give to them will be rejected and they’ll take your money, that’s how people look at the Home Office!” (Fijian Wife)

Family size is also a factor in the cost of family immigration, with those with partners and children born abroad facing greater costs than single personnel arriving to serve in the UK Armed Forces. This is a particularly important issue to consider given that many non-UK personnel are often older at the point of joining service, having acquired careers and families back home before commencing their service career. The implications of the Minimum Income Requirement on the reunification of these families in the UK will be discussed in further detail in our answer to Question 3.

2.3 European Roma migrant families

Our research on EU Roma migrants and ongoing study into older EU migrants has evidenced that immigration law is not applied to every family the same way and that rules are applied inconsistently. Hardening of welfare policies in connection with immigration law from 2014 has had a disproportionate negative effect on EU Roma citizens as a result of their precarity and position in the labour market. The strands of research which pertain to these populations suggests that a deliberate strategy of welfare benefit regulation pre-Brexit sought to portray Britain as less welcoming and desirable than potential migrants may have thought. The effect was to discourage the exercise of EU Roma rights under EU free movement law. EU Roma citizens and their families may experience particularly high barriers to demonstrate their entitlement to welfare benefits through disproportionate monitoring of their welfare claims and unclear documentary requirements.

In addition to the barriers that exist for all EU migrants who seek to access in-work welfare benefits, whether linguistic or bureaucratic, there seems to be an additional layer of difficulty placed upon Roma migrants. This migrant group - as we have found in ongoing research into older EU migrants²⁵ (although also impacting other less well networked/lower skilled Romanian migrants who are non-Roma) - are frequently subject to stringent application of rules for compliance with the UK legal tests, often without consideration of their family's individual circumstances, adequate interpretation services, with a lack of transparency over documents required as evidence and lack of proper knowledge by welfare officials regarding the ever-changing conditions for welfare entitlements. Inadequate knowledge by officials over the legal status of migrant claimants play a key part in creating institutionalised barriers within the welfare application process. Decisions on refusal of welfare benefits are inconsistent and moreover, often cannot be challenged judicially.

These sets of circumstances appear to affect EU Roma migrants and their families disproportionately. The effect has been to subject Roma to interviews by the migration authorities with pressure applied to encourage 'voluntarily return' to countries of origin following the refusal of welfare benefits. Our research found cases of Roma being threatened with unlawful removal from the UK despite having the right to remain or holding British citizenship. 'Quasi-voluntary' returns also occur, motivated by fears of child protection interventions or the risk of destitution following failed welfare benefit applications. Similarly our ongoing research into the situation of older EU migrants has gathered data from community and legal advisors which suggests that Roma relatives of those with settled status, or who are themselves entitled to enter or remain in the UK appear to face additional barriers such as lack of digital literacy, poor documentation or disbelief about their status or intentions at borders both in the UK and in countries of origin (see further Parliamentary briefing gathered by specialist Roma advice groups which bears out our findings)²⁶

Findings suggest that the pejorative perception of being a migrant, working in a low-paid sector and in some cases being openly identified as Roma, for instance, by translators from the same country of origin, create a particular risk for the EU Roma over and above that experienced by other EU migrants with similar skill sets or working in low-paid jobs. Therefore, policing is occurring through enforcement action and active discouragement of settlement of Roma and other marginalised migrant households. The precarious situation of unsuccessful welfare benefits claimants can lead to destitution of Roma households which results in certain cases in Children Act interventions, due to neglect associated with poor housing conditions and food poverty.

3. Does the financial requirement for spouses and partners (also known as “minimum income requirement”) achieve its objectives? How could the requirement, and the process of demonstrating it is met, achieve them better? How could it be adapted to reflect changes in the economy and the labour market? Are there any unintended consequences for individuals and families?

²⁵ Currently ongoing, funded by ARU. Principal Investigator is Dr David Smith, Co-Investigators: Professor Margaret Greenfields and Dr Eglė Dagilytė.

²⁶ Roma Support Group Briefing (2020)

https://www.romasupportgroup.org.uk/uploads/9/3/6/8/93687016/briefing_mp_la_for_grt_appg_event_roma_and_euss_final.pdf

The Minimum Income Requirement (MIR) is a blunt instrument that ignores the variance in financially maintaining a family across different professional groups. When determining whether a non-UK Armed Forces serving person has the ability to financially maintain a family in the UK, the specific circumstances and benefits that come with military service need to be taken into account. For example, rent and housing costs are often a substantial outgoing for civilian migrant and non-migrant families, yet non-UK military families can access the subsidised accommodation provided by the MoD. The cost of the service accommodation is typically a third to a quarter that of the cost of rent to a civilian family.²⁷ **There is therefore a case for the MIR to be reconsidered and lowered in the context of an Armed Forces family.**

The Minimum Income Requirement as it currently exists is keeping non-UK families separated for extended periods of time. Despite their previous careers, qualifications and life experiences, non-UK personnel typically enter at the lowest rank and experience significant delays in advancing in their careers at the speed that they anticipated, and feel they deserve, when compared to their UK colleagues of similar ability. These career delays are seeing family members staying behind in their home country for much longer than they had originally expected, with children being cared for by their extended families instead of their parent in the UK. Amongst our participants there were non-UK service personnel who had stayed at the lowest rank (Private or equivalent) for ten years or more, yet due to their arrival before the MIR came into force, they were allowed to bring their family members over to the UK. New recruits who are held back in their careers in similar ways would be separated from their families for a decade or more under the current MIR rules. The causes of career delays for non-UK serving personnel are multifactorial and will be explored at greater depth in our forthcoming report (expected March 2023). Career delays in combination with the MIR are causing unnecessary issues and extended periods of family separation and are difficult to find solutions to without changes to existing policies being made.

See further our comments on the minimum income requirement impacting lower paid workers – including Roma migrants – and the inherent risk of driving undocumented migration in relation to family members of those unable to fulfil the fiscal requirements.

C. How family migration policies affect society

4. What are the fiscal and economic impacts of family migration policies, for instance in respect of the labour market, recruitment, productivity, and innovation?

We have not responded to this question.

²⁷ MoD (2015) Combined Accommodation Assessment System: The new accommodation charging system explained.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/366803/NEM-CAAS-V3.pdf

5. What is the impact of family migration policies on public services?

In the Fenland Migration Study²⁸ report, we noted that family migration policies impacted on a range of on public services investigated. Particularly for migrants residing in rural areas, transport and other local authority services may be limited, and access to translators or stretch on provision of appropriate support was reported by service providers. We found that a level of additional stretch was noted in relation to education, health and housing/accommodation services as well as statutory social provision e.g., for older, disabled or in some cases children and families.

Challenges around provision of advice and translation services were met to a large extent by the voluntary sector re provision of a range of non-statutory services and appropriate advice and information, but this did not fully meet all needs where large recent migrant populations speaking diverse languages resided. For example, additional need for provision of support staff in schools and education services was identified in some cases to enable children to achieve to the best of their ability following migration to the UK.

6. What is the impact of family migration policies on local authorities?

Findings from the Migration Research in Essex project shows that local authorities need to support better community groups and VCSE organisations, as 'newcomers usually lack informal support, so agencies are vital to help build them'.²⁹ Such networks are vital, especially for individuals whose family is abroad, a finding which was also noted in relation to recent East European migrants in the Fenland District.³⁰

Another concern noted by this study is the barrier of language. For some interviewees, the lack of English language had an impact on accessing health service or being able to communicate with a health professional on personal and intimate health concerns. Having to rely on family members or simply co-workers with a shared language for translation means lack of privacy or potentially miscommunication if a third language is utilised for communication (as found both in the Fenland migrant workers study³¹ and our Roma projects)³². Other interviewees raised the importance of language skills for victims of domestic violence. It was mentioned that general cuts

²⁸ Greenfields, M., Smith, D., Dagilytė, E., Ramadan, S., Bright, J. (2019) The impact of migration in the Fenland area: a scoping report. Project Report. Rosmini Centre, Wisbech, UK. Available at: <https://arro.anglia.ac.uk/id/eprint/704980/>

²⁹ Schneider, C., Paraskevopoulou, A., Noble, A., and Preston, C. (2020) *Migration Research into Ethnic and Culturally Diverse Groups in Essex*. Cambridge: Anglia Ruskin University. Unpublished – project funded by Essex Council and Rainbow services.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Greenfields, M., Smith, D., Dagilytė, E., Ramadan, S., Bright, J. (2019) The impact of migration in the Fenland area: a scoping report. Project Report. Rosmini Centre, Wisbech, UK. Available at: <https://arro.anglia.ac.uk/id/eprint/704980/>

³² Dagilytė, E. and Greenfields, M. (2015) United Kingdom welfare benefit reforms in 2013–2014: Roma between the pillory, the precipice and the slippery slope. *Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law*, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp.476–495. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2015.1121954>

Greenfields, M. and Dagilytė, E. (2018) 'I would never have come if we'd know it might be like this': On the (un) intended consequences of welfare governance of EU Roma migrants in Britain. *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 3. <https://intersections.tk.mta.hu/index.php/intersections/article/view/447>

in translation and interpretation services could accordingly put people at risk of personal harm as well as limit access to support and services to which they are entitled.

We argue that a more concentrated effort is needed in general to help communities integrate in order to tackle racially motivated violence. This was perceived as a priority by the research participants in several of our studies, as it was mentioned that some migrant local residents live in fear and therefore policies that engage with them in a better way are needed to support wellbeing and integration. Discussions on integration were often linked to more engaged youth work, which has as with many other public facing services experienced budgetary cuts in recent years.

Our survey with community leaders in the Essex study (footnote 5) shows similar concerns as whilst many respondents viewed migration as positive or very positive (12.5% and 50% respectively), 38% of community leaders were less positive or more explicitly negative about migration (12.5% stated 'fairly positive' followed by 12.5% 'neither positive nor negative' and 12.5% very negative). All community leaders noted that more dialogue between communities was vital as part of the process of social integration but also important for the socio-economic development of the area. The theme of concern by local indigenous populations over relative rapid and fairly large-scale migration and some public officials' anxiety over integration, risk of hate crime and public safety risks to migrant populations also emerged in some interviews in the Fenland migration study funded by the then MHCLG.

Finally, the Essex research found that Covid 19 had brought communities closer together, as many local residents came together to help both local 'indigenous' and migrant families that needed support. Migrants themselves were noted to actively participate in supporting the local community during the pandemic and this was viewed as a positive step towards enhancing community relations.

The Art of Integration project (see footnote 6) revealed similar concerns as interviewees mentioned that local authorities and policy makers in general should fund more art-related projects and this helps people to come together in 'common' spaces to be creative, especially young people and children with their families. This helps people to communicate more effectively.³³

D. How migration policies affect families

7. In what circumstances may family immigration law and practice result in an extended (or indefinite) period of family separation or place families under stress in other ways? How could they be adapted to prevent or shorten periods of family separation or be more accommodating of the wellbeing of families?

³³ Paraskevopoulou, A (2021) The Art of Integration, unpublished paper

In response to this question, we draw on two “bespoke” immigration pathways that were created in response to the ongoing Ukraine war and the 2021 Afghanistan crisis: the Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme and the Afghan Citizens’ Resettlement Scheme.

7.1 The Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme

Emerging data from the Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme Support Organisation (a local support group) working in collaboration with Stamford Diversity Group (CIC)³⁴ in Stamford, South Lincolnshire, Peterborough and Rutland, illustrates the effectiveness and impact of the Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme³⁵ in several respects on families.

7.1.1 Family separation is common

Due to the nature of the Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme and the requirements of the Ukrainian government for men aged 18-60 to remain in the country, most Scheme applicants in this area are women and children. In many cases, families have been unable to secure a sponsor for all family members who want to come to the UK and have ended up split over several sponsors’ homes and / or often located in different geographical areas. This UK separation contributes to ongoing stress, anxiety and logistical problems. In addition, having other family members such as husbands / partners, parents and grandparents left behind in Ukraine is a major source of concern for those who are accommodated within the scheme. Having to find additional sponsors for family members who decide to apply later is challenging and often results in being far from other family members. This places additional stress due to having children settled in schools and beginning to adapt to life in the UK, yet families will have to move again to be reunited.

It has been noted (emergent evidence in the ongoing Older EU migrants project³⁶ that for Roma (and indeed LGBT+ - particularly Trans people who may not have documentation in their appropriate gender)³⁷ people displaced from Ukraine, their situation is even worse than for other Ukrainian refugees. In particular, Roma residents of Ukraine often have poor or non-existent documentation whilst experiences of racism and discrimination at borders³⁸ and lack of access to digital services and low language skills – even potentially in Ukrainian if Romanes is routinely spoken at home - preclude effective engagement with the Sponsorship scheme. Several respondents to the ongoing study as well as anecdotal evidence gathered during community

³⁴ <https://stamforddiversitygroup.co.uk/>

³⁵ <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/apply-for-a-visa-under-the-ukraine-sponsorship-scheme>

³⁶ Currently ongoing, funded by ARU. Principal Investigator is Dr David Smith, Co-Investigators: Professor Margaret Greenfields and Dr Eglé Dagilytė.

³⁷ Euronews, 22nd March 2022 <https://www.euronews.com/2022/03/22/lawful-transphobia-stopping-ukraine-s-trans-community-from-fleeing>; UN OHCHR (22nd March 2022) Press Release <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/03/ukraine-protection-lgbti-and-gender-diverse-refugees-remains-critical-un>

³⁸ Travellers Times, February 2022 <https://www.travellerstimes.org.uk/news/2022/02/pray-ukrainian-roma#:~:text=Ukrainian%20Roma%20have%20been%20caught%20up%20in%20the,fighting%2C%20splitting%20Roma%20families%20apart%2C%20say%20Romani%20campaigners.>; Strzyżyńska V. (May 2022) *Meet us before you reject us’: Ukraine’s Roma refugees face closed doors in Poland* <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/may/10/ukraine-roma-refugees-poland>

group meetings and following online discussion boards suggest that Roma are excluded from such schemes and that even dedicated support groups working with Roma in the UK don't feel able to deliver access to the Sponsorship scheme for this population given such deep social exclusion by Ukrainian Roma and the often limiting circumstances experienced by migrant Roma to the UK who are often resident in crowded shared accommodation and living on low incomes.

A mechanism to facilitate family reunification within the Scheme and particular account taken of the impacts on the most marginalised populations in Ukraine or those at particular risk of discrimination - would minimise the challenges of separated families and unnecessary negative impacts on young, elderly and particularly vulnerable people.

7.1.2 Lack of public awareness of refugee family challenges

The very design of the Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme carries within it inherent problems which contribute to pressure on families. Goodwill of sponsors to host Ukrainians is widespread. However, evidence shows that sponsors are often unprepared for the realities of housing refugees. There is widespread lack of understanding of what the experience of being a refugee may consist of and the various stages of this process. Cultural and social differences, together with the difficulties of adaptation and refugee status, have led in many cases to breakdowns in relationships, with Ukrainian families having to seek new sponsors and alternative housing arrangements. Fiscal challenges in the light of delays in receipt of 'thank you' payments and soaring costs of living as well as even higher bills expected in coming months have had a drastic impact on the potential for hosts – even when otherwise willing to continue to host refugees - as illustrated by the ONS survey of which found that 26% of hosts wished to end their arrangements early, with 100% of respondents indicating that they had provided support over and above that provided by local authorities and statutory services, and 45% reporting that they had provided financial support to the refugees whom they were hosting³⁹

Even for relatives of Ukrainian refugees who have an additionally deep personal desire to assist their displaced family members, challenges to hosting may be profound. Indeed, it was recently reported in the press that some families are unable to continue to host their relatives as those who have welcomed guests under the Family Reunion Scheme are not eligible for the 'thank you' payment of £350 a month to meet the costs of bills, impacting significantly on the host household's ability to meet their own bills⁴⁰

Expectations by sponsors that Ukrainians will be able to move on quickly to being independent having established a pathway to an adequate command of English, work and housing within a few months are frequently unrealistic and moreover many hosts report lack of appropriate support in their local area from statutory services, meaning that individuals are needing to dedicate considerable time to supporting their guests to navigate statutory services or even open bank accounts and register for health services.

³⁹

<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/experiencesofhomesforukrainschemesponsorsuk>

And <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-62493852>

⁴⁰ <https://inews.co.uk/news/ukrainian-refugees-forced-new-homes-family-hosts-struggle-support-1595242>

Colleagues involved in this research, note that public education requirements should be built into the policy to ensure that sponsors are appropriately prepared for the ongoing difficulties and trauma that refugees may experience and the challenges that all parties may encounter.

7.1.3 Housing shortages

A key emerging problem with the Homes for Ukraine Scheme is the lack of detail and planning of how Ukrainian families are to move forward, once their time with sponsors comes to an end. In many cases, sponsors commit to an initial six months, though in practice many are ending or attempting to end their hosting arrangements sooner (see footnote 33).

The lack of ability to access rental accommodation on the private market due to lack of UK credit history, no deposit, agency reference requirements and limits on available universal credit local housing allowance, are major obstacles for Ukrainians seeking housing as they are in direct competition with other low-income residents who require accommodation particularly where local housing allowance is required to meet rental costs in the private sector. Local councils are unable to help, unless people are declared homeless by having to leave their sponsor and in turn with a lack of social housing this may lead to refugees being placed in sub-standard or inappropriate short-life or temporary accommodation. In many cases, assistance to find alternative sponsors is the only proposed solution offered by local authorities.

Letting agencies and landlords will need to be more flexible if Ukrainian families are to be able to access private housing, especially in the current legal environment of the right-to-rent checks that landlords must carry out as part of the 'hostile environment' policies. This prevailing issue causes a sense of insecurity and uncertainty over how Ukrainian refugee families can set up independent lives after the initial period of sponsorship, a situation that many are currently finding themselves in. Although there have been recent amendments on right to rent checks in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine⁴¹ there is mixed often anecdotal evidence emerging that this may be incorrectly applied or that letting agencies may not take this new guidance fully into account.

7.2 The Afghan Citizens' Resettlement Scheme (ACRS)

7.2.1 Background

The Afghanistan Crisis in August 2021 saw the Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan to the extent that many Afghans attempted to flee the country. In response, the UK government (who has led military operations in Afghanistan since the 19th century and in particular, since 2001)⁴² initiated Operation PITTING. This was a military evacuation conducted in August 2021. It evacuated British citizens and some Afghan nationals to the UK (generally, family members of British or Afghan nationals living in the UK, people eligible under the relocation schemes for UK Government employees, and other particularly vulnerable individuals).⁴³ The UK decided to evacuate anyone

⁴¹ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/landlords-guide-to-right-to-rent-checks/ukrainian-nationals-and-right-to-rent-checks-accessible-version>

⁴² National Army Museum, 'War in Afghanistan': <https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/war-afghanistan> (accessed 13th September 2022).

⁴³ Sturge, G., Gower, M., (2022). 'UK immigration routes for Afghan nationals', House of Commons Library: <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9307/> (accessed 13th September 2022).

who was British or associated with a British citizen in light of the increasing power and control of the Taliban over Afghanistan.⁴⁴

Operation PITTING was not just a civilian evacuation but was linked with an immigration and resettlement scheme. From August 2021, the UK government stated it would grant evacuees indefinite leave to remain if they were within an appropriate immigration category (for example, under the resettlement or relocation schemes, or as a family member of a UK-based sponsor).⁴⁵ The Afghan Citizens' Resettlement Scheme (ACRS) was launched in January 2022, with aim to resettle in the UK up to 20,000 people over the following few years.

7.2.2 Impact of Britain's Evacuation and Immigration Policy on Afghan Hazara Shi'a families

Hazara Shi'as have historically been persecuted by the Taliban. The Taliban's attitude towards those who do not follow their literalist and extremist version of Sunni Islam is torture, violence and persecution.⁴⁶ Many recent reports confirm the Taliban's violence towards Hazaras and Shi'a Muslims, including the massacred and brutal torture several of members of the Hazara minority in the Ghazni province in July 2021.⁴⁷

During Operation PITTING, many Hazara Shi'a Muslims in Afghanistan could not be evacuated to the UK. Even today, many British Afghans who are Hazara Shi'as or Shi'a Muslims are separated from their husbands, wives, fathers, mothers, uncles and aunts who are still residing in Afghanistan.

The aim of Operation PITTING was to evacuate "British citizens and some Afghan nationals to the UK (broadly, family members of British or Afghan nationals living in the UK, people eligible under the relocation schemes for UK Government employees, and other particularly vulnerable cases)."⁴⁸ However, the reality was quite different. As an example, see below a case of an Afghan Hazara Shi'a Muslim who had a wife and four children (including a new-born baby) and had been working for the British army on and off for about 8 years (evidenced by payslips and proof of employment). This man advised the army on cultural issues in Afghanistan and was scheduled to be working with the army for 2 weeks in September 2021. However, despite this evidence of risk,

⁴⁴ Clarke, M. (2021). 'Afghanistan and the UK's illusion of strategy', RUSI, <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/afghanistan-and-uks-illusion-strategy> (accessed 13th September 2022)

⁴⁵ Sturge, G., Gower, M., (2022). 'UK immigration routes for Afghan nationals', House of Commons Library: <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9307/> (accessed 13th September 2022).

⁴⁶ Maizland, L. (2022). 'The Taliban in Afghanistan', Council on Foreign Relations: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan> (accessed 13th September 2022)

⁴⁷ BBC News (2021). Afghanistan: Taliban 'tortured and massacred' men from Hazara minority: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-58277463> (accessed 13th September 2022);

The Hill (2021). The imminent danger for Afghanistan's women and minorities: <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/568192-the-imminent-danger-for-afghanistans-women-and-minorities> (accessed 13th September 2022);

Written Submission to the UK Parliament by the Hazara Research Collective (2020). International Relations and Defence Committee: The UK and Afghanistan, Call for Evidence: <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/11165/html/> (accessed 13th September 2022)

⁴⁸ Sturge, G., Gower, M., (2022). 'UK immigration routes for Afghan nationals', House of Commons Library: <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9307/> (accessed 13th September 2022).

the family were denied entry to the evacuation planes leaving Afghanistan for the UK in August 2021. Another example involved several elderly and ill women who had relatives in the UK and required medical assistance, but they were also denied entry on the British evacuation planes.

In sum, despite the efforts of the UK in evacuating some Afghans from the country, many were refused permission to board the planes leaving Afghanistan. The effect, therefore, of Britain's current Afghan Citizens' Resettlement Scheme is limited in that many Afghans (especially Hazara Shi'a families) were left in Afghanistan at great risk.⁴⁹ It is understandable that in any crisis situation a military and immigration policy will not be perfect, but as comments from British politicians show (recorded in Hansard)⁵⁰, the Afghanistan Crisis of August 2021 could have been avoided and a fairer and more efficient resettlement scheme devised.

8. How do family migration policies affect children separated from one or both of their parents (or other relative)? How do families separated by immigration law use modern means of communication, and what is the impact of this use?

Research from a study of the UK based Chilean diaspora⁵¹ undertaken by one team member shows that divided families located in different countries and across time zones causes stress, loss of attachment and the missing of important family milestones. These issues are frequently exacerbated by the difficulties of navigating a complex immigration regime in the UK and the process of leaving Chile, which for many is associated with the political and social turmoil of the dictatorship era (1973-1990) which continues to contribute to movements back and forth between the UK and Chile today and the division of families between the two countries.

There is abundant evidence that families divided by immigration law make extensive use of modern technology to minimise the impacts of geographical separation. Digital connectivity platforms that allow free access to daily interactions, conversation and the ability to see each other make a tangible difference to feeling closer despite the vast distance between family members⁵². The impact of technology has contributed to the active preservation of transnational

⁴⁹ The National News (2021). UK's Afghanistan evacuation ends as last troops leave but criticism grows: <https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/uk-news/2021/08/29/uks-afghanistan-evacuation-ends-as-last-troops-leave-but-criticism-grows/> (accessed 13th September 2022).

⁵⁰ Hansard Lords 26th May 2022 <https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2022-05-26/debates/1B9E9E60-FE4D-4E7B-9A1F-12329AECF2DD/EvacuationsFromAfghanistan> ; Commons Debate Inquiry into the UK withdrawal from Afghanistan debated 15 November 2021 <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2021-11-15/debates/96EFD258-1AE4-4D36-ADFD-6387848A68F3/AfghanistanInquiryIntoUKWithdrawal?highlight=evacuation%20from%20afghanistan%20operation%20pitting#contribution-EDA78C6E-5218-4426-94EF-DEB42EB94456>

⁵¹ Radley, C (2021) *Tracing Diaspora and Development over Time: UK-based Chileans and their Transnational Engagements with Chile from the 1970s to the Present*, Unpublished PhD thesis. British Library EThOS: [Tracing diaspora and development over time : UK-based Chileans and their transnational engagements with Chile from the 1970s to the present \(bl.uk\)](https://ethos.bl.uk/DocumentDetails.aspx?docid=1354444)

⁵² e.g. AbuJarour, S., Ajjan, H., Fedorowicz, J. and Köster, A., 2021. ICT Support for Refugees and Undocumented Immigrants. *Communications of the Association for Information Systems*, 48(1), p.40 ; Madianou, M. (2019). Migration, transnational families, and new communication technologies. *The handbook of diasporas, media, and culture*, 577-590.; Bacigalupe, G., & Camara, M. (2012).

networks in many ways including to maintain relationships and fulfil care giving and health responsibilities, for example as noted in the Chilean diaspora research, enabling participants to call on local help.

“Yes, we talk all the time! With my family. I was talking to my son, he’s not well, he has a fever and I feel so bad, he’s so far, what can I do? And I call my mum who lives not too far, and she goes to him.” (Chilean woman living in the UK since 2000)

Access to daily news, current events and politics in Chile through internet media meant that family members in the UK can share in local matters with family in Chile, providing a sense of connection and of the moment knowledge which contributes to creating a sense of togetherness. This is essential to the basic well-being of separated families who do not often have the funds or time to make the long journey to Chile (or vice versa) to see each other. The research found that UK based Chileans often have business or professional interests in Chile, frequently in conjunction with family members still living there. These are usually on a very small scale, such as the purchase of a small plot of land or a part share in a family-owned taxi company. Modern communications methods facilitate these types of familial business relationships, providing the ability to actively participate in these processes.

Similar findings pertained in our Roma related research re participants referring to the ability to remain in contact with family members, share news and assist in supporting migration pathways as well as sharing of opportunities which could enhance migration decisions such as selection of destination countries or create reassurance that remittances had been received and vulnerable relatives were being cared for.

Conversely this close degree of digital contact with relatives living elsewhere may also lead to exacerbated concerns over wellbeing of family members and a sense of helplessness at not being able to intervene at times of crisis such as during the Covid pandemic (when our research with Roma⁵³ indicated return migration to countries of origin sometimes took place to facilitate support for vulnerable older people and to enable family reunification) or for Ukrainian residents in the UK where numerous anecdotal and media reports reflect on the fear occasioned by being able to watch real-time footage of the war and yet know if family were safe.

Ongoing preliminary internally funded research by ARU colleagues – not yet analysed/reported - into communication between potential migrants using a variety of migration routes both lawful and undocumented, is similarly exploring how digital platforms operate to create opportunities to share information and support migration narratives.

Transnational families and social technologies: Reassessing immigration psychology. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 38(9), 1425-1438.

⁵³ And see also findings in relation to Roma young people and their family returning to countries of origin to be with family during waves of Covid, when anxiety over elderly or disabled relatives led in some cases to return migration noted in Greenfields et al 2022 <https://www.gohigherwestyorks.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Higher-Education-Opportunities-for-Gypsy-Roma-Traveller-Young-People-in-West-Yorkshire-A-Go-Higher-West-Yorkshire-Research-Report.pdf>

9. How should family migration policies interact with the right to respect for family and private life and the best interests of the child? What can the immigration process learn from the family justice system and how could they best interact with one another?

We have not responded to this question.

10. How do family migration policies and their implementation affect the integration and participation in British society of (would-be) sponsors and their sponsored family members?

We have not responded to this question.

i