**The Influence of Power and Politics in Sport**

Spencer Harris, Ph.D. and Mathew Dowling, Ph.D.

**Learning objectives**

* To examine the meaning of politics and power
* To set out and discuss the key events in the Russian Doping Scandal
* To analyse how politics and power influence the Russian Doping Scandal
* To illustrate how politics and power are inextricably linked with sport

**Key concepts to be discussed in the chapter**

* Politics
* Politics from state intervention in sport
* Politics in organizations and systems
* Politics as inherent aspect of social life
* Power
* Hard power and soft power
* Three dimensions of power
* Governance

**Introduction**

This chapter introduces two interrelated concepts that are essential to understanding contemporary issues in sport systems and organizations: *politics* and *power.* These are long-standing concepts within political science (e.g. Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Dahl, 1957) and have received notable attention within the sport management/policy domain (e.g. Bergsgard, 2018; Grix, 2016; Houlihan, 1997); we argue that they are also useful for sport managers operating within the international sporting context. In particular, they help explain many of the issues sport managers face within the international sporting context across geographical and jurisdictional boundaries.

Within sport, the widespread appeal of the concepts of politics and power is evident in their application to a number of different sporting contexts, from sport governing bodies at the national and international level to community-based sport organizations at the local level. Furthermore, both have the necessary analytical flexibility to explain how dynamics at one level can influence (i.e. enable and constrain)—and be influenced by—another. Therefore, we suggest that the concepts of politics and power are particularly well-suited to assisting managers and researchers in understanding political dynamics within sport as well as the increasingly complex and ‘wicked problems’ (Sam, 2009) that characterize the globalized sporting landscape. This chapter demonstrates the utility of these concepts through a case study of the Russian Doping Scandal.

**Theoretical perspectives: Politics and power**

Sport is inherently political as it reflects the authoritative allocation of values (Dahl, 1957); the collective action necessary to determine who gets what, when and how (Laswell, 1936); and “who cares about what, where and why or who believes what and with what effect” (Allison, 1993, 3). Clearly, the sport-politics nexus can be explained by and is closely linked to government intervention in sport and its use of sport to achieve political ends. Sport represents a politically usable resource, including a character-building socializing agent, a vehicle for propaganda, the opportunity for prestige, a tool to deliver social change, and *the opiate of the masses,* diverting or distracting the energies of the population (Allison, 1986; Sage & Eitzen, 2013). Such approaches clearly demonstrate governments’ authoritative allocation of values to sport and belief in its value to society. However, solely focusing on such issues fails to consider the deeply intertwined nature of sport and politics outside the confines of formal political institutions (Houlihan, 1991). This is particularly true for Olympic sport, which has had a historical commitment to remain autonomous and free from government interference or control. Our conceptualization of the sport-politics relationship highlights three elements: state intervention in sport, sport as an integral aspect of systems and organizations, and sport as a ubiquitous part of social life (Houlihan, 2008). Our analysis is not only of the *politics of sport*—the government motives for investing in sport and the government-sport relationship—but also the *politics in sport,* which accepts that a wide range of stakeholders, not just the state, influence sport (Houlihan, 2008). Table 1 provides examples of the sport-politics relationship illustrating the three-fold conceptualization highlighted above.

**--Table 1 about here--**

Whether politics refers to the state, the system, or society more generally, it is “the constrained use of social power” (Goodin & Klingermann, 1996, 7), where actors use a variety of tactics to promote their interests and to manipulate, manoeuvre and modify the preferences of others. Stoker and Marsh (2010: 8) go so far as to describe politics as “the struggle over power”. Such interpretations not only serve to illustrate the inextricable link between power and politics, but also the fact that to act politically requires control over a range of resources, including expertise, money, organizational capacity, and moral authority (Houlihan, 2008).

According to Nye (2004), “power is like the weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few understand it” (p. 1). Common understandings of the term refer to power as the capacity to do things. The analytics of power may seem somewhat abstract and arbitrary in nature, but they bring to the forefront important questions: Who has power? Where does it lie? How is it exercised? Not only are these questions central to political analysis in general (Hay, 2002), but they are essential for sport managers to navigate the sporting landscape effectively. Despite its importance, the concept of power within sport policy studies has remained a peripheral theoretical consideration rather than being taken seriously as a useful theoretical construct in its own right. One exception to this is recent work by Bergsgard (2018), who proposed a three-level analytical approach that explicitly combines Bourdiesian and Lukes’ three faces of power to examine Norwegian elite sport policy. Like Bergsgard, we also seek to re-center power as a revealing concept for understanding and explaining political aspects surrounding sport. Furthermore, like Haugaard (2002), we also recognize that the concept of power essentially remains a contested domain, which is both value- and ontologically-dependent, and that “to engage in such disputes is itself to engage in politics” (Hauguaard, 2002, p. 45).

Broadly speaking, power can manifest itself in a variety of ways within and around sport organizations, ranging from explicit, coercive and concrete expressions of power (i.e. hard power) to more implicit, subtle and indirect forms of power (i.e. soft power). According to Nye (2004), power is the ability to get want you want from others and manifests itself in three ways: coercion, payment, and attraction/persuasion. The former (coercion and payment), he argues, are forms of hard power that often involve force and economic means to influence behaviour or interests. Hard power is therefore about inducements (‘carrots’) or threats (‘sticks’), regardless of whether they are exercised (Nye, 2004). Examples of hard power within sport could be funding arrangements between governmental agencies and national governing bodies of sport (e.g. Bostock, Crowther, Ridley-Duff & Breese, 2017) or an athlete being coerced by a coach or teammate into taking performance-enhancing drugs (Stewart & Smith, 2008). In contrast, soft power is the ability to persuade, co-opt and attract others through culture, shared values, and policy. Central to the notion of soft power is the idea that one can affect other people’s behaviour without commanding it. Thus, soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others (Nye, 2004). From this perspective, leadership within sport does not rest upon the ability to command and control, but to lead by example and attract others through shaping their preferences. Examples of this within international sport include the use of mega-events such as the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games as a form of public diplomacy (e.g. Grix & Houlihan, 2013) and attempts to reform the bidding and hosting process through Olympic Agenda2020 (Schnitzer & Hazinger, 2019).

Hard power and soft power should be used together (Nye, 2004). Sport managers cannot lead through command and coercion alone, so hard and soft power are complementary, as both are required to get others to do what one wants them to do. Nye (2004) places hard and soft power on a spectrum ranging from command and force to co-option and attraction (see Table 2 below).

**--Table 2 about here--**

Delving deeper into the ‘hard-soft’ power dichotomy, we briefly outline two different conceptions of power—Lukes’ three dimensions of power and Foucault’s relational-power—which help explain further how these forms of soft and hard power manifest themselves in practice. It is important to note that these conceptions have emerged from fundamentally different philosophical traditions (see Table 3), but we suggest that both have value and utility for understanding the political aspects surrounding sport.

**--Table 3 about here--**

Lukes (1974) conceptualizes three dimensions (or faces) of power or, more accurately, builds upon two previous attempts to conceive power by Dahl (1957) and Bachrach and Baratz (1967) by identifying a third self-termed ‘radical’ conceptualization. The *first dimension of power* is most closely aligned with normative definitions of the term and can be simply expressed as (A) has power over (B) to the extent that they can get (B) to do something that (B) would not otherwise do (Dahl, 1957). Power is therefore the influence of an actor on direct, overt decision-making. In addressing how power can be measured, examining power involves “careful examination of a series of concrete decisions” (Dahl, 1958, p. 466). Thus, those who prevail in decision-making processes are most powerful. For the first dimension of power, observation and measurement of conflict is critical.

Lukes’ *second dimension of power* can be expressed as: (A) also exercises power over (B) when (B) is prevented by (A) from bringing to the fore any issues that might be detrimental to (A). In other words, this second dimension of power is the ability of actors to keep issues off or on the agenda. In outlining this dimension of power, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) argued that actors exercise power when they are able to set agendas. In this manner, an actor is able to influence without resorting to either a tacit or an overt threat, by causing (B) to change their course of action. The consequence of this conceptualization in terms of understanding power is that both decision-making and *non-*decision making are equally important for influencing others. Non-decision making constitutes “a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970, p. 44).

The *third dimension of power* that Lukes expands upon is preference shaping. This dimension can be formally stated as: (A) socializes, shapes, and molds (B) to have the same preferences as (A). In this dimension, an actor has the ability to shape the entire preferences of another. This suggests that B may even have a ‘false consciousness’ in the sense that they are unaware of their own ‘real’ preferences. This third face of power has come under substantial critique due to the difficulty of being able to empirically measure or verify it. How, for example, it is possible to know what one’s ‘real’ preferences are? Nonetheless, there have been many attempts to reinstate Lukes’ third dimension for purposes of political analysis (cf. Hay, 2002). These dimensions are summarized in the table below.

**--Table 4 about here--**

In contrast, Foucault’s conception of power represents a radical departure from previous modes of understanding power (e.g. Dahl, Bachrach, Baratz, and Lukes). Foucault believed that power is not wielded, exercised or enacted on or by people but rather it is dispersed, pervasive and constantly in flux throughout society. Power is everywhere, diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and regimes of truth (Foucault, 1991). Seen this way, power dynamics are relational. Power can manifest itself through a variety of mechanisms within society and can occur at various levels from the macro-level (governmentality) and the steering and control of populations through societal institutions such as hospitals, schools, universities etc., through to the micro-level and disciplining of the self (biopower). Foucault’s conception of power, particularly at the organizational and societal level, is best encapsulated within his notion of *governmentality*. In his essays on security, territory and population, Foucault was interested in the role of state in structuring power relations and how they utilized these relations to regulate populations. Foucault termed this the ‘art of government’ or governmentality in that it involved a deliberate attempt to direct human conduct and that people can be regulated, controlled, and shaped to achieve specific ends usually determined by the state. According to Foucault, then, power dynamics within sport are pervasive, from the structural regulatory and accountability mechanisms faced by sport organizations through to the more subtle, relational forms of power that are normalized through disciplinary frameworks, rationalities, and technologies.

In addition to the examples of the ways in which politics intersect with sport (as illustrated in table 1), it follows that power and sport share a close and convoluted relationship. Not only is power used and abused to influence sport but sport is used as a vehicle to garner and enhance power. Examples of the use and abuse of power in sport include the allocation of developmental grant aid to influence the voting in a Presidential election within International Federations, attempts by International Federations to control all international competitions and the events in which athletes can and cannot compete, as well as the more specific examples of abuses of power such as the USA Gymnastics abuse scandal, the FIFA corruption scandal, and match fixing in international cricket. Examples of sport being used as a platform to enhance power include Hitler’s aspiration to use the 1936 summer Games in Berlin as a platform to demonstrate Arian superiority, Tommy Smith and John Carlos’ black power salute in the 1968 Mexico City summer Games, the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Moscow summer Games, the reciprocal Soviet boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles summer Games, and the use of sport to support and propel the transition of past athlete to future politician, for example Bill Bradley (US, basketball), Manny Pacquiao (Philippines, boxing), Romario (Brazil, football), Imran Khan (Pakistan, cricket), Sebastian Coe (Great Britain, athletics), and George Weah (Liberia, football).

The following section further demonstrates the utility of the above outlined concepts in being able to explain political issues faced by sport managers as illustrated through a case study of the Russian Doping Scandal. The key events of this case not only reveal the varied ways in which politics and sport interrelate, it also shows how power is used and abused to influence sport and how sport is used to support the quest for heightened power or at least to manage perceptions relating to enhanced power and superiority.

**The Russian Doping Scandal**

In the history of modern sport, few, if any, governance-related scandals match the scale and range of manipulation seen in the Russian Doping Scandal. The case involves the government, the state security agency FSB (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation), national governing bodies of sport, RUSADA (the Russian Anti-Doping Agency), the World Anti-Doping Agency-accredited laboratory in Moscow, international sport federations, as well as the International Olympic Committee (IOC), International Paralympic Committee (IPC), the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), and the Court of Arbitration in Sport (CAS). The scandal centres on institutionalized doping on an unprecedented scale. To capture the true magnitude of the case, one must consider inept structures and poor governance practices together with hard crimes such as collusion, corruption, bribery, death threats and the highly suspicious deaths of former high-level anti-doping officials. Put simply, the Russian Doping Scandal is only partly about doping in sport. More precisely, it is about the sport-politics nexus. As will become apparent, the case reveals much about how sport in general and the Russian Doping Scandal in particular is inherently political and who holds power, how power is manifested, and on what particular issues are affected.

**Background to the case**

This sub-section provides an overview of the Russian doping scandal. Contextualising these key events allows for a more detailed analysis of the power and politics at play both within and surrounding the case. These key events are summarized in Table 5.

**--Table 5 about here--**

The Russian Doping Scandal began with the individual actions of one whistleblower—Vitaly Stepanov. Mr. Stepanov was a Doping Control Officer with RUSADA. During the Winter Games Vancouver 2010, he began to communicate with various WADA officials about major-scale deceit and corruption within RUSADA and more generally across Russian sport. Mr. Stepanov’s insights were gleaned from his first-hand experiences as an employee of RUSADA and his marriage to Russian 800m elite-level runner, Yulia Rusanova. Specifically, Mr. Stepanov reported systematic doping of Russian athletes competing in major international competitions. At that particular time it was clear that WADA did not want to intervene, perhaps due to a lack of corroborating evidence, the fear of upsetting the Russian state and Russian leaders involved in international sport, or the real lack of precedence or procedures for dealing with such problems.

Given that WADA was unable to investigate serious doping allegations in Russia, Jack Robertson, WADA lead investigator at the time, suggested that the Stepanovs work with investigative journalist Hajo Seppelt. This led to the production of the German-based ARD documentary *The Doping Secret: How Russia Makes its Winners*. The documentary exposes the scale of doping in Russian athletics through testimony from the Stepanovs and secretly recorded video and audio footage of coaches and officials advising athletes on the use of prohibited substances to support enhanced athletic performance. The documentary left the sport world reeling and WADA was forced to launch a formal investigation despite the WADA President’s email to Vitaly Mutko (former Minister of Sport and then-Deputy President of Russia) and Natalya Zhelanova (appointed by Mutko to oversee Russia’s anti-doping efforts) assuring them that he did not intend for WADA to do anything that would adversely affect the relationship that he had with Minister Mutko.

The WADA Independent Commission Report 1 was published in November 2015 with Report 2 published shortly after in January, 2016. The WADA Independent Persons Report 1 was published in July, 2016. These reports were received with a heightened sense of anticipation due to the serialised nature of their publication, the varied media reports on the scale of the scandal, the looming Summer Games Rio 2016, and the possibility of the IOC deciding to ban the Russian team from the Games. Ultimately, the reports concluded that Russia was guilty--beyond a reasonable doubt--of “a systematic and centralised cover-up and manipulation of the doping control process” (McLaren, 2016, p. 1).

The cover-up and manipulation included the creation of a difficult to detect drug cocktail known as the *Duchess* consisting of Oral Turinabol, Oxandrolone, and Methasterone dissolved in alcohol and absorbed in the mouth to shorten the window of detectability; a disappearing positive [test] methodology whereby dirty urine was switched for clean urine; the Russian Ministry of Sport controlling and overseeing the manipulation of athletes’ analytical results and sample swapping with support from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), the Centre for Sports Preparation (CSP), and the Russian anti-doping laboratories; and corrupt payments being made from the Russian Athletics Federation to the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) so that Russian athletes who had been found guilty of doping could have their sanctions delayed or disappear completely (McLaren, 2016; Pound, McLaren, & Robertson, 2015). This matter has been subject to a four-year criminal investigation led by French judiciary authorities with cooperation from The International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol). Five IAAF officials, including the former President Lamine Diack, are set to stand trial in France.

Subsequently, based on the weight of evidence—much of which was provided by former Moscow laboratory director Dr. Grigory Rodchenkov—WADA suspended RUSADA with immediate effect (after the publication of the first Independent Commission report) and recommended that Russia be banned from the Rio 2016 Games. Controversially, the IOC did not follow WADA’s recommendation, instead deferring to the respective International Federations (IFs) in the decision to ban Russian teams or individual athletes. Initially, the IOC required that all positive decisions about Russian athlete inclusion be approved by a CAS arbitrator and that all Russian athletes with previous doping offenses be banned from the 2016 Games. This, the IOC President claimed, balanced the desire and need for collective responsibility with the right to individual justice of every athlete. Of the 24 IFs overseeing sports at the Rio 2016 Games, only two (athletics and weightlifting) issued full bans against all Russian athletes with a further six (canoeing, cycling, modern pentathlon, rowing, sailing, and wrestling) issuing bans on athletes implicated in the WADA-commissioned Independent Persons report or having committed previous doping offences. On 7 August, 2016, in contrast to the IOC, the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) took the decision to ban the entire Russian Paralympic team from the Rio 2016 Paralympic Games on the basis of the evidence contained within the Independent Persons Report which suggested that the Russian Paralympic Committee would be unable to fulfil its obligation to comply with the World Anti-Doping code and the IPC Anti-Doping Code (IPC, 2019).

The Russian Doping Scandal also involves suspicious deaths and death threats. On February 3, 2016 the death of Vyacheslav Sinev, aged 58, was reported to the media. Mr. Sinev was the former Chairman of the executive board of RUSADA. There are no reports of where he died or the cause of death. Eleven days later, on February 14, 2016, Nikita Kamaev, aged 52, died outside Moscow; the cause of death was identified as a massive heart attack. Mr. Kamaev was the former Executive Director of RUSADA. He did not have any known heart-related problems. However, he had communicated with renowned journalist David Walsh of the Sunday Times about his desire to write a book about the true story of doping in Russia. Within Russia, these deaths, the threats and the doping scandal more generally were treated with disdain. For example, Ramil Khabriev, the former Director General of RUSADA suggested that the issues had been politicized and were generally the product of an ‘inflamed imagination’ that was better suited to a spy movie (Associated Press, 2016). In addition to these suspicious deaths there have been repeated threats against, and vilification of, the key whistleblowers involved in the case, leading to them seeking refuge in the U.S. Leonid Tyagachev, the head of the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) between 2001 and 2010, and now Honorary President of the ROC, was quoted as stating that Dr. Rodchenkov should be shot for lying, as would have happened under Stalin (Walker, 2017). Vitaly Mutko, Deputy Prime Minister, referred to Vitaly Stepanov as ‘a judas’ and ‘a swindler’, and to Yulia’s collection of audio recordings as ‘disgusting’ and ‘allegedly a criminal activity’. U.S. law enforcement have also received credible information of threats to the lives of both Dr. Rodchenkov and the Stepanov family, leading to the former entering the U.S. Federal Witness Protection Program as documented in the Academy Award-winning documentary, *Icarus*, and the latter applying for asylum in the U.S*.*

*Icarus* renewed wider public interest in the Russian Doping Scandal. Around the same time, McLaren’s final report, published in December 2016, provided a catalogue of evidence which the IOC would need to deliberate and further examine to decide appropriate action in advance of the Winter Games PyeongChang 2018. The evidence included the Evidentiary Disclosure Package largely provided by Dr. Rodchenkov (consisting of electronic correspondence between the Russian Ministry of Sport, RUSADA, CSP, and the Moscow laboratory, including attachments such as spreadsheets and lists related to doping controls, washout lists, list of athletes taking prohibited substances, and with emails explicitly detailing the names of people included in the distribution), testimony from key whistleblowers, forensic analysis of the urine sample bottles (Bereg-kit bottles) involved in the Russian case, and biological analysis of urine samples of Russian athletes competing at Sochi 2014. Dr. Rodchenkov has consistently claimed that the problem was much bigger than Sochi with thousands of Russian athletes implicated, as evidenced in the secret folder which outlined the details of athletes, times and their performance-enhancing drug regimes. This secret folder was made available to WADA and Richard McLaren in order to support their investigations. As a matter of official process, the IOC created two disciplinary commissions (DCs). The first commission, the Schimd Commission, was charged with establishing the facts on the basis of documented, independent and impartial evidence regarding Russia’s violations of the Olympic Charter and the World Anti-Doping Code (IOC, 2017). More narrowly, the second commission was responsible for initiating reanalysis and a full inquiry into all Russian athletes who participated in the Winter Olympic Games Sochi 2014 and their coaches, officials and support staff, and to take decisions regarding the individual athletes’ situations related to the possible violation of the WADA code (IOC, 2017). The conclusions of both DCs confirmed:

 …the systemic manipulation of the anti-doping rules and system in Russia, through the Positive Disappearing Methodology and during the Winter Games Sochi, 2014, as well as the various levels of administrative, legal and contractual responsibility, resulting from the failure to respect the respective obligations of the various entities involved (IOC, 2017, page 28).

The IOC, following the DCs’ recommendations of effective sanctions while protecting clean Russian athletes, decided to ban Russia from competing as an independent nation in the Winter Games PyeongChang 2018. The IOC also banned Vitaly Mutko (as Minister of Sport overseeing the system) and Yuri Nagornykh (Mutko’s deputy Minister) from any participation in all future Olympic Games. For the Winter Games 2018, the IOC decision meant, in some respects, no *Russian* team, and also no Russian uniform, flag or anthem. Russia pursued a partially successful appeal with CAS, finding that there was insufficient evidence to ban 28 Russian athletes, and a further 11 Russian athletes had their lifetime bans reduced so that they could, in theory, participate in the 2018 Winter Games. These findings were predicated on a new legal standard of *absolute proof* (replacing the precedent of *beyond reasonable doubt)* together with concerns about the fairness of the Osaka rule (i.e. banning athletes found guilty of doping from participation in the Games). Whilst legally, the IOC continue to file appeals against the CAS decision to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, for the 2018 Games, the IOC ultimately addressed concerns about the 39 athletes by refusing to extend an invitation to them to participate. In total, 169 Russian athletes, who were screened by the IOC and deemed to have no doping past, were invited to complete in PyeongChang for a team officially named *Olympic Athletes from Russia* (OAR), competing under the Olympic flag and anthem. OAR represented the third largest team at the Games after the U.S. and Canada.

On February 2, 2018, before the closing ceremony of the Winter Games PyeongChang 2018, the IOC executive board lifted the ban on the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) with immediate effect. Similarly, on September 20, 2018, the WADA Executive Committee decided to reinstate the Russian Anti-Doping Agency. The IPC agreed to lift the ban on the Russian Paralympic Committee by March 15, 2019. The only sport maintaining an international ban is the IAAF. The IAAF will review the Russian ban again at the next IAAF Council meeting scheduled for September 2019.

**Analysis**

Our analysis of the Russian Doping Scandal below is structured into three parts, focusing on the ways in which politics and power intersect with pre-conditions and causes of the scandal, the key events of the scandal, and the consequences that followed.

***Preconditions and causes.*** The motivations underpinning the Russian case are deeply political in nature. This is not solely the about the type of politics that involves the state or exists between organisations within networked systems of governance, such as international sport, although both are evident in the Russian case. While state intervention is undesirable for the IOC (as it is viewed to politicise sport and jeopardise its autonomy) it can hardly be described as extraordinary. In fact, numerous countries have active Ministries of Sport led by feverishly keen Ministers, and many have national structures for elite sport that enable politicians to navigate around the National Olympic Committee (NOC) and thus avoid accusations of political interference. What is more extraordinary about the Russian case is the way in which it reflects a politics of the type that uses state apparatus to support immoral acts that are primarily driven by values and ideology. To be clear, the Russian state not only has a history of doping, athlete exploitation, and doing whatever is necessary to win, but it has also used resources associated with soft power to cultivate socio-cultural norms which not only accept but come to expect such behaviour in order to win (Riordan, 1993). Thus, it was Russia’s failure at the Winter Games Vancouver 2010, coupled with the pressure to succeed in the Winter Games Sochi 2014, that became the impetus for escalating the doping regimen to the point evidenced in the WADA and IOC reports. The primary motivation was to showcase the power and capability of the Russian regime, thereby contributing to Putin’s ‘maximal vision of Russia as a revived great power’ (Harding & Luhn, 2015).

Russia’s actions mirror Orwell’s (1945) view of sport ‘as war minus the shooting’ (pp. 10-11) insofar as their actions reinforce the importance of the outcome and the need to win with little, if any, consideration or respect for the opponent. It reveals an insidious form of politics, one which is self-interested and concerned only with projecting certain ideals over the implications for the health and welfare of its own athletes, any respect for Olympism, or any notion of self-respect should they be found cheating. Clearly, the desire to re-position itself as a major sporting force—and the use of a systemic doping regimen to support this aspiration—represents a softer, more subtle form of power focused on persuasion and based on the achievements of Russian athletes (Nye, 2004), thereby shaping the perceptions of the (domestic and international) viewer in line with Russian preferences (Lukes, 1974). However, while Russia’s overarching aspiration may represent a more subtle view of power, the means used to achieve these ends represents a harder, more direct form of power.

Elite Russian athletes appear to have been coerced not only to take performance enhancing drugs (PEDs), but to enter into the entirety of the doping regimen in order to be part of the team. This relationship reflects Lukes’ (1974) first dimension of power whereby the elite athlete either decides to follow the directions of the coach (and the PED regimen) or accepts that s/he is no longer on the team. As indicated by the Independent Commission,

An athlete’s decision not to participate is likely to leave him or her without access to top calibre coaches and thus the opportunity to excel. This acceptance and, at times, expectation of cheating and disregard for testing and other globally accepted anti-doping efforts, indicate a fundamentally flawed mindset that is deeply ingrained in all levels of Russian athletics. The mindset is “justified” on the theory that everyone else is cheating as well. (Pound, McLaren & Robertson, 2015, pp. 10-11)

This internal tension was encapsulated in Vitaly Stepanov’s own written testimony to the IOC Disciplinary Commission: “In Russia truth and sport collide. It is believed that you cannot have both. It is believed that you must dope to succeed in sport. I, however, disagree that truth and sport are in irreconcilable conflict” (Stepanov, 2017, p. 2). This is a situation that was further exacerbated by Russian team officials and coaches sustaining a normative framing of doping behavior whereby Russian athletes were continually told that ‘everyone is doing it and to not do the same would put both the athlete and Russia at a severe disadvantage’. This issue was also identified within the Independent Commission report:

The coaches wrongfully encouraged their athletes, or athletes chose to believe that all other nations were following similar illicit training methods, thereby creating a self-justification that ‘sport doping’ and the non-enforcement of violations were competitive necessities and perhaps even patriotic obligations (Pound, McLaren, & Robertson, 2015, p. 22).

Given that doping athletes were complicit in the scandal, Russian authorities had the ability to control the agenda by preventing them from bringing to the fore any issues that might have been detrimental to the Russian authorities, thus reflecting Lukes’ second dimension of power (1974). While athletes are able to blow the whistle, such actions would likely end their career and could result in the athlete fleeing the country as in the case of Yulia Stepanova. The use of coercive techniques driven by the need to demonstrate the revitalisation of a new socialist era enabled the Russian authorities to manipulate and manage the environment thereby allowing the doping programme to escalate and flourish.

***Key events, actions and inactions.*** The evidence in the Russian case not only reveals doping on an unprecedented level, it also exposes how the Russian state, specifically the Russian Ministry of Sport, the FSB, and the Centre of Sports Preparation used direct power to commandeer the nation’s anti-doping apparatus (specifically RUSADA and the WADA-accredited Moscow laboratory) to manage and conceal the nationwide doping programme in the pursuit of more medals and a renewed position as a recognised global sporting and political power. However, the power exercised by the Russian state was not solely about the quest for more medals but also about *managing* anything that might jeopardise or threaten this, including athletes being found guilty of doping or having athletes or other insiders threaten to reveal the truth about the doping programme. The evidence shows that the state used hard power to coerce athletes to pay for positive tests to either be delayed or deleted. The state also used attempted to use its state resources (diplomatic and secret services) to threaten key whistleblowers—not only an attempt to hush dissenting voices, but also a strategy to warn potential future whistleblowers of the consequences of such action. Additionally, although there is no categorical proof demonstrating that the state was involved in the deaths of former RUSADA officials, the circumstances surrounding their deaths were highly suspicious, particularly when considered against the number of similar deaths of individuals who oppose the political leadership or represent risks to the state (Hurst, Dorell, & Petras, 2017). Again, from the perspective of Lukes’ dimensions of power, such events shape and mold the macro-level reality within which actors think, feel and act. Even if it is not known categorically that the state were involved in these events, actors take them into account as they weigh the possible consequences and potential risks associated with whistleblowing.

The case is also revealing in that it demonstrates the limits of power and indicates where power lies within the international sporting domain. For example, the Russian case highlights the limitations of the IOC and WADA’s power to govern the fight against doping. A closer inspection of the relationship between WADA and IOC also reveals that governing over the Olympic Movement and fighting against doping are not mutually exclusive goals as WADA is financially dependent upon and therefore inextricably linked with the various governments and the IOC who directly fund it. This is perhaps one of the many reasons why an independent commission was set up to investigate the doping allegations. In contrast to the limits of the IOC and WADA’s power and their (in)ability to affect change, the Russian case also highlights the ability of other actors who are in some cases deeply embedded within the system (e.g. Vitaly Stepanov, Grigory Rodchenkov) or in others peripheral to events (e.g. Bryan Fogel, Hajo Seppelt) to enact power. In all these individual cases the media have played an important role in agenda-setting by raising public awareness of the allegations and in so doing applied pressure on key agencies (WADA, IOC and IAAF) to respond effectively. The Independent Commission, for example, was created in direct response to the allegations raised by the ARD documentary, which aired in December 2015. WADA set up the commission two weeks later specifically to investigate the allegations made within the ARD documentary. Similarly, the conspirator-turned-whistleblower Dr Grigory Rodchenkov utilized a rather fortuitous (or perhaps deliberate) encounter with journalist Bryan Fogel to secure legal protection and support for seeking exile to the US whilst simultaneously documenting his allegations through the *New York Times*, the Netflix documentary *Icarus*, and the popular CBS News show *60 Minutes.*

The IAAF’s inaction and their ability to keep issues of widespread, state-sponsored doping off the political agenda constitutes another example of the limits of power illustrated by the case. The Independent Commission found numerous incidences whereby the IAAF had either excessively delayed responses to doping allegations or were complicit in facilitating corruption and bribery. This led to the Independent Commission to conclude that there was a “consistent disregard for ethical behaviour and a conspiracy to conduct and conceal corrupt behaviour by particular highly placed members and officials of [the] IAAF and ARAF” (p. 24). In particular, the Independent Commission described it is a “multifaceted and complex conspiracy” (p. 124) between the two organizations*.* The reportidentified, *inter alia*, direct bribery of, and acceptance of bribes from, Russian officials (including a 1.5 million euro bribe to influence a Senegal political election); systematic covering up of doping infractions; creation of illegitimate governance structures facilitated by the inappropriate hiring of family members as ‘consultants’; and the sharing of confidential information regarding anti-doping protocols to the ARAF. Of particular note were the numerous ‘excessive delays’ the IAAF’s response to positive doping tests and broader doping allegations of which it was aware from 2011 onwards (McLaren, 2016). It is evident, then, that key members within the IAAF were aware of and helped facilitate corruption for many years through a collective strategy of bribery, delay tactics and compartmentalization of managing cases led by senior IAAF officials, which collectively facilitated the doping scandal. These actions and inactions are also viewed as acts of hard power, in that various inducements (and the risk and penalties associated with being complicit in the scandal) were used to influence the behavior of IAAF officials in line with Russian interests.

***Outcomes and consequences.*** It is often assumed that the IOC is an all-powerful, central actor within the Olympic Movement. However, the IOC’s power is largely, although not exclusively, limited to its ability to endow countries (or, more accurately, National Olympic Committees) with the rights to host the Olympic and Paralympic Games. In Lukes’ (1974) terms, this can be viewed as a form of agenda setting (i.e. second face of power) in that it endows a nation with the rights and privileges associated with hosting the Games. That said, the IOC also has a number of other, more subtle, mechanisms at its disposal to allow it to retain its regulatory power. These mechanisms include sanctions (e.g. banning the Russian team from the 2018 Winter Games), revoking membership (e.g. suspending the NOC), removal of key individuals from positions of power (e.g. banning Vitaly Mutko), and revoking mega-events from nations (e.g. advising IFs not to award events to Russia). In response to the McLaren Report findings, for example, the IOC adopted a number of provisional measures, one of which was to request that all winter Olympic IF’s “freeze their preparations for major events in Russia, such as World Championships, World Cups or other major international competitions under their responsibility, and to actively look for alternative organisers” (IOC, 2016, p. 2). Consequently, Russia was stripped of hosting the Bobsleigh and Speed Skating World Championships. Similarly, in response to the findings of Schmid Commission, the IOC Executive Committee decided to suspend the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC), ban officials from attending the PyeongChang 2018 Games, ban politicians from future Olympic events, suspend Russian committee members, and invoice the ROC for the USD $15 million costs of its investigations into the doping allegations (IOC, 2017). These sanctions demonstrate the vast array of direct and indirect mechanisms through which the IOC can enact power and influence a country to comply with regulations. They also remind other countries and key stakeholders of the consequences of cheating. Nonetheless, the Russian case demonstrates that the effectiveness of such measures must be considered alongside the extent to which actors are motivated to do whatever it takes to win, their attitude toward risk, their overall attitude toward being associated with cheating or being able to suitably mitigate the fallout should they be found cheating the system.

Russia were readmitted into the Olympic system with the IOC, WADA and IPC all lifting bans and sanctions with the exception of the IAAF, who decided to retain their ban until further review in September 2019. In all cases, Russia were readmitted as they met a range of conditions, including that there should be no further positive drug tests at the Games (following positive tests for Russian curler Alexander Krushelnytsky and bobsledder Nadezhda Sergeeva), they pay $15 million to cover the cost of the two IOC investigations and future anti-doping research. In addition, they were required to give WADA investigators access to the Moscow laboratory and over 1.5 million files of doping data as well as implement a series of measures, including a new robust testing programme, a new anti-doping education programme, a new whistleblower hotline, and new rules, meaning that no government official can be appointed to any role within the RPC. The IAAF is sustaining its ban primarily due to reports that Russian coaches who had been suspended for doping were continuing to train Russian athletes together with reports that the Russian Athletics Federation had fabricated documents to show that Danil Lysenko was too ill to provide his whereabouts after failing to make himself available for out-of-competition drug testing (Reuters, 2019). It is also possible that the continued IAAF ban is linked to a deeper concern about the degree to which Russia has genuinely changed. It is likely that the IAAF will wait to see genuine change in light of the immoral actions of the previous IAAF leadership, the damage that the IAAF suffered as a consequence, and the desire of the new IAAF leadership to be seen to be turning a new leaf, which requires that the IAAF use their first dimension of power clearly and firmly.

Interestingly, the IOC, WADA and IPC made concessions despite Russia’s refusal to accept the findings and conclusions of the McLaren reports. This is striking insofar as it reflects the Russian state’s desire to control the story—at least, the part which relates to Russia’s admission of guilt. Consequently, Russia can continue to utilise the mechanisms associated with soft power and influence storylines about anti-Russia conspiracies, hostility toward Russia from the West, a few bad actors implicating the entire state or the fact that all countries are doping. This then galvanises certain elements of the Russian population, particularly those prone to nationalism, creating nuance and confusion to the point where many observers accept that the story is complex and has two sides, ultimately enabling the state to continue to appeal to and co-opt its population through culture and values.

On the international stage, the Russian case and the way in which it has been governed by the IOC, WADA, and the majority of IFs has caused severe turbulence, created a new, higher level of distrust across the key stakeholders involved in international sport and added to the problematic diplomatic relations that Russia has with the U.S., the U.K. and other western nations. Much of the angst stems from athletes, investigative journalists, a number of National Anti-Doping Agencies and a few key watchdogs (e.g. Play the Game, Transparency International) who have consistently called attention to the overall leniency shown to Russia, emphasising, in particular, the conflicts of interest in the system and lack of consistency in the IOC treatment of different countries. The conflicts of interest generally relate to relationships and priorities. In terms of relationships, there is a somewhat cozy relationship between high-level administrators and politicians in international sport; a modern version of a very well-developed ‘old boys club’. Similarly, there is a lack of independence across the Olympic system and therefore decisions are oftentimes influenced by competing interests. Linked to this latter point are the inherent conflicts associated with one group of stakeholders playing the key role of regulator *and* promoter, as is the case in international sport. Here, the very agencies that have legitimate power to regulate sport (e.g. issue penalties and enforce sanctions) are the same agencies that have the authority to sell broadcasting and marketing rights. The accusation is that the latter role can cloud judgement and lead to issues that should be regulated being buried or downplayed in order to not adversely affect media or marketing rights. The lack of consistency relates to the way in which the IOC issued outright bans to other NOCs (e.g. Kuwait for government interference, South Africa during the apartheid regime) but did ban for Russia for the Summer Games Rio 2016. Part of the IOC’s rationale for not issuing a complete ban was to be fair to Russian athletes who were clean and were not involved in the systemic doping programme. However, no such consideration was given to Kuwaiti athletes who did not support the regime nor to South African athletes who spoke out against apartheid. Such inconsistencies have led some to question whether the initial Russian decision was politically motivated and connected in some way to perceptions of the size and importance of Russia and their participation in the summer Games.

A final consequence of the Russian case lay in the work of the U.S. Congress in passing new legislation that would permit prosecutions and civil cases associated with doping in international sport. To be clear, the legislation—commonly referred to as the Rodchenkov Act—would give the U.S. jurisdiction over international sport events where there are three or more nations competing with at least four U.S. athletes competing or two U.S corporations sponsoring the event. The legislation would give cheated athletes and sponsors the ability to sue and seek damages for lost revenues “against any person, other than an athlete, to carry into effect a scheme in commerce to influence by use of a prohibited substance [in] any major international sports competition” (116th Congress, 2019, pp. 8-9). The law, should it be passed by Congress, would undoubtedly have major political ramifications for the U.S. and international sport. One the hand, there are supporters who argue the need for athlete protection, and therefore, the need for a clearer form of legitimate power to intervene in such cases. On the other hand, there will be those both inside and outside sport who argue that the U.S. legislature have no business intervening in international sport and that the legislation represents another example of U.S overreach. The U.S. justifies such intervention by explaining that the U.S. makes the largest annual contribution to WADA of any single nation and that the actions of doping athletes not only defrauds clean athletes, but it also defrauds the U.S (116th Congress, 2019).

**Chapter summary**

The Russian Doping Scandal illustrates the increasing diffusion of power across the range of stakeholders involved in the governance of international sport and, moreover, the ability of individuals to set agendas that lead to incremental change in policy and governance practices. Albeit beyond the scope of this chapter, relevant to understanding the sport-politics nexus in the discussion of who it is that holds power or where power lies is the concept of governance (Rhodes, 1997), or the so called ‘governance narrative’, which attempts to encapsulate the shift from traditional, hierarchical, top-down delivery approaches to increasingly pluralist, network-based approaches to governing (Grix, 2010). We argue that power, and more specifically, the power relations that underpin the international sport governance network, reflect Foucault’s (1991) ideas about power as a ubiquitous, dispersed and pervasive concept whereby all actors have relational power, although some agents have access to more considerable resources or more direct control over accountability and regulatory mechanisms than others. Such arguments support the notion of asymmetrical power, whereby all stakeholders have relative power but it is not equally distributed across the network. In this way, international sport can be said to reflect Marsh and colleagues’ (2003, p. 308) analysis of British society insofar as it “is marked by continuing patterns of structured inequality”. This structured inequality together with the historical evolution of modern international sport have contributed to and continually shape the asymmetries of power that characterise the international sport landscape. Thus, while all actors have power, the executive of the IOC is dominant due to its direct access to key resources in the system. These asymmetrical power relations play a key role in how the IOC cultivates relations and regulates key actors within the network in order to direct human conduct to achieve specific political ends. Of course, dominant power is moderated and influenced by forces inside and outside the network, including but not limited to the media, commercial sponsors, politicians, and public opinion.

These structural arrangements and the ubiquitous but unequally distributed patterns of power that underpin them, in part, explain how politics and power played out in the decisions of the IOC in regard to Russia. For Rio 2016, the story was new, with the start of the summer Games imminent and the evidence—whilst growing—not indisputable. The IOC’s view of a sensible decision was to pass the decision over to the IFs. This did not adversely affect relations between Russia and the IOC—particularly in the case of Russian officials involved in international sport governance. Neither could the IOC be later accused of overly harsh treatment or sanctions based on a range of incomplete evidence. At the same time, the IOC did not entirely exonerate Russian sport. Thus, they could be seen to be acting appropriately, even if not entirely consistently, given the decision against the Kuwait NOC and Kuwaiti athletes. This decision may ultimately be viewed as one that balanced regulatory fairness with the opportunity to continue to maximize the promotional efforts that are associated with the Summer Games. For the Winter Games in PyeongChang 2018, however, circumstances were different. The weight of evidence against Russia was overwhelming. Public awareness had grown due to media interest and the Netflix documentary *Icarus*. The IOC was widely portrayed as weak, unable or unwilling to take on the might of the Russian empire. Furthermore, this was the much less valuable, much less attractive, and much less watched Winter Games, and the IOC, was looking to preserve some sense of integrity and concern for fair sport. Thus, it was not surprising to see the IOC act in a stronger, and more authoritative way regarding Russia’s involvement in PyeongChang, 2018 than in Rio, 2016. Such governance practices reinforce Foucault’s notion of governmentality where the overall art of government is principally concerned with regulating, controlling and shaping a governed population (i.e. the sport system) to achieve specific ends. The ends in the IOC’s handling of the Russian case appear to be balancing the need to be *seen* as being fair and strong with the desire to sustain positive relations with the Russian state and the Russian NOC’s continued involvement in the Olympics beyond PyeongChang 2018. The extent to which appropriate structures and systems have been established to ensure wholesale change in the culture of Russian sport remains highly questionable. Politics and power will undoubtedly remain key influencers in how the Russian case continues to unfold and in how the key structures of international sport decide to navigate the future strategic, operational and moral challenges associated with the regulatory and promotional functions of international sport governance.

**Class discussion topics**

* What is politics and how does is interact with sport?
* What is power and how does it influence sport?
* What role did politics and power play in the motivations of the Russian state?
* Who has overall power in the Russian Doping Scandal?
* How does politics and power influence the actions of key international stakeholders such as the IOC and WADA?
* What are the major challenges for key stakeholders such as the IOC and WADA in managing the Russian Doping Scandal?
* Why do you think the IOC acted differently in advance of PyeongChang 2018 than it did for Rio 2016?
* Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of creating a new independent oversight body with responsibility for maintaining integrity in international sport and with powers to sanction individuals and organizations involved in sport.

**Sample test questions**

* Explain the meaning of politics.
* What are the differences in the three conceptualizations of politics?
* Provide sport-related examples of the three conceptualizations of politics.
* Explain the meaning of power.
* What are the differences in Lukes’ three dimensions of power?
* Provide sport-related examples of Lukes’ three dimensions of power.
* Explain the differences between hard power and soft power using sport-related examples to support your explanation.
* How does Foucault’s view of power differ to Lukes’ three dimensions?
* Why are politics and power important concepts to study in relation to the governance of international sport?
* Explain the differences between the *governance narrative* and the notion of *asymmetrical power*.

**Additional classroom activities**

* List the key stakeholders involved in the governance of international sport.
* Prepare an illustration to show the relationship between the stakeholders involved in the governance of international sport.
* Debate the strengths and weaknesses of government intervention in sport.
* Identify the key sources of power and explain what sources of power key stakeholders such as the IOC, WADA and International Federations have.
* Imagine that you are an IOC representative… you are involved in the decision about Russia’s involvement in the Rio 2016 Games. What decision would you take (i.e. to ban Russia from the Games, support Russian involvement, or otherwise) and why?
* What can the IOC, WADA and other key stakeholders do to limit the chances of any similar doping programs being created in other nations?

**Web-based activities**

* Watch the Netflix documentary *Icarus* and identity key issues that you think are pertinent in illustrating the influence of politics and power in international sport (<https://www.netflix.com/title/80168079>)
* Look at the WADA and IOC reporting of the Russian Doping Scandal and compare this to reports in the mainstream media (e.g. Guardian, New York Times, etc.). What are the major differences in reporting and what are the reasons for these differences?
* Use the IOC website to identify the key departments and structures of the IOC (<https://www.olympic.org/the-ioc>)
* Access the report of the IOC Commissions (Schimd and Oswald) and briefly explain the key evidence underpinning the conclusions of the Commissions (<https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/Who-We-Are/Commissions/Disciplinary-Commission/IOC-DC-Schmid/IOC-Disciplinary-Commission-Schmid-Report.pdf>).
* Explore resources on the Transparency International Sport website ([www.transparency.org/topic/detail/sport](http://www.transparency.org/topic/detail/sport)) and the Play the Game ([www.playthegame.org](http://www.playthegame.org)) website and identify the range of ethical issues in sport.
* Select a country and research the way in which the government and the state intervene in sport within the country.

**References**

116th Congress. (2019). S259, Bill Proposal: The Rodchenkov Act. Washington D.C.: U.S. Congress.

Allison, L. (1986). The Politics of Sport. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Allison, L. (1993). The Changing Politics of Sport. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. (1962). Two Faces of Power. *The American Political Science Review, 56*(4), 947-952.

Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. (1970). *Power and poverty: Theory and practice.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Bergsgard, N. (2018). Power and domination in sport policy and politics ‒ three intertwined levels of exercising power. *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics*, 10(4), 653-667.

Bostock, J., Crowther, P., Ridley-Duff, R., & Breese, R. (2018). No plan B: the achilles heel of high performance sport management. *European Sport Management Quarterly*, 18, 25-46.

Dahl, R. (1957). The concept of power. *Behavioral Science*, *2*(3), 201-225.

Dahl, R. (1958). A critique of the ruling elite model. *The American Political Science Review*, 52(2), 463-469.

Ellingworth, J. (2016, 21 February). Russian doping official planned book before sudden death. Associated Press. Retrieved from: <https://apnews.com/d207f87cca9f4f0bbe4f79d235bda5ca>

Foucault, M. (1991). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. London: Pengiun.

Goodin, R., & Klingermann, H. (1996). A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Grix, J. (2016). Sport Politics: An Introduction. London: Palgrave-Macmillan

Grix, J. (2010). The ‘governance debate’ and the study of sport policy. *International Journal of Sport Policy*, 2(2), 159-171.

Grix, J. & Houlihan, B. (2013). Sports mega-events as part of a nations soft power strategy: the cases of Germany (2006) and the UK (2012). *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *16*(4), 572-596.

Harding, L., & Luhn, A. (2015, November 13). *Sport, doping and Putin’s vision of Russian as a revived world power*. *The Guardian.* Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/nov/13/sport-doping-putin-russia-world-power-wada

Haugaard, M. (2002). Power: A Reader. (Ed). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hay, C. (2002). *Political analysis: A critical introduction*. Basingstoke: Palgrave

Houlihan, B. (2008). Politics, power, policy and sport. In B. Houlihan (Ed), *Sport and society* (33-54). London: Sage.

Houlihan, B. (1997). *Sport, policy and politics: A comparative analysis*. London: Routledge.

Houlihan, B. (1991). *The government and politics of sport.* London: Routledge.

Hurst, S., Dorell, O. & Petras, G. (2017, 2 May). Suspicious deaths in Russia. USA Today. Retrieved from: <https://www.usatoday.com/pages/interactives/suspicious-russian-deaths-sacrificial-pawns-or-coincidence/>

International Olympic Committee (2016). *Decision of the IOC Executive Board concerning the participation of Russian athletes in the Olympic Games Rio 2016*. Retrieved from: <https://www.olympic.org/news/decision-of-the-participation-of-russian-athletes-in-the-olympic-games-rio-2016>.

International Olympic Committee (2017). *IOC Disciplinary Commission’s Report to the IOC Executive Board: 2 December 2017*. Lausanne: IOC.

International Paralympic Committee. (2019). Information on the suspension of the Russian Paralympic Committee by the IPC. Retrieved from: <https://www.paralympic.org/russian-paralympic-committee-suspension>

Lasswell, H.D. (1936). Who gets what, when, how. London: McGraw Hill Book Company.

Lukes, S. (1974). *Power: A radical view*. London: Macmillan.

Lukes, S. (2005). *Power: A radical view (2nd edition)*. London: Macmillan.

Marsh, D. Richards, D. and Smith, M. (2003). Unequal Plurality: Towards an

Asymmetric Power Model of British Politics. *Government and Opposition, 38(3).* 306-332*.*

McLaren, (2016). *The Independent Person Reports #1 and #2*. Montreal: WADA

Nye, J. (2004). Soft power: the means to success in world politics. New York: Public Affairs.

Pound, R. McLaren, R. & Robertson, J. (2015). *The WADA Independent Commission Report #1: Final Report*. Montreal: WADA.

Reuters, (2019, 3 August). *Russian Lysenko stripped of neutral athlete status*. Retrieved from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-athletics-doping-russia/athletics-russian-lysenko-stripped-of-neutral-athlete-status-idUSKBN1KO13O>

Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997). ‘The New Governance: Governing without Government’, *Political Studies*, 44, 4, 652–67

Riordan, J. (1993). The rise and fall of Soviet Olympic Champions. *Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies*, Volume III, 25-44.

Sage, G.H. & Eitzen, D.S. (2013). *Sociology of North American sport*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sam, M. P. (2009). The Public Management of Sport. *Public Management Review*, 11(4), 499-514.

Schnitzer, M., & Hazinger, L. (2019). Does the Olympic Agenda 2020 have the power to create a new Olympic heritage? An analysis of the 2026 winter Olympic games bid, *Sustainability*, 11(2), 442.

Stepanov, V. (2017, October 9). *Written testimony to the IOC Schmid Commission*.

Stewart, B., & Smith, A. (2008). Drug use in sport: implications for public policy. *Journal of Sport and Social Isues*, 32(3), 278-298.

Stoker, G., & Marsh, D. (2010). *Introduction*. In D. Marsh & G. Stoker (Eds). *Theory and methods in political science* (3rd ed, pp. 1-12). Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.

Walker, S. (2017, 17 November). Russian Olympic official says doping whistleblower should be executed. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/nov/17/russian-olympic-official-says-doping-whistleblower-should-be-executed>

*Table 1: Examples of the sport-politics relationship*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Politics as…** | **Sport-related focus** |
| Intervention from state institutions | Emphasis on decisions of the state at national, regional and local levels including consideration of involvement in international sports competitions, sport policy-making processes, support for sporting structures, investment in major facilities, the allocation of public resources to sport, and consideration of the motives underpinning government support for sport.*Examples: Decisions on whether or not to boycott major sport events or competition against certain nations (e.g. Moscow 1980 or LA 1984 Games; South Africa under Apartheid); The relationship between the military, military recruitment, and sport; The UK government’s investment in the 2012 Olympic Games legacy plan; Congressional oversight of abuse in gymnastics in USA, Review of elite sport policy in Australia after the Olympic and Paralympic Games Beijing 2008; Cities funding the development of stadia for professional sports teams; The use of sport to enhance diplomatic relations (e.g. the UK’s investment in International Inspiration as part of the 2012 Legacy); The use of sport to globally or regionally [re]position the image and identity of nations (e.g. Mega sport events hosted by small autocratic regimes).* |
| An integral aspect of systems and organisations | Emphasis is on the activities and decisions across international and national sporting networks including sport organisations (e.g. CAS, WADA, IOC, IFs, NGBs, etc). and non-sport organisations (e.g. broadcasters and other media, sponsors). *Examples: The ways in which the National Football League (NFL) decided to govern the football league in the face of increasing evidence of Chronic traumatic encephalopathy in dead former professional American football players; The creation and implementation of the IOC’s Agenda 2020 reformation strategy; The IAAF decision to create a policy requiring females with high testosterone to reduce their levels of testosterone in order to compete in certain female disciplines; The nature of the relationship between the IOC, IFs, NGBs, and athlete associations; How organisations decide to gender or race inequality across the workforce.* |
| Ubiquitous and inherent part of social life | Emphasis on issues rather than institutions particularly those of a divisive nature or where there is a conflict between beliefs or values.*Examples: The support for or opposition to Colin Kaepernick’s protests prior to NFL games in order to bring greater attention to racial injustice and systematic oppression against African Americans; Attitudes toward 46XY DSD athletes competing in female disciplines in track & field without intervention to reduce levels of testosterone; Support for or against the displacement of communities in order to regenerate cities and build facilities for mega sport events; Attitudes toward the inclusion of lesbian, bi-sexual, gay, transgender athletes in sport; The local-level support for an increase in taxes in order to improve local school sport facilities.* |

Adapted from: Houlihan (2008)

*Table 2: Hard-soft power continuum*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Hard | Soft |
| Spectrum of behaviours | CommandCoercion Inducement | Co-optAgenda setting Attraction |
| Most likely Resources | Force PaymentsSanctions Bribes | Institutions Values Culture Policies |

Adapted from: Nye (2004)

*Table 3: Traditions in the Analysis of Power*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | The ‘Faces of Power’ Controversy | The Foucault, Habermas, Bourdieu “Debate” |
| Protagonists  | Political scientists- Dahl, Bachrach, Baratz, Lukes | Socio-political theorists- Foucault, Habermas, Bourdieu |
| Origins of debate | Anglo-US | European |
| Key Issues of debate | How should power be defined?How should power be measured? | Is power ubiquitous? Is liberation from power possible? |
| Nature of debate | PragmaticMethodologicalDirect: modification of perspectives | PhilosophicalMetaphysical (Ontological)Virtual: comparison of perspectives |

Adapted from: Hay (2002)

*Table 4: Lukes’ (1974) dimensions of power*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | One-dimensional view | Two-dimensional view | Three-dimensional view |
| Proponents | Dahl (1957), Polsby, classic pluralists | Bachrach and Baratz (1970), neo-elitists | Lukes (1974), Marxists, neo-marxists and radical elitists |
| Conception of power | In decision making | In decision making and agenda setting | In decision-making, agenda setting and preference shaping |
| Focus of analysis | Formal political arena | Formal and informal political arena  | Civil society  |
| Methodological Approach | Counting of votes in decision-making forums | Ethnography of corridors of power | Ideology critique |
| Nature of power | Visible, transparent and easily measured | Visible and invisible, harder to measure  | Largely invisible - power distorts perceptions |

Adapted from: Lukes (1974, 2005)

*Table 5: Timeline overview of the Russian Doping Scandal (2014-2019)*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **2014**  |  |
| 3rd Dec  | German broadcaster ARD documentary ‘*The Doping Secret: 'How Russia Makes its Winners’* aired – claims an “East German-style” doping programme in Russian Track and Field Athletics  |
| 10th Dec | Valentin Blakhnichev quits as IAAF treasurer and steps down from IAAF committee  |
| 16th Dec | WADA announces the creation of independent commission to investigate allocations – became known as the Pound Commission |
| 17th Dec | WADA carries out unannounced visit to Moscow Laboratory  |
| **2015**  |  |
| 10th Feb | Pound Commission investigation into ARD allegations of Russian doping begins  |
| 17th Feb  | Valentin Blakhnichev quits as ARAF president |
| 1st Aug | ARD 2nd documentary ‘*Top Secret: The Shadowy World of Athletics*’ reveals new allegations based on a leaked IAAF database |
| - | Sunday Times publishes “Shadow over the London Marathon” article |
| 9th Nov | Pound Commission publishes independent report alleging widespread, state-sponsored corruption in Russian Track and Field Athletics.  |
| 10th Nov  | WADA suspends Russia’s Anti-doping agency (RUSADA) with immediate effect |
| 10th Nov  | Head of the Moscow anti-doping laboratory Dr Grigory Rodchenkov resigns  |
| 13th Nov  | IAAF provisionally suspends ARAF barring all athletes from international competition |
| 17th Nov | Dr Grigory Rodchenkov fleas Russia and seeks exile in the US |
| 18th Nov | RUSADA suspended after being deemed non-compliant by WADA |
| 26th Nov | Russia accepts indefinite suspension from athletic competition for non-compliance and confirm they will co-operate fully to oversee changes |
| **2016** |  |
| 7th Jan  | ARD 3rd documentary ‘*Russia’s Red Herrings*’ reveals new allegations suggesting malpractice from and implicates a number of Russian stakeholders  |
| 14th Jan | Pound Commission publishes final report revealing additional information given to the French authorities  |
| 3rd Feb | Suspicious death of Vyacheslav Sinev, former Chairman of RUSADA  |
| 14th Feb | Nikita Kamaev, former Executive Director of RUSADA dies of heartattack |
| 8th May | Dr Grigory Rodchenkov reveals Sochi doping allegations on CBS *60 minutes television* segment |
| 12th May  | New York Times publishes Dr Rodchenkov’s allegations of widespread state-sponsorship, systematic doping at Sochi 2014 |
| 16th May  | WADA appoints Richard McLaren to conduct independent investigation into manipulation of doping control processes by Russia at Sochi 2014 Olympic and Paralympic Games |
| 17th May | IOC announces retesting of 454 doping samples from the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games |
| 27th May  | IOC announces reanalysis of ‘A’ samples from London 2012 Olympic Games. 23 athletes, in five sports across six nations returned adverse findings.  |
| 1st Jun | Russian athlete (and whistle-blower) Yuliya Stepanova cleared to compete at the Rio 2016  |
| 17th Jun | IAAF unanimously votes to uphold its ban of ARAF. Clean athletes allowed to compete as ‘Neutral Athletes’  |
| 18th Jul  | McLaren preliminary report (Part #1) published. Report confirms “*institutionalised manipulation of the doping process*” before, during and after Sochi 2014 Olympic and Paralympic Games |
| 19th Jul | IOC adopts provisional measures in response to McLaren report including non-recognition of Russian sporting events, accreditation denial, sample reanalysis, and IF event planning freezing, and reversing “presumption of innocence” for Russian athletes |
|  | IOC establishes a Disciplinary Commission (IOC DC) to further investigate McLaren report findings  |
| 21st Jul  | Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) upholds the ban on Russian athletes at the Rio 2016 Olympic Games  |
| 24th Jul  | IOC rejects WADA’s recommendation to ban Russian from the Summer Olympics citing this was an decision that would be made by each sport federation |
| 30th Jul  |  IOC establishes the Oswald Commission to investigate the alleged doping violations by individual Russian athletes at the Sochi 2014. |
| 5th-21st Aug  | Rio 2016 Summer Olympics. 278/389 Russian athletes compete. Russia finishes 4th place with 19 gold, 17 silver and 20 bronze medals (56 total) |
| 7th Aug  | IPC confirms ban all Russian athletes from the Paralympic Games |
| 15th Aug  | Russian Paralympic Committee file statement of appeal against wide-spread ban  |
| 19th Oct | Vitaly Mutko promoted to deputy prime minister for sport, tourism and youth politics |
| 7th Dec | IOC extend doping sanctions against Russia until further notice |
| 9th Dec  | Final McLaren Report (Part #2) published. Identified more than 1000 Russian competitors had benefited from state-wide cover-up from 2011 to 2015 |
| 13th Dec  | Russia (Sochi) stripped of hosting 2017 Bobsleigh World Championships. Moved to Königssee, Germany. |
| 22nd Dec  | Russia (Chelyabinsk) stripped of hosting the ISU Speed Skating World Cup  |
|  | Russia withdraws from hosting Biathlon World Cup event and Junior World Championships |
| **2017** |  |
| 8th Feb  | Russia (Tyumen) stripped of hosting 2021 Biathlon World Championships. Moved to Pokljuka, Slovenia. |
| 8th Aug | American documentary film ‘Icarus’ released by Netflix. Documentary reveals further insights into the Russian doping scandal through a chance encounter with Dr Grigory Rodchenkov |
| 17th Nov | Honorary President and ex-head of Russia’s Olympic Committee, Teonid Tyagachev, says Grigory Rodchenkov and whistleblowers should be shot  |
| 5th Dec  | IOC announces that the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) is suspended with immediate effect and will not compete at Pyeongchang 2018. Athletes with no previous drug violations allowed to compete as ‘Olympic Athlete from Russia’ (OAR). |
|  | IOC proposes an alternative logo for OAR athlete’s uniforms |
| **2018** |  |
| Jan  | All leading Russian athletes avoided meeting doping officers and passing anti-doping tests in a track and field competition in Irkutsk |
| 1st Feb  | CAS overturns doping bans for 28 Russian athletes and results reinstated at Sochi 2014 Winter Games |
| 9th-25th Feb | 168 athletes compete as Olympic Athlete’s from Russia (OAR). OAR finish 13th with 2 gold, 6 silver and 9 bronze medals (17 total) |
| 25th Feb  | IOC announces to lift Russian ban conditional on no more doping violations in Pyeongchang Winter Olympics |
| 27th Jul  | IAAF announces that despite improvements Russia would remain suspended from international athletic competitions |
| 20th Sep  | WADA votes unanimously to lift sanctions and re-instate RUSADA |
| 26th Sep | Russia launches legal fight against IAAF over continued ban  |
| 2nd Nov |  IOC announces additional retests for  |
| 17th Dec |  Team of WADA experts travel to Moscow but refused full access to doping data  |
| 31st Dec |  Russia misses deadline to hand over data to WADA from its anti-doping laboratory in Moscow |
| **2019** |  |
| 10th Jan  |  WADA gains full access to Moscow laboratory  |
| 8th Feb | IPC lift doping ban on Russian athletes stating it had met 69 of its 70 reinstatement criteria and made “significant” reform. |
| 15th Mar | IPC formally lift Russian doping ban on the Russian Paralympic Committee |
| 19th Mar  |  France issues arrest warrants for two Russian athletics officials Valentin Blakhnichev (ex-coach) and Alexei Melnikov |