### Blue light Integration: a pipe dream?

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### Structure of the presentation

- Context and background
- State of interoperability
- Critical analysis of the blue light integration agenda
- ► Challenges, opportunities and future research agenda

### Context

- ➤ The swift and professional response of the emergency services during the tragic events of the Grenfell Tower fire and the terrorist attacks in Manchester and London drew universal praise.
- ▶ It has also highlighted serious concerns about resources, funding levels and sustainability of the increased visibility and presence.
- Calls for greater interoperability between the emergency services are also necessitated by the changing nature of demands, new threats to national security coupled with reduced budgets.
- ► The Kerslake Report (2018) which reviewed the emergency response to the Manchester Arena attack of May 2017 praised the overall response but also highlighted the need for better *communication and coordination* between various agencies involved.
- ▶ But problems in these blue light organisations go much beyond the issues of staff numbers and resources, which we will highlight later in our presentation .
- We next discuss the current blue- light architecture

### Policing and Crime Act 2017



#### Policing and Crime Act 2017

CHAPTER 3

Explanatory Notes have been produced to assist in the understanding of this Act and are available separately

#### Government intends to:

- Introduce a new statutory duty on the three emergency services to collaborate with one another to improve efficiency and effectiveness;
- ► Enable Police and Crime Commissioners to take on the duties and responsibilities of fire and rescue authorities, where a local case is made;
- Where a PCC takes on the responsibilities of their local Fire and Rescue Authorities (FRA), further enabling the PCC to create a single employer for police and fire personnel;
- In areas where a PCC has not become responsible for Fire and Rescue Services (FRS), enabling them to have representation on their local FRA with voting rights, where the local FRA agrees.

### **JESIP**

► The national Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP). JESIP was commissioned by the Home Office in 2012 in order to promote inter-agency working practices during the management of large-scale incidents

# Creation of a new HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS)

- Major expansion of HMIC to take on inspection of fire and rescue in England;
  - Aim is to become a fully integrated inspectorate for the police and FRS.
  - Programme of activity involves running pilots with 3 fire and rescue services in 2018, before moving to a full programme of inspections later in the year;
- ► HMIC currently inspects all 43 police forces in England and Wales together with other major policing and law enforcement bodies.
- ► HMICFRS will be reporting on each of the 45 FRSs over the next couple of years, culminating in a national summary of the overall performance of the FRS.
- ► A new inspection framework was published in March 2018 outlining three main themes:
  - how effective each service is at preventing, protecting against and responding to fire and other risks;
  - whether the service provides value for money; and
  - how well the service looks after its people and ensures fairness and diversity.

## Police and Crime Commissioners (PCC) taking over FRS

- ▶ A controversial move which is gathering momentum.
- ➤ So far 5 PCCs have been given government's approval on proposals to run the FRS. These include PCCs in Essex (2017), Avon (2017) and recently the PCCs in Staffordshire, West Mercia and Cambridge (2018).
- Not been a smooth sailing. Proposals have met with opposition from the Fire Brigade Union (FBU), FRS bosses & staff and local councils and have been rejected in Hertfordshire, North Yorkshire, Norfolk.
- Even in the recent cases Staffordshire, West Mercia and Cambridge, the local authorities 'did not support the transfer of governance', meaning that the Home Secretary commissioned independent assessments through the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) and considered their reports for making a decision.
- At the same time there is less insights on how have existing integrations / strategic alliances functioned and what were / are the key challenges.


## Case study of a strategic alliance: Devon and Cornwall and Dorset Police Forces

- Ongoing collaboration, since 2013-14, between two Police Forces in Southwest of England.
  - ▶ Key objective is to achieve saving of £12m per annum by 2022
- The research engagement initiated in 2014-15.
  - Phase I: May 2015 May 2016:
    - ▶ 14 formal interviews; 2 informal conversations; cross functional representation
  - ▶ Phase II: Questionnaire survey 2017: 300+ responses
    - ▶ Reflective survey encouraging respondents to reflect on how the alliance has developed over three phases: (a) when the alliance was originally announced;
       (b) when the DBCs were developed and cultural / team building workshops were organised; and (c) current experience of working in, or alongside, an alliance department or team

### Details of the respondents

Total

45-55 Above 55 Total



### Phase I - Alliance announcement

#### **CONCERNS**

- Short / Long term effectiveness: 87%
- Coordination of tasks: 87%
- Communication / information sharing: 83%
- Understanding each other's viewpoints: 80%
- Governance and reporting structures: 78%
- Implications on existing role: 76%
- Joint Leadership: 74%
- Impact of cultural differences: 70%
- Trust related issues: 64%

#### **OPTIMISM**

- Greater consistency in delivery of services: 64%
- Reduction in duplication of effort: 59%
- Higher cost saving for the two forces: 58%
- Greater resilience in the two forces: 56%
- Greater flexibility in undertaking tasks: 52%
- Greater clarity regrading key drivers for the alliance in the two forces: 45%

# Phase II - DBCs and Cultural / Team building workshops

Lack of direct involvement in the DBC process - 90%

Lack of indirect involvement - 64% (no opinion sought during/ on the process)

Low participation - 60%

Majority attended one session closely followed by though those who attended two or more

### Confirmation of concerns or possible improvements?

- Potential communication challenges: 69%
- Potential coordination related challenges: 66%
- Potential leadership challenges: 61%
- Potential cultural differences: 60%
- Potential challenges relating to sharing of resources: 56%
- Development of interpersonal relationship with colleagues from other force: 42%

#### **Positive effects**

- Opportunity to understand viewpoints and expectations: 61%
- Interpersonal relationship: 59%
- Facilitating knowledge / information sharing: 54%
- Building team cohesion: 52%
- Sensitising to cultural differences: 48%
- Trust development: 46%

### Phase III - Current status

No emergence of a new / dominant culture – 61% Yet, most observe different features of culture – 82% Most respondents have negative view on critical issues relating to undertaking and accomplishing tasks / job roles

### Emerging cultural features to build upon

- Shared leadership: 16%
- Learning / knowledge/ info sharing: 15%
- Collaborative working: 14%
- Sharing resources: 13%
- Operational flexibility: 8%
- Trust: 7%
- Functioning efficiently: 5%
- Well being: 3.5%
- No specific change in culture : 18%

#### **Critical issues**

- Coordination of tasks: 10%
- Work duplication: 10%
- Greater confidence regarding cooperation: 21%
- Sharing good practices amongst teams: 22%
- Greater degree of commitment towards alliance: 25%
- Retaining / integrating good practices: 25%
- Communication: 27%
- Participatory decision making: 29%
- Consideration of inputs / suggestions: 40%

### Alliance as a change process

#### INITIAL STAGE / UNFREEZING

The case for alliance, with the broad institutional and organisational context, was well understood / accepted

Respondents were concerned, yet showed optimism of the outcome

#### TRANSITION STAGE /

The DBC process, in particular and cultural team building workshops, underpinned the actions undertaken to make changes


#### **MOVEMENT**

Lack of involvement of almost 60%+ respondents mean that the two actions could have resulted in addressing the concerns identified in the previous phase

The alliance is still in the transition stage. No evidence of emergence of common working practices and culture. Coordination mechanisms are missing, particularly in the absence of a common IT platform and perceived lack of harmonisation of policies. Governance structure, in general and how the alliance department relates to other alliance department and departments not currently under alliance, needs to be clearly communicated. There is a growing perception that 'going live' is end of an process and with which the interest of the senior managers diminishes..

#### **DESIRED STAGE / REFREEZING**

### Alliance as a change process



### Key points for discussion

- Creating and institutionalising operating processes and working practices is challenging:
  - Putting structures / timelines in place for the above is equally contentious;
  - Regular workshops / focus groups to share experiences might facilitate the process;
  - Cultural team building workshop are critical.
- Common IT platform / intranet;
- Site visits arrange members to visit and spend time at a different site to observe work practices (and build personal relationship);
- Centrality of : Communication; communication;

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### The Kerslake Report (2018)

# The Kerslake Report: An independent review into the preparedness for. and emergency response to, the Manchester Arena attack on 22" May 2017

#### 1. Key findings:

- 2. Scathing criticism of the local Fire & Rescue Service
- 3. Poor communication between the emergency services
- 4. Need for effective information sharing across all relevant agencies
- 4. Phone line failure catastrophic
- 5. "Strategic oversights" by police commanders that led to confusion over whether an "active shooter" was on the loose
- 6. Praised the bravery of the emergency staff and public
- 6. Over 50 recommendations


### Key issues still not on agenda


- 1. Fragmented governance model will hinder collaboration
- Offer verses Expectations- current models of service delivery and management do not reflect considerable changes to the working and nature of demand of these organisations
- 3. Supporting workforce development-a neglected management priority
- 4. Becoming adept to changing demands- developing skills sets and professionalization of staff
- 5. Developing supportive organisational culture(s)

### Our analysis-A missed opportunity!!

- Limited scope.
- Will it ensure efficiencies?
- Model untested and untried.
- Where does it leave the ambulance services?
- Highlights the importance of operational procedures and compatible technology (co-location, back-office resource sharing).
- Very little on the drivers and enablers of interoperability including the people, processes and integration of diverse professional cultures.

### Co-production of knowledge







### A new research agenda

- Reform to Transform.
- ► Pluralistic leadership style (s) rather than a heroic models to support networks in an uncertain landscape.
- Promote closer links with academia & co-production of knowledge .
- Support and build a professional workforce but professionalisation will need time and cost money.
- Build systems that embrace and enhance differences

### References

Policing and Crime Act (207) available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/3/pdfs/ukpga\_20170003\_en.pdf

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