WHAT IS THE JUST RESPONSE TO CRIME?: THE STUDY OF

POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND CONVENTIONAL CRIMES

IN NIGERIA

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# ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF ARTS, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

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The issue of criminal justice and the just responses to different types of crimes are very important to many countries and have been advanced by studies of radical criminologists in the western world. Post-colonial countries who underwent arduous period of transition consider it specifically burdensome to create justice for all. The phenomenon of political corruption has been addressed by different studies, but the issue of just responses to crimes in Nigeria are not explored.

The post-colonial Nigerian state has been affected by political corruption that has resulted in a prejudiced or unfair criminal justice system: the system that treats the elites/rich and poor differently. This thesis critically addresses the issue of national and international responses towards two distinct types of criminality: political corruption and conventional crimes, in order to promote the understanding of the issue of justice in Nigerian society. By engaging in thematic media analysis, legal analysis and analysis of criminal statistics, this thesis explores the issue of justice and the significances of the impacts of national and international bodies on the development of criminal justice system responses to crime.

Based on the findings, this thesis argues that political corruption in Nigeria is a crime with greater interest but lesser punishment, while conventional criminality in Nigeria is a crime of lesser interest but comes with greater punishment. Drawing on the findings that if the war against corruption in Nigeria is to be effective, the status quo (injustice or bias against conventional offenders and the impunity enjoyed by the elites) must be addressed.

Key words: political corruption, conventional crimes, criminal justice.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………**

**CHAPTER ONE: CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN OVERVIEW ……………1**

* 1. **What is Corruption** …………………………………………….7
  2. **Origin of Corruption in Nigeria ………………………………..**8
  3. **Nigeria and the dilemma of Corruption** ………………………10
  4. **The evolution of anti-corruption war** …………………………12
  5. **Nigeria: Corruption and the resource curse**………………….14
  6. **National Response**………………………………………………19
  7. **Elites Protection**……………………………………………………………..25
  8. **Political Corruption and Conventional Criminality: Provision of The Criminal Code Act 1990** …………………………………………………………….27

**1.9 National Corruption Statistics ……………………………**30

**1.10 Reported EFCC Convictions: from 2013-2016 …………………….32**

**1.11 Conventional Crimes Statistics …………………………………………….33**

**CHAPTER TWO: Political Corruption: Critical Analysis oft he cause and Criminal Justice Responses……………..37**

**2.1 Radical Criminology: Crimes of the Elites and low-class**……………………………………………………… 37

**2.2 Political Corruption** …………………………………………. 37

**2.3 Conceptualising Corruption** …………………………………. 41

**2.4 Categories of Corruption ………………….** 48

**2.5 Causes of Political Corruption**  52

**2.6 Reducing Political Corruption**……………………………………………………57

**2.7 The Media** ………………………………….. …………………………. 62

**2.8 Corruption School of Thoughts……………………………………………..** 64

**2.9 International Responses**…………………………………… ……66

2.10 **Theoretical Framework ………………………………………………………70**

**CHAPTER THREE: Research Methodology**

**Introduction**

**3.1 Theoretical Standpoint: Social Constructionism**……………………………………………...84

**3.2 Media Space in Nigeria**………………………………. 84

**3.3 Selection of Data Source…………………………………………………** 86

**3.4 Date Sampling………………………………………………………………………** 86

3.5 **Sampling of Articles**……………………………………………...88

**CHAPTER FOUR: Data Analysis of Media Representation**

**CHAPTER FIVE : DISCUSSION ………………………………………….129**

**CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION ……………………………………141**

**REFERENCES ……………………………………………………………149**

**APPENDICES …………………………………………………………...169**

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# INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is a developing country with a huge population of close to 200 million people and diverse cultural heritage. As Africa most populous country, Nigeria is endowed with human and numerous mineral resources, with crude oil as its main foreign exchange earner. In spite of the huge revenue from oil, infrastructural inadequacy has remained a key feature of the Nigerian state. It is argued that, revenue derived from mineral resources, brings prosperity, economic growth and development and not the opposite (Esu,2017). In the case of Nigeria, this could be true on the condition that, the earnings from oil are not mismanaged or appropriated by those entrusted with the responsibilities to manage the earnings. But in the face of corruption it would result in the opposite – poverty, hunger and economic retardation.

One of the biggest challenges facing the Nigerian state due to poor living conditions, lack of access to basic amenities, poor living conditions, high crime rate, unemployment and death is corruption. Nigeria is perceived a corrupt country by international organisations such as TI (Transparency International), World Bank and IMF (International Monetary Fund). Nworu (2018) argues that, the impunity of those committing it are behind it. The various anti-corruption agencies established by acts of parliament in Nigeria to tackle corruption are a direct benefit of the western-led efforts under the auspices of the UN (United Nations) to globally fight corruption, in which Nigeria is a state party. The domestication or incorporation of those legal instruments resulted in the formation of the EFCC (Economic and Financial Crimes Commission) and ICPC (Independent Corrupt Practices Commission) as foundation to the fight against corruption.

The vast majority of Nigerians as a consequence of corruption have been deprived of their rights to the basic amenities of life in other words it has brought about poverty - a state of lacking in money or the means of affording the basic needs of life (Enofe, Oriaifoh & Omagbon, 2016). This implies that, the appropriation of public resources by public officials has impoverished nations because of selfish interest at the expense of the overall welfare of the people, while also denying people educational and employment opportunities, thereby exposing them to involving in all types of criminal activities.

The degree, impact and punishment for criminal conducts differ across jurisdictions, while some punishments are proportional to the crime committed, others appear disproportional. In Nigeria the issue of proportionality of sentences is not discussed widely. One of the reasons is that it is over-represented by the media. Under proportionality, the punishment fits the crime committed, for example convicting committing an offender to 25 hours community service for stealing £200. While for disproportionality, the punishment outweighs the crime committed, for example convicting and sentencing an offender to 30 years imprisonment for stealing a phone worth a £1,000. Or on the opposite, convicting and sentencing an official to a year in prison, or an option of fine of £3,000 for looting public funds running into millions of pounds. Those at the receiving end of this imbalance in the criminal justice system in Nigeria, often times are perpetrators of convention crimes as against perpetrators of corruption, technically creating a class issue.

# AIMS OF THE STUDY

The main aim of this research is to critically analyse the Nigerian criminal justice responses established to tackle political corruption and conventional crimes. This dissertation engages in policy responses and ideology of the criminal justice system in Nigeria. Ideology means a set of outlined ideas or rules that form or serve as the foundation to achieving the set goal of justice delivery for any form of criminal conduct in Nigeria’s criminal justice system. In this case, how perpetrators of crimes are brought to justice and crime itself is tackled in Nigeria is partly dependent on the ideology of the criminal justice system, from the structure, the composition and rules of engagement of all relevant institutions that are part of the fight against crimes, such as the police, anti-corruption agencies, and the courts.

The objectives of the study are:

i. To critically analyse the representation of political corruption and conventional criminality in the Nigerian print media.

ii. To critically evaluate the responses of criminal justice system in Nigeria to corruption and conventional crimes, including analysis of legislation and available statistical data

In order to achieve a critical analysis of the representations of political corruption and conventional crimes, a thematic content analysis was carried out.

This thesis is structured in the following way: Introduction, this introduces the general scope of the research briefly; chapter one discusses criminal justice, practical cases of proportionality and disproportionality, corruption in general and Nigeria specifically and government responses; chapter two discusses the causes and typologies of corruption and national responses ; chapter three discusses discusses conventional crimes; chapter four discusses the research method from its theoretical standpoint to the data collection processes; chapter five presents and analyses data on political corruption and conventional crimes; chapter six discusses key points and findings; chapter seven conclusion of thesis.

# CHAPTER ONE

**CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN OVERVIEW**

The fair or just responses to different types of criminal conducts remain a key component of the criminal justice system of many countries that have been advanced by the research of criminologists in the west. In the case of Nigeria, political corruption and conventional criminality are critically examined as crimes that are perpetrated by the elite/rich on the one end of the polar extreme and the poor on the opposite end of the polar extreme in the society.

The history of political corruption in post-colonial Nigeria reveals the vestiges of impunity, selfishness, greed, lack of political will, non-enforcement of laws, selective justice, military interference, arbitrary use of power, and but not limited to underdevelopment. The most surprising part to Nigerians is that the government has not been able to respond to the degree of how ‘fantastically corrupt’ Nigeria has been portrayed or reported by the media. To technically consider an anti-corruption war a success, it is expected that offenders in good numbers would have been convicted and sentenced on the ground of corruption, as well as the confiscation of properties. However, it is possibly fair to express that, the Nigerian experience is the opposite – where the people might struggle to count offenders (public officials) in jail for acts of graft or those that have completed their jail terms, more than five decades after Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain.

The researcher would have categorically stated that, politicians or public servants do not get punished for graft, only that one or two former state chief executives (governors) had been convicted, sentenced but given disproportionate option of fines. Conversely, one of the two was later granted a presidential pardon some few years later, and this drew or generated huge public outrage over such action and was deemed a setback to fighting corruption. But even with punishments, the number and names of big fishes are still not in sight, the proportionality of punishment to the criminal act of corrupt enrichment are also rare.

For further discussion, let’s take a short and closer examination on the UK and Nigeria, in terms of response. In the UK, some MPs in their numbers were prosecuted, convicted and sentenced for charges hinged on false expenses claims, to bring sanity and serve as deterrence to others. Can the government of Nigeria replicate the UK response as a country that is far way more corrupt? With the current height of impunity, it is likely to take years before this would or not happen at all with the calibre of legislators and their cohorts. The distinction

between the two countries above are partly evident in strong institutions, a fearless criminal justice system – that encompasses an active enforcement where the rule of law is supreme, and a system where the prevailing orientation in a way recognises and puts public interests above individual interests.

The personalisation of public wealth by the elites, might be perceived to have affected the socio-economic lives of the people, where resources that are meant to tackle social problems such as, unemployment and poverty end up in private pockets. And perhaps compel the helpless many and others who lack self-control into involving in street crimes, as their only alternative. However, the reaction of government, according to media reports have shown that the Nigerian criminal justice system has been much more impressive with the way and manner justice had been served to the perpetrators of street crimes (though with some reservations), who evidently are the common people. The system has become so unfair because while the highly placed are living in affluence through looted public funds, the common people are dying of frustration, hopelessness and much more discriminated against in the context of crime and punishment. And this was further reinforced by Jose Udaz, chair of Transparency International (2016) affirming *In too many countries people are deprived of their most basic needs and go to bed hungry every night because of corruption, while the powerful and corrupt enjoy lavish lifestyles with impunity.*

The above assertion tells us the whole story of how the greed and selfishness of those that the Nigerian people so much look up to for direction in Nigeria, as a result of trust end up paying the masses with pain, hardship, neglect, starvation and at most poverty. Are there no laws? Yes, there are, but it’ a question of the mindset integrity or probity of the enforcement agencies of government, where most times these agencies are corrupt – by betraying the trust reposed in them for material, financial or on sentimental basis. The public trust in Nigeria’s law enforcement is as good as pegging it at zero, because what can we make of the system after about fifteen years of anti-corruption war, when unemployment, hunger, disease, infrastructural decay are all on the increase as a fall-out of corruption? It becomes dysfunctional when a certain class of offenders – with the responsibility to oversee, control the resources of a state and govern generally are not penalised for their deviant behaviours.

The reaction of Nigerian government through its declaration of war on the alarming scale of graft can only be credited to the western world under the UN auspices. And the reaction of Nigerian government comes by police arrest/detention or punitive judicial pronouncements which are key ways to deter potential deviant behaviours and also slow down or check the activities of some regular criminals, which however may not be sufficient to stem the phenomenon, but combined with other proactive strategies. While the government reaction to cases of corruption has the international support and framework through the legislative establishment of different anti-corruption agencies – such as EFCC and ICPC in Nigeria, as offshoot of the general United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). But for conventional or street crimes in Nigeria, the framework has been more of a national one – with no such international legal instruments to aid the fight against these crimes but to rather rely on the national policing institutions and other local and community vigilante groups to address the problem of inadequacies.

Judicial response may either be long/short jail sentences, option of fines, as the case may be and capital punishment (which depends on the jurisdiction, where such is legally permitted). In the case of Nigeria, it is very common or widespread for petty offenders to be disproportionately treated with punishment to their acts of crime, contrary to how in most cases, economic and financial crimes are handled – crimes committed by the elites. A Nigerian, 23, was sentenced to death by hanging for stealing an LG smartphone worth 87,000 NGN (two hundred and fifty six pounds equivalent), after four years in detention (Dailymail, 31 March,2017). But this is however rare to find in corruption cases undergoing prosecution in Nigerian courts. But a possible explanation for his capital punishment, is likely because he’s a common Nigerian. Majority of serving and retired public officials that have landed Nigeria in a corruption-stricken situation, still dominate the socio-economic and political space freely, which may somewhat be attributed to the influence they wield, that street crime offenders do not possess.

Bunge (2006) argues that, to achieve a decline in crime rate the causal factors must be understood with social policies developed to address the causes instead of relying only on retribution, hence ‘traditional jail has proved to be a school of crime.’ Although Bunge is not against the practice or idea of punishment, but to maintain an equilibrium – where the issue of crime causation should be addressed along side the traditional approach of punishing deviant behaviours. And this proactive step in some cases could check the potential for people to indulge in criminality. For example creating job opportunities for the unemployed or jobless, creating the enabling environments for local and foreign investments, tackling out-of-school social problem, and investment in the welfare state, just to mention a few. Though criminality will not be completely eradicated, but would experience a drastic reduction.

While government response or reaction to criminality is justified and always expected, proportionality also elicits interest, possibly because of the unfair ways offenders may have been excessively punished over a deviant behaviour that does not require such degree of penalty. In fairness punishment is meant to be proportional to the crime committed not otherwise. On the contrary, a public official embezzles for instance, two million pounds and the official is eventually convicted and sentenced to one year in prison with an option of fine, ten thousand pounds. From whichever perspective this might be viewed, it sounds disproportional. Or a public official appropriates, for example, twenty five billion naira, and he or she is convicted and sentenced with an option of fine of, three million naira. And this in a way technically lacks deterrence. Of concern in the context of how offenders and citizens are handled, considering the decisions or pronouncements of legal bodies and other law enforcement institutions – is the issue of legitimacy.

Legitimacy as generally understood, is becoming an increasingly key subject in criminological discourse, particularly in the areas of ‘prison’ and ‘policing.’ The reason be that, it helps to secure crime free behaviours and collaboration from the people and jailed offenders via what is termed ‘procedural justice’ – *that is, quality of decision making procedures and fairness in the way citizens are personally treated by law enforcement officials’(*Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012). The quality of treatment and decisions made are such that borders on whether the people and those with criminal cases have been accorded fairness, fair hearing devoid of humiliation, harassment, jungle justice, but accorded the respect and dignity they are entitled to, by right. As a concept of high and increasing theoretical usefulness that has advanced criminology further in the research world, following Tom Tyler’s research break-through contribution ‘legitimacy’ in this context, according to Bottoms & Tankebe (2012) means ‘people’s perception as to whether law enforcement officials rightly have authority over them.’

The above generally applies to so many areas in criminal justice, where for instance people are arrested by the police and detained beyond the stipulated period permitted under the law - without trial; property search are carried out by the police may be without a search warrant, which of course lacks legal standing; a suspect is called a thief when he or she is yet to be tried and convicted; or making arrests without warrants, just to mention a few. All these put together, in a society where most of these practices are tolerated – legitimacy and its theoretical framework becomes threatened. Although there are so many different crimes out there in the society, it is a possibility that procedural justice may depend on the kind of crime being looked into by the law enforcement officers and the calibre of suspects, offenders/perpetrators involved

Corruption is ubiquitous, not just a Nigerian problem. But from available evidence, it is pervasive and systemic in Nigeria. To mention a few, some former political office holders were arraigned (Odusote,2013) on the grounds of corruption involving various sums of 11.5 billion naira (US $70 million); 32.8 billion naira (US $200 million); and 6.5 billion naira (US $40 million). The above mentioned figures may not account up to 0.1 percent of such cases in Nigeria. Although this research work is not out to dispute the widely held view that, corruption came to the front burner after the Cold War; but in the Nigerian context, corruption had always been an issue irrespective of any regime (military or civil rule) in power in post-colonial Nigeria. However, the political will to tackling the phenomenon, may be seen as a consequence or off-shoot of the global efforts geared towards its eradication. Nigeria under military regime or rule was described as a ‘predatory state.’ A predatory state *is a government that resorts to wholesale abuse of government power, and where the head of state rules and decrees much like the head of an organised crime ‘family’ using criminal individuals and syndicates to loot his country’s treasury* (Ebbe,1999).

From the definition given above, military administration seems to fit into it – where governance is always by decrees and not constitution. And expenditure and revenue receipts are not subject to any form of legislative scrutiny or approval by the various legislative houses, for example in Nigeria, where the constitution provides for a bicameral legislature. Democratic tenets or ideals are undermined – where the populace have no say on who governs; freedom of expression is limited, that anyone found to be against the government is hunted-down. From the date of independence (1960), the period of military interregnum had taken a lion’s share compared to Nigeria’s years of democratic sojourn. But such description of the military, overtly states what Nigeria may have experienced in terms of bad governance and corruption, hence this argument does not exonerate civil rule. However, the paradox of the whole issue is that, ‘corruption and bad governance are the two major reasons’ always used by the military while justifying its intervention in the politics of Nigeria. Above all, the emphasis on military does democratic and constitutional principles. From the definition above, the techniques and manners apart from the administrative system may not be different from corrupt practices or behaviours in contemporary Nigeria. While the government is doing everything internally possible to turn the tide – through policy reforms, legislations anti-corruption agencies and other relevant institutions, as part of the global crusade on corruption, relief is yet to occur – owing to the poor CPI by TI (Transparency International); and HDI (Human Development Index).

In the light of the poor rating, Nigeria garnered the following scores in years as follows: 1.6, 1999; 1.2, 2000; 1.0,2001; 1.6, 2002; 1.4, 2003; 1.6,2004; 1.9 2005; 2.2, 2006; 2.2,2007; 2.7,2008;2.5,2009;2.4,2010;2.4,2011;2.7,2012;2.5,2013;2.82,2014([www.transparency.org/cpi](http://www.transparency.org/cpi)).In 2004 ranking, Nigeria only beat Bangladesh and Haiti to the bottom reflecting evidence of pervasive and systemic corruption. Although the CPI has been heavily criticised for being too narrow and reliant on foreign executives to determine a country’s corruption level, but it still remains a global leading method. Based on that, there may be no reason to jettison the method. From the scores above from 1999-2014, it obvious that, Nigeria only recorded marginal improvement, marred by fluctuations – because the year-to-year changes recorded were not consistently sustained from the years under review. And as such, gives opportunity for questioning, as to how the entire anti-corruption framework was design, the modus operandi, what they have been doing, who the perpetrators are, the neutrality and the integrity of the anti-corruption fighters, and their entire achievements - are some of the questions that will be answered in the course of this research – considering the number of anti-corruption agencies and other arrangements put in place. How corruption came to rear its ugly head, and in a way became the biggest social vice in Nigeria, remains an unresolved issue. May be the failure of government to nip it in the bud may have created its path to this alarming level, as we search to uncover its likely root, while aiming at the goal of this research.

## 1.1 WHAT IS CORRUPTION?

While the prevalence of political corruption in Nigeria is very-known, but defining it has proved difficult, as a consequence of its varied perception (Ayoola,2013) across countries. The notion of no general or universally accepted definition of corruption, may not end soon, probably because it is complex. In the absence of no generally agreed definition, but there seem to be more attention given to the World Bank and IMF definitions, in terms of citations. However, this does not imply that, their definitions stand universal. But why is this common? Possibly, because their operational constituency covers the entire globe. The World Bank (1997) defines corruption as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain.’ Other definitions by academics, NGOs and public institutions remain similar – confined to those who have been entrusted with public trust and confidence, but abusing such for private benefits. Section 98 of the Criminal Code, cited in Okogbue (2007) as operational in the southern states of Nigeria, may be consistent with the World Bank definition in terms of interpretation, though different in wording. The section states: Any person –

* Being employed in the public service and being charged with the performance

Of any duty by virtue of the employment, not being a duty touching the administration of justice, corruptly ask, receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain any property of benefit of any kind for himself or any other person or account of anything already done or omitted to be done, or to be afterwards done or omitted to be done, by him in the discharge of the duties of his office, or

* Corruptly gives, confers or procures or promises or offers to give or confer, or to procure to,

upon or attempt to procure to, upon, or for, any person employed in the public

service, or to,

upon or for any other person, any property or benefit, of any kind on account of any

such act

or omission on the part of the person so employed, is guilty of felony, and is liable

to imprisonment for seven years

The description of political corruption in the Nigerian context, seem to be in tandem with most definitions, not only what amounts to corruption on the part of public official, but part of the consequences also. For example, in southern Nigeria, the criminal code stipulates a 7 year jail term for someone found or proven guilty. While the criminal code is used in the southern part, of Nigeria; the penal code is in use in Northern, Nigeria (Aigbovo and Atsegbua,2013). Although, no reason(s) were advanced by Aigbovo and Atsegbua, as to why the two distinct criminal codes are used differently in two separate geo-political zones in the same country. But further investigation revealed that, the restriction of the penal code was to cater for the historical and religious values, interests and beliefs of a predominantly muslim region – that is incompatible with the criminal code (Peters,2001). The history of the criminal and penal codes are not just recent legal instruments, but date back to colonial Nigeria. Although, Peters argues that, the ‘harsh mutilating punishments’ may not be brought to bear in the dispensation of justice (2001).

## 1.2 ORIGIN OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA

No one single source is responsible for the pervasive corruption in Nigeria. It is only fair to

say, irrespective of divergent views. It has both internal and external angles to it –considering the manner of execution and the players involved. As a contagious social disease, that is said to have eaten deep into the moral fabrics of the society through dishonest and criminal behaviours, different accounts have been offered as to how it started in Nigeria – bordering on extrinsic and intrinsic factors. Mohammed (2013) somewhat ascribes the pervasive corrupt practices in Nigeria as a consequence of the subjugation or insecurity suffered by ethnic minorities from the major ethnic nations. That the sense of insecurity propelled the minorities into manipulating their ways to stay with ethnic majorities – who used their strength to take charge of the system. The lack of trust created as a result of the squabbles set the stage for corrupt behaviours. In view of Mohammed’s assertion, politics of the ethnic groups with the highest numbers to determine how resources are allocated at the exclusion of those with lesser numbers, instead of anchoring it on leadership qualities, skills, and path to socio-economic and political transformation may have set in motion the race to loot public treasury for personal use, at the expense of public good. However, the diverse nature of Nigeria, would have been tapped into (as strength) to catapult the country to a higher level of economic advancement, than who gets the jumbo share of the ‘national cake’ as it’s mostly called.

As a follow up to the above factor, Omisore (2013) opines that, corruption in the Nigeria was a product of British colonialists – who tampered with the indirect rule system by dislodging traditional chiefs who were not ready to do their bidding for the enthronement of ‘weaklings’ with the will or determination ‘to lick the boots of the British.’ That the British were not interested in who had the following of the subjects; or chiefs that were capable to deliver on the jobs in terms of their intellects to direct the affairs, but those that were on ground to execute British interests. Secondly, the discovery of oil in commercial quantities was also put forward as one of the sources where corruption emanated from. However, the author failed to back up his assertion of traditional chiefs that were removed (where, when and how) to pave way for the actualisation of British interests. Another silent point being made with the trace of corruption to colonialism, is the argument that precolonial Nigerian society was devoid of acts of corruption. Omisore, also took a step further arguing that, the British did not just stop at introducing corruption, but ‘they taught Nigeria how to practise it’(ibid).

However, from Omisore’s assertion, there was no hint of where the colonisers had applied force,(if any) for Nigerians to learn how to be corrupt or the method used to impart such knowledge and skills. Furthermore, if there was any such thing, it’s a thing of choice to either accept or reject. Not even an instance was mentioned or cited – where, when and how the colonialists taught Nigerians how to be corrupt and live with corruption. It is easy to blame anyone for being responsible for the problem of corruption, but difficult to buttress such claims with evidence Again, there is always a chance to outgrow abnormality in an objective sense, after fifty five years of independence, what has the Nigeria state done now? Or what did she do two or three decades ago? One would not expect anything less than *good governance, transparency and accountability, legislative oversight, judicial reforms, civil service reform, societal reform, promoting ethical principles* (Ayoola,2013) as elements that can shrink corruption. Although Ayoola’s assertion remain helpful to fighting corruption, but it should be of note that, they are not exhaustive. But, he however, went further to hint on the ‘cashless policy’ initiative, designed to reduce handling as introduced by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), in 2012 as part of effort to curb corruption, and other numerous objectives of : promoting e-payment; cutting cost as regards to banking; and discouraging of other risks associated with the physical handling of cash (2013). Although the scheme sounds good – in terms of technologically connecting Nigeria to other advanced economies of the world, but the challenges or risks are also enormous, such as: phishing, hacking etc. But how it could convincingly curb corruption, in view of the intricacies surrounding corruption, is a subject of another debate. Does it stop over-inflation of contracts, discretional approval of funds without due process, appropriation of funds for ghost projects, nepotism, selfish interest, abandoning of projects after funds have been collected, unilateral awarding of contracts without due process, excess borrowing? It can’t be exhausted, as many as possible could be mention. Trying to put the blame on one source for more than five decades of rot may sound absurd. Of course in the blame game, it might sound difficult to exonerate anyone, because they seem interlinked in many ways.

Further to the incorporation of corruption in Nigeria, by the British colonialists – as asserted above by Omisore, Ekeh (1975) in his work :*colonialism and the two publics in Africa…*, corroborated such claim. The conceptualisation of the term ‘two publics’ represent separately the pre-colonial and colonial African societies and their political characteristics. For a clearer understanding, Ekeh opines that, the ‘private realm’ and ‘public realm’ are governed by same ethical under-structure going by western standards or traditions. The implication of this is that, what is perceived right in the private world is also considered right in the public world. – as universally espoused and strongly anchored on ‘christian beliefs.’ Conversely, in the African context such theoretical postulation has no moral place in Africa – because the private world was seen as a distinct one from the public world. As a consequence, Ekeh rather advocated the existence of only two public worlds – with distinct moral connections to the private domain. Ekeh referred to the two publics as: *primordial public –* where *primordial groupings , ties and sentiments determines the individual public behaviour;* the *civic public -*  which *is amoral and lacks the generalised moral imperatives in the private realm and in the primordial public.* The compendium of it all is that, the two different domains represent two different historical/political eras. The primordial public is conceptualised as the precolonial period in Africa’s history inundated with honesty, respect for institutions, transparency, accountability, adherence to rules, and over all observation of high moral standards. The civic public was adjudge a colonial construct characterised by administrative structures, security institutions and an absolute moral disconnect from the private sphere.

Overall, the argument or case being made by Ekeh, is that, corruption is alien, not an indigenous vice, because before the coming of the colonialists, there was nothing of such, as people lived communally with high sense of trust. Although the critics may be right in their own way of trying to say if they had not introduced the phenomenon into the system, it would have been a different Nigeria with a better image amongst comity of nations. However, some people tend to promote corruption using colonisation as an escape path to avoid blames. Further to the above, the kind of communal setting that people lived in was such that was small and homogenous in nature – where people were familiar with each other with a strong sense of bond in pre-colonial context. But the colonial context saw the coming together of different ethnic nationalities who had been on their own before coming together with a strong sense of diversity and heterogeneity. This somehow seems to be missing in the narrative, failing to recognise that the different ethnic groups had their different world views.

## 1.3 NIGERIA AND THE DILEMMA OF CORRUPTION

Nigeria like any other developing country is no exception to the alarming global phenomenon of corruption. Corruption is so alarming that, people in high positions of authority may want to swap their positions for lower jobs (specifically in a developing country) because of the availability of opportunities for corrupt incentives as revealed by Svensson (2005),in his ‘pilot survey project’ conducted in a Thai company where a high ranking executive officer ‘exclaimed’: ‘I hope to be reborn as a custom official’. The question is why would a top ranking official want to do that? The problem is multidimensional, as the absence of institutional framework for tackling a problem like this represent a tiny opportunity or opportunities created for corrupt enrichment may not be far in this regard. Is the Nigerian state different? Although no such case by Svensson has been brought to the know of this research in Nigeria, but this does not give the country a clean bill of health or dispel that such can’t happen.

In reflection, Inoboka and Ibegu (2011) argue that corruption is ‘deeply’ instilled in the Nigerian system. It is imperative not to apportion blames, defend the country or say it is a universal problem, but to ask critically why the phenomenon has been allowed to fester? In the light of the above question, Achebe (1983,p.22 cited in Agbiboa 2012) stated, *the trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or water or air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal example which are hallmarks of true* *leadership*.

X-raying or exploring Achebe’s position, Nigeria is resource-endowed but focused leadership has remained a challenge. Good leadership matters a lot in governance, but just one side of a coin, though the activities of political godfathers have not been helpful in this situation, who Olarinmoye (2008) describes as ‘go-betweens’ hijacking the power of the electorate for their selfish desires. Azeez (2011) dubs this type of leadership where the self always comes before national interest as ‘parochial.’ The implication here is that, once individual interest is given priority attention over public or national interest, it is argued that, deviation from rules could set in – thereby paving way for abuse of power. The other side of the coin (followership) was not brought into the picture by Achebe. Followership also has its own part to play – because no leader leads an empty space or vacuum. Leadership appraisal lies on the people and any leader found underperforming should legitimately be punished through various means. One of such means is to vote such leader out during election. This research argues that, followership should also be considered when analysing political corruption in Nigeria, hence it can make and unmake leaders. But of concern is the financial demand (as a condition or persuasion) by a section of the electorate, from politicians to be voted into power is quite unimaginable. Secondly, pressure from political supporters, friends, and relatives – who often times request for material/financial assistance, with the thinking that politicians/representatives are money-bags is another likely phenomenon. So when these pressures are not markedly tamed politicians/representatives run the risk of being lured into borrowing - to meet their demands. And the consequence of such indebtedness partly pushes politicians into looting spree, while subtly using that as a factor to rationalise such criminality, at the detriment of infrastructural development. Some of these aforementioned issues, ideally are factors that can be examined and resolved, but partly due to lack of effective regulatory institutions and other associated factors, it has become a serious challenge.

Proper understanding of corruption in Nigeria may require some historical knowledge of governance in pre-independence and post-colonial Nigeria, with emphasis on political structures; regimes (military and civil rules);corruption cases (if any) at the early stage of democratic experiment and consequently government responses. In the light of the above Porta (1996), affirms the existence of ‘political corruption’ before the coming on board of democracy in human history. “ The history of corruption seems important in explaining the current corruption levels”(Herzfeld and Weiss,2003:629). Arguably this technically supports the fact that, political corruption is not a recent phenomenon but a problem that has long existed. However, for weak and non-visionary leaders in Nigeria and anywhere else this could be employed as a defensive mechanism, when faced with the inability to roll out structures, institutions and all other legitimate means that can puncture or drag back the growing threats of corruption. What is dilemma referred to in this subheading?

According to an online dictionary, the term ‘dilemma’ means, ‘a situation in which a difficult choice has to be made between two or more alternatives, especially ones that are equally undesirable.’ In this context, it has become a serious decision for the state to make – either to kick out corruption by sending its officials to jail and getting their loots recovered; or to maintain the statusquo – allowing flourish with its attendant consequences with state backing. Anti-corruption, if the government is to combat corruption remains a pathway to unsettle officials who are corrupt. In the Nigerian context, it is nothing new but dates back to independence showing efforts made by civilian and military regimes. as shown in the subsequent section.

## 1.4 THE EVOLUTION OF ANTI-CORRUPTION WAR

A Look down the history lane, some of the founding fathers/leaders of Nigeria (pre and post- independence Nigeria) were at different instances accused of corrupt behaviours. For example the Foster Sutton Tribunal of Enquiry of 1956 into the African Continental Bank (ACB) accused Nnamdi Azikwe for abuse of office – in the wake of channelling jumbo sums of Eastern Nigerian government funds into his own bank (ACB) to resolve the challenge of ‘operating capital’; similarly Awolowo was also accused of corrupt enrichment by the G.B.A Coker Commission of Inquiry 1962 into some public corporations for alleged corrupt enrichment in the Western region of Nigeria (Osoba,1996).

In the light of the above pace set, other subsequent regimes also came up with similar steps, such as the promulgation of the *Corrupt Practices Decree of 1975; the Ethical Revolution of President Shehu shagari in 1981-1983; the War Against Indiscipline of General Muhamadu Buhari in 1984; the National Orientation Movement by General Ibrahim Babangida in 1986; the Mass mobilisation for Social Justice and Economic Reconstruction also by General Ibrahim Babangida in 1987 and the War Against Indiscipline and Corruption in 1996 by General Sani abacha* (Aigbovo and Atsegbua,2013)*.* Post military era bodies such as, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act 2003 and Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission Act 2000 – all saddled with the responsibilities to combat corruption and other fraudulent practices in Nigeria.

The resolve of the Nigerian government to establish the EFCC and ICPC can be linked or credited to the UN anti-corruption architecture, which injected more life into the anti-corruption war with a different approach involving the entire globe as never been seen or existed in the past. As a state party, whether the aim of the UN has been met by Nigeria remains a serious issue for consideration. The investment by the UN to combat corruption has not only benefited nations only, but a huge impact to regional and sub-regional groups. For example, the African Union (AU) Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, adopted in 2003, while at the sub-regional level of West Africa, is GIABA (Iner-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa).

One would expect that, from the number of institutions mentioned above, there should be success stories, in terms of the number of public officials arrested, tried, convicted, jailed and properties confiscated in relation to financial embezzlement or misconduct. GIABA 2014 report decried the ‘lack of prosecution and conviction’ in view of the huge amount of suspicious transaction reports a symptom of the problem Nigeria faces with anti-money laundering. The opposite of it all is that, most of the leaders who could be called retrogressive elements, are same leaders pretending to fight corruption and are still being felt in the political scene of modern day Nigeria.

In the absence of deterrence, it may be logical to argue that such pervasive phenomenon that was not tackled and allowed to mastitise could be perceived as a carry-over into modern day Nigeria. In the midst of the clamour for self determination from the British colonial masters part of the issues pondered upon was corruption within the Nigerian shore and Africa at large; which they also used as a ‘moral justification’ for governance – when the African political class started fighting for independence (Tignor,1993). While others point accusing fingers on the British for stoking and bringing in corruption, from Tignor’s assertion, the colonialists had relied or given corruption as a reason for their continuity in power at the call for independence by African political leaders, which indirectly dispels the notion of perceiving the British as being responsible for corruption in Nigeria. The researcher might not be in position or have the overwhelming evidence needed to say who actually caused corruption in Nigeria, but the position remains that everyone has a blame when discussing the phenomenon.

## 1.5 NIGERIA: CORRUPTION AND THE RESOURCE CURSE

The concept of ‘resource curse’ relates well and seems very significant in the understanding or study of political corruption in Nigeria. Idemudia et al.(2010),posit that ‘the centrality of oil in national politics, against the backdrop of pre-oil politics, has facilitated the full manifestation of the resource curse.’ Ikelegbe (2005) in his analysis of oil endowed region and crises ,describes ‘oil’ and ‘gas’ as ‘the lifeblood of the nations revenues, economy and national survival’, with a GDP of 40%, and 70% income. His description presents oil as the principal foreign exchange earner – in which the Nigerian state wholly relies on. Over-dependence or a mono-product economy breeds a lot of problems, like who gets the biggest share and the neglect of other sectors. This may also have similarly gained the support of Al-kasim, Soreide and Williams (2013), reiterating that ‘weak governance and corruption’ remain a strong factor in the disparity that exists among oil producing countries in terms of the general wellbeing of the populace. X-raying the position of Al-kasim, Soreide and Williams seeing bad governance and abuse of public office for personal interests may not be disputed, going by the mass of available evidence in this regard, and concerted efforts by concerned governments globally to contain the phenomenon. The position or argument being made by the authors is that – there are countries with oil resource and do not evidently suffer from the resource curse. However, the authors skipped the model adopted by those countries to jump over the resource curse.

The link between resource curse and corruption has never been overstated. Abdih, Chami and Dagher (2012), posit that oil windfall ‘plays a buffer role between the government and the citizens’- by spending such oil income (that is as surrogate for taxes), in financing huge unproductive public sector, which eventually leads to opportunities for high corruption and rent seeking activities. Creating massive public sector without checks and balances, may be a subtle way of sending invitation to government officials to milk the system dry. It has also been posited that the more remittances a country receives, the weaker the institutions for corruption control; government productivity; and a total disregard for the rule of law (Abdih et al.2008; Berdiev, Kim and Chang,2013). The implication is that, the more the financial inflows a country receives (remittances), the more the opportunities created for graft on the part of government. The points above may be strong but not empirically substantiated, as to how it practically results in looting of state treasury. Ideally, the issue of remittances should not be a factor that promotes corruption, but one that results in economic growth and development.

Although, Al-kasim et al. further acknowledged the rigorous task of sourcing for data as to the correlation that exist between oil production and corruption, but they however, depicted that most of the data on ‘political and regulatory corruption’ are sourced through ‘generalised perceptions-based surveys’(ibid). The researcher’s argument is that, the difficulty faced in trying to obtain information as stated above, may be ascribed to the confidentiality of oil matter; the existence of some high profile illicit deals; although freedom of information is available. Every country of the world is naturally and differently endowed with one mineral or the other. One serious task is to manage the proceed of such wealth; and another is not to carelessly allow it breed other social problems: conflicts (war or ethnic crises),and corruption which may threaten the corporate existence of a country. Ross (2008) states that, there have been no decrease in conflicts afflicting oil-dependent states; but such has succeeded in causing socio-economic and political damages, thereby making it quite possible for militants to bankroll their illicit activities. The problem of oil or the concept ‘resource curse’ is very common with the developing world. However, Canada and Norway are advanced countries that have been able to manage situations like this without havoc, arguably due to their diversified economy and literate population (ibid 2008). We should be perturbed and concerned by how some of these resource-rich countries have been able to overcome resource-linked problems: corruption, conflicts, insurgency etc. But in the setting of Nigeria, albeit so many factors are involved, it could be argued that opportunism is exploited, which on its own is perceived a symptom or consequence of institutional flaws or failings.

What is resource curse? Shaxson (2007) argues that, it is the inability or failure to make judicious use of resources for the overall development of a country, instead bringing about underdevelopment. In the number of countries involved in this mess, Nigeria is used as a point of illustration: in a study conducted by IMF on Nigeria, it was realised that between 1970 (the period of oil boom) and 2000 – Nigeria earned $350 billion, with income per capita not commensurate (fell), followed by a sharp increase in inequality: for the period under review, 36% of the people were poor; while in the year 2000 it skyrocketed to 70% (ibid 2007). What must have happened to this huge oil wind fall? Was it given away as gifts to individuals or charity organisations? Or was it invested or used for debt servicing? These questions are seriously begging for answers. But to say the least - it is only worthwhile, to note that something shady may have partially occurred to such estimated proceed realised from the sale of oil spanning through a period of three (3) decades. However, Kochan and Goodyear (2011),outline the following: corruption, conflict or violent instability and absence of competitiveness with the non-oil sector of the economy – as products of ‘resource curse’ or ‘paradox of plenty.’ Apart from the above outlined factors, the oil phenomenon has deepened the division in Nigeria, a situation where the oil producing states of the Niger-Delta, keep agitating for more derivation from the present 13% to a more bigger figure and somehow see those from other regions, from an economic sense as parasites – because they contribute little or nothing to the national coffers.

In a survey conducted by Asekunowo and Olaiya (2012), to understand the inability of Nigeria to record economic growth and development as an oil-dependent state, while countries like Botswana, Chile and Norway have done so, suggest that: ‘institutional difficulties, voracity effect, excessive spending, excessive borrowing, and fractionalisation of resource curse’ as likely factors. While Li (2013), suggests that ‘abundance of natural resources’ is not responsible for poor economic performance of a country, but ‘incentives’ created for such developmental failures. Citing further problems of: corruption, conflicts, poverty, unemployment, poor life expectancy and deplorable medical service provision – as problems natural resource dependent countries are confronted with, in which Nigeria is a part of. Similarly, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003 in Asekunowo and Olaiya,2012), suggest available empirical data of a convincing negative relationship exists between oil and economic growth and development as a result of its adverse effects on institutional framework. Although, no statistical data were given in this regard. There seem to be a version of the resource curse called the ‘Dutch disease’ if not discussed may readily not give a full template of understanding surrounding the resource curse discourse.

The Dutch disease seems present in most natural resource rich countries of the world, especially when resources are not properly, effectively and efficiently managed except for a few countries. The disease is a symbol of the negative result of resource income in the following ways: appreciation of currency and its unattractive impact in the competitive market; unstable prices of goods and services and finally it effects on the political environment (Shaxson 2007; Frankel 2010, cited in Asekunowo and Olaiya,2012). Though, the term was coined originally to delineate the temporary challenges faced by the Netherlands when it found ‘huge gas reserves off its northern coast in 1959’(Asekunowo and Olaiya,2012). As a way forward in unlocking or defying the resource curse - Boschini, Pettersen and Roine (2013),suggest that reversing this trend require a high degree of ‘institutional quality’. They went further to assert that the merits and demerits of resource curse depend on ‘appropriability’(institutional and technical appropriability) Boschini, et al. (2013).The opinion of the authors is quite full of prospects in terms of how to reduce the problem – concentrating on delivering on standards in every sense of institutionalisation. However, quality institutions only won’t give the maximum and most desired results, but must be widened to accommodate other areas, such as, positive orientation on the part of officials. Kolstad and Wiig (2009), suggest that, reversing the evil of resource curse – transparency is key to tackling the problem of corruption. They also acknowledged that, transparency alone will not yield the anticipated outcome, but must be followed up with result oriented reforms. Reforms should not be carried out for the sake that reforms are required, but must be founded on some basic fundamental principles: accessibility, rule of law, and a strong punitive workable framework – that is capable of deterrence.

Contrary to the resource curse debate, there seems to be an ideological shift or gravitation to the ‘governance curse’- which is a way of oil companies dodging the blame and shifting it to politicians. Andre Madec (Exxon Mobil spokes person) frames it: ‘We don’t like to call it the oil curse. We prefer to call it a “governance curse’’ ’(Shaxson 2007). The governance approach draws support from the position of Okpanachi (2011),in the context of Nigeria’s oil industry, specifically during the civil rule of ex-president Obasanjo 1999 to 2007 – policies were put in place to reverse the very popular problem called ‘resource curse.’Such policies according to Okpanachi, were to address ‘the bum and bust cycle of oil and lower volatility by de-linking public expenditure from oil revenue through the “oil price-based fiscal rule”.’ The term ‘oil price-based fiscal rule’ denotes the disconnection of spending or expenditure from ‘oil revenue fluctuations’ by government at all levels in Nigeria (IMF 2008). However, the development in this area was never equated with, in the areas of: security and safety of lives and oil installation, transformation of oil producing areas, transparency and accountability in the use of oil income (Okpanachi 2011). This without doubt, could be offered as a reason for those trying to shift the debate because the rules and principles of good governance have been disdained.

In the light of the above, and from all indications, the problem of resource curse may best be seen as a product of mismanagement – through various dishonest and shady human activities. Shaxson went further to buttress that, the new unit of analysis is not centred on the ‘behaviour’ but the ‘impersonal’ oil cash coming in, that is the problem. And that to properly decode what corruption entails – two things are absolutely required: not judging actors who get involved in corruption by their behaviour, but such should be based on ‘externally derived standards’; secondly, that corruption should be perceived from a global view point – ‘especially in the context of international financial flows’ (ibid 2007). Shaxson’s suggestions seems powerful – as they reflect some of the collaborations that exist between nations, regions and the world at large in trying to contain the phenomenon of corruption. As the former World bank President (James Wolfensohn) once said in his speech of 1996, ‘Let’s not mince words – we need to deal with the cancer of corruption.’ Though not all issues about corruption could be placed in the context of cash flows internationally, because most times some of these deals that lack transparency and accountability are exhibited internally. For instance, the public official who approaches a bank for loan with attached detailed information on how the loan will be spent, secures the loan but turns around to divert the loan for personal use because of the protection or immunity guaranteed under the constitution of Nigeria, may not need to look outside for blame.

However, Shaxson did not unpack what he meant by ‘international flows’ was it about bribes offered by foreign investors? Or foreign exchange earned through export? Or remittances? But it could be assumed either way. There may be no mono-dimensional way to silent corruption, but the instrumentality of the law can never be compromised if we are to win the war against corruption in the world and Nigeria in particular. Nigeria as a signatory to so many treaties within and outside Africa has done some work when it comes to legislation or creating anti-corruption instruments through the various organs of government. But one fundamental thing is to attempt to find out the nature, functions and how well and successful these institutions ave been.

## 1.6 NATIONAL RESPONSE

In a bid to key into the global framework of tackling corruption, Nigeria, as a state party to the UN convention against corruption instituted two core anti-graft agencies: Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission(ICPC) Act 2000; and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act 2003. Although external influence played a vital part in the anti-corruption crusade, but internally, the avalanche of evidences bordering on financial misappropriation prior to 1999, (the birth of the fourth republic); and the soft handling of those indicted by a probe panel set up by the regime of General Abdusalami Abubakar – between 1998 and 1999 on corruption matters was instrumental to the anti-corruption fight by the democratic administration of former president Olusegun Obasanjo (Azeez,2011). By virtue of the parliamentary acts establishing the two agencies, the ICPC came into operation first – to traditionally combat corruption, years later the EFCC followed to address the shortcomings of ICPC; to address the growing problem of money laundering, cyber crime codenamed (‘yahoo’) and advance fee fraud (419) which was notorious in Nigeria (EFCC,2002 cited in Folarin,2009). As a national anti-graft agency with huge responsibility to tackle corruption, it has outlived different presidential administration, how has it fared under the different regimes?

The Obasanjo administration which came on board in 1999, established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2003, with the appointment of Ribadu as the chairman of the commission. The task to rid Nigeria of corruption by EFCC was perceived as discriminatory – hence it was deemed a tool employed to hunt those that were seen to be opposing him (Michael, Hezekiah and Chukwuma, 2019). However, in a study conducted in Nigeria to evaluate the performance of EFCC under distinct leadership administrations, former President Obasanjo was perceived to have given the anti-corruption agency a free hand to operate, but was however silent on whether it was effective or not – with a mean score of 2.83, implying not too satisfactory response on those who agree and disagree (Umar,2015). The EFCC in 2005 is said to have first stamped its authority, following the arrest, prosecution, conviction and sentence of former Inspector General of Police, to six months, in prison (Amaraegbu,2011). And the subsequent indictment of former Minister of Education, Prof. Fabian Osuji; and former Minister of Housing, Mobolaji Osomo (Umar,2015). Although the EFCC was all over Nigeria, going after politicians under the Obasanjo regime, a section of the public was of the view that former President Obasanjo personalised it to witch-hunt politicians that were perceived to be against his administration. And those that were loyal to former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, the likes of Former Governor Ladoja of Oyo State; former Governor Fayose of Ekiti; former Governor DSP Alamieyeseigha - who were all impeached and charged for corruption (Amaraegbu,2011).

Former President Y’Adua on assumption of office in 2007, promised to tackle corruption in his quest to change the perception of Nigeria as a corrupt country. In furtherance of his intention, some indicted former governors were charged by the EFCC. However, in August 2007 the Y’Adua government challenged the constitutionality of the prosecuting powers of the EFCC and ICPC through the minister of justice in spite of its prosecuting powers incorporated in its act of establishment, invalidated it and ultimately requested the EFCC to always ask for authorization from the office of the attorney general of the federation. And this negatively affected the anti-corruption spirit of the Y’Adua administration (Umar,2015). Was this really helpful? Or was it consistent with former President Y’Adua’s earlier promise to Nigerians to tackle corruption? From common sense, it is an absolute step back from the fight against corruption and a signal that, corruption was fighting back through hidden interests.

Unfortunately, former President Y’Adua could not complete his four years mandate as a result of death, which led to the swearing in of Goodluck Jonathan (then Vice President under former President Y’Adua) as president to complete the four years term in office, as provided in the constitution of Nigeria. Upon completion, Goodluck Jonathan, contested for a fresh four years mandate under the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) which he won in the year 2011. Farida Waziri, who was the chairperson of the EFCC under the Y’Adua administration into the Goodluck Jonathan leadership, was perceived to have run the agency in a clever fashion – because she did not witch-hunt but was rather transparent by publishing the number of cases under prosecution and the ones inherited from the pioneer chairman, Nuhu Ribadu (Umar,2015). As the chairperson of EFCC, Farida Waziri’s head of the anti-graft agency saw the receipt of 5,000 petitions, investigation of 2,103, prosecution of 306, 2,000 arrested, while 100 corrupt public officials were convicted, according to anti-corruption handbook (Nwoba and Monday,2018). Farida Waziri, in 2011 was quoted to have recovered $11 billion from corrupt public official, notwithstanding her remarkable rating, for her high competence, in 2012 Farida Waziri was abruptly removed as the chairperson and replace with Ibrahim Lamorde by former President Goodluck Jonathan without justification (Umar,2015). The Nigerian public was dissatisfied with the performance of EFCC under former President Goodluck Jonathan’s regime with a mean score of 2.90. And this further aligned with former President Obasanjo’s position that the former lacked the political will to fight corruption – hence the subsidy scam between oil marketers and Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and other issues of corruption (Umar,2015). It may be right to say, no administration in Nigeria (whether civilian or military) could be described as saint or corruption free. The same Obasanjo who accused Jonathan of not being serious with fighting corruption, was also accused during his administration of being selective in his anti-corruption fight and over-ambitious in his bid to influence the legislature to amend the constitution in order to pave the way for his third term in office as president, but it failed. In 2015, former President Good Jonathan was defeated at the polls in his attempt for another term in office, which led to the emergence of President Buhari’s administration in 2015.

Under the Buhari administration, a new chairman of Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Ibrahim Magu was appointed in acting capacity. In President Muhammadu Buhari’s inaugural speech, he was pained by the damage done by corruption on Nigeria, promising to fight the evil. In 2016, a whistleblowing policy was put in place by the ministry of finance – to expose corrupt public officials and their corrupt deals. The whistleblowing policy was centrally designed to recover looted funds. And it ensured that whistleblowers were rewarded for the exposure, and also protected from their employers and bosses as the case may be (Michael, Hezekiah and Chukwuma,2019). The minister of information, Lai Mohamed, enumerated the achievements of the Buhari administration in the fight against corruption, specifically looted funds. He said, fifty billion naira (N50,000,000,000) equivalent to (138,500,000). With a further breakdown as follows: £74,000 and $9,772,000, from the house of Andrew Yakubu – former Group Managing Director of Nigeria Nation Petroleum Corporation (NNPC); N449,770,000 (four hundred and forty nine million, seven hundred and seventy thousand naira), an amount more than a million dollars recovered at Legico shopping plaza in Victoria Island (V.I), Lagos. In addition, the sum of $43,449,947, £27,800, N23,218,000 – which amounts to $64,546.04 – discovered at 7B No.16, Osborne Road, Ikoyi, Lagos (Michael, et al,2019). In general, the performance of EFCC varies across the distinct administrations from 1999 (the beginning of the fourth republic) till date, based on the total number of prosecutions, recoveries and convictions. However, it is the position of this research that, the strand selective behaviour in the fight against corruption has been a major weakness that runs through all the regimes since the inception of EFCC, 2003 till date.

As part of government efforts to stamp out corruption, two anti-corruption agencies – the ICPC & EFCC were established. However, there have been reports in the media criticising the rationale behind the establishment of the two bodies. One may want to ask in the past one decade how many corrupt public officials have they prosecuted and jailed? Or the number of corrupt officials investigated and whose properties or assets were confiscated? These may be difficult to answer. But what could be argued is that, there have been one or two cases of pardon as reported in the media for convicted political office holders (see Nigerian *Punch* Dec.13 2013). More interestingly, the agencies have been described as tools (‘political spanners’) in the hands of government to hunt-down opposition figures; while the anti-corruption war is somewhat being perceived as a selective combat (Folarin,2009).

However, in contrast to the perception of the anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria – as presidential tools for conducting war against or victimising the opposition in the political space, the Hong Kong experience was one of hope and change – where a state that was seemingly pervaded with corruption (a generally accepted norm) was transformed into a ‘clean’ one with the inauguration and help of Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974 (Mao, Wong and Peng,2013). If a country like Hong Kong could achieve such feat, when there was no globally driven legal instrument engineered by the UN, then why the difference in Nigeria going by media report? Is it lack of political will, vested interest, wrong approach, policies without teeth or corruption of the anti-corruption agencies themselves? The answer to these questions may at best be multi-dimensional. How replicable is the experience of Hong Kong in Nigeria? There is no one particular way to achieve this, but one of such approaches, would be allowing national interest to supersede every other interest. Or what could be perceived as the selfless approach, irrespective of cultural or geographical distinction.

As part of efforts to strengthen government parastatals, minimise cost, and have a small government, Nigerian government inaugurated a body – Presidential Committee on the Rationalisation and Restructuring of Federal Government Parastatals, in all it recommended that, ICPC and EFCC be scrapped - arguing that, the anti-corruption agencies were doing the job of the police in Nigeria( see Nigerian *Punch* April 17,2012). Although the above reasons may seem valid on the grounds of – making savings, duplication of functions, and reducing the size of government and usurping the powers of the police, but it somehow creates a feeling of suspicion if examined deeply. How? The police has been there for ages before the establishment of the two agencies, EFCC and ICPC, and the presidential panel that was set up did not give reasons over the failure of the Nigerian Police Force to function as an anti-corruption body prior to the establishment of EFCC and ICPC. It could be counter-productive to rely on the police to fight corruption, because the police was ranked the highest of all public officials in Nigeria that collect or accept bribes – following the result of a survey that was conducted in Nigeria in across the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria (UNODC,2017).

More importantly, when there are agencies of these nature, framed to punch corruption in a manner that will inculcate fear into potential violators, it becomes a cul-de-sac when those who are suppose to safeguard state resources from pilfering are much more accused of corruption (Inoboka and Ibegu,2011). The plan to condense the two anti-corruption commissions did not materialise, but whether it will be achieved in the future is what can’t be told – as such will be determined by a couple of factors: the political will of leaders, ability to achieve bipartisanship, and other known and unknown vested interests.

The Washington consensus (that is a Western international development organisation based in Washington) have also been quite instrumental in tackling the problem of corruption. In the early 1990, they had come together to identify and promote economic development in the developing countries of the world – through various economic policy plans of: trade liberalization, privatisation of public owned enterprises, fiscal discipline and investment in education. However, it became disappointing, when it realised that the goal (which is the idea of having to measure up with western nations developmentally), was yet to be achieved. And many key players were of the strong conviction that, the prescribed development initiatives were distorted as a result of corruption (Azfar, Lee and Swamy,2001).

As a signatory to different treaties, and member state to different international bodies aimed at fighting corruption, money laundering and organised crime, the consequence of such membership culminated in the establishment of different anti-corruption agencies and legislations. Apart from EFCC and ICPC, others are: Money Laundering Act 2011 and the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal, the Public Procurement Act (PPA), and the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI).The issue is how well have they been put into use? Nigeria is perceived as a country not mobilising or putting into full use all weapons at its arsenal to trounce corruption. That many cases of corruption against the elites have not made much progress or head way, while the few ones that have been prosecuted and convicted, have either been given little or no jail term, casting much doubt on the judiciary (Odusote,2013). I may want to disagree with the position Odusote, in respect to Nigeria not using all it has to fight corruption. Nigeria has all it takes to fight corruption, but the concern should be that of effectiveness, sincerity and honesty. Apart from the establishment of the above agencies; introduction of more legislation and the role of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), the judiciary is much more relied on to give the final blow (conviction and sentencing) to suspects if found guilty of corruption. But for such to happen would require that, the cases are proved beyond all reasonable doubts. People may have different views of how to define a successful anti-corruption crusade. But one thing that may be certain is that prisons are not built to be empty but for all criminals – whether violent or non-violent. It is not out of context to argue that, the number of people sentenced also form part of the success stories. From Odusote’s assertion, there is this tone of suspicion against the judiciary not doing what they are appropriately meant to do.

So many factors have been identified to promote corruption and deny a people the benefits or dividends of good governance, and so much consensus have achieved by academics, public commentators and analysts and opinion leaders based on this, within and outside national boundaries. In the context of Nigeria, a peculiar and rare factor generally perceived as driving and protecting corruption emanated from 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended). Section 308 of the constitution is very popular amongst Nigerians and would say, to a level also known to some aliens (particularly academics, diplomats and journalists) because it dampens and gives hopelessness to the fight against corruption, as it protects or shields the chief executives and their deputies of the states and federation.

## 1.7 ELITES PROTECTION

While there is serious outcry on daily basis in Nigeria on the need for government to do more to tackle the problem of corruption, based on evidence, the elites remain parochial, by being protective of their interest, partly owing to a protective section of the constitution.

Section 308 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 Constitution (as amended) states as follows:

1. no civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against a person

to whom this section applies during his period of office;

1. a person to whom this section applies shall not be arrested or imprisoned during

that period either on pursuance of the process of any court or otherwise; and

1. no process of any court requiring or compelling the appearance of a person to whom this section applies, shall be applied for or issued;

(2 The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to civil

proceedings

against a person to whom this section applies in his official capacity or to civil or

criminal proceedings in which such a person is only a nominal party.

(3) This section applies to a person holding the office of President or Vice-President,

Governor or Deputy Governor; and the reference in this section to “period

office”- Is a reference to the period during which the person holding such

office is required to perform the function of the office

The doctrine of ‘sovereign immunity’ is not new and peculiar to political office holders in Nigeria only, but exists in advance western democracies of the world, such as, US and UK .The term was derived from the English law phrase, ‘the King can do no wrong’ (Chemerinsky,2001). Ordinarily, this means, the ruler can never be wrong, or perceived right when in actual sense, he or she is wrong and immuned from prosecution and conviction. If so, what are the implications? The immunity clause as enshrined in the Nigerian constitution and enjoyed by only four set of leaders( the president and the vice, the governor and the deputy) for the researcher has the following consequences: one, it undermines accountability, hence power can be used arbitrarily bearing in mind there can be no criminal prosecution of any sort. Two, it rubbishes the popular maxim of the supremacy of the law, which implies that leaders with immunity are perceived as being above the law, because they cannot be investigated, prosecuted and convicted while in office. Three, it could result in dictatorial tendencies for weak states or emerging democracies, such as Nigeria What this means is that, when public officials are immuned from criminal prosecution such tend to give them , in certain situations that false sense of being too powerful and not answerable to the law – through human rights violation and outright disobedience of court orders.

It appears a deliberate attempt to protect those entrusted with executive powers (with the exception of the judicial and legislative arms of government) to serve at the expense of the people. For more than fifteen years, the Nigerian national assembly (the house of senate and representatives) have failed to rid this section from the constitution during amendments. This could perhaps be alluded to the constitution amendment process, because the constitution amendment process in Nigeria is rigid – hence it requires two third (2/3) majority of the thirty six states houses of assembly approval for such amendment to be valid. However, because the state houses of assembly are controlled technically by the state governors, it becomes almost impossible to come through. Amongst other stumbling blocks is the practice of former governors turning senators after serving their governorship terms and senators becoming governors – all these put together, result in elites selfishness – resulting in their reluctance to rid the constitution of the immunity clause.

There may be no justification as to why this was incorporated into the constitution, but one could assume it’s a calculated opportunity to protect the political class from their foreseen deviant behaviours, investigations and litigations against them. Two, as a document that was prepared by the military and handed over to a democratically elected government,(what is meant to be seen as a people’s constitution) leaving the footprint of military arbitrariness and a lack of public engagement – a critical factor that is essential and promotes democratic governance, transparency and accountability. Since no criminal proceedings can be filed against any of the above mentioned officials on account of the constitutional immunity while in power, prosecution evidence are most likely to be tampered with, due to selfish protection. While this happens, it looks somehow or almost impossible to rid it from the constitution by the legislators due to vested interests. However, section 308 of the constitution does not in any way carry with it everything that represents corruption, or in anyway protects every public official, but a handful of elected chief executives – which in total are seventy four (74) elected politicians. How was this number arrived at? Section 308 as above, clearly specifies, president, vice-president, governors and their deputies – as those entitled to immunity. In Nigeria, there are thirty six (36) and thirty six (36) deputies as well, with all summed up, it gives you 72 with the president and vice – one apart added – seventy four (74) in total.

The public workforce in Nigeria is in thousands – the military, the police, air force, navy, other paramilitary forces, civil servants, to mention a few. For example, a former inspector general of police, Tafa Balogun was arrested, prosecuted, convicted and jailed. His six months sentencing according to the judge, Binta Nyako was because he had ‘shown remorse’ couple with the fact that, he had no previous criminal record. And was slammed with a 4 million naira ($30,000), ‘while some $150m-worth of cash and property will be seized by the government’ (BBC,2005).But whether the assets were later confiscated as asserted above is what is not understood. Had he any immunity? Or was he the only corrupt police officer, before and after being arrested? The researcher’s argument is not to trivialise the function of the immunity clause, knowing fully well that, they (the president, vice, governors and deputies) have enormous executive powers to make their various states better or worse. But the point being stressed is the idea that there are other corruption infested organs of government outside the confines of the immunity clause, such as the legislature, and the judiciary – which Obadina (1997) described as ‘increasingly politicised’, as such corruption in Nigeria is not – a single-source phenomenon. Though immunity clause will remain in public discourse as long as it remains in the constitution, but if eventually amended the trust and confidence level on the representatives by the electorate may possibly be restored.

Section 15 (5) ‘The State shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power.’ This ordinarily seems ironical and in conflict with section 308 as above. On the one hand , certain category of politicians can’t be prosecuted regardless of any offence committed until they are out of power. On the one hand the state should remove everything that is corruption, while a few are being shielded from the law no matter how much they violate it. However, the section did not go further to expansiate or state clearly everything that should be termed corrupt practices. Secondly, the strategies for removal were also not emphasised. We may as well describe it as not a peoples’ constitution, hence it was a document prepared by the military and handed over to a democratically elected government. Some of the provisions are self-serving, elitist and fit well with the military, because they were not elected, and as such in technical terms – they don’t represent the people. Prior to the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended), and other legal initiatives put together through national and international collaborations of efforts to address the problem of corruption, the Criminal Code Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria,1990 prohibits and prescribes punishment for such behaviour.

## 1.8 POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND CONVENTIONAL CRIMINALITY: PROVISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL CODE ACT 1990

This thesis analyses the Criminal Code Act, 1990. s.98 about ‘corruption and abuse of office’. And thection begins with what constitute corruption. Section 98(1) Any public official (as defined in section 98D) who –

(a) Corruptly asks for, receives or obtain any property or benefit of any kind for

himself or any other person; or bribes, etc;

(b)Corruptly agrees or attempts to receive or obtain any property or benefit of any kind

for himself or any other person; on account of –

(i) anything already, done or omitted, or any favour or disfavour already shown to

any person by himself in the discharge of his official duties or in relation to any

matter connected with the functions, affairs or business of a Government

department, public body or other organisation or institution in which he is serving

as a public official, or

(ii) anything to be afterwards done or omitted, or any favour or disfavour to be

afterwards

shown to any person, by himself in the discharge of his official duties or in relation

to any such matters as aforesaid, is guilty of the felony of official corruption and is

liable toimprisonment for seven years.

Section 383, specifically deals with conventional crime with the following provisions

(1) A person who fraudulently takes anything capable of being stolen, or fraudulently

converts to his own use or to the use of any other person anything capable of being

stolen, is said to steal that thing.

(2) A person who takes or converts anything capable of being stolen is deemed to do so

fraudulently if he does so with any of the following intents-

(a) an intent permanently to deprive the owner of the thing of it;

(b) an intent permanently to deprive any person who has any special property in

the thing of such property;

(c) an intent to use the thing as a pledge or security;

(d) an intent to part with it on a condition as to its return which the person taking

or converting it may be unable to perform;

(e) an intent to deal with it in such a manner that it can not be returned in the

condition which it was at the time of the taking or conversion.

The section on corruption deeply provides for what makes political corruption and further provides for deterrence - seven years jail term for a public official found guilty of it. The section almost completely encompasses or covers the key elements – material and non material enrichment and every other favouring and disfavouring acts, by virtue of the public office being held. This code had operated more than a decade before the UN-championed war against corruption and consequently other legal acts that were developed after the UN legal instrument came into force. It was the era of the military in Nigeria, where people were hardly tried for corruption, because the military itself drained Nigeria, the popular example late Gen. Sani Abacha, considered to have looted money running into billions of dollars. In an environment where impunity thrives, a criminal behaviour such as, political corruption has the tendency to spread uncontrollably.

For conventional criminality, section 390 (4) of the Criminal Code Act (1990) stipulates seven years punishment for the following offending behaviours:

(a) if the thing is stolen from the person of another

(b) if the thing is stolen in a dwelling-house, and its value exceeds ten naira, or the

offender at or immediately, before or after the time of stealing uses or threatens to

use violence to any person in the dwelling-house;

(c) if the thing is stolen from any kind of vessel or vehicle or place of deposit used

for the conveyance or custody of goods in transit from one place to another;

(d) if the thing stolen is attached or forms part of a railway;

(e) if the thing is stolen from a vessel which is in distress or wrecked or stranded;

(f) if the thing is stolen from a public office …

(g) if the offender, in order to commit an offence, opens any locked room, box, or

other receptacle, by means of a key or other instrument.

In this code are two different crimes with same seven years punishment, where in reality one of the two offending behaviours is heavier and more damaging. At the international level is a coalition of countries working together to combat corruption, while conventional crime remains unattended to, unlike the manner and approach adopted to fight political corruption.

Further statistical evidence, in part shows how deep corruption has eaten into the fabrics of the Nigerian state, as it focuses on a recent survey jointly organised by UNODC (United Nations Office for Drug and Crime) and the EU (European Union), with a lot to be revealed on bribery in particular.

## 1.9 NATIONAL CORRUPTION STATISTICS

The above title does not in any way imply that the statistical information presented cover every forms of corruption known in corruption literature and governance in Nigeria, but particularly cover bribery based on a household national survey that was conducted across the 36 states and Abuja (FCT).

As part of effort to support the anti-corruption war in Nigeria, the EU (European Union) in collaboration with UNODC funded this task, in order to ensure authenticity and trustworthiness of data. The survey was designed by NBS (National Bureau of Statistics), while implementation was conducted by Practical Sampling international (PSI) – an organisation skilled at sampling survey (UNODC, 2017). In the survey, 33,067 households were sampled across the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. According to UNODC (2017). Some of the findings are presented below under different headings, covering key areas:

### Extent of bribes

It was discovered that close to a third (32.3%) of persons who were in touch with public officials in the twelve months preceding the survey between June 2015 to May 2016 paid or were asked to offer bribes to a government official, out of the 52% of Nigerians that were in touch with the officials. While the sum total of bribes paid in the period under review was 82 million

### Total amount of bribes

In the twelve months preceding the survey, the total amount of bribes paid to public officials was 400 billion naira, with the dollar equivalent of $4.6 billion based on ‘purchasing power parity.’ This same amount represented 2016 combined state and federal education budget. And the total of bribes given during the period under review was put at 82.3 million, resulting in an average of 0.93% of bribes per person. The extortion is alarming considering the jumbo nature of the amount and the consequence of slowing down government activities, because the public officials who collect these bribes won’t ordinarily want to discharge their statutory responsibilities or functions, but rely on this illegal payments and collections, which become institutionalised. One key feature of ‘administrative bribery’ lies in the fact ‘that it is linked to the accessibility of public services and interactions with public officials’(UNODC,2017). Implying that, individuals that have no business relating to public services, in most situations are less at risk of being extorted by government officials.

### Ranking of officials who accept bribes

The twelve months preceding the survey, of all public officials, the police force was ranked the highest, as 46.4 % of persons paid an officer a bribe. Following the police in descending order were prosecutors, with 33% claiming to have paid to them bribes, judges and magistrates came third in the ranking, with 31.5% claiming to have paid bribes. To this extent, this begin to yield loss of confidence in a system where those who are saddled with the responsibilities of protecting and maintaining law and order are perceived as the highest promoters of bribes – for living on bribes – by selling justice

### Geopolitical prevalence of bribes

The distribution of bribes was also measured based on the six geopolitical zones that exist in Nigeria. The North-West, one year prior to the survey had 36.2% as the highest payment of bribes nationally to public officials followed by the North-East with 35.2%, North-Central 29.1%, South-South 33.8%, South-East 24.4% and South-West 32.8%. The payment of bribes from the data given, showed variation across zones and indirectly mirrors variation across the 36 state of Nigeria and Abuja as Federal Capital Territory, in terms of the number of those who were in touch with government officials and those that offered bribes. Regardless of the marginal differences across the zones, the statistical information represent that, it is a national problem to be combated.

### Hiring

Of employable Nigerians who had sought for public jobs, 15% confirmed making payments to bribe public officials for chances of being selected for the available positions. What is the future implication of this? From the point of investment, they are likely to recoup their money, because the tendency and justification to extort Nigerians who seek public services had already been established. This by and large, contributes to the systemic nature and argument on corruption. The researcher thinks, majority of these Nigerians who offered bribes for jobs would developed the tendency to also extort or accept bribes, from job seekers because they were also victims of such deviant behavior. In addition, the impunity enjoyed by public officials for acts of crime; and the quest by people to get jobs, as a result of unemployment will be exploited .

### Complaints

Despite the bribes paid by adult Nigerians who had contacts with public officials, some of them report lodge reports to the authority to express their displeasure. Of all who were extorted by public officials, according to the UNODC (2017) only 3.7% complained to the authority, a percentage that is quite insignificant, depicting a low trust and confidence level on the ability of the authorities to deal with corruption or handle the situation. Also, 20% who reported these cases of bribery were advised to discontinue, while 33% did not follow up on their reported cases of , presumably they knew nothing would be done differently or the consequence they are likely to face if reported. As 9.1% (one out of ten Nigerians) experienced negative consequences.

Although only 3.7% reported or complained about cases of bribery, in reality according to the report, 86% had initially stated they would be willing to report to authorities such corrupt behaviours, implying the difference between perception and actual behaviour.

## 1.10 REPORTED EFCC CONVICTIONS: FROM 2013 -2016

The reports of the convictions presented were not about political corruption but included other financial crimes that fall within the investigating and prosecuting powers of the EFCC. For the years – 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, a total of four hundred and seventy one (471) offenders were convicted for different offences and handed different sentences. In 2013, EFCC (Economic and Financial Crimes Commission) secured a total of 117 convictions, in 2014 a total of 126 convictions, 2015 a total number of 103 convictions and 125 convictions in 2016. In the report of the convictions, the EFCC failed to state clearly whether they were all public officials, private or a combination of both, because their employment status was not indicated, for example, the number of politicians, civil servants, and the armed forces that were convicted and handed sentences, coupled with recovered loots. The convictions and breakdown were derived online at <https://efccnigeria.org> tagged ‘Public Notices & Conviction’. The total number of convictions (471) was arrived at after the researcher summed up all the yearly figures. Although, the EFCC did not state the number of cases where it failed to record convictions and its overall success rate.

The above report of the survey sponsored by the EU in partnership with UNODC, only shows one aspect of political corruption in Nigeria, the distrust level of law enforcement by Nigerians, the height of impunity of corrupt public officials and bribery as investment in anticipation for returns by potential public service job seekers. It will take more to ensure that these job seekers who had paid their way into the system not to promote corruption, hence they bought their job offers and may want returns on such investments. The number of convictions secured by the EFCC, represents partly a success story of the anti-corruption agenda, but the jurisdiction of EFCC includes cyber crimes and not limited to corruption only. It is not sufficient to report why someone has been convicted, but who the person is to the society – particularly, what the person does.

Regardless of how challenging the situation is, the government has to be battle ready to fix the system, because bribery based on the UNODC, survey is just a constituent part of political corruption that is about taking money or gifts as a condition to render services to Nigerians, not the aspect of taking from government treasury. All these put together require a strong multi-level government responses. Also to be presented below are statistics from the other polar end of conventional criminality

## 1.11 CONVENTIONAL CRIMES STATISTICS

The statistical information presented below were obtained from <https://knoema.com/atlas/Nigeria/topic/crime>. The data cover vehicle or auto theft and domestic burglary. Auto theft figures available cover between 2008 to 2013, while the figures on domestic burglary cover between 2007 and 2013, except for year 2011 missing from the two different crimes above.

### Auto Theft Figures

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **DATE** | **VALUE** | **CHANGE** |
| 2013 | 2,043 | 64.89% |
| 2012 | 1,239 | -32.15% |
| 2010 | 1,826 | 44.35% |
| 2009 | 1,265 | -63.15 |
| 2008 | 3,433 | 60.65 |
|  |  |  |

### Auto Theft Rate

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **DATE** | **VALUE** | **CHANGE** |
| **2013** | **1.2** | **59.46%** |
| **2012** | **0.7** | **-35.65%** |
| **2010** | **1.2** | **40.24%** |
| **2009** | **0.8** | **-63.88%** |
| **2008** | **2.3** | **56.55%** |
| **2007** | **1.5** |  |

The figures show both upward and downward trends in the cases of auto theft recorded. From the number of years under review, 2008 had the highest record of auto theft, seconded by 2013, closely followed by 2010, 2009 and 2012 respectively. Although there were no reasons given in the online platform for the variations that occurred in the years under review, but the intervention of law enforcement agencies can’t be overlooked couple with other security conscious steps taken by individuals and members of the public and socio-economic factor, are likely to be responsible for the fall and increase in the criminal behaviours . The rate of commission of these crimes also reflect the changes observed on the first table above and borders heavily on a plethora of factors that can be linked to government response, individual and public contributions.

### Domestic Burglary Figures

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **DATE** | **NUMBER OF REPORTED CASES** | **CHANGE** |
| **2013** | **3,160** | **6.47%** |
| **2012** | **2,968** | **22.19%** |
| **2010** | **2,429** | **-4.93%** |
| **2009** | **2,555** | **-5.72%** |
| **2008** | **2,710** | **10.93%** |
| **2007** | **2,443** |  |

### Domestic Burglary Rate

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **DATE** | **RATE** | **CHANGE** |
| **2013** | **1.8%** | **3.98%** |
| **2012** | **1.8** | **15.79%** |
| **2010** | **1.5** | **-7.88%** |
| **2009** | **1.7** | **-7.82%** |
| **2008** | **1.8** | **7.8%** |
| **2007** | **1.7** |  |
|  |  |  |

The pattern of changes with domestic burglary was similar to that recorded with auto theft within the same years under review as the figures fluctuated. That means the reported cases of domestic or household burglaries changed every other year, owing to a number of factors not mentioned in the online platform. But government, individual and public quality level of responses and other socio-economic factors could be argued to have impacted for the drop and increase recorded during the period. It is unknown the number of perpetrators caught in these act of criminality or not, whether they were prosecuted or not or sentenced. The number of domestic burglaries and auto thefts that took place within this period under review may not be limited to the values in the tables above, because of the dark figure of crime the unreported vehicle thefts and domestic burglaries.

Ultimately, this chapter critically mirrors political corruption and a wide range of debates surrounding causation – the argument to blame foreign force – the British colonial rule; the other to blame internal forces – the fear of ethnic domination, military involvement in politics, and the blame on oil resource, consequences and the internal mechanism of how the Nigerian state has reacted, but for international pressure to combat political corruption.

In the light of all the arguments, it’s practically impossible to hinged the cause of corruption on one single factor. However, those blame the colonialists have a point; those who argued and hinged it on internal rivalry between the major and minor ethnic groups have a point, as well as the role of oil in the discourse. But the greed factor of Nigerian leaders is missing and not being talked about. If there was no greed, how would public officials loot millions and billions in naira, dollars, pounds and either stash them abroad or invest them in properties, when the masses, they claim to lead are living in poverty and dying of starvation? If not greed why would a public official want to buy everything buyable when he or she knows twenty years wages can’t afford it, but unless through stealing from public treasury? Why would a public official get immunity institutionalised against prosecution if his or her hands are clean, if not to protect and promote greed? Can anyone or public official blame the British colonialist over the immunity clause in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria? Governance is about service to the people, not the accumulation of wealth. It can only get better when leaders put national interest first. Lessons learnt:

One, it is understood that corruption comes in different forms, but by the incorporation of the immunity clause - section 308 indirectly confer on the executive constitutional supremacy against the legislature and the judiciary and totally amounts to discrimination.

Two, with corruption in the judiciary and law enforcement, as shown in the UNODC report, it would mean that the anti-corruption war is just a mere exercise to fulfil international obligation and keep the discourse going

Three, that there is a trust problem with governance in Nigeria. No one knows who wants to work selflessly for the people.

Four, that convictions of public officials (politicians or civil servants) in Nigeria for corrupt behaviours are quite rare.

A further analysis of media contents will give us an idea of what the media is saying on these two different crimes that represent two polar ends. That being said, procedural justice – a concept which encapsulates the excellent decision making as to fairness and procedure by criminal justice officials in Nigeria lacks quality and admiration of the Nigerian people in the following ways: one, the decision of the attorney general of the federation, under former President Ya’Adua, to strip EFCC of its prosecuting powers as established by an act of parliament, but to get a clearance prior to any prosecution from the attorney general’s office. This by all standards, does not fight crime but obstructs the cause of justice, because emboldens or grant soft landing to corrupt officials. Two, the promotion of disproportionality of punishment (that is less punishment to crime) as against proportionality of punishment to crime committed, as evidenced in the conviction and sentencing of the former Inspector General of Police (IGP), Tafa Balogun for a period of six months for corruption in the amount of N16 billion to N17 billion (an amount in excess of $40 million conversion). However, the case is different for crimes committed by those at the bottom ladder of the society – whose punishments are disproportionately higher than crimes committed.

Conclusively, the growth of corruption in Nigeria can be linked to internal and external factors – ranging from how corrupt public officials are treated in Nigeria and the level of seriousness on the part of foreign governments, such as allowing public officials to stash stolen public funds away, or creating a conducive environment for them to land. While conventional criminality appears to have partly been aided as a consequence of impunity, and the appropriation of public resources by public officials meant to cater for the welfare of the people ,through various poverty alleviating social programmes designed to bring about the security of lives and properties. However, this does not in any way provide justification in the commission of such crimes. Regardless of class, power, influence, position and wealth, the laws should be applied to everyone fairly without being selective.

# CHAPTER TWO

**POLITICAL CORRUPTION: critical analysis of the causes, typologies and criminal justice responses**

This chapter aims to critically discuss two types of criminality: political corruption and conventional property crimes in order to address the issue of causes, institutional responses, other forms of legislation to combat it and radical criminology – as its general theoretical framework.

## 2.1 RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY: crimes of the elites and the low-class

The main theoretical framework of this thesis is situated within radical criminology. Radical criminology argues as follows:

‘A capitalist political economy has structural attributes promoting high levels of exploitative and harmful activity by government and corporate elites’(Friedrichs, 2009,p.29). Radical criminologists believe that because of the profit driven motive of the capitalist world, the elites in order to protect their concerns or interests they engage in high degree of exploitation. The term ‘exploitative’ and ‘harmful’ in this context can be interpreted to mean criminal behaviour, but because the elites are state protected, their damaging business becomes unheard of. As Finley (2002) argued that criminologist were yet to concur on the degree in which ‘law’ is enshrined into the ‘economic system’ but went further to say, ‘instrumentalist Marxists’ perceive legislation as a weapon employed by those in position of authority to advance their socio-economic beliefs. While other radical criminologists, adopt ‘structural perspective’ – the view that ‘law’ – is a body of commandments decided by the process of production, allocation and distribution of goods and services.

‘The activities of government and corporate elites cause far more harm than do the crimes of conventional offenders’(Friedrichs,2009, p.29). It portrays the idea that, the actions or behaviours of the privileged class are far more damaging than those of the powerless – who basically and arguably make up the conventional offenders. Lea (2016) argues that, though the rate of conventional criminality in some western countries had been declining, it still remains on the high side, while such crimes as financial and environmental ones are on the increase, due to social divisions, economic downtown and social inequalities.

‘These elites have sufficient influence over the law-making and criminal justice process to prevent much of the activity from being characterised or adjudicated as criminal’(Friedrichs,2009) radical criminologists, believe that with the amount of power and influence the privileged class wield they can manipulate the criminal justice system at their disposal to prevent their actions or behaviours being pronounced criminal, as against what the common criminal suffers from the criminal justice system.

‘Distorted and unrepresentative media coverage of crime contributes to an attenuated public consciousness of and concern with white collar crime generally’(Friedrichs, 2009). Radical criminologists based on the above, are of the view that the lopsided or imbalance nature of crime reporting or representation, function as a factor to the diminished interest of the masses in ‘crime in the suites’ as most times called, or what Michalowski, calls ‘crimes of capital’ (Lynch & Groves, 1989,p.34, cited in Finley, 2002). That the reality twist in media reporting has denied the people the awareness of such crime.

‘Even when white collar offenders are prosecuted and punished they are subjected to significantly more lenient treatment than is true of conventional offenders’ (Friedrichs, 2009, p.29)The point asserted above by radical criminologists, is the view that when the elite offenders are caught and punished for their acts of crime, the punishment would not appear to be a harsh one, but one that comes with leniency, as very less of what the common offender suffers in the hand of the law. That being said, with the high rate of political corruption in the world, this leaves no doubt, but to explore more about corruption

## 2.2 POLITICAL CORRUPTION

The discussion and use of the term ‘corruption’ in this research specifically implies the violation of prohibited behaviours by government officials for personal benefits, as against its varying everyday use and contexts. To begin with, Transparency International (2011) defines corruption as ‘abuse of entrusted power for private gain; while World Bank (1997) sees it as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain.’ Although the wordings of the definitions given by these two organisations are different, the emphasis remain similar – as they focus on the misuse or misapplication of authority by government officials or representatives of the people based on the trust reposed in them.

Corruption is perceived as a global problem that did not begin in the 21st century. As a menace that has been around for years, the scale differs or varies from country to country based on a multiplicity of factors, such as, the quality of law enforcement, transparency and accountability, freedom of information, media presence, procedural justice but not limited to these aforementioned factors.. The global attention to corruption became a ‘foreign policy issue’ after the collapse of the ‘Berlin Wall.’ Subsequently, the focus on ‘democratisation and free trade’ created an active platform for more awareness and condemnation (Collier,2002). Collier recognises the fact that, corruption had always existed before the 1990s, but its identification as a threat to democracy and economic liberalisation, bequeathed it a global attention. Batra (2007) and Funderburk (2007) argue that political corruption as one of the biggest threat to human existence and socio-economic development that is not limited to a particular environment or terrain whether in the form of ‘embezzlement of scarce state funds or “white elephant” project’(Vaidya,2006). No single country, region or continent is spared, as ‘Western European democracies’ are also under attack due to ‘massive corruption’ with political parties becoming enmeshed in the phenomenon due to its ‘economic model’ of arrangement (Hopkin,1997). As a response to the threat faced by democracies, it has been argued that, while corruption existed in ‘liberal democracies’ it never short-changed or distorted the democratic tenets, but for a high number of people – ‘it was a pathological phenomenon of the creation of political society’(Bull and Newell,1997).

Corruption a global problem that requires a global solution, irrespective of who is most affected. It has been argued that, though corruption is generally seen to be a ‘social phenomenon’ mostly in ‘comparative research’ corruption originates ‘from the decisions of individuals’(Groenendijk,1997). It entails that corruption does not appear from the blues, but occurs through human thought process. ‘Corruption’ depicts a channel to evade the unseen ‘hand of the market’ while trying to manipulate laid-down rules to the benefit of the individual (Lambsdorff,2002). The assertion of Lambdorff suggests unlawful and unethical means adopted to beat laid-down rules in order to achieve personal interests.

As a global phenomenon, it has also been confronted with a global response through ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ channels combined with ‘commercial’ and ‘non-commercial’ operations to addressing the various segments of the problem (Hansen and Stachowicz-Stanusch,2013).The response given to corruption and ‘rent-seeking’ has been commended by way of the correlation that exists between OECD economies and emerging economies (Goudie and Stasavage,1998). The implication of this is that, the fight does not involve states only, but also includes other bodies such as, civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which are not left out in the fight to contain the cancerous growth of the phenomenon.

Lambsdorff (2002) argues that, most times, the definition of corruption is extracted from the ‘principal-agent model’ – where the institutions put in place by the principal are violated through ‘third parties’ conspiracy to advance personal gain. Similarly, Jain (1998) opines clearly that, definitional issues revolve squarely on economic gains ‘from institutional power inherent in political and bureaucratic appointments. The implication of Jain’s above postulation, is that public official take undue advantage of the opportunity created by positions outside what is lawful to enrich themselves. ‘Corruption only has not been subjected to the principal-agent model analysis, but the activities of ‘political parties’ (Hopkin,1997). Although there may be no evidence to buttress such claim on the part of political parties as conduit pipes for corruption, pressure on party members and agenda setting may subtly speak volumes. This assertions will be subjected to verification, while a number of definitions are examined and analysed subsequently .

## 2.3 CONCEPTUALISING CORRUPTION

*Without conceptual clarity we cannot begin to make sense of the world and we cannot know what we are observing* (Bull and Newell,1997). Based on the above assertion, then what is corruption or how is corruption defined? Almost everyone working on corruption would want to give a straightforward definition. Corruption is a complex phenomenon to define as mostly agreed, because it encompasses broad areas (Jain,1998). In a similar way, Alemann (2004) argues that ‘political scientists’ were yet to provide the world with an all-round definition that is acceptable to everyone. Although corruption remains a multi-disciplinary subject, Alemann’s reason for emphasizing on ‘political scientists’ to provide a universal definition remains unknown, hence the study of corruption is not limited to political scientist alone. But the other side of the story is that, political corruption had been a marginalised or ‘neglected’ area of study in political science, only recently efforts are being made to reverse the trend (Bull and Newell,1997;Thompson,1993).

Although this research does not express any form of pessimism on the part of political scientists leading the way to provide a universally acceptable definition but it’s more interested in what corruption completely represents as against a sort of dominant monetary narrative or depiction. Public officials are hardly prosecuted for given a job opportunity to someone or people they share certain religious and cultural connections with, who ordinarily do not merit such for lack of qualification or experience, but are subjected to the pains of the law when it involves money or other material things that might have been taken unlawfully by the power of the office they occupy. The phrase ‘abuse of office’ portrays a lot of ambiguity – because it applies to many issues which are unethical or unlawful but in the eyes of the law, they are not given attention unless it otherwise concerns funds, perhaps because the impact of money looted can be measured. However, what is certain is that most of the definitions are tied around public officials, abuse of authority or trust and private gains. It is not just about financial abuse (as generally understood), but has a lot to do with decision making to favour those around the official or self.

Former President Jonathan of Nigeria, in a ‘media chat’ stoked a debate, because he said, corruption is not stealing. In his words: *If somebody is a thief, he is a thief. We should not use the word corruption to cover a case of stealing. Thieves should be called thieves* (*Punch,* Feb 14,2015)*.* According to *Punch Newspaper,* this drew the ire of some legal experts, opinion leaders, politicians, academics and civil society groups, who at various instances said the two concepts were the same. The summary of their arguments was that, stealing or corruption is primarily about taking or acquiring what belongs to someone intentionally without the person’s consent for personal gain. But, the argument could be held on the basis that, the explanation given was tilted to a single angle of the corruption frame – the financial/material side of it. Most times, there seems to be this erroneous understanding that, when corruption is mentioned, a good number of people just think it’s all about money, but this is far from reality as a phenomenon that is mostly seen or described as challenging.

Corruption goes beyond the frontiers of ‘immorality’ and ‘dishonesty.’ And as such opens the door-way for series of definitions, with a common strand running across most definitions on what constitute political corruption. Corruption is very tasking to study – because of the secretive ‘clandestine nature’ (Alam,1989). This runs on the same path with the *political economy* dimension – which sees corruption ‘as hidden exchanges between two actors, for example a public official and an entrepreneur’(Hopkin,1997). Osvaldo (2010),defines corruption ‘as an action, omission, vice or abuse that diverts the ethical or legal obligation of a public function towards private objectives of economic, social or political benefit’. While the World Bank(1997),defines it as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain.’ Manion (2004),defines it slight differently from the position of the World Bank as ‘abuse of public office for private gain in violation of rules.’ Transparency International (2011), defines corruption as the ‘abuse of entrusted power for private gain’. Manion, added a slight twist of ‘violation of rules’ which obviously is different from others and makes it much more clearer in dealing with the situation, because its been outlined as breaking the rules if indulged in the phenomenon. But for the definitions given by the World Bank; Transparency International (TI);and other above mentioned scholars, they centred their definitions directly or indirectly, with particular emphasis on ‘public office’ and ‘private gain.’ But still, their definitions may not all be immaculate – because they seem narrowly focused on financial and material perspectives. The concentration on the financial aspect by academics or authorities, at the expense of other corruption components – like favouritism/nepotism, on the grounds of: kinship, friendship, ethnicity, and other socio-cultural affiliations – may possibly turn the tide on the fight against corruption. It is not a surprise that, corruption comes in varying forms and definitions. In the context of the diverse definitions given, the notion that, it’s a cultural phenomenon may not be an invalid one, in the views of some scholars. Ultimately, whether it is financial/material abuse or discriminatory on account family, ethnic, and socio-religious belongings, it all amount to corruption. Why? The reason is that, when the code of conduct or oath of office is violated, in the context of the definition of corruption, such a public official is deemed corrupt regardless of if it can be measured in financial terms or not.

Funderburk(2012),defines it as ‘acts by public officials that are dishonest or illegal, most often for private gain.’ Klitgaard (1998), defines it as the ‘misuse of office for unofficial ends.’ The definition by Klitgaard says ‘office’- whether it’s private or public is what remains unknown. In this context private and public are entirely two different things. Corruption is an ‘arrangement’ that has to do with ‘an exchange between two parties (the ‘demander’ and the ‘supplier’) which: (i) has an influence on the allocation of resources either immediately or in the future; and (ii) involves the use or abuse of public or collective responsibility for private ends’(Macrae,1982:678, in Husted,1999).

The definition of corruption given by Macrae as ‘an exchange between the ‘demander’ and supplier brings to the fore – how parties tend to compromise through material or financial inducement, like bribes or kick-backs. There are forms of corruption that may not necessary involve a two-party exchange or demand from one party per se, but may still be tagged corruption. For example, a chief executive in a state gives a contract to his brother, nephew or cousin without bidding (which ideally ought to have been bidded for), and when this happens, academic literature on corruption has a name for this - ‘parochial corruption’ - based on kinship or what some call ‘amoral familism.’

In addition to the critique offered above, the World Bank definition of corruption was described by Shaxson to be ‘more too restrictive’ in approach. The focus on ‘public office’ at the exclusion of the private sector has made it myopic generally. Focusing strictly on government may definitely not yield the desired results anticipated, because corruption exists in the private sector. This was concretely supported by Klitgaard (1998), depicting that people are use to seeing corruption as a ‘sin of government’ but dispels such notion and held the contrary, saying that it is inclusive of the ‘private sector.’ Arguing further that, a higher percentage of corruption in government does not exclude private sector participation.

The argument that a big private sector participation in corruption occurs may not be wrong by way of collaboration though most government sleazy deals seem to take place internally. For a more helpful understanding of the phenomenon Klitgaard, came up with corruption formula: C =M+D-A. i.e. ‘corruption equals to monopoly plus discretion minus accountability.’ The definition of corruption is not limited to the domain of public institutions – but encompasses similar illegal practices in the private sectors

As a highly discussed concept – corruption has no universally accepted definition – irrespective of the ones given by the World Bank and TI (Transparency International). But what may not be disputed is that definitions are in high numbers, almost equalling the number of research works being done in the field about the phenomenon (Groenendijk, 1997). This is more of a growing trend, as scholars and researchers would attempt to come up with their distinct versions of definitions with almost same meaning, but while also trying to prove a point of how good their definitions stand.

Groenendijk (1997) argues that the behaviour of people comes into play in a bid for the individual to be concerned and protective of vested interests. These interests according to the author range from: *materialist or an idealist, an egoist or an altruist, a crook or a saint, or (like most people) a little bit of all of these* (ibid). The elements of personal gain and abuse of office or authority encompass both material and non-material benefits. It may not always be material, financial or monetary exchange between individuals, but it includes decisions, actions or policies that will improve a party’s standard of living in return for a favour. For example, if a person applies for a permit or licence for product distribution, and the civil servant conditionally instructs the company to offer a bribe for such or alternatively does not request for money, but enjoins the company to make the wife as one of their distributors, and this in every way constitutes corruption.

Though Sardan(1999) argues that in discussing corruption, the focus should be on ‘corruption complex’(for example: bribes, extortion, kickbacks, embezzlement),in their real sense of words, they do not mean corruption. Similarly, World Bank(1999) referred to it as a ‘complex phenomenon’ embedded profoundly in civil service and political establishments. Zimring and Johnson(2005) define it as the ‘criminal misuse of power’. They argue that, it is a crime because it is understood to be committed more regularly, by people with higher socio-economic status and power. The argument put forward by the authors remain narrow and class defined. But dubbing it a crime on the ground that it involves people of high status and power, is what this work does not subscribe to. The reason for this is simply because for you to tag an act a crime, would mean breaking a moral rule defined in law (Wikstrom 2006).

Contextualising corruption within the top hierarchy may not be appealing and all inclusive as Zimring and Johnson opine, because petty corruption seen as criminal acts perpetrated by those at the lower level of service ladder may unintentionally be side-lined. Zimring and Johnson further argue that dubbing an act as corrupt is a function of the law. It is an ‘abuse’or ‘misuse’ – because of the level of trust reposed in the officials. The position of Zimring and Johnson was also towed by Svensson(2005),depicting that, defining corruption involves the application of a ‘legal standard’- meaning that to tag something as corrupt, is to apply the law. For others it is a different ball game entirely, as Rocha, Brown and Coke (2011), argue that corruption goes beyond the frontiers of either public or private sector , what they referred to as ‘artificial boundaries’.

Although corruption is seen as a universal or global problem, but in certain quarters this may really not be the case – as some persons, institutions may view it directly or indirectly as a problem of the ‘global south’. For example, one of the most recognised international non-governmental organisation devoted to challenging the ‘inevitability of corruption’ in the world – Transparency International (TI), publishes its annual corruption ranking of countries from a scale of 0-10 – the higher the score the less corruption; the lower the score, the more corruption in a country. Sun and Johnston (2009),criticised it as not ‘a definitive measure’ to corruption, because it lacks, ‘validity, precision and variability.’ From all indications, most African countries always find themselves at the bottom of the table, which subtly restates the position of Harrison (2007),that ‘Africa is riddled with corruption like a diseased body’ (meaning high level of corruption perception), using the corruption perception index (CPI). How are the varying corruption levels in different countries measured ? Or what are the parameters being used? Although, Transparency International has contributed immensely to opening up the field of corruption, through its global war, its current approach seems flawed. Its one-sided approach of focusing on the takers of bribes only introduces a discriminatory undertone.

The way CPI operates is through a survey of foreign business executives – whether they have paid bribes to government officials in order to have their ways or not (Harrison, 2007;Shaxson, 2007; Klitgard, 1998). In the light of the above, critics have been quite hard on the ways countries are ranked or rated using the so-called amalgam - CPI (Corruption Perception Index) said to be the brainchild (Heidenheimer,2004) of ‘lawyers’ and ‘economists’ of German extraction. Xenakis (2010) lamented over the focus of the CPI on the ‘crippling effects’ of corruption related activities of political emissaries of the developing world, instead of the ‘impact’ and ‘forms’ of graft initiated by capitalist ‘interests’ and facilitated by the political aid and dictates of ‘core’ advanced world. While the unethical, ugly and draining tax systems couple with their shady and unfair global financial practices have been painted as ‘legal and thus not corrupt behaviours, or else as white-collar business-to-business fraud.’ In compendium, the argument is that, the perception is narrowly centred.

It is also faulted (Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston, 2007) not to be a true representation of ‘actual corruption’ but ‘perceptive corruption’ hence its pervasive nature can’t be gauge directly. Dreher et al argued that, CPI gauges the effectiveness and efficiency of institutions, hence the ‘hidden economy’ can’t be measured. But they however argued that, the ‘structural equation model’ seems more productive focusing on the ‘manifest variable’(i.e. causation/indicating factors) and the ‘latent’ (i.e. corruption), which they argued had proved very effective on countries corruption levels – measuring the structural correlation between ‘causes’ and ‘indicators’(2007). In spite of all the criticisms of CPI, Transparency International, in justification of its action argues that the effects of deals with multinational corporations is perceived a ‘critical dimension of corruption in Africa’ and the international economic competitiveness in terms of the construction of infrastructure remains a strong source through which corruption is promoted on a massive scale (Goudie and Stasavage, 1998). In evidence, a good number of cases are available in this regard, for example in Nigeria, cases like: Halliburton, a multi-billion dollars project for the construction of a $6 billion dollars liquefied gas plant in the oil-rich Niger-Delta with an alleged $180 million dollars paid out as bribe between 1994 and 2004 (UK *Guardian* Thursday 2 December,2010), and the Malabu oil scam.

In a research conducted by Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010), on corruption perception in Sub-Sahara Africa – using two different approaches: a sample of 35,000,and 350 – with questions separately hinged on experiences, in their findings, it was discovered that, their perceptions were prone to error. Their responses were influenced by ‘ideological biases’ and ‘political preferences’ and an unreliable model in cultural tune of ‘how Africa works’ On the contrary Widmalm (2008), posits that there is a lacking evidence, that corruption is more pervasive in where it is seen culturally as a way of life. The Razafindrakoto and Roubaud research without doubt tend to partly or fully prove Transparency International wrong.

Does CPI (Corruption Perception Index) reflects contract inflation or overpricing; unjustified borrowings (internally and internationally);manipulated unofficial pay for ghost workers; unexecuted or abandoned projects paid for; tax collection for personal use; acquisition of government properties(landed or mobile); execution of projects with counterfeit materials; discretionary use of government resources without checks etc, as experienced in some countries? Although the above questions are not exhaustive, they portray ways – through which state resources are siphoned or abused. In view of the aforesaid, this work aligns with view of Heidenheimer (2004) who describes CPI as ‘subjective impressions’ and a grand plan aimed at magneting the interest of national and international press on ‘corruption topics.’ But surprisingly TI seems not interested in areas conspicuously bordering on how public resources are drained for private aggrandisement, but rather from a narrow purview – with a clear focus on ‘passive corruption’ shunning ‘active corruption.’ From the plethora of definitions, no matter how well articulated they seem to be, no chosen definition that stands out to explain corruption in a universal context. In the light of the characterisation, it is only proper to dissect how corruption has been framed on an economic model – in reference to the ‘principal-agent’ – which Jain (1998) described as a ‘frequently used’ economic design.

Reflecting on the above model, Thompson (1993) explains that under this model, the political representative (politician) acts as an agent, while the populace or electorate remain the principal or what some may call ‘client.’ The politician is mandated to act as the mouthpiece of the people, principal for the delivering of political good in the overall interest and welfare of the principals. Let’s not forget that, in spite of representing the general interests of the principals, his or her personal interests exist. But for the inability of the principals to put the agent (politician) in surveillance, or put control mechanisms in place in order not to side-line the interest of the principals, the agent decides to promote his or her interest against that of the principals. Thompson further argues that, the model could somewhat assist in understanding how the principal-agent waned relationship generates ‘moral hazard’ and fuel corruption. He, however criticised the inability of the framework to define acts that are appropriate and inappropriate. Thompson, also questioned why some inducements are allowed and others disallowed. For example, the permission of a stimulus like campaign donation on the one hand, and the prohibition of ‘bribes.’ Although described as the most applied approach to explaining corruption, this does not immune it from further weaknesses.

Lambsdorff (2002) describes it as ‘too narrow’ specifically for cases of grand corruption; failure to differentiate between what is a permissible and non-permissible act; and inadequate provision of rules that will limit those in charge of governance. In the same vein, Groenendijk (1997) discusses ‘neo-institutional economics’ – which the ‘principal-agent’ approach is concerned with the impact of institutional elements on human decision making process.

The model gives a good illustration of a coterie of interests, personal interest against public interest – where politicians or political representatives go outside the confines of public interest to pursue personal interest - due to insufficient or non existing rules to checkmate their personal interests.

The issue where people, authorities and law enforcement groups try to present corruption as solely a financial criminal behaviour, which perhaps fall short of its definition seems addressed by an all-encompassing classification of elements that represent corruption putting into context distinct individual labelling below .

## 2.4 CATEGORIES OF CORRUPTION

Categorisation of corruption means, the classification of corrupt behaviours as perceived by distinct authors based on their varying contexts. Note, the categories are not general and might as well be dubbed differently by other academics.

Jain (2001) discusses corruption generally and somewhat argues that, the classification of corruption helps to a large extent in understanding the paths and clearly the actions that were influenced by the phenomenon and ‘types of models that can be used to explain corruption.’

**(a)** Heidenheimer (1989), in his work: *Perspectives on the Perception of Corruption* gave the following types : ‘black corruption’, ‘grey corruption’ and ‘white corruption.’ Black corruption occurs when a higher number of the ‘elite’ and general public kick against it and want it penalized. The attraction of penalty for such act of transgression shows how noteworthy the values are. For grey corruption it is about the few ‘elites’ giving their consent to the punishment of the corrupt act, with majority of the public disagreeing. White corruption is the type allowed by a higher number of the ‘elites and the general public, in which no penalty is sanctioned by either parties. For this act of violation to remain unpunished, it indicates that the offence committed on the ground of corruption is no value. From the above, it is obvious that white corruption is the reverse side of black corruption. But what is not clear is the rationale behind the three different colours.

**(b)** Mashali (2012) offered a different typology of corruption: ‘political and technical corruption’. In the case of ‘political corruption’ it involves using all necessary information and skills in doing their job to perpetrate the corrupt act. In contrast, ‘technical corruption’ is absence of the information and skills required in the course of the job while getting involved in corrupt acts. Put differently, the Swedish International Cooperation Agency (Sida) (2007),categorised corruption into the following: ‘petty corruption’(bureaucratic corruption); ‘grand corruption’(political corruption) and ‘state capture’(i.e. corruption which is said to have impacted on the entire state institutions. The categorisation may as well depend on how corruption has actually eaten deep into the fabrics of the society; personal experience, and the ways in which the transactions are conducted. Is it convincing enough to support the position of SIDA, that petty corruption is carried out by bureaucrats? Petty or grand corruption can involve anyone, once the opportunities are created for such to occur.

**(c)** Alam (1989), accentuated on the need and importance of having to categorise or classify the forms in which corrupt acts appear, as they expose the ways through which legally defined moral rules are twisted by officials to serve their private interests. While also acknowledging the impossible task of having a taxonomy that covers all different criminal activities deemed corrupt. Alam’s taxonomy of corruption was stratified into four (4) distinct parts:

1. Cost-reducing corruption: This type of corruption according to Alam, exist where for instance, the original amount of tax meant to be paid by an agent is reduced below the official level; while the saved difference is shared between the agent and government official.
2. Cost-enhancing corruption: This is a type of corruption where the officials demand extra or additional cost above the official bench mark from agent. For example, an agent pays 5% above the official amount with no justification for such. This type of corruption if the actual amount and the extra bribe added are completely embezzled, it could also be referred to as ‘corruption with theft.’ Then if the actual amount meant to be remitted to government coffers is done and only the extra (i.e. bribe) is taken then it could be described as ‘corruption without theft’(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).
3. Benefit-enhancing corruption: This type of corruption occurs, when the amount of benefit disbursed to an agent is more than the amount earmark for such. Perhaps, with a percentage kick-back for the government official or done purely on nepotism or unknown reason. A good example could be paying an agent extra 300% of what the original sum is.
4. Benefit-reducing corruption: This type of corruption comes into force when an official appropriates part of resources meant for an agent. For example resources meant for a government establishment – school or hospital.

This is an aspect of the many parts of criminal behaviours exhibited by public officials according to Alam in their bid to deprive government of their expected revenue – to enrich themselves. Although this criminal behaviour exist not in all jurisdictions, due to differences in institutional checks, technological advancement and effective criminal justice system. However, the author failed to proffer deterrents to the above criminal behaviours or provide evidence, where in the past this had happened and how it was tackled.

**(d)** Kingston (2007), outlines two types of corruption:

(i)‘Parochial corruption’. According to Kingston, it is such corruption in which a

preferential treatment is given to someone related to an official – either by ‘kinship,

caste and affection’.

(ii) ‘Market corruption’. This is the type of corruption, where the person willing to

or who pays the highest amount requested, is granted the favour bribed for.

Under Kingston’s typologies, the first one is hinged on the behaviour of an official favouring a party against the other, even when it is not merited as a consequence of the ties or connections that exist between them. While the second label represent getting a request granted after paying the highest amount of money.

**e.** Alemann discusses five distinct areas of corruption: *social decline, deviant behaviour, logic of exchange, system of measurable perceptions* and *shadow politics* (2004). The five different classifications are explained below sequentially:

* ***SOCIAL DECLINE*:** Alemann’s concept of ‘social decline’ rests on the argument that, the prevalence of corruption is based on the ‘decaying’ societal virtues. That with the present growing trend, the proclivity of these virtues going into extinction remain high. Bull and Newell (1997) argue to support this that, ‘corruption jeopardises the very values of the system itself.’ Contrary to the author’s position, an environment where corruption is rife does not imply absence or a lack of community values. Corruption is caused by varying factors, and one of such is opportunity – in the form of no checks or deterrents.
* ***DEVIANT BEHAVIOUR*:** He sees corruption as deviating from standard norms of the society. That the *sociology of corruption* is not based ‘on the rise and fall of nation but on social relationships’ Arguing further that deviation from standard code of behaviour results in a crack of the entire political framework – leading to possible ‘crises and collapse’ of the system. The author seems on point in this area, because criminal behavior takes place when there is a violation of laid-down rules. At the centre of corruption is a deviation from rules or laws to advance personal interests.
* ***LOGIC OF EXCHANGE*:** That corruption exists as an exchange between two individuals or more (‘or groups organized into two or more parties’).This is what Hansen and Stachowicz (2013) refer to as ‘secretive transactions, exchanges and relationships’ and further dubbed as ‘invisible’- because it lacks institutionalisation. The exchange dimension that exist between two or more parties, is further polarised into two: the one that ‘corrupts’ and the ‘corrupted.’ Alemann,’s argument is that the individual who corrupts has the financial and material resources to influence the corrupted – the one entrusted with power by the public for the good of the society. The corrupting party has reasons for doing so – either to win a government project ; evade punishment for offences etc. Put differently, it is more like the demander and supplier transaction explanation offered in previous studies. Or a quid pro quo dimension. The exchange argument by the author does not completely represent corruption. There are practices by public officials that do not require exchange between individuals. Public officials that put in place policies to advance their interest, do not need to make exchange in certain situations; or those who unilaterally have control over public funds.
* ***SYSTEM OF MEASURABLE PERCEPTIONS*:** There are concerns as to how representative is measuring actual corruption, probably because of the clandestine nature of transactions. The measurement according to Alemann is based on the ‘intensity’ and prosecution of corruption cases, couple with punishment given to guilty individuals in a society. This seems to negate the approach by Transparency International.
* ***SHADOW POLITICS*:** In this instance, Alemann describes ‘political corruption’ though a unique side of ‘corruption’ forms a constituent part of the less formal government business. The term ‘shadow politics’ also represent ‘shadow economy’- which houses the normal economy, subterranean economy and ‘organised crime.’ The compendium of it is that, it represents the lawful and unlawful aspect of government business.

Alemann’s approach gives a compendium and worthwhile understanding of almost the features of political corruption. His multidimensional path covers infraction or deviation from legal and ethical standards, reciprocity, diminishing values, and corruption generally. However, this research argues that corruption should not wholly be centred on exchange between two or more parties for benefits. While exchange remains a key aspect of corruption, monopoly and discretionary powers might also not be side-lined bringing into context Klitgaard’s corruption formula equation of m+d-a=c – explaining that people use their absolute powers to access state coffers without being answerable to anyone. Alemann’s five dimensional approach technically did not x-ray this area.The contributions of most scholars, who are unique in their own way, in terms of their classifications or dimensions remain remarkable, but with opportunities for further advancement and strengthening.

## 2.5 CAUSES OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION

Is it possible to have a single variable that causes corruption globally? Is it possible to stamp out corruption if the causes are identified? Do the causes of corruption differ in context? When we talk about causes – they refer to those factors, that give rise or birth to corrupt behaviours across countries. Myriad of causal factors have been identified irrespective of where we all hail from. Cultural factors (ranging from customs, habit, attitude etc), political milieus (i.e. orchestration and building of political structures by politicians in other to garner votes during elections; activities of the wealthy class – who at various times splash gifts, make donations in returns for gains or favour in future); natural resource endowments, policy-driven sources of corruption and ethnic orientation have been identified as strong factors that cause corruption (Bromberger,1983;Salisu,2000). For the purpose of this study the following causes of corruption have been identified: cultural consideration, natural resource, ethnicity, weak policy and political environment. Although causes are not limited to the aforementioned factors, but they are perceived as part of the promoting factors. For example, the term ‘resource curse’ – where majority of countries endowed with oil resource are understood to have high level of corruption as a consequence of failure to erect strong institutions to protect oil proceeds. While on ethnicity, it somewhat exposes public officials for failing to keep the trust reposed in them by disappointing to treat people fairly on the basis of ethnic belonging. That being said, when certain policies are introduce that do not advance common good or address perceived injustice then corruption settles in.

Social norms: Montinola and Jackman (2002), identified ‘social norms that emphasize gift-giving and loyalty to family or clan, rather than the rule of law’ as sources of corruption. Arguably, stopping or banishing the practice of ‘gift-giving’ may be too far to achieve, because what determines whether a gift is corrupt or not may likely depend on the context, reason for such gift, and the relationship between the parties. Rose-Ackerman (1999),argues that, corruption is allocated varying meanings, in different societies, and further depicted that ‘what is a bribe is another person’s gift.’ Rose-Ackerman’s position or assertion was subtly supported by Foster (2001),in his discussion of politics and corruption, argues that, the law is a product of ‘corrupt authorities’ and that such laws could be changed to suit their personal interest; and with a compelling argument, that certain ‘middle eastern countries when arms-dealing – bribery is accepted.’

Culture of distrust: in view of the cultural tune captured above Melgar, Rossim and smith (2010), describe it as a ‘cultural phenomenon’, which breeds a ‘culture of distrust.’ The trust argument has also become another area of serious debate in terms of whether a correlation exists or not between the two concepts – trust and corruption. Uslaner (2013) argues that there is a strong relationship between trust and corruption. That the less the trust, the more the corruption – back to low trust. But Graeff and Svendsen (2012) kicked against it. Literally, when someone is corrupt he or she does not enjoy the trust of the people. The reason could be failure to deliver on promises and keep the trust intact. Ufere, Perelli, Boland and Carlsson(2012),in their contribution to the growing literature on the causes of corruption in Nigeria, pinpointed poor economic environment, over involvement of government in matters of regulating the economy, unreliable judicial system, and unlimited access to oil windfall as areas that require fixing, in order to reduce corruption level. But in an environment where there are loads of personal interests to protect, some levels of resistance could be generated from people with those interests. But with the right reforms these could be addressed.

Dysfunctional state: Johnston (2012), suggests that, carrying out a reform in a dysfunctional state faces the brick wall of ‘corrupt interests’(meaning those who already have something to loose if the reform is allowed to continue could resort to sabotage). Soliman and Cable (2011), argue that , discretionary powers, dearth of political competition, information control by the government and the infiltration of the political environment by the ‘economic elites’ have been identified to be causes of the dreaded ‘malady without cure’( corruption).This further reinforces the position of Funderburk (2012),that laws are made by the powerful in the society in such a way to protect their personal interests. In fairness, there may be nothing wrong literally with the protection of interests by individuals, but what is of serious concern – is a situation where rules and due process are relaxed in favour of certain class of people at the expense of good governance and the society in general.

Globalisation and corporate culture: Hagher (2011), argues that, the adverse roles played by foreign companies remain a serious factor that fuels corruption, hence they demand for preferential treatment over their competitors,‘with cash incentives, air tickets, paid holidays abroad, choice real estate and shares in their companies’. These same companies go back to give a feed-back to their principals and eventually paint the affected countries bad. From the issues raised above, should the initiator (giver/foreign companies) be blamed or the receiver (government officials)? Murphy (2011), in his opposition to Transparency International dubbing the developing world as home to corruption, describes corruption as ‘an inherent feature of international capitalism’ and discussed further, that the uncoupling of business ‘safeguards’ burst into unimaginable and undesirable outcomes – leading to the global financial melt down. This again takes us back to the problem of interests and Foster’s argument that, what exist as laws are products of corrupt ‘authorities.’ Conversely because these laws are the outcomes of corrupt officials, then they automatically become corrupt.

Politicisation of legislative drafting: politically, it has been argued, that corruption tend to blossom when legislative rules setting are left in the hands of political parties to decide. When this occurs, political parties become very powerful; strip certain persons legislative mandate; configure their scale of preference – with money making as their top priority – thereby endearing the business class to the political party instead of the legislature, capturing state institutions in order to cover up financial deals that lack transparency (Havdav,2012). Although corruption is everywhere, there is the belief that it thrives more in the developing world. Tanzi (1998), on his part, argues that international companies strongly contributes to the degree of corruption in the world, stating the huge sums that have been paid out in bribes (‘commission’). Tanzi supported his claim, citing the Le Monde of March 17,1995 report which estimated the bribe paid out by French companies overseas at FF10 billion as capture in a confidential government report. While Germany was also quoted to have paid out $3 billion – as estimated and reported by World Business of March 4,1996.(ibid,1998). This research argues that, the systemic institutional deficiency has become an exploit in the hands of foreign companies, and as such resort unjustly to corrupt means, arguably in furtherance of their goals.

Klitgaard’s description of corruption in such a manner, appeals quite convincing, putting into consideration – the secrecy factor, which is considered to be a strong feature of corruption, as Galang (2013) argues the case of ‘illegality and secrecy which promotes market distortions and unpredictability.’ In discussing corruption, culture has never been disdained, but one of the key component factors that seems to promote it. Husted (1999) opines that, some cultural factors promote or thwart the growth of corruption, citing further the very applauded ‘work related values’ of Geert Hofstede correlate with corruption.

The values are:‘power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and Confucian dynamism’(Hofstede,1997 cited in Husted,1999). From the argument of the authors, it is deduced that, the principles outlined above tend to drive corruption when on the high side; and slow corruption when on the low side. Put simply, for example: when ‘uncertainty avoidance’ is high, according to the author, the more the level of corruption. But it could be argued that, most of these factors could be determined by context and institutional arrangements in place across countries. For instance, ‘material success’ as against ‘quality of life’ (which is masculinity) could be very high; while the tendency for this to translate into corruption may become ineffective by anti-corruption institutions. But for some countries the story may be different – possibly because of weak and corrupt institutions. This seems to have been corroborated by Nossiter (2013) stating that: ‘convictions for corruption by top officials in Nigeria are so rare that they are treated as national milestones’.

In the light of the above, Oguzhan, Dincer and Gunalp (2012), in their analysis of the ‘effects of corruption on income inequality’ did something quite different from the traditional standpoint of having to measure corruption from various subjective indices established by renowned international organisations. They however, adopted on the contrary, an objective model – focusing on the ‘number of public officials convicted in a state for crimes related to corruption’. Deviant behaviours require deterrence and not impunity. If we fail to bring to justice corrupt bureaucrats and politicians, it may become impossible to put up a war against corruption and the multiplier effects of such failure may be huge. The approach by Oguzhan et al. has its own pitfalls, because the secrecy associated with corruption may pose serious impediments to accessing evidence, in a system that is institutionally disorganised, as against a better organised one. Applying this to the Nigerian context may become very unproductive – in view of Nossiter’s revelation above.

Apart from the understanding that corruption breeds income inequality (Oguzhan,2012), on the contrary, income inequality may also be sufficient to push a lot of people into committing crime for example, if the power distance between the ‘haves’ and ‘haves not’ is terribly wide, people could be compelled to violate those moral rules as defined by law. However, this explanation may not be applicable to all contexts, because it does not provide a convincing rationalisation of the activities of the wealthy class – who are also indulged in deviant behaviours of draining state treasury in spite of their huge wealth. Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (2002, cited in Oguzhan et al.2012), argue that corruption brings about an unfair system of taxation which is designed to benefit people whose income are high. Further more, they argue that corruption also consequently leads to an unequal accumulation of assets. This apparently, may be because of their financial power to influence or bribe government official for such advantage.

Szefel (1998), posits that most structural reforms are caused, having recognised authoritarian rule as a catalyst to breeding corruption. Szefel claims that, to thwarting the force and pace at which it moves the building and improving of institutions, better transparency, accountability, and effective ‘oversight and punishment’ must be encouraged. One may agree to the use of oversight and punishment as necessary tools that can help to reducing corruption as suggested by the Szefel. However, the author was not very specific on what kind or model of oversight and degree of punishment (whether proportionate or disproportionate).

Apart from our understanding that corruption breeds income inequality (Oguzhan,2012; Uslaner,2013), on the contrary, income inequality may also be sufficient to push a lot of people into committing crime – for example, if the power distance between the ‘haves’ and ‘haves not’ is terribly wide, people may be compelled to violate those moral rules as defined by law. However, this explanation may not be applicable to all contexts, because it does not provide a convincing rationalisation of the activities of the wealthy class – who are also indulged in criminal acts of draining state treasury in spite of their huge wealth.

The number of factors discussed above that cause corruption, do not entirely represent everything that results in or promote corruption, but they show how the actions or behaviours of few public officials can directly or indirectly create a fertile ground for corruption to flourish and therefore put the general wellbeing of the people at risk. On the other hand, individual and public inaction to prioritizing corruption as a problem, couple with government response at snail pace might have put some societies at a higher risk than others couple with unreliable and loose criminal justice system in place. By and large, corruption is not invincible but can be tackled using varying fronts, but also depends on the environment, the quality of people, and commitment to reducing it. Some of the approaches as suggested by different literature are identified below.

## 2.6 REDUCING POLITICAL CORRUPTION

Corruption reduction literature suggest that democracy, press freedom, ICT (Information and Communication Technology), good governance and countervailing actions – all play vital roles at reducing corruption.

Democracy: Mohatdi and Roe (2003 cited in Rock,2008) argue that democracy reduces corruption, not at the very inception of it, but as it becomes consolidated. This argument may possess some facts, but, even at the very consolidated stage, if the necessary supporting structures are not put in place difficulty might ensue. Kalenborn and Lessmann (2013), argue that, democracy enables the electorate to vote out corrupt politicians. The case of India and China may help us to understand that, democracy can’t do it all alone. After a comparative study was conducted, it was unearthed that democracy without a solid economic foundation, tackling corruption may be counter-productive (Sun and Johnston,2009). It is the view of this research that, democracy less effective institutional arrangements and political will could result in cul-de-sac. To buttress this further - an environment where electoral corruption thrives (that is the use of violence or thuggery to discourage voters, election rigging, disenfranchising of voters, absence of a level playing field for all election candidates remain a threat to democratic consolidation. To this end, Olarinmoye (2008) posited that, the ‘subversion of electoral process’ opens the door-way for the enthronement of leaders who care less for the people, other than themselves.

Democracy at times could be taken advantage of - as experienced in the case of North Carolina, U.S.A, 1997. In this particular case, a construction company had requested for a refund of its contribution to the campaign of the state governor, as a result of the failure of the government to give returns (Rose-Ackerman,1999)..Decentralisation as strongly canvassed for, by the World Bank - according to Lessmann and Markwardt (2010),would render corruption forceless and fruitless, in a setting where press freedom is strongly rooted. The emphasis is that, for a result-oriented decentralisation, press freedom must be guaranteed without harassment. Freedom does not imply that, corruption will seize to exist, but ensure that the press is able to have access to information and transmit same to the public thereby inculcating fear in looters and reduce indiscriminate public treasury looting.

Press freedom: Freille, Haque and Kneller (2007), argue that a society with a restriction placed on press freedom, corruption is higher compared to a society with absolute press freedom – after using ‘unexplored disaggregated result.’ However, the degree of freedom that should be allowed or guaranteed was not established or stipulated by the authors, as there have been situations where the privacy of people have been evidently hacked into for various reasons. This also gained the support of Graber (1986 ) arguing that the merits and demerits that come with press freedom may arguably not survive a well reasoned analysis. Financial exploitation, physical attack, restrictive laws, verbal assault, capital intensive access into the industry and censorship – have been identified as ways through which the press could be controlled (Freille et al.2007).

Ojo (2003), says as the ‘fourth estate of the realm’ the media provide public sensitisation and information about the government, whether positive or negative, to keep the public aware for informed decisions during election periods. Apart from the problem of bugging into people’s privacy as earlier mentioned, other possible limitation may be media ownership by politicians and journalists political affiliations in a democratic environment. If the system is not to be compromised, these concerns should be addressed for effective, efficient and reliable press. Camaj (2013),argues strongly that, without a free press, the goal and dream of having good governance may be rendered impossible – because of its powers to expose corrupt officials. The urge and hunger to expose corrupt behaviours resides in the idea of having massive audience base, popularity and increased profit (Suphachalasai,2005 cited in Camaj,2013). On the other hand, how possible is it to have an unbias, dependable and investigative journalism in a situation where ownership may be in the hands of politicians and their protégé? Or how critical can a press be, when some press members are employed as political aides in government? The ways to contain corruption are inexhaustible. Sandholtz and Gray (2003), have argued that, the level in which a country is internationally integrated, drastically reduces the rate of corruption, through two different pathways: importation of cherished values which criminalise and prohibit corruption; and secondly, the changing of the negative and positive impacts (i.e. the costs and benefits) on perpetrators. Contrary to this, sympathy and a lack of political will somehow play a role. It has strongly been argued that, fighting corruption should be left in the hands of affected countries, not to foreign powers – as such would be perceived as undue imposition of foreign values (Rose-Ackerman,1999).

Furthermore, Rose-Ackerman (1999),argues in defence of foreign governments ‘if the entire state is permeated with crime, there is probably not much outside organisations can do except wait in the wings and hope for the best.’ Contrary to Rose-Ackerman’s position of defending foreign governments of not being able to do anything to bring in change over prevalent criminal behaviours in countries, in the context of political corruption may entirely not be true, hence foreign governments can put in place stiff measures to track and seize corrupts funds and also prosecute the suspects. Most corruption proceeds in developing countries seem to be laundered abroad. Secondly, the ranking of some countries, as being the most corrupt in the world by Transparency International (TI) is based on the data generated through surveys conducted on foreign business executives, in view of bribes paid to officials. Based on the latter, there is a need to tackle active and passive bribery concurrently. Rose-Ackerman, may be right – considering the fact that, most of these countries are independent states, and as such their sovereignty need to be respected to avoid undue internal political interference in their affairs. However, the status quo must not remain because politicians would hide under the umbrella of sovereignty to perpetrate crime.

Information and communication technology: The crucial role information plays is key in governance. Dirienzo, Das,Cort and Burbridge (2007), acknowledged empirical studies carried out in the past in a bid to understand the factors that determine, a country’s corruption level. Advancing on previous research, they decided to focus and direct their energies on how ICT (information and communication technology), has impacted corruption. In their findings, they unearthed that, the more access to information, the less corruption in a country. From available evidence and previous studies, fighting corruption using a single approach may be rendered counter-productive, but, it takes more than a path to succeed in such a challenging task. But this runs contrary to the situation in Nigeria, in spite of FOI (Freedom Of Information) Act 2011 enacted by the Nigerian National Assembly, Nigeria is still perceived as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. The Nigerian case is not to render the above point baseless or invalid; but to state that the Nigerian experience runs contrary to the generally held view.

The issue of oversight, as a way of stemming this ‘social embarrassment’ sends a reminder of the oversight function in America, in which the legislative arm debated, and evaluated between adopting the ‘police patrol model’ or ‘fire alarm model’ in checkmating the excesses of the executive – making sure they don’t overstep their boundaries (McCubbins and Schwartz,1984). The concept of ‘police patrols model’ – entails the idea of parliamentarians having to personally act as watch dogs over the activities of the executive; while the ‘fire alarm model’ allows other institutions, (private or public), to always blow the whistle (like press reporting) each time anything negative is observed (ibid 1984). But the two models have their ups and downs, but the more result-oriented one depends on individuals, contexts, and other social/political dynamics. But a combination of approaches will be helpful. Treisman (2000), argues that, the relationship between the costs and benefits of getting involved in corrupt activities determines the differences of countries corruption levels, couple with the legal structures and its entire culture. When people are not given the rightful punishment, the proclivity to indulge in deviant behaviours becomes high.

Countervailing actions: Alam (1995),posits that variations to the degrees or altitude of corruption across different societies or countries seem to come from a different perspective entirely. Alam, bases his explanation to account for variation using the victims reactionary strategies of ‘countervailing actions’(CA). This has to do with fighting back at the loss of such (resistance), using three fronts: ‘evasive CA’ – pruning down the reliance on corrupt officials; ‘direct CA’ – increasing the official costs for involving in corruption; finally, ‘illicit CA’- employing corruption as a veritable tool to recouping the said losses from corruption. The idea of fighting corruption from the victim’s perspective may be a welcomed approach. Is it possible to achieve the central argument of countervailing actions (CA) without a complementary role? Alam went further to offer other supportive structures – through which countervailing actions can be successful: ‘(a) secular increases in wages, education and urbanization; (b)growth of mass media; (c)advances in transportation and communications technology; (d)improvements in managerial and accounting skills; (e)growth of capitalist classes, urban middle classes, and an urban labour force; and (f) upward pressure on government expenditure’(ibid,1995:430). From the suggestions given above, the chances of a positive result are most likely to be high, if it does not derail.

Transparency: Florini (1998) argues ‘transparency and secrecy are not either/or conditions. As ideals, they represent two ends of a continuum. What we are seeing now is a rapidly evolving shift of consensus among observers and actors worldwide about where states and corporations should be on that continuum’. What this represent subtly when applied to the study of corruption, is the idea that when a government is transparent, there tend to be less corruption; while a government that harbours secrecy becomes prone corruption. Information is key, if we are to make progress in the fight against corruption. The political and economic poor performances in public institutions, is said to have resorted in the falling level of trust the people have in public institutions (Hanitzsch and Berganza,2012).

Mungiu-Pippidi (2013) argued for a strong presence of ‘civil society-driven good governance’ – which has to do with the mobilisation of persons with a sense of determination and efficacy, with a view to change the way things are done with a critical mass of people that will eventually metamorphose into an NGO that is recognised and strongly rooted. She cited few examples, such as, South Korea, Central Europe and Baltic states, as areas where such movements had taken place and succeeded. NGOs or civil society organisations, act as go-between the government and the people or put differently as the mouth-piece of the people - through protest, opposition to perceived government bad policies, and other socio-economic and political actions on the masses.

The section above discussed some of the approaches or strategies to combat corruption as suggested by distinct literature on combating corruption. These same factors outlined across the various literature as suggested do not yield same results across societies, but however, the results are dependent on the degree of application or the quality of practice. For example, democracy on its own might not deliver a good result in the absence of other supporting institutions, structures or low quality democracy being practised – where the electorate are disenfranchised, offered money to sell their conscience, elections are rigged, investment in electoral violence – the use of thugs, and most importantly a media without freedom. For example, not all democracies are a true reflection of an ideal democracy, because a democracy where the opposition parties that are supposed to provide alternative platforms are hunted, might lack the balance to scrutinise the policies of the ruling party. Two, a democracy where there is so much intimidation of opponents might lack the power to fight the corrupt elites. Tackling or reducing corruption with democracy, seems to dependent on the variant of democracy that encourages freedom of speech, free press, political fairness – regardless of being an opposition party or ruling party, checks and balances, a neutral police force and other law enforcement agencies, an independent judiciary devoid of fear and executive interference, and above all a constitutional government – that is constitutionally compliant.

As a medium for entertainment, information and education, our understanding of events happening locally, nationally and internationally/globally remain a function of the media, couple with the investigation and exposing of distinct criminal acts, such as state crimes and other criminal acts by individuals in the course of business or governance. As part of the research design where part of the data collection and analysis are centred on media contents, the immediate section below will in general x-ray the media in the light of its instrumentality in the fight against corruption..

## 2.7 THE MEDIA

The choice of creating a subheading to discuss the media from the number of corruption reducing or controlling ways discussed is hinged on one, the evidence that, media serves as a powerful weapon for curbing the behaviours of rent seekers; one of the most result oriented channel to curb ‘bureaucratic corruption and promotion of good governance’(Camaj,2013). Two, other conspicuous consequence of their function or action appears by way of ‘the launching of investigation by authorities, the scrapping of a law or policy that fosters a climate ripe with opportunities for corruption, the impeachment or forced resignation of a crooked politician, the firing of an official, the launching of judicial proceedings, the issuing of public recommendations by a watch dog body, and so on’(Stapenhurst,2000). And three, as one of the sources for data collection of media contents about political corruption and conventional crimes in order to understand what is being said by the media about the two different crimes that represent two polar worlds.

The assertions of Camaj and Stapenhurst represent a pragmati one, where in many situations the media have had to pressure public officials into resignation of their positions or appointments on scandal bordering on corruption, discriminatory comments and so on. But Camaj (2013) and Stapenhurst (2000) however warned that, the above feat is only achievable through a free media. The influential role of the media in bringing corruption down does not imply or grant the media the status of corruption free, as Pillai (2011) in the case of India, lamented how famous media experts acted as middle contacts ‘between the state and commercial interests’ arguing that in a democratic setting the press is meant to shun such involvement.

*The daily news alerts us to the latest events and changes in the larger environment beyond our immediate experience. But newspapers and television news, even the tightly edited pages of a tabloid newspaper or internet web site, do considerably more than signal the existence of major events and issues. Through their day-by-day selection and display of the news, editors and news directors focus our attention and influence our perceptions of what are the most important issues of the day* (McCombs 2004:1).

McCombs reflects on how indispensable the media is in the day-by-day activities of the society. That our knowledge and understanding of what happens within and outside our environment, ranging from entertainment, crime and socio-economic activities is a function of the media – irrespective of whether it’s print, electronic or new media. More importantly, the peoples’ views or perceptions (negative or positive) of government performance also remains a function of the media. Be as it may, the ability of the media to influence the opinions of the public, may also rest on the techniques or logic employed in the information transmission process. What is also embedded in the above piece is the idea that, the news or information the media give to the people are not first-hand but rather distorted reality or what some scholars dub ‘mediated reality.’ Meaning the news the public is fed with are diluted or twisted news – lacking originality. As McCombs (2004) promoted and drew from Lippmann (the intellectual brain behind what is technically now called ‘agenda-setting’) in his work *Public Opinion* in the early twentieth century to avow that, the press ‘our windows to the vast world beyond direct experience, determine our cognitive maps of the world.’

The elucidation of news is executed by a double system of ‘framework of concept and values’ for the categorisation or classification of different news into forms of ‘stories’ - ‘political’, ‘human interest’, crime, show-biz, ‘celebrity.’ Secondly, it changes the meaning of event and making it better understood by virtue of the ideological framework, and completely explaining it in a number of ways (Chibnall,1977). This is all about the process and need for the division of news contents into different representative sections. The author also explained that, the way news are reported by different media institutions, owe partly to their ‘news policy.’ The volume of news content produced and consumed, is very much dependent on representation, as Siapera (2010) argues that, the concept ‘representation’ is the end-product of ‘media production process’ combined with ‘reception’(i.e. what is seen, heard and perceived) and interpreted for final use. The core issue or argument is that, representation involves processes, not just a single process of news production or transmission, but a combination of processes that finally culminate in consumption and subsequent deployment for other purposes.

Kalathil (2011), describes the press as a ‘watch dog’ which protects the interests of state and other institutions. It implies the surveillance role the media plays by keeping their eagle eyes on the activities of governments, and individuals at all levels. It reflects hugely Foucault’s concept of *panopticism* (an advanced model of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon). But surprisingly, Kalathil lamented the non-inclusion of the press sector in the particular use of templates for a wide-range evaluations in the act of governance as affirmed by USAID (ibid). It is quite disappointing, in view of Houston, Lin and Ma (2011) arguing the indispensable role of the media in the fight against corruption, by detecting and exposing varying degrees and acts of corruption.

The role of the media in nation building, may at no time be ignored. In the words of Thomas Jefferson ‘‘were it left me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government; I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter”(cited in Freille et al.2007). The statement credited to Jefferson does not only symbolise the indispensability of the press to the fight against corruption; but its informative and entertaining functions. Similarly, “a press is not a luxury. A free press is at the absolute core of equitable development because if you cannot enfranchise poor people, if they do not have right to expression if there is no searchlight on corruption and inequitable practices, you cannot build up the public consensus needed to bring about change”(Wolfensohn cited in Kalathil,2011). The central message is that, to bring about any form of political, economic, and social change, the input of the press remains a vital factor.

Altheide (2006), in his discussion of ‘Mass Media, Crime and Terrorism’ argues that, the media play a huge function as to ‘public perception and acceptance of criminal behaviour by the U.S. government’. And that, the approval of unlawful ‘actions’ by the American people, in view of the war in Iraq was a function of the ‘entertainment’ world, ‘media content’ and ‘media logic’. Although, this was used at a different instance, but it is within the general context of crime and media influence. Media logic is defined ‘as the form of communication, and process through which media transmit and communicate information’(Altheide,2006). Media logic encompasses the characteristics of different media institutions, style of presentation, vocabulary of communication, and a defined focus. When media logic is employed to explain a prevailing situation in an organisation, the ‘form and content’ are changed (ibid 2010).

## 2.8 CORRUPTION SCHOOL OF THOUGHTS

Whether corruption is a blessing or a curse is dependent on an individual’s perception and what school to align with. The ‘revisionist’ school of thought argues that corruption serves a positive purpose. Within the revisionist school, according to Montinola and Jackman (2002) is the argument that, corruption promotes efficiency; reduces the difficulty of ‘capital formation’ and administrative rigidity symptomatic of a ‘modernizing economy.’ According to the ‘corruption apologists’ they posit that, it ‘oils the mechanism’ or ‘greases the wheel’(Left,1964;Huntington 1968). In essence, these renowned authorities are of the opinion that, with corruption people are bound to get quicker results – by having to use available short-cuts to undermine bureaucratic bottlenecks or red tapes through the use of ‘speed money.’ Kaufmann (1997), explains the core value of the ‘grease-the-wheel’ argument – which lies in the idea that, giving bribes result in a turn around situation of ‘burdensome regulations and ineffective legal systems’. But that such justification has not only propelled high class educational models only, but has engineered most organisations with such mind-set to indulge in such prohibited criminal practices. Kaufmann, however, went further to flaw their values – describing it as ‘full of holes’ on the following grounds: first, the discretionary powers of political office holders and that of civil servants; second, the powers for the ‘creation, proliferation and interpretation of counter productive regulations.’ Contrary to their claim, Kaufmann, sees corruption as the ‘fuel for excessive and discretionary regulations’ (1997).

Let’s assume corruption results in economic efficiency or growth, but the question is: on whose part is the efficiency, public or private? Is it at a micro or macro level? Or should we subscribe to the idea that death is a positive benefit of corruption? Spector (2012), in his discussion on ‘detecting corruption’ posited that most earthquakes where not just natural, but were artificially created. And that most construction codes may have been compromised as a result of sharp corrupt practices for personal enrichment. Spector, further fortified his argument that the loss of 29 (twenty nine) miners in the U.S. state of Virginia, was an outcome of unenforced ‘strict mining regulation’(2012). The issuing of driver’s license without having to undergo a driving test is likely to be perceived as an outcome of illegal payments made to government officials, which may in turn pose a serious risk to lives and properties.

Further to the above, there is the counter view that it ‘sands-the-wheel’. The implication of this is that, it grounds the wheel of progress, development and growth. In addition when certain abnormal practices are allowed to continue there could be interference with certain administrative procedures – as bureaucrats would expect illicit payments for something that ought not to be. For example, if one pays to jump a queue as against the rule of having to wait for your turn, the overseeing official may want to adopt delay tactics so others who may not be patient enough may come forward to negotiate for preferential treatment. Secondly, it could create an atmosphere of unfairness, and discrimination – a situation where those who are financially buoyant are favoured against those who can’t afford so.

Lui (1985), discussed about the centrality of time (i.e. how people view and use their time to get things done). He argued that people want to get things done on time. The idea of getting things done on time may not be a criminal issue that should be debated. Let’s assume with corruption one can actually cut corners (that is jumping over before it gets to your turn), for example, in a queue one buys his or her way to get attended to by giving bribe, in the realm of fairness, this would be interpreted to mean undue advantage over those without money. While corruption has become an evil phenomenon for retrogressive reasons, attempts at different levels have been made to contain it.

## 2.9 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

This thesis classifies the international responses in a descending order of three layers: global/international, intercontinental and continental arrangements. One, the global/international has the United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003(UNCAC) – a product of the UN General Assembly Resolution 55/61 of 4th December 2000, requesting for a strong, robust and effective legal tool to contain the dreaded phenomenon, and ultimately came into force with the aid of Resolution 58/4 in December 31st 3003 (Manarcoda,2014). Two, OECD Anti Bribery Convention, falls under the intercontinental category. While the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 2003 (AUCPCC) comes under the continental category - one of such legal instruments with the force of law to help in combating corruption at the regional environment. The UNCAC & AUCPCC, with Nigeria as a state party are two different legal instruments aimed at combating corruption at the global and African terrains. The UNCAC, which led the way calls for criminalisation of corruption, international cooperation, preventive steps towards corruption, technical cooperation and confiscation of assets of public servants found wanton (UN,2004).

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a body established in 1989 as one of the institutions and a watchdog founded to tackle organised crime, such as money laundering. The FATF, is a product or outcome of international collaboration, encouraging countries internationally to review sections of their organised crime regulatory frameworks where necessary, as they affect individual nations regarding organised criminal activities, like ‘money laundering’(Beare,1997). The FATF (2012) as part of its global campaign to reduce the threats of terrorist funding, money laundering and weapons of mass destruction, appealed to member states to replicate its new detailed and ‘consistent framework’ in a way they think it’s adaptable to their local jurisdiction, taking into cognisance the socio-economic and legal differences among its member states. The implication of this is that, the FATF, is to monitor funds not necessarily money laundering only, but funds that may be use to bring about global crises or instability.

Also in the pipeline, is the ‘ABC model’(Anti-bribery Compliance Model) a project being undertaken by numerous educational bodies with private sector participation under the help and umbrella of United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime aimed at producing result-oriented tools for containing bribery. Basically, it’s anchored on three stanchions:

* *The elaboration of a common standard for anti-bribery compliance programs which will ultimately serve as a model for corporations*
* *The acknowledgment within domestic criminal law systems of self-regulation as an instrument for assessing the liability for corporations in cases of corruption*
* *The endorsement of such compliance programs at the international level* (Manarcorda,2014).

The need or urge to continually review, modify and improve on existing anti-corruption instruments calls for a relentless approach to the phenomenon. An interesting aspect of most of the international and legal instruments, is the respect for sovereignty, by not superimposing regulatory operations on them, but rather ensuring that they are able to adapt the international instruments by carefully adjusting the local system for this purpose. The above international instruments toward checking corruption are not without flaw, because the extradition of suspects, technically does not feature as a key element in most of the legal instruments.

The Washington consensus (that is a Western international development organisation based in Washington) have also played a huge role in tackling corruption. In the early 1990, they had come together to identify and promote economic development in the developing countries of the world – through various economic policy plans of: trade liberalization, privatisation of public owned enterprises, fiscal discipline and investment in education. However, it became disappointing, when it realised that the goal (which is the idea of having to measure up with western nations developmentally), was yet to be achieved. And many key players were of the strong conviction that, the prescribed development initiatives were distorted as a result of corruption (Azfar, Lee and Swamy,2001).

At the end of this critical engagement of literature on corruption, its ambiguity of definition, cultural conception and view as a state crime, serves as an impediment to a consistent framework of analysis. It is a crime used by the elites or the powerful to unfairly widen the gap between them and the masses, while they get richer, the people are getting poorer. This can be observed in the living standards, for example of politicians, who prior to being in power ordinarily struggled with hardship, but things changed suddenly while they got into power, living in luxury. While the state claims to be tackling corruption with all relevant state institutions, in reality they manipulate the system to evade punishment, while the impact of their behaviour on the public are not cushioned. While some of the suggested solutions to reducing corruption are giving results in some societies, others are struggling to make impact for lack of dedication or commitment hence they struggle with integrity.

In the light of the definitions critically discussed, the working definition of political corruption in this thesis is: the misuse of office for financial and non-financial benefits for a person or groups by public officials. This working definition is in a way unique by way of specificity, as it places emphasis on financial and non-final areas, as against other existing definitions that seem not to be specific, but practically view and measure corruption in monetary terms only.

One of the lessons drawn in this chapter on political corruption is that, it’s a phenomenon with a thick skin that can’t be cracked with a single tool, but a combination of tools.

Two, that suppressing corruption in the face of punishment alone may run short of its decline, but with a re-orientation on the parts of public officials and potential public officials the chances of winning the war may become high.

Three, that a free press as widely argued for or suggested won’t only deliver on reducing corruption, if the media itself does not fight media corruption.

Four, that with corruption no one is safe in the society regardless of status. Though the powerful in the society have the means to cushion the impacts, the problem remains a general one, that in every little way affects all and sundry.

Five, that when officials go unpunished for corrupt practices, it encourages and inculcates a culture of no fear and also push offenders to go about engaging in corrupt behaviours.

Six, unlike other forms of crimes political corruption are not easily reported to the police or any agency established by law to specifically deal with financial crimes, because they are not easily accessed as a consequence of visibility.

Seven, that at the international level, the United Nations (UN) needs to do more in the area of repatriation of looted funds and performance appraisal of member states, with a designated monitoring group put in place in order to ensure compliance with the implementation of the recommendations of the UN convention against corruption. The international response through its initiation of the convention against corruption had injected force and led to member states taking the issue of corruption more seriously, through the introduction of legislations to combat political corruption and the establishment of anti-corruption agencies to investigate and prosecute public officials that are found to have violated the law.

Eight, that there is so much focus on the financial abuse segment of political corruption in terms of investigation and prosecution offenders, while the abuse that revolves round preferential treatment accorded to persons based on personal, family, ethnic, and religious connections are left unaddressed – in the sense of investigation and prosecution. One hardly finds a public official being prosecuted for favouring someone with a job opportunity on the ground of religious or ethnic closeness when he or she does not merit it. Hence the definitions given by experts and organisation does not explicitly, specifically and solely dub it a financial crime, some of these unfair practices subtly serve as foundation and grows into this bigger problem that humanity now struggle to defeat.

As crime of the powerful class in the society or a state crime, with radical criminologists viewing the perpetrators as being under state protection, political corruption represents one end of a spectrum with many sides, while conventional crime, which represent the opposite end of the spectrum, as crime of the powerless or ordinary people with much interest from mainstream criminology is critically examined in chapter two – opening up the opportunity to draw on the similarities and differences between these two different crimes. Although these two categories of crimes are way different from each other, in terms of who the offenders or perpetrators are, their modes of operation and the pattern of criminal justice administration. But what is common between them is that, they take advantage of the opportunities or lapses that have been created by a system to achieve their goal. Whether it is called a common criminal or elite criminal, opportunity is a key factor for their criminal desires to achieved, as shown in the subsequent chapter theoretically.

## 2.10 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The explanation of why a lot of people indulge in criminal activities; or why certain crimes or criminal behaviours are pervasive or more in some areas than others have attracted the interests of criminologists and their theories. One of such theories is *Routine Activities Theory of Crime,* by Cohen and Felson (1979). The use of this theory does not suggests that, it is the most suitable of all criminological theories, but its uniqueness and relevance to this research calls for it. The deployment of this theory, is informed by the need to exploit or capitalise on the opportunity arguments – where the partial or complete absence of institutional pillars meant to deter crimes have been argued to bolster the above offending behaviours, which scholars like: Klitgaard, HUNG-EN SUNG and Clark, to mention a few have concretely elaborated upon – in their distinct crime categories.

The routine activities theory of crime is fundamentally hinged on ‘opportunity’ or what this research may call space explanation of crime causation. According to Cohen and Felson (1979) – the theory is basically built around three elements of: *offender ,target* and *guardian.* What these presuppose is that, for any criminal act to take place, the three elements emphasised above must be present. How? For instance, for a crime committed, there must be an offender (the person that has violated the law); second – there must be a target ( the object/person desired); third – guardian ( effective institutions). When there is an offender and a target, but no violation, it points to the subsistence of institutional guardians (ibid1979). For clarity of what is being analysed, how do we define institutions? ‘Institutions can be defined as collectively working rules’(Groenendijk,1997). The function of institutions is that they state clearly the boundaries of the decision made by individuals i.e. what should and should not be done (ibid). For example, the school rules, business rules or an agreement between two parties.

Cohen and Felson, in their analysis, referred to the concept ‘routine activities’ as everyday legitimate activities people involve in within and outside the family institution – ranging from food sourcing, housing, games, chatting, leisure etc., irrespective of origin and cultural orientation. They argued that, the gravitation of people from jobs or activities around the family to activities far away increases the proclivity of indulging in illegitimate deals between space and time, in the absence of able guardians (1979). The argument here by the authors, is that the closer people live with their family, the less opportunity they have to get involve in illegitimate activities. The argument of being close or away from home, a factor perceived as promoting acts of criminal indulgence, may not hold ground in all situations – by virtue of psychological differences. The nucleus or high point of this theory is that, violations exist when a fertile ground is created for them to grow. However, the concentration of the theorists on the physical aspect to explain crime causation, shunning the psychological plain (in terms of individual traits or characteristics) seems to give it limited coverage. Is it being said that an offender who commits a crime, does not have any psychological influence over the crime committed?

Although the routine activities theory is not flawless, but its applicability had proved to be remarkable. In a study conducted by HUNG-EN SUNG (2002) analysing ‘country-level political corruption’ the author found the above theory very instrumental –opining that, outside it being universally perceived as an economic/political disease; that the problem emanated from ‘culture and history’ stoked by unproductive and misguided policies and lack of effective institutions.

The opportunity-driven theory of Cohen and Felson, was illuminated further by Garcia-Quesada, Jimenez and Villoria (2014) *that corruption derived not only from* an inadequate formal incentive structure, but also from the prevalence of certain *expectations contrary to the common good and from the absence of ‘principled principals’ willing to ensure that agents acting on their behalf did not engage in corruption.* The implication of this according to the authors, is about lack of purposeful and disciplined leadership, adorned with systemic loopholes outside paucity of structural incentives promotes corruption on a massive scale. That is to say, the more the loopholes, the more material and financial haemorrhage that will play out.

Also the Mungiu-Pippidi’s(2013) model– which canvasses for the use of ‘normative constraints’ – a way of collectively combining in no little way the following four key ideas that form the concept: *values, social capital, civil society,* and *civic culture*, in order to fight corrupt behaviour. One of the core arguments of the Cohen and Felson’s theory is the failure of *guardian institutions* to effectively and purposefully discharge their duties in a manner that will dissuade criminality.

To further support the above theory, interestingly, quality literature on institutions and their impacts on social behaviour in relation to this analysis abound. One of such interesting works was by Collier(2002) using *The institutional choice analytic frame* a derivative of Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner and James Walker’s *Institutional Analysis and Development* (IAD) approach which represent an investigation of ‘social behaviour’ guided by ‘social institutions.’ These institutions are further divided into three distinct frames with varying purposes: *instruction rules*, *directive rules* and *commitment rules.* Instruction rules, outline *principles, beliefs* or *norms* that give the agents or representatives an idea of the institution’s cause. The directive rules is about what must be done by the representative. While the commitment rules, states clearly to the representatives where their rights could be exercised. Human beings have the capacity to produce as many rules as possible, but what matters most is the result or impact of the enacted rules, hence rules don’t operate on their own but require human actions. How are these rules made result-oriented? Collier asserted that, the outcome of the rules depend largely on ‘formality and strength.’ The assistance of ‘other rules’ is what formality is all about. While strength is about the constant adherence to laid-down rules by agents (ibid).

On the contrary, if the expected outcomes become the unexpected, then the floodgate of crime is opened. But to stop this such a space or opportunity should not be created, other than for the institutions to do the needful. The summary is that institutions or rules are not formulated to remain inactive or dormant, but meant to achieve a purpose for which they were created. They should be energised by ensuring their effectiveness. But how far can the rules or institutions go? Like Foster (2001) argues that rules are a product of ‘corrupt authorities’ and as such could be changed to meet their individual interests.

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From the literature examined, the perpetrators of these two different crimes belong to different societal social strata. Apart from class difference, the modus operandi, the motive behind the commission, the detection rate, setting, are also far apart. The concept of ‘white collar crime’ as propounded and discussed by Sutherland (1949) seems to be instrumental in this context. How? Sutherland, in his analysis of the preponderance of crime in the lesser ‘socioeconomic’ stratum compared to the higher stratum, identified ‘poverty’ as the foundation of it. But went further to pinpoint financial and political muscles – as the brick walls faced in bringing white collar offenders to book by authorities (1949). It could be argued that, the reliance on financial and political power by white collar offenders, remains a symptom of institutional deficiency. In relating his analysis to the findings of this review, this work found that a good percentage of the offenders revealed based on their involvement in conventional crimes (like shoplifting and residential burglary) - were somewhat poverty driven – due to their hunger for drugs, alcohol etc. In stark contrast, based on the findings from various literature political corruption turned out to be entirely different – hence offenders do not come out to state why they had indulged in such criminal behaviour, (if any) and the reasons behind the breach of public trust for personal gains, unlike conventional crimes. What is not known is if same situation would play out, in terms of how the media would cover or represent the two crime categories. Although there appears to be a huge dynamic difference between both crimes, one thing is however clear – a technical link exists between what the country loses through corruption – denying every other citizens the benefits of their common wealth. From all, some of the following lessons below have been learnt from the study of various literature on conventional crimes

One, that most of the offenders who were into drugs and alcohol went into crime in order to raise money to satisfy their urge, desire or addiction. With this known fact, it puts the government in a better position to address some of these social problems and imbalance in the society.

Two, that If these crimes are left unaddressed or unattended to for so long with the reasons given by the conventional offenders for committing crimes or indulging in such criminal behaviours, at some point, the streets might become very unsafe for people to do their daily activities.

Three, that while it presents a huge challenge to the government, it also gives the government the opportunity to develop a model that will ensure that these offenders are taken off the street, as part of measure to reduce conventional crimes. And that government should ensure offenders convicted and sentenced with drug or alcohol problems are rehabilitated and re-integrated into the society.

Four, that if the government fail to come out with a clear plan on how to ensure ex-convicts do not relapse to their criminal past, it might be too much for the government to handle if they do.

From the perspective of the radical criminologists, the concentration on the criminal behaviours of the poor in the society was due to the conspicuousness or rather detectability and accessibility of such crimes, compared to political corruption - crimes of the elites, which are shrouded in secrecy, lacking visibility, difficult to measure but easy to identify through its symptoms dotting the landscape.

Conclusively, corruption remains the world biggest and most challenging problem, considering the global, continental, subregional and national efforts at tackling the criminal practice of public officials converting public resources for private gain in violation of the public trust and confidence reposed in them. There is no one single solution to the phenomenon, because different environments with different challenges, but can be fought or reduced to the barest minimum with the right political will, and absence of culpability on the part of political leaders. That a country is an international signatory to anti-corruption conventions or instrument, in the case of Nigeria, is not an end in itself to the dangers or destruction caused by corruption. Although, it ensures and promote international collaborations, information sharing on looted funds and repatriation. In spite of the domestication in Nigeria of various international instruments aimed at eradicating corruption, corruption in Nigeria remains rife. The reality is that, in spite of government efforts, the international perception of Nigeria as a corrupt country remains extremely high – as justified by high infrastructural deficit, unemployment, absence of safety net, and long delays in the prosecution of alleged cases of corruption and many more.

# CHAPTER THREE

**RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

## INTRODUCTION

In the analysis of political corruption and conventional criminality in Nigeria, record of crimes from the Nigerian Police Force was deemed vital by the researcher, unfortunately, the number of attempts made were unsuccessful. In the first instance, the researcher contacted the Nigerian police formation Lagos through one of its officers, the response through email was that, no data with reliability. The officer did not stop there but furnished the researcher further with police contact telephone numbers, but further attempts made by the researcher were fruitless. While in the second instance, the researcher was given the contact information of police headquarters, Abuja and established telephone communication with one of the officers, and furnished him with what the research was all about, and the need for the police records of crimes. Surprisingly, the officer’s response was that, there was no data base for police records of crimes. So, in the absence of Nigerian police crime data, the following strategies are adopted:

* Media analysis: a critical analysis of political corruption and conventional criminality of selected articles from selected national newspapers
* Analysis of legal frameworks: a critical analysis of sections 308 and 15 (5) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended) as it relates to political corruption; section bordering on the functions or powers of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004.
* Analysis of official statistics: a critical analysis of statistics on political corruption and conventional criminality.

This thesis aims to analyse the ideologies behind Nigerian criminal justice system in order to assess Nigerian responses to two types of crime: political corruption and conventional crimes. This thesis defines ideologies in a narrow perspective, as pressure from international and national bodies for the government to change legislation.

In an attempt to achieve the aims and objectives of this research, this work discusses content analysis (as the research method), to explore the representation of political corruption, conventional crimes and the criminal justice system in the Nigerian media and other legal sources mentioned above. But to begin with, the researcher discusses briefly the theoretical cover of the research method, hence it’s an approach that hinges on language. Edley (2001) describes ‘language’ as a phenomenon that has given rise to ‘the theoretical foundations’ upon which any research that is centred on social constructionism is anchored. On the basis of this, social constructionism is examined succinctly.

## 3.1 THEORETICAL STANDPOINT: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM

Social constructionism, as a theory of knowledge has specifically (Young and Collin,2004) in the social sciences gained prominence – with its ‘contributions’ and ‘challenges’ identified as factors responsible for its fame. It has been argued that, in most educational environments it is less of a controversy to submit that, human activities are ‘socially constructed’(Edley,2001) or ‘socially mediated’ in the phrase of Newton, Deetz, and Reed (2011). What this implies or encapsulates, is the idea that, the natural world is a product of social undertaking. It (social constructionism) is centred on the historical and cultural production of ‘knowledge’ and ‘meaning’ by virtue of ‘social processes and action.’ To this end, this brings us to the strong view or claim of Derrida, that ‘there is nothing outside of the text’(1976,p.158, cited in Edley,2001), or what some see as ‘turn to language’. This ordinarily would be misconstrued to imply that everything about the world is nothing but text. But connotatively, it is ‘the medium through which we come to understand or know the world’ (Edley,2001). By seeing it as the medium through which the world is projected, may not be different partly from how it creates or constructs its narratives or stories - which forms part of representation. To further support this, Edley (2001) argues that, when people ponder and interact about the ‘world’ representation sets in.

.Holsti (1969) defines content analysis ‘as any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages’(p.14). While Berelson (1952:18 cited in Bryman,2012) considers content analysis as “a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.’ Bryman (2012:90) says ‘Content analysis is an approach to the analysis of documents and texts that seeks to quantify content in terms of predetermined categories in a systematic and replicable manner’.Neuendorf (2002,p.1 cited in Rudy, Popova and Linz,2010) defines it as ‘the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics.’ It is about the analysis of written, unwritten and visual ways of communicating irrespective of the approach adopted. From the definitions given, it seems there is a consensus or put differently a common ground in view of the emphasis on the unique and clearly defined ways it should be conducted.

Objectivity requires that, certain symbols which appear in the communication process be noted; likewise the coding of concepts, words, and patterns highlighted in the text – which are brought under different categories (Holsti 1969). This stance was similarly taken by Krippendorff (2013) describing content analysis as an objective account of messages. The problematic nature of content analysis is in the fact that content analysis is the inability to state of any existing practice or rule – confining the definition of content analysis to the manifest content (that is looking at meaning from a surface perspective), or the latent content (which is about hidden meaning). Can we state exactly when latent content analysis is meant to be carried out, vis-à-vis manifest content? If we say yes, we may as well be far from reality. But if we say no, the better we improve on the method. The difference between the two methods, as may be argued, is an issue of focus: while the quantitative is concerned about manifest content; the qualitative is centred on latent content of texts. It is also very noticeable – that some of the definitions outlined above, seem to put more emphasis on quantitative while ignoring the qualitative angle. The reasons for such emphasis may be attributed to bias, scope, and research goal.

Apart from what has been discussed above, the issues of reliability and validity in this research method (content analysis) is also another area of concern, considering the different ways it is used in the quantitative and qualitative spheres. One of the indices for determining a sound research is ‘validity’ (Schreier,2012). Schreier further affirms that, in a quantitatively piloted research, validity is achieved if the researcher succeeds in measuring what has been set out from the beginning of the research ( 2012). *Validity is a very important criterion for assessing the quality of qualitative research. It is used in two senses: in a narrow sense, referring to the extent to which your instruments help you capture what you set out to capture, and in a broader sense, referring to the overall quality of your study (Schreier,2012:27).* So for the purpose of this study, the measurement of validity will be premised on achieving the overall aim and objectives of this research – which is the exploration of media depiction of corruption and conventional crimes and the ideologies backing the Nigerian criminal justice system responses to corruption and conventional crimes.

In relation to the above, it is not about being subjectively bias, but it’s about context; and what is it that the researcher wants to explore and achieve (Kondracki et al.2002).This implies that, the purpose and desired outcome, play a central role in determination of the best approach that suits it. We might as well dissipate time debating which is better (quantitative or qualitative)? However, in plain term, that is not the focus of this research. The approach to be adopted is a longitudinal one – similar to that employed by Reiner and Livingstone (1997 cited in Davies, francis, and Jupp 2011 ), in their study of crime(i.e. representation or portrayal of crime) in both print and electronic media texts (written and visual) between 1945 and 1991. To buttress this further, Lombard, Snyder-duch and Bracken (2002:587) argue that “*the study of communication is interdisciplinary, sharing topics Literatures, expertise, and research methods with many academic fields and disciplines. But one method, content analysis, is specifically appropriate and necessary for (arguably) the central work of communication scholars, in particular those who study mass communication: the analysis of messages.* The above snippet is a further clarification that content analysis does not enjoy any limitation, as to where it can only be used, but often times its application is more with ‘communication scholars.’

But for clarity of purpose, content analysis should not be misinterpreted as the only research tool, by which any research organised around mass communication is exhibited. But there are very specific cases where it is most needed and suitable (where interview methods may not fit in) – in view of its very nature and research design. In the context of its strength, content analysis analyses archived data which date back to ages; less capital intensive; and monitor changes. In spite of the advantages mentioned, its demerits are: inability to produce adequate inferences; and its labour-intensive nature of research (Kondracki et al.2002).

In spite of the fact that, it is widely employed in the academic fields as a concrete ‘methodological tool’ (Montabon et al.2006 cited in Sodhi and Son,2010) outside its comfort zone ( the media industry), content analysis has been firmly reported to have been criticised as a soft method (Elo and Kyngas 2008). But in real terms it is not simple, because it goes beyond the manifest interpretation to latent content, and it’s also time-consuming as asserted by Kondracki, et al. above – because of the processes or stages involved while content analysing. Understanding the latent meaning of texts does not come easy, as such would require a deep understanding of the entire context, the layout of text, in order to allocate meaning.

Morse (1991 cited in Downe-Wamboldt 1992) asserted, ‘researchers who purport to subscribe to the philosophical underpinnings of only one research approach have lost sight of the fact that research methodologies are merely tools, instruments to be used to facilitate understanding.’ In the light of Downe-Wamboldt’s assertion, whether a research technique is simple or not may not be unsettling, but what could be perceived as more important, may be validity, and reliability etc. The reduction of the value of content analysis by the quantitative school through criticisms - for lack of ‘statistical’ presence (Elo & Kyngas 2008), seem to be of no importance going by Downe-Wamboldt’s assertion.

Harwood and Gary (2013) argue that Content analysis came into use as a method for analysing newspapers, magazines and singing books (hymns) as early as in the 19th century. Krippendorff (2004) argues that, the use of content analysis became more prominent by the 1940s. It first appeared in English in 1941,while print media and ‘quantitative newspaper analysis’ commenced early 20th century – as a final outcome of a determined and powerfully designed scheme to produce a ‘simplistic and scientifically objective methods of analysing news articles’( Sodhi and Son, 2010). In looking at the trend, the interesting argument here is that, the development of the media also paved way for the development of approaches to analysing media contents.

In order to employ content analysis certain basic issues must be sorted or resolved in order to achieve maximum benefits of the method. According to Krippendorff (1980 cited in Stemler, 2001), a quality oriented content analysis can be achieved by sorting out six fundamental questions: Which data are analysed? How are they defined? What is the population from which they are drawn? What is the context relative to which the data are analysed? What are the boundaries of the analysis? What is the target of the inferences?

The six questions raised above clearly defines or represent the research scope or what may be called the research environment. They summarise in its entirety data processing and methodological importance. The context, data, the general population from which materials are extracted all seem quite instrumental in defining the scope and bearing of a research that is hinged on content analysis (though not a universal condition, but the views of Krippendorff). However, there is a good and cogent reason to argue that, this research meets the requirements of the above six questions raised by Krippendorff.

Hansen, Cottle, Negrine, and Newbold (1998) argue ‘if we wish to describe and analyse media content in a more comprehensive way, a way less prone to subjective selectiveness and idiosyncracies, then we must employ a systematic method. Content analysis is one such method for the systematic analysis of communication content’.

The characterisation of it as ‘a systematic method’ may not be short of its processes – which cut across counting, categorisation, coding and interpretation. It has strongly been criticised for its quantitative sense or its positivistic view of objectivity; and attempting to make social research ‘scientific’ in consonance with the procedural template of the ‘natural sciences’(ibid). The critique is all about the statistical elements; the independent nature of the researcher with his or her research; and less interaction with the research elements with a sense of objectivity. In a nutshell, it is an attempt to dissuade the use of a natural science method in conducting social research, hence they differ.

Conversely, Holsti (1969, page) devised an objectivity test: ‘can other analysts, following identical procedures with same data, arrive at similar conclusions’? He argues that a researcher that can not convincingly transmit to others the ‘procedures and criteria for selecting data – for deciding what is and not important; interpretation of research findings, could be perceived as a failed mission – for not passing the task of objectivity. If we examine carefully, it will be unearthed that, Holsti’s understanding and explanations are very much centred or hinged on a well articulated, planned and clear-cut processes that will reduce any trace of ‘subjective predispositions’ acknowledging the presence and impossibility to erase subjectiveness.

As a matter of context, it may be hard to rid content analysis of subjective interpretation. Ahuvia (2001),argues that people’s comprehension of ‘same text’ differs strongly – because the audience or readers, authors may have conflicting understanding of a piece of message. In view of the above dilemma, Berelson (1952 cited in Ahuvia,2001) argues for a ‘common meeting ground’ between all parties concerned ( the author, reader and others) – where the meanings given to texts blend perfectly with each one of the aforementioned parties. But this position has been strongly criticised for its lack of reliability; the inability to achieve such a targeted result; and lack of contextual consideration – because people view things from distinct perspectives (Jacob et al.,1980; Jacob 1985;Kepplinger 1989 cited in Ahuvia 2001).

For Hsieh and Shannon (2005),content analysis was dubbed ‘the quantitative analysis of qualitative data’. This description seems to be anchored on the counting character of content analysis – which looks at the frequency or the number of times a word occurs – mostly referred to as ‘manifest content analysis’(ibid).But it is technically worrisome, that much of the attention or concerns seem centred on its numerical value and inferences – as what wholly constitute content analysis. If we agree to such a narrow view, does it provide an explanation for the context of the texts? Does it showcase the hidden or underlying meanings of texts? – most times labelled ‘latent content’. Or does it contextually explain the use of ‘direct versus euphemistic terms’? Or does it interpret ‘less obvious or standardised meanings’? It is difficult for quantitative analysis to provide answers to the above raised questions. For example, in a quantitative sense, 3 or 4 retains its conventional meaning regardless of situation, but in qualitative analysis, someone could say ‘friendly environment’ and this could be interpreted differently by different people, hence the setting would be considered.

Schreier (2012) argues that, quantitative content analysis is suitable for words with ‘highly standardised meanings’- implying words or concepts that are conventionally known to have a particular meaning with a bit of effort in terms of having to understand them. Arguing further on the contrary that, for the ‘less standardised meanings’- which favour qualitative content analysis, it is a different ball game – where mammoth efforts are required in deciphering their meanings due to contexts. Schreier describes: where in one of the advertising print media – one tries to find out the number of men and women in such advertisement. That in such a situation, quantitative content analysis is best suited, because with the images, the number of men and women will be identified. But in a different situation where one is trying to know ‘whether women in magazine advertisements are more often placed in trivial contexts than men’ she argues, that would require a qualitative content approach – because of the difficulty one would be confronted with understanding: ‘what exactly is a trivial context’? which pointedly falls within the purview of non-conventional meaning (ibid).

The point being made above is not to render quantitative content analysis unhelpful, but that relying on it solely may limit the length and breadth of the research to the surface contents. In the light of the reason adduced and to explore the hidden meanings of texts material beyond the very helpful frontiers of words frequency and counting (Hansen et al.1998) affirms that, the idea of counting the frequency of words do not in anyway reflect the interpretation of meaning assigned to texts or symbols. Similarly, Thomas (1994 cited in Hansen et al.1998) argue that, it is not about counting or identifying a word such as ‘punch’ but queried if ‘punches’ should be counted in such context and disagrees with such meaning as suggested with what the punches signify.

The media is described as ‘a key contributor to the perception of crime’(Marsh and Melville,2008). What the above excerpt seems to imply is that, a people’s understanding or interpretation of crime or criminal activities is partly owed or influenced by the ways through which such events are reported by the media. For the media to achieve such a feat, it may be hugely dependent on the concept of ‘news value’- which is the overall end result achieved from the ‘production processes’ of media houses and the presumption of news workers about the needs of consumers of media contents (Jewkes,2004 cited in Davies, Francis and Jupp 2011),though the aforementioned concept was developed by Galtung and Ruge (1965 cited in Davies et al.2011).

Jell Ferrell (An American Criminologist) – is credited with ‘cultural criminology’- a field centred on the usefulness of ‘style and representations’ and the apparent manners through which, they have influenced the media in the ‘construction of crime and criminal justice’(ibid 2008). Although, the term ‘cultural criminology’ has variously been defined, Ferrell (2013,p.258) defines it as a ‘focus on the human construction of meaning.’ Ferrell, argues further that, it is chiefly framed to critically engage the ‘politics of meaning’(2013). ‘Media representation’ is centred on ‘narratives’ and ‘images’ that emanate from distinct origins, with ‘media consumers’ being part of it as a result of its own stories (Orgad,2012). The conceptualisation of crime-based phenomenon (Yar,2010, cited in Yar,2012,p.247) appears in the form of ‘imaginaries’, ‘ideologies’, ‘rhetorics’, ‘cognitive framework’ etc. However, in the context of Nigeria, what we do not understand is how crime, such as political corruption and conventional crimes are constructed and represented. But with this study, we will be able to understand what representations do; and their significance in the context of political corruption and conventional crimes in Nigeria.

In a related research conducted by Markina (2004), on ‘printed media’ delineation of organised crime (OC) in Estonia, she posits that ‘organised crime was being presented as an extremely dangerous social phenomenon existing outside the community and state of Estonia’. According to Markina, the reality on ground was that, there was a huge ‘Mafia-type criminal organisation in Estonia,’ which was neglected and allowed to fester.

In the context of media construction and representation of crime, this research aims to examine, and explore political corruption and conventional crimes in Nigeria, through ‘media logic.’ The concept ‘media logic’ refers to the effective ways through which information is channelled and transmitted to the consumers of media content – with a focus on grammar, rhythm and format (Altheide,2004). The term ‘representation’ on the other hand ‘refers to the issue of how language is employed in different ways to represent what we can know, believe and perhaps think’(Wilson,2001). In this context, it may be right to affirm that, what the author implies, is the idea of how language functions as a tool; and how it influences and inflects people’s perception on a subject, phenomenon or discourse in the society. And the variation that exists – in terms of how things are expressed distinctly, in addition to the effects produced based on the varying approaches adopted in sending across messages.

In the context of the above, there seem to be a universal consensus that, in every research embarked upon, the research question to a large extent determines the methodological approach employed by the researcher, as Matthews and Ross (2010,p.141) argue that ‘the choice of methods therefore depends on the type of data you need to collect to be able to test your hypotheses or answer your research questions.’ What this clearly explains, is that the source and type of data required in a research process influences a researcher’s choice of method. However, this method (content analysis) is not confined to the media industry, but one that is inter-disciplinary (Howland, Becker and Prelli,2006). Similarly, Stemler (2001), in analysing its usefulness, describes it as a tool in ‘examining trends and patterns in documents.’ This further supports the argument – that content analysis is not exclusive to media application, but a universal method applicable to every other type of documents. While the media contents are content analysed, attention would be directed or given to the thematic make-up of the different national dailies to be analysed.

Thematic analysis is defined as ‘a method for identifying, analysing, and interpreting patterns of meaning (“themes”) within qualitative data’ (Clarke and Braun,2017). It implies that, thematic analysis is a technique for searching for themes that run through texts when conducting analysis, which indirectly condenses. While Clarke and Braun (2017) described it as a ‘method’, some other authors argued and dubbed it ‘a process’ employed in many qualitative research methods, in other words, that it plays a supportive role, hence it does not stand on its own (Nowell, Norris, White, and Moules,2017). The summary of it is that, thematic analysis can’t be branded as a qualitative method that is independent in nature, but a tool to be used in a qualitative research method.

As a merit, it is easy to understand and flexible in nature, hence it harbours ‘few prescription and procedures’(Nowell, et al.2017). It allows for a deep account or description of style or patterns found in a research data for analysis (Attard and Coulson,2012). It is a technique that involves the process of highlighting the themes through an attentive or mindful repetitive perusal of text. And an identification of patterns where themes emanating ‘become the categories for analysis’(Fereday and Muir-Cochrane,2006). This means reading through the text and repeating such in order to get acquainted and have an idea of what the text is all about. One of the demerits identified in thematic analysis, is the paucity of ‘substantial literature’ in contrast with other qualitative research method, and could cause inexperienced researchers or beginners not know how to conduct a painstaking thematic analysis (Nowell, et al.2017).

The media is a huge world which appear to be different across different environments – in terms of the nature, how free and active they are. In Nigeria , the print media is examined below.

## 3.2 MEDIA SPACE IN NIGERIA

Nigeria like any other country in the world - houses a lot of media outlets – through which information, entertainment, and educative programmes are disseminated. This sort of space is occupied by myriad of media organisations, with distinct ethnic background, ideological configuration, interests, news value, and operational scope. In Nigeria, over 100 newspapers are produced on daily or weekly basis as at 2017. In spite of the above number, only a few of these dailies have achieved national coverage – *The Guardian, The Punch, Leadership and Vanguard,* though Nigeria lacks accurate or reliable newspaper distribution data. Other newspapers are: *Premium Times, Daily Independent, Business Day, Daily Trust, Thisday, The Daily Sun,* according to the oxfordbusinessgroup.com. The difference between this site and mediaReach OMD (2005) is the *The Sun* newspaper that was captured as one of the leading national dailies, but missing from the Oxford business group web. However, the Oxford business group web had no evidence to buttress its claim of the four national dailies mentioned, unlike mediaReach OMD. Although not all print media outlets have national spread or coverage, but some are limited to their region/state and, local council areas. In the context of understanding the philosophy and guiding principles of the chosen national dailies – each of the print media channels are examined one after the other:

### 3.21 THE SUN

The result of the survey released according to mediaReach OMD Nigeria (2005) dubbed The Sun as the leading national daily with the highest readership in Nigeria. However, what is not known is if it (*The Sun*) still maintains same readership position as of present – considering the year the survey was conducted and result released. Literally, one would opine that – for such a feat, *The Sun* may have existed for ages. But reality may be far from such imaginative thinking, as it was founded in 2003 as a limited company registered as: The Sun Publishing Limited – which initially operated on a weekly basis. But on June 16, 2003 its weekly operation transitioned to a daily one. As a company, it is headquartered in Lagos, with other regional centres in Abuja, Enugu, Port Harcourt, Kaduna, Ibadan and Jos. As a media company its vision is: “to be a dominant media content provider and entertainment outlet in Nigeria and Africa through the pursuit of excellence in delivery in innovative and quality media and entertainment outlets”. While its mission is: “to practice journalism in the classical tradition of presenting the news and features in an exciting style, with impact, objectivity and appeal that generate returns to all stakeholders: the society, the investors and the practitioners”(see www.sunnewsonline.com).

### 3.22 VANGUARD

The choice of Vanguard was also because of its coverage and readership rating according to mediaReach OMD Nigeria (2005). According to the information extracted from its website: www.vanguardngr.com - that Vanguard initially commenced operation on a weekly basis on June 3rd,1984, with the motto: “Towards a better life for the people.” But on July 15th 1984 - it metamorphosed from its weekly routine to a daily one. Vanguard covers very vast areas inter alia – *Entertainment, Education, ICT, Transport, Tourism, Commerce, Governance, Banking, Health* etc. Apart from the aforementioned areas, Vanguard runs other specialised services – *Financial Vanguard, Allure, Sweet Crude, Hi-tech, Sports Vanguard, and Cyberlife.*

Vanguard over the years has remained known as a competing force in the print media industry in Nigeria. Apart from the rich and diverse products it bequeaths to the public – Sports, Advertising, Management and Marketing, Maritime, Energy, Hi-tech and Computer, Aviation, Business and Banking, Tourism, Health, Politics, Education just to mention a few. It remains a centre of brains – where intellectually grounded columnist like Kola Animasuan, Dele Sobowale, Pini Jason Tony Momoh, Bisi Lawrence, Ocherome Nnanna, Les Leba, Helen Ovbiagele, Bunmi Sofola etc, have tremendously or deeply increased the penchant for its readership nationally.

### 3.23 PUNCH

As a national daily, it originally commenced operation as a weekly daily,(Sunday Punch) in 1973, before subsequently graduating to a daily one in 1976 – with Aboderin as its founder (Ciboh 2007). In the 1970s, the press which The Punch is part of never failed taking a swipe at the military regime of Gowon on issues centred on graft, ‘waste in government’, issues arising from the national census conducted in 1973, and other issues of national concerns (ibid). The choice of Punch as one of the national dailies to be analysed is also hinged on the mediaReach (2005) report as one of the leading national dailies – in terms of coverage and readership

### 3.24 GUARDIAN

The founding of *The Guardian* by Alex Ibru, in 1983, was premised on an ‘era of selective approbation and condemnation’(Ciboh 2007). The Guardian newspaper hit the public sphere on February 27th,1983 – on a weekly basis for a six months period; while on July 4th, 1983 – it became a daily newspaper. Apart from its daily publication, it also published inter alia: The Guardian on Sunday, African Guardian (magazine) and Guardian Express – ‘an afternoon tabloid’(ibid). In situating the The Guardian ideologically, Ciboh (2007) describes it ‘as a liberal newspaper pandering to the taste and sensibilities of the elite class.’ Its very liberal stance may be ascribed to its non-partisan nature or what has been described as no ‘allegiance to any political or special interests.’

## 3.3 SELECTION OF DATA SOURCE

Four newspapers were selected as data sources for this research. The researcher wanted to explore newspapers that covered a wide audience and came up with the following newspapers: *Vanguard, The Guardian, The Punch* and *The Sun.* From the pool of national newspapers, according to mediaReach OMD (2005), based on the findings of a survey conducted affirms these selected national dailies as newspapers with the highest ‘percentage readership’ amongst the Nigerian populace. The mediaReach OMD research eventually suppressed the challenge of how the newspapers should be selected from the pool .

The analysis was based on the on-line editions and articles published online. In the web sites of the newspapers, are carved search spaces, or what some people call ‘search window’ - where words or phrases were typed in to search for articles, compared to situations where the researcher would have applied to the newspapers concerned – for approval to access their archives, and probably pay an access fee, if the need arises. However, the researcher was fortunate not to be faced with these challenges, because the collection of data was done on-line.

## 3.4 DATE SAMPLING

The choice over dates (Bryman,2012) is somewhat based or necessitated by eventuality. For example, what Bryman’s assertion may reflects, is that, if a study is conducted on the media coverage of ebola disease in West Africa, the focus of the date may arguably be the period of the outbreak. On this basis, because this research is centred on the media, my data (i.e. articles collected and analysed – were the ones published between 2011 and 2015. This period was specifically centred on the immediate past regime of former president Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. Why this regime? During this regime, there were couple of serious allegations bordering on corruption: the $20 billion dollars NNPC (Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation) missing fund (Vanguard, April 26,2015); a pardon granted to a former Bayelsa state governor in Nigeria convicted on the ground of corruption (Thisday,April 8,2013); and a multi-million naira car scandal by a former aviation minister (Punch, April 3,2014) and many more allegations of corruption against public officials in public discourse.

The $20 billion dollars scandal was one of such scandals during the administration of former president Goodluck Jonathan, bordering on unremitted funds by NNPC (Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation), to the CBN (Central Bank of Nigeria) as raised by the former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Mr Sanusi Lamido. The weighty nature of the allegation led former president Goodluck Jonathan, a leader said to have been faced with strong opposition in his bid for re-election, and to douse public tension, had directed PWC (PricewaterhouseCoopers) to make public the report of their forensic audit for Nigerians to be in the know, in view of section 7(2) of the NNPC Act. Part of the findings by PWC was that a fraction of the alleged missing $20 billion dollars was spent on kerosene subsidy, while running costs took the other part (Premium Times Nigeria, 2015). Despite government efforts, the subject has remained in public discourse – considering the hugeness and its consequences within and outside the shores of Nigeria, couple with a presidential pardon to one of the convicted treasury looters in the history of Nigeria – a former governor in one of the Niger-Delta states.

The case of national pardon granted by former president of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan to his former boss, the former governor of Bayelsa State, Diepreye Solomon Peter Alamieyeseigha (late) an ex-convict, may be seen as the height of setback to the anti-corruption crusade, in view of the systemic cleansing needed against corruption in Nigeria. Alamieyeseigha was convicted in Nigeria on the ground of corruption, and had also ‘jumped bail’ after he was arrested in London on various offences bordering on ‘money-laundering in 2005 (BBC ,2013). This occurred while he served as the governor of Bayelsa State, with former president Goodluck Jonathan as his deputy governor then. The justification given according to Okupe was that, ‘he was tried, jailed and dispossessed of his property. He has been remorseful’(BBC,2013). However, this presidential pardon granted to D.S.P Alamieyeseigha, by former president Goodluck Jonathan might have come as a surprise to Nigerians, considering how Nigeria would have been perceived by other countries, and what it means to treasury looters. The scandals did not end here, but much out there which includes the multi-million naira bullet proof cars.

The multi-million naira car scandal was another episode that attracted immense public outcry, which was allegedly perpetrated by a former aviation minister, Stella Odua, under former president Goodluck Jonathan’s administration. The scandal involves an inflated procurement of bullet proof BMW cars, which culminated in a query from the presidency – requesting the troubled former to furnish it with details of purchase in terms of cost, due process and other related aspects in the public domain, as raised by the press (Premium Times Nigeria, October 22, 2013). As a follow up, the embattled former minister responded to the president’s query by maintaining that, the conception and execution of the procurement processes was done by the NCAA (Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority), hence it falls within its jurisdiction (Vanguard,October,2013). The essence of these scandals or allegations is not to negatively portray the administration in question or persons mentioned, but as a justification for the chosen period explored by this research.

## 3.5 SAMPLING OF ARTICLES

In the search, a number of articles on corruption came up and selections were made at random on the following grounds: date of publication, the headlines, couple with the first few lines of introduction, and Nigeria as its central focus. Key words were instrumental to the researcher’s web-based data search. The key words used by the researcher in search for articles that featured the distinct crimes, first for political corruption were: ‘graft’, ‘corruption’, ‘misappropriation.’ These number of terms ensured that no gap was left in place, as the failure of one search term not producing results, were compensated by the productivity of other

For the conventional crimes, marked a difference as to how the data were generated on the web. Different approaches were applied to the four national newspapers, and they responded differently to the various queries entered through the key words deployed under this category of crime. The researcher started initially by typing such keywords as ‘steal’, ‘theft’ into the search window, but understanding that there were other subcategories of crime under the umbrella heading ‘conventional crimes’, the researcher had to also use ‘burglary’, ‘shoplifting’ and ‘auto/car theft’ as search keywords. In selecting these articles at random, the researcher considered the headlines, date of publication, and partly a few lines of the main content. The reason for the expanding the search terms to include the above classes of crimes was to explore the possibility of getting a breakdown of crimes that fall under conventional crimes to account for representativeness of data collected; and to also add some quality and dimension to the overall research. And this was particularly achieved with *Vanguard* newspaper. In searching for these crimes, it was discovered that, the crimes generated were of 2016 – which slightly went beyond 2011-2015.

For the purpose of clarity, this research selected and analysed ten web-based or on-line articles per one national daily – leading to a total of forty (40) on the one hand on political corruption; and forty (40) also for other street crimes, and in all eighty (80) articles. Creswell (2014), argues that qualitative research favours small amount of data. Although Creswell did not particularly affirm the limit of the number, but hinted that, it should be anchored on the ‘qualitative design being used.’

Although, the selection process gives equal chance of inclusion, the date of the articles were of primary importance (i.e. the chosen years the articles fell into). Since the articles sourced were web-based ones, it saved a lot of time and energy garnering physical newspapers; and the hassle of further seeking approvals from managements of the selected newspapers. Although, professional tips; informal one-to-one interplay; and encouragements from media experts may be seen as missing merits that would have added immense value.

However, the exercise was not completely devoid of challenges, as some searches had returned ‘no results found’ at various times. Even for some of the key words that were productive, some at first instance returned no results, but for a second or third attempt, it became successful. Technically, network problem may not be far from those disappointing experiences in the course of those searches. This frustrating outcome was not peculiar to only one particular newspaper but occurred across boards. And the challenge may have been caused technically or by a likely wrong query from the researcher or for no reason whatsoever.

## 3.6 THEMATIC ANALYSIS

The focal point of the analysis was on the themes. These themes were the discussed ideas that ran through or were common to the selected articles. The themes identified and analysed are: the government of Nigeria, official misconduct, impunity, a lack of political will or commitment, perpetrators, words or terms that imply corruption directly or indirectly, and victims. Apart from the themes, other useful features such as word counts were also identified as crucial elements in the analysis. The results of the analysis can provide the instruments for considering the subject of justice in Nigeria.

The use of codes, categories, or what some also call ‘labels’ is central to qualitative research. But before this, is the lasting problem of how to shrink texts or words in a qualitative research to an understandable and tractable size. Albeit done in a way that will protect the quality of the data in question. And the path to overcoming this problem or difficulty accordingly, as argued is content analysis (Cohen, et al.,2011). Achieving the above task of reducing a huge amount of texts arguably rests on coding. Creswell (2014), identifies the coding process as the subsequent step, after perusing or examining the data (but generally falls into the third rung of the ladder, in qualitative research data analysis). ‘A code is simply a name or label that the researcher gives to a piece of text that contains an idea or a piece of information’ (Cohen, et. Al.,2011). Creswell (2014) says ‘it involves taking text data or pictures gathered during data collection, segmenting sentences (or paragraphs) or images into categories, and labelling those categories with a term, often a term based in the actual language of the participant (called an *in* vivo term)’. While Punch and Oancea (2014), call it ‘data reduction’ – a stage saddled with the exploration of ‘themes’, ‘clusters’ and ‘patterns’. Although the authors did express or define the word ‘coding’ differently, the common thread that runs through all the explanations or definitions given, is the understanding of texts downsizing in a systematic way, giving the fact that, they express certain ideas or concepts.

The reduction of those texts into an idea or concept implies what they represent or amount to. Like Cohen, et al. further argue that these ideas (i.e. codes) have ‘properties’ and ‘dimensions’. To illustrate this, the word ‘lateness’ is used as an example, with ‘frequency’ as its property; while ‘always’ and ‘never’ represent it dimensions. The idea of deploying a word (that’s a code) to represent a bunch of sentences or paragraphs also equally exposes the ugly part of the story – as the decision on which lump of the sentences or paragraphs to and not to be coded rests on the initiative of the researcher. And doing so, may have thus opened the floodgates of biases on the part of the researcher, and the challenge of ensuring neutrality.

Seen as a practice (i.e. coding) that cant be trivialised, the process of how a researcher arrives at such a decision also forms part of the coding process, hence it impinges on the validity and reliability of the researcher. From the list of articles gathered and read, the researcher came up with seven categories or codes through a time-consuming process or exercise that involved or featured repeated reading – just to have a full grasp of what were expressed in the articles. This denotes that, the full comprehension of the various articles across the four national newspapers was achieved or rather made possible after the researcher had read them over and over (that’s some twice, while others thrice) – to elicit the themes of the articles understood to be very common with most of the articles examined. The tasks of data coding were not only restricted to data that bordered on political corruption alone, but covered also the other side of the spectrum (i.e. conventional crimes), though the articles on corruption took more efforts on the part of the researcher, as a consequence of the huge amount of words, and pages to peruse, compared to conventional crimes with less contents.

The task of eliciting the themes from the articles by the researcher was done methodically. In reading through the articles, the researcher adopted the open coding approach. It is a system where coding is carried out ‘line-by-line, phrase-by-phrase, sentence-by-sentence, paragraph-by-paragraph, or unit-of-text-by-unit-of-text basis’(Cohen,et al.,2011).In practically coding the articles, ideas or concepts that were being expressed were either written on the margins or in-between sentences while the researcher read the articles. Apart from writing on the margins of the articles, and in-between rows, the researcher also colour-coded the sentences that tallied with the categories that were developed from the carefully perused articles for clarity of purpose, and easy identification of information.

On the issue of categories, seven of them were identified as common threads that ran through almost all articles, but varied in terms of how they were expressed, the circumstances, the act, setting, and of course the authors of the pieces. The categories are: Nigerian government, official misconduct, lack of political will/commitment, perpetrators, impunity, words or concepts that evoke corruption, and victim.

For the colour-coding arm of it, first, the researcher used the green colour to represent the Nigerian government. This encompasses phrases or sentences in the articles that accommodated the administration of former president Goodluck Jonathan, and other government parastatals and anti-graft agencies such as the police, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences Commission (ICPC), the judiciary, and the legislature in terms of their actions and inactions. For example, in one of the articles in TABLE M1 it states, ‘…the Nigerian Government has established agencies such as the EFCC, ICPC, the Code of Conduct Bureau, the Federal Character Commission and the Public Complaints Commission’(Theo,2014). Second, the researcher used the colour red to represent official misconduct. This category comprises sentences, phrases that imply or express sentiments, biases on different grounds, investigations, arrests, prosecution, arraignments, confiscation of assets, conviction and sentences (if any) on the abuse of office by public officials. Also in TABLE M1,one of the articles states, ‘Until recently, who would have believed that a director in the civil service could keep N2 billion cash in his house? some of those civil servants with torn T-shirts and worn shoes have estates all over Abuja and mansions in their village’(Jason,2012). An expression of that nature would have been situated under official misconduct, same as the snippet from Theo – which came under the Nigerian government category.

Third, the researcher assigned the colour blue to represent a lack of political will/ commitment. This has to do with sentences or instances, where there is a lack of efforts to tackling all forms of corruption, aiding and abetting. Jason (2012), in his article posits, ‘given half a chance they out steal the people they were criticising yesterday oh the smart phrase nowadays is “the hunter becomes the hunted”! In other words, the thief and the “catcher” easily trade place’ A statement of this nature implies a lack of political will/commitment.

Fourth, the colour dark red was assigned to represent perpetrators of a crime or offence. In other words, it means those to be blamed for an act of crime, or suspects alleged to have done wrong or committed punishable offences.

Fifth, the category impunity was colour-coded pink by the researcher. This entails statements, expressions, or sentences symbolising the absence of punishment in respect to allege corrupt practices; or lack of deterrence against corrupt practices. For instance, ‘while many believe the anti-graft was rudderless until there is a commitment from the highest level of government, others argue the courts have been the cog in the wheel of anti-graft war’(Momoh,2014). The above quotation from Momoh, is one of the many positions or examples, from one of the various newspapers examined that falls under this specific category.

Sixth, are words or concepts that directly or indirectly refer to corruption in the various articles was colour-coded yellow. Jason (2012) deployed the following, ‘steal’, ‘stealing’, ‘stole’, ‘filching of public funds’, ‘unexplained sudden wealth’, ‘out steal’ and ‘graft’ to imply corruption, as a good number of the articles perused came up with varied terms and phrases that arguably denote or imply corrupt practices in the act of governance. The expression of corruption was not limited to the above terms, but other concepts or phrases were used as evidenced in the table in subsequent chapter – where all the categories and sentences that fit into the group were entered into.

The seventh category according to the researcher is victim, colour-coded orange. This category comprises of sentences, phrases that point to those who are affected by the corrupt practices; or the consequences of corrupt practices as they affect the society. An example of this is, ‘Nigeria… as producers of oil they have had to suffer trying to get the commodity in the last three weeks or there about’ (Fasan, 2016). At play here, is a veiled reference to corruption. That as a country that produces and sell the black gold to foreign nations, became a victim of scarcity for three weeks – an allusion to the criminal activities of those at the corridors power, which ordinarily is thought not to have happened.

From the petty crimes (i.e. conventional crimes) divide of it, five categories were generated as against seven from the axis of corruption. The categories are: Nigerian government, perpetrator/offender, offence, retribution, and victim. One, according to the researcher, this category represents the formal institutions of government colour-coded or assigned a green colour. This entails sentences or expressions that had to do with the police, judiciary and other deterrent and correctional institutions in the news articles and were marked using green colour for easy identification. Two, the perpetrators/offenders category, according to the researcher involves convicts and suspects of allegedly committed and proven offences, colour-coded dark red. The sentences or phrases that involved those that were blamed for an offence or crime were marked, underlined or shaded in dark red. Three, the offence category represents a crime in which an accused, or a suspect was charged by the police authority or found guilty of by the courts and was colour-coded red by the researcher. So, corresponding sentences or phrases in the news articles were shaded or underlined in red colour.

Four, the retribution category represents penalty for a criminal behaviour in violation of certain laws which bar people from indulging in behaviours that are unlawful. This comprises of phrases or expressions that entail financial bails, provision of sureties, convictions, jailed sentences and option of fines, marked out in yellow colour based on the researcher’s code. Five, the category victim was colour-coded orange, representing people or organisation that may or have suffered material dispossession in the hands of suspects or convicted criminals. The corresponding sections in the news articles where it was emphasised, with the orange colour were clearly marked out.

All the bits and pieces put together on the basis of every single step taken in data collection, examination, sorting and texts reduction, in terms of pruning down the amount of material texts to a manageable proportion, have been quite helpful with the level of progress achieved in this research report writing. As a practice, the idea of not using all texts and allowing the researcher to decide which part to and not to be use remains an enduring characteristic of qualitative content analysis. However, this trend bequeaths the researcher ample room to become bias – as he or she decides which texts to be discarded and the ones to be kept for the research proper. Although this is not an indictment on the part of the researcher over such possibility, but the tendency for this to occur may and not be there. The data that have been organised into tables, provide the foundation for the research results and discussion of findings in the subsequent chapter.

# CHAPTER FOUR

**DATA ANALYSIS OF MEDIA REPRESENTATION**

This chapter discusses the results of study of selected on-line newspaper articles. The researcher specifically focused on the common themes that ran all through the chosen articles. In total 7 themes are identified and presented below. Each theme is presented by a table and discussion. The two sections were analysed with the help of tables – presenting expressions or phrases that define or reflect the themes. Each of the individual newspaper selected for this research had their individual table per theme analysed for all the seven themes. In the table, the first row contains the title, author, and date of publication of the articles. While the second row contains the phrases, texts, or expressions that define the themes.

This chapter is divided into two sections: corruption and conventional crimes and their themes considered separately.

## THEME ONE: Nigerian Government

This theme refers to expressions, texts, or phrases about the actions or inactions of government institution such as: the tiers of government, the judiciary, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other anti-corruption agencies such as EFCC (Economic and Financial Crimes Commission), the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) and other government parastatals like the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). One of such texts is presented below in table 1A that, ‘ICPC boss said recently that the embezzlement of government funds is theft but not corruption’(Ibelema,2014).

### TABLE 1A: Punch results on the Nigerian Government theme.

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| *Rebasing Corruption*  **Minabere Ibelema**  01/06/2014 | *Corruption:countries that punish graft with death penalty*  **Gbenga Adeniji**  16/11/2012 | *Musings on Nigeria’s corruption rating*  **J.K. Randle**  13/12/2012 | *Before we forget these scams*  **Eze Onyekpere**  17/02/2014 |
| *ICPC boss said recently that the embezzlement of government funds is theft but not corruption* | ***‘****No court in Nigeria will condemn anyone to death for corruption even if it was the law of the land* | *… The general belief in Nigeria is that the legal system is not effective enough* | *NNPC has clearly disobeyed lawful instructions for a selfish purpose* |

### TABLE 1B: The Guardian results on the Nigerian Government theme.

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| *Chinweizu: Nigeria and their anti-corruption charade*  **Chinweizu**  29/01/2015 | *Benefit of corruption prevention strategy*  **Abosede Musari**  29/12/2014 | *Endless search for good governance amid impunity*  **Lawrence Njoku**  23/10/2014 | *Pains, gains of anti-corruption crusade*  **A.Musari**  **04/11/2014** |
| *The 1999 constitution has entrenched institutional lootocracy* | *ICPC chairman Barr. Ekpo Nta has spoken extensively that it is better to prevent corruption than to waste more of government resources prosecuting offenders* | *The nation will not forget in a hurry the 2007 general election and the role of EFCC in stopping aspirants* | *Indeed preventing corruption is one of the tripod pillars on which the ICPC mandate rests, the other two being public enlightenment and prosecution* |

### TABLE 1C: The Sun results on the Nigerian Government theme.

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Dimension of corruption in Nigeria*  **S. Alamutu**  12/12/2014 | *How we encourage corruption*  **L. Obijiofor**  08/10/2014 | *THE MALABU OIL SCAM: A SCANDAL THAT WON’T GO*  **S. Oshunkeye**  28/07/2013 | *Re: Rising poverty amid abundance*  **A.Orabuchi**  25/07/2013 |
| *…the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC actually threw up startling discoveries of how our leaders feasted with impunity on our common wealth…* | *Rivers State Governor Chibuike Amaechi once gave chilling insights into how an uncritical civil society can aid politicians to continue to raid treasury* | *… justice minister wrote President Jonathan asking for authorisation to serve as obligator to resolve the issues among all parties involved in the OPL 245 saga.* | **…** government is using kidnappings and assassinations to intimidate and harass their perceived political opponents. |

### TABLE 1D: Vanguard results on the Nigerian Government theme.

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| *Corruption and Nigerian hypocrisy*  **Pini Jason**  03/07/2012 | *Corruption cases: The courts are not to blame*  **Chris Momoh**  01/05/2014 | *A legacy of incompetence and corruption*  **Rotimi Fasan**  13/05/2015 | *The war against corruption: How has Nigeria fared?*  **Theo**  31/07/2014 |
| *President Jonathan insisted during the presidential media chat, that there was nothing in law that compelled him to declare his assets publicly* | *The Economic and Financial Crimes (EFCC) has also arraigned some former bank chiefs for financial crimes.* | *Whatever profit there is in the energy sector, or more specifically that the NNPC (Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation) makes ultimately ends up in the financial black hole…* | *…the Nigerian Government has established agencies such as the EFCC, ICPC, the Code of Conduct Bureau, the Federal Character Commission and the Public Complaint Commission.* |

The tables above show clearly various issues, such as the failure of government not to abide by its laws; issues of trust and confidence in the ability of government to do the right thing; problem of underperformance; and the practice of cutting corners. Leadership as they say, is by example. However, this is quite the opposite, as the government seems not to be law-abiding going by the data in table 1A above, states, ‘NNPC has clearly disobeyed lawful instructions for a selfish purpose’(Onyekpere,2014). Government is not just about making laws for the people, it is also about playing by the rules, which is a core aspect of leadership, regardless of which arm, tier or agency of government that is involved, hence no individual, group or government is above the law. In table 1C above, it states,‘ Government is using kidnappings and assassinations to intimidate and harass perceived political opponents’ (Orabuchi,2013). If this is true, it undermines the essence of government – where the protection of lives and properties, is argued to be a top priority of government, while anything less may however be perceived to amount to neglect or a case of leadership failure. At times, government can be tactical in trying to deflect blames in certain situation as evident in table 1C above, where, ‘Rivers state Governor Chibuike Amaechi once gave chilling insight into how an uncritical civil society can aid politicians to continue to raid treasury’(Obijiofor,2014). As a former elected governor of one of the oil producing states in the Niger-Delta, he seemed to technically be of the view that, civil society should be blamed for the wrongs of public officials, as a consequence of failure to criticise public officials. Should the civil society be blamed for corruption in government or the government itself?

Most importantly, corruption is criminal, and comes with consequences. So, any public official who engages in corrupt behaviour is matter of rational choice, and he or she must be made to face the consequences squarely, before apportioning blames. Yes, the civil society is not immune to criticism for not doing enough, but still they have their limit, as they may only be able to bark but not bite. Leadership is about taking responsibility, as Nigerian government should take responsibility for her inability to instill confidence and trust in the populace towards the government, as portrayed in table 1A above, row two, column two, ‘no courts in Nigeria will condemn anyone to death for corruption even if it was the law of the land’(Adeniji,2012). This assertion clearly implies that, the judiciary in Nigeria has over the time built a reputation that cannot be trusted by Nigerians, because they allow people to get away with their criminality. The insight given here, is not a case of no law, but a question of application.

The Nigerian government, as one of the most conspicuous themes, to many it represents service to the Nigerian people; to others it is a fraud. How? Elected and appointed representatives serve the people in their different capacity and responsibilities, as evident in table 1B, column three, ‘the nation will not forget in a hurry the 2007 general election and the role of EFCC in stopping aspirants’(Njoku,2014). The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC, is an anti-graft agency of government established to primarily fight corruption in Nigeria, by investigating and prosecuting alleged cases of corruption on the part of public officials. From the assertion above, the publication tells the public that, they did just part of what they were statutorily set up and empowered to do by also thwarting the aspiration of corrupt politicians from further wrecking of havoc on the system. But what is unknown is if the practice of stopping corrupt politicians from seeking public office during general election in Nigeria, is a practice that they regularly carry out in every election cycle or a selective tactic deployed to frustrate political opponents? The EFCC, by law falls under the executive arm of the Nigerian government, and not a court, that has legal powers to disqualify aspirants or candidates from participating in elections, if their actions are inconsistent with the electoral laws of the land. In addition, the period in question,2007 was an election year, when former president Obasanjo handed over to former president Yar’Adua (late), after he won the 2007 presidential election. But the use of EFCC to stop the aspirations of politicians, seems to be in tandem with or reinforces the characteristic description of the Obasanjo’s presidency, as selective in the war against corruption in Nigeria in the review of literature. Another sister agency established to tackle corruption, as shown in table 1B, ‘indeed preventing corruption is one of the tripod pillars on which the ICPC mandate rests, the other two being public enlightenment and prosecution’(Musari,2014). All these, in their individual and group capacity put together is service to Nigerians.

While service to the nation is seen as a key component of governance, others see the foundation upon which the running or management of the affairs of Nigeria as a fraud. In table 1B above it states, ‘the 1999 constitution has entrenched institutionalised lootocracy’(Chinweizu,2015). Different people with their different view of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). The various organs of government: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, and the three tiers of government: the federal, the states, and local governments all derive their powers from the constitution. How come it is tagged ‘institutionalised lootocracy’? It is believed that, majority of Nigerians are not happy with the Nigerian constitution, one, because it was framed and handed over to a democratic government by the military – which in itself came to power through an unlawful means of coup d’etat. Two, it is not seen as a document that truly represent the diverse interests of the Nigerian people, because it lacks the input of the various interest groups in Nigeria, but represents that of the few. Yes, it could be countered to say various amendments have been carried out by Nigeria’s bicameral legislature: the houses of representatives and senate. But how deep and fundamental are these amendments? The issues of true federalism or restructuring and immunity clause in Nigeria, since twenty one years ago, from 1999 (the birth of the fourth republic) till date, have remained unaddressed, while legislators gave attention to issues at the periphery, creating a strong atmosphere of suspicion, and vested interest.

The institutionalisation of looting in the Nigerian constitution is clearly evident with the incorporation of the immunity clause which was discussed in the literature review section. It resurfaces as one of the key elements being analysed, considering its huge impact in the political landscape of Nigeria. What is immunity clause? And how has it impacted on Nigeria? It is an elitist or minority political class protective provision of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Section 308 of the Nigerian constitution states as follows: (1) (a)’no civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against a person to whom this section applies during his period of office’; (b) ‘a person to whom this section applies shall not be arrested or imprisoned during that period either on pursuiance during the process of any court or otherwise’; (c)’no process of any court requiring or compelling the appearance of a person to whom this section applies, shall be applied for or issued’; (3) ‘This section applies to a person holding the office of President or Vice-President, Governor or Deputy Governor; and the reference in this section to period of office – is a reference to the period during which the person holding such office is require to perform the functions of the office.’

The immunity clause as outlined above protects top political executives at the federal and state levels only from criminal and civil matters while in office, with the exception of local government executives. This constitutional provision only protects the President, Vice-President, Governors, and Deputy Governors, all seventy four (74) political office holders in total. Although this seems to have drawn wide condemnation, and debate as to its morality, it may otherwise be justified to protect the above concerned leaders from unnecessary diversion, that is protection from the floodgate of civil/criminal lawsuits, in order to enable them discharge their constitutional duties to her citizens. On the contrary, to others it is a licence to plunder the state dry, as these office holders hide behind the immunity clause to perpetrate acts that undermine their oath of office, and also violate the constitution. They, most times take decisions not on public good or interest but to satisfy their desires and that of their accomplice. It breeds absence of accountability and transparency in the running of state affairs, and as a consequence spend public funds without recourse to due process. Do these protected political office holders think their governed territories are conquered personal estates? No, but their actions speak volume, because they seem not worried considering their four years least term of office and eight years maximum term of office, which would give them time to cover up every suspected cases of corruption, as institutional loopholes are exploited. And with judicial corruption rife in Nigeria, (see discussion and concluding chapter) these leaders become so emboldened that they can go unpunished by buying their way through. No doubt, the proponents of the immunity clause may have meant well – to allow the ship of the state to sail undistracted, but the bigger picture of it in the past twenty years with evidence in the public domain seems to be wrong. Why has the immunity clause be left unamended or reworked despite public outcry in the past twenty one years?

Yes, almost every public office holder wants protection naturally, while serving the public. The failure of it being left unamended seems to connect to its sensitive nature, because it benefits majorly the elites. One of the appealing perspective is what the researcher calls, zig-zag web of political aspirations. Under this circumstance, for example a governor of a state in Nigeria (who belongs to the executive arm of government) wants to retire to the legislature at the national level (that is the senate) after exiting his or her present political office. Likewise the national legislators (senators and honourable members of the house of representatives) after one or more terms in the legislative chamber, they declare their interest to vie for governorship in their respective states of the federation. And there are a few former governors in Nigeria who eventually won elections to the senate, and a few national assembly members who also won elections to become governors in their respective states. Driven by parochial interests, these set of politicians in their quest to protect their future ambition and quest to protect their former offices do not see the need to call for a review of the immunity clause. Ultimately,in every election year, political actors in Nigeria go about selling their programmes to the electorate with the promise to serve, by uplifting the socio-economic standard of living of the people. Often times, reverse is the case after being elected, they go about to serve themselves by taking advantage of the system to enrich themselves at the expense of the electorate. The next theme that follows below is official misconduct.

## THEME TWO: Official Misconduct

It involves statements or expressions that imply or refer to biases, sentiments, investigations, arrests, prosecution, arraignments, convictions and sentences for criminal acts of corruption. For example, the statement – ‘coup making is corruption’(Ego-Alowes, 2015).

### TABLE 2A: Punch results on the theme Official Misconduct.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Rebasing corruption*  *Minabere Ibelema*  01/06/2014 | *Pain, gains of anti-corruption crusade*  A.Musari  04/11/2014 | *Before we forget these scams*  Eze Onyekpere  17/02/2014 | *Jumbo pay: activists move against legislators*  T. Famuti  23/09/2013 |
| *The Nigerian military are asking for more funds… to combat book haram. And they want their funding to bypass the usual budgetary allocation process* | *ICPC is working on the federal govt. payroll system where it has been found that ministries allegedly inflated the number of personnel in order to obtain money from government coffers* | *The quantum of resources that have been wasted through the NNPC criminal conduct is in trillions’*  *‘Reports of various committees on the petroleum subsidy scandal and their damning indictment* | *National Assembly transferred N150 billion at the detriment of the welfare of 160 million citizens* |

### TABLE 2B: The Guardian results on the theme Official Misconduct.

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| *Olaniyan: what does ‘corruption’really mean?*  **K. Olaniyan**  05/11/2014 | *Benefits of corruption prevention strategy*  **A.Musari**  29/12/2014 | *Pains, gains of anti-corruption crusade*  **A.Musari**  04/11/2014 | *Role of judiciary in fighting public corruption and promoting democracy in Nigeria*  **A.Kuti**  11/11/2014 |
| *The case of the missing $20 bn from the account of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) unresolved oil subsidy scam, the unimplemented KPMG report on corruption within the NNPC, unresolved cases of corruption in the pension fund* | ***…****that the EFCC has hundreds of cases in different courts nationwide, most of which have passed the plea stage. The cases such as: Orji Uzor Kalu of Abia State, Gbenga Daniel of Ogun State, Lucky Igbinedion of Edo State etc.* | *The ICPC has so seized 56 properties from officers of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defense corps in Abuja. The properties are mostly land in the Federal Capital Territory.’ ‘Mrs Bintu owned an Estate of 60 buildings (10.9 acres) on airport road, Abuja* | *Local govt. bosses travel behaving like Arab sheiks… they would buy houses in choice area … stash away millions of foreign currencies to foreign accounts.* |

### TABLE 2C: Sun results on the theme Official Misconduct.

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Dimension of corruption in Nigeria*  S.Alamatu  12/12/2014 | *How we encourage corruption*  L. Obijiofor  08/10/2014 | *Thank God, we cracked the atom of corruption*  J. Ego-Alowes  22/01/2015 | *The church must fight corruption*  W. Jibril  03/11/2013 |
| *The man that supplies diesel to power the generator set delivers below the expected quantity in connivance with engineer, who gets the cut at the end.* | *You have heard that $50 bn is missing you have done nothing about it. It is N8 trillion, it can change Nigeria.* | *Coup making is corruption.* | *The recent case of convicted army officer who allegedly defrauded a state government to the tune of N150 million and allegedly paid a tithe of N11 million in two instalments to a church* |

### TABLE 2D: Vanguard results on the theme Official Misconduct.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Corruption in the Nigerian media*  **Tony Iredia**  29/05/2011 | *Corruption and Nigerian hypocrisy*  **Pini Jason**  03/07/2012 | *Corruption in Nigeria: Banks abroad have to rethink how they handle the bad guys*  **K. Olaniyan**  15/09/2014 | *A legacy of incompetence and corruption*  **R. Fasan**  13/05/2015 |
| *Some journalist will beg their way to choice assignment like covering the governors, the presidency and ministers but that obviously cannot accommodate many practitioners.’*  *‘After charging their normal and usual fees, charge an extra for the judge.* | *Until recently, who would have believed that a director in the civil service could keep N2 billion cash in his house?*  *‘Some of those civil servants with torn T-shirts and worn shoes have estates all over Abuja and mansions in their villages.* | *Every year an estimate $148 billion is siphoned off annually from African states and stashed in developed economies’*  *‘Over $400 billion is considered to have been lost to high level corruption since independence* | *Long queues of vehicles at filling stations across the country, testimony of the level of corruption and incompetence that has marked the last six years* |

As a theme that refers variously to issues of sentiments, biases, looting, investigations, arrests, arraignment, asset confiscation, convictions and sentences. One of such criminal behaviour is presented in table 2d as, ‘until recently who would have believed that a director in the civil service could keep N2 billion cash in his house? Some of those civil servants with torn T-shirts and worn shoes have estates all over Abuja and mansions in their villages’(Jason,2012). It is not just about the unthinkable behaviour of the civil servant involved but a reflection of a failed and porous system in Nigeria. The above amount is more than $5 Million USD. This is just one out of thousands of civil servants in the Nigerian civil service workforce, not the police, military or politicians who have more control over state resources. Such amount could be invested to cushion the socio-economic pains of the masses. But how did this public officer arrive at such level to have corruptly amassed such huge amount? Corruption thrives where there is opportunity; weak deterrence or no deterrence at all. Public officials understand and know the loopholes in the system, which they exploit to the highest advantage for their personal enrichment at the detriment of the public, while they break the code of conduct and the law at large. Although there was no revelation to the effect of how the illicit fund was acquired, this may not be far from the methods identified in the literature review section, that includes: bribery, kickbacks, cost or contract inflation and Alema (1989) four parts categorisation: one,‘cost-reducing corruption’- the practice of reducing the original tax to be paid by a client, while the difference is shared between the client and government official; two, ‘cost-enhancing corruption’- under this the official price to be paid by a client is increased and the difference embezzled by the government official; three, ‘benefit-enhancing corruption’ – this happens when an official overpays an agent more than the official benefit, and gets a percentage as kickback of the extra; four, ‘benefit-reducing corruption’ this occurs when an agent’s entitlement is reduced and embezzled by a government official.

Outside the failure of the official to show restrain and discipline, government poor handling of workers welfare cannot be ignored, in terms of prompt and regular payment of salaries, housing, health and insurance incentives should never be underestimated as push factors, though not in any way a justification for a criminal behaviour. In a different situation, as shown in table 2A ‘the Nigerian military are asking for more funds … to combat book haram. And they want their funding to bypass the usual budgetary allocation process’(Ibelema,2014). How transparent and accountable is the above request at the detriment of due process? Asking for more funds to fight insurgency with a clause that, it should not be subjected to budgetary procedure raises suspicion and signposts fraud. The due process of law should be followed as part of checks and balances, to ensure that the proposed expenditure is justified and inline with the procurement law. Avoiding every step that defines accountability and transparency fertilises corruption. Had the military been allowed, a precedent would have been established to become the norm. This in itself would have been a huge drain pipe to appropriate public fund for personal gain. Public officials or civil servants have their very clever ways of defrauding government, one of such ways is through the importation of ghost employees or workers into the payroll as presented in table 2A, ‘ICPC is working on the federal govt. payroll system where it has been found that ministries allegedly inflated the number of personnel in order to obtain money from government coffers’(Musari,2014). The greed or insatiable appetite for money or material things will always lead public officials to devise criminal ways of feasting on public funds to enrich themselves. This systemic form of corrupt behaviour has over the years increased the cost of governance in Nigeria across different establishments of government. Why ghost employees instead of providing real employment for the teeming populace? If not for the greed of public officials in Nigeria, the living condition of Nigerians would have experienced huge improvement, by providing employment to the unemployed instead of converting such opportunity for personal gain that will increase the crime rate.

The conduct of public officials across different government parastatal, specifically the case of Nigeria’s economic power house, NNPC (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) as revealed in table 2B above as follows, ‘the case of the missing $20 bn from the account of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) unresolved oil subsidy scam, the unimplemented report KPMG on corruption within the NNPC, unresolved cases of corruption in the pension fund’(Olaniyan,2014). The amount of missing funds involved is massive and equivalent to Nigeria’s annual budget. Joke or reality? The amount in question is in billions of dollars. Could this have happened in a country with strong institutional checks? In advance economies and democracies, this will not certainly occur. With the word ‘missing’ one would have thought the $20 billion was misplaced or lost carelessly in a pocket-size wallet, the way it was ordinarily presented or headlined, but this was not the case, rather it appears to have been looted and not remitted by a highly organised crime group within and beyond the NNPC, as it might not be out of place for the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to claim innocence of this devastating crime. From the information available, it seems KPMG, did a pretty job based on their findings, but it amounts to no good after much effort the report was dumped and not implemented considering the public funds spent for the audit. In a related development is an excerpt from table 2C which states, ‘you have heard $50 bn is missing you have done nothing about. It is N8 trillion, it can change Nigeria’(Obijiofor,2014). From the article, this reported statement was credited to one of the opposition leaders prior to the findings of KPMG, which later confirmed unremitted $20 bn by NNPC. Although the figures from the two camps varied, the focus should be centred on the phrase: ‘it can change Nigeria’. An expression that will in no way justify the desire of Nigerian government to go borrowing; and may as well justify the refusal of domestic and foreign creditors to grant credit request to Nigeria for malfeasance. The $20 bn stolen is actually able to change Nigeria for the better, through infrastructural development, and the roll out of various socio-economic programmes for the benefits of Nigerians. Amid social problems why was no action taken as regards the KPMG report? It is common sense, that no erring government would want to implement an indicting report but would rather prefer to be mute about it but keep people in perpetual suspense. Official misconduct is not only hinged on financial impropriety as a public official, but covers every behaviour that contravenes the official laid down standards for public officials, as presented in table 3A, that, ‘coup making is corruption’(Ego-Alowes,2015). This brings to the attention, the position the researcher has always held, that the understanding of corruption as a criminal behaviour should not be confined to the prism of money only, but one that outstretches financial impropriety due to the occupation of a public office, to include but not limited to coup making. Nigeria as a country, had before now experienced series of coups by the military overthrowing democratic regimes or other military regimes through force or violence, as against the traditional job of territorial protection from external aggression; and protection from other internal forms of wars. Unconstitutionally, going beyond its limits amounts to misconduct. Not all acts of misconduct are anchored on financial impropriety, but some on actions and inactions (that is wrong policy decisions or failures to act due to vested interest).

Negligence on the part of public officials could result in mass suffering or hardship on the people. Such is presented in table 2D, column 4, as follows, ‘long queues of vehicles at filling stations across tha country, testimony to the level of corruption and incompetence that has marked the last six years’(Fasan,2015). It identified corruption as being responsible for the queues, but there was no particularity as to exactly if it was due to embezzlement of funds, wastage of resources, lack or failure to put in place proper logistics, or poor decision making due to conflict of interests. Ultimately, it would have been any of the above factors that resulted in such socio-economic hardship, because the long queues means scarcity of petroleum products at the petrol stations nationwide. Long queues or scarcity of petroleum products are not new to Nigeria. But why would Nigeria, a leading oil producing and exporting country experience scarcity of petroleum products? As one of the top oil producing and exporting country in the world, it is not expected considering the fact that she sells oil to other countries who do not experience scarcity of fuel. The out of place actions and inactions of government officials certainly are responsible for this problem of long queues as a consequence of fuel scarcity or shortage. The problem of fuel scarcity resulting in long queues don’t just occur in seconds but takes a lot of time, and the role of internal and external factors for it to materialise cannot be ignored. On the internal factors, it is likely that, due to the desire of public officials to enrich themselves, it is a possibility that they may have employed means to sabotage the distribution system, possibly through pipeline vandalisms, disruption of the refining process at refineries, for their personal benefits regardless of the pains inflicted on the society. On the external influence or cause, the activities of some of the major and independent players in the oil sector, could possibly be seen as an area of concern in their bid to get more than a fair share in the oil industry at their own terms through sharp practices such as: inflation of cost, offering bribes to government officials to undermine due process and influence policy decisions, just like the oil subsidy fraud that has become that lacks accountability and transparency.

It is an established fact in Nigeria that no public sector or tier of government is corruption free. There has been this call in Nigeria, as part of attaining true federalism for the constitution to be amended to accommodate local government autonomy – as a truly autonomous third tier of government, free from state government control. However, table 2D, column 4, describes the behaviour of local government leaders as, ‘local government bosses travel behaving like Arab Sheiks … they would buy houses in choice area … stash away millions of foreign currencies to foreign accounts’(Kuti,2014). While most Nigerians are asking for local government autonomy for a rapid grassroot development, the above excerpt has revealed that, despite the paucity of resources for development, the trust and confidence repose in them have been violated by the plundering of public funds to advance their interests while the living condition of the locals worse off. Development or improved living conditions of the Nigerian people will become a mirage, if business as usual or the status quo remains. If it is public information that local government chairmen or chairpersons as they called in a democracy in Nigeria, are embezzling public funds for personal benefits what is the government doing about it or what has it done to contain the situation? The roles of the EFCC and ICPC, can never be more appreciated than a situation like this, by ensuring that public officials are kept in surveillance within and outside Nigeria in collaboration with other foreign anti-corruption agencies. But for as long as these politicians are allowed this opportunity to carry out their criminal behaviours without deterrence, or evocation of relevant sections of the law to address the injustice, as act of impunity may be very damaging to the system, a theme subsequently examined.

## THEME THREE: Lack of Political Will/Commitment

This encompasses texts or expressions implying the lack of genuine and concerted efforts in tackling the problem of corruption. The use of texts such as, ‘our representatives have lost their moral conscience to reject… the most criminal form of raping its citizens’(Famutimi,2013).

### TABLE 3A: Punch results on the theme Lack of Political Will/Commitment

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *On the inside of corruption*  **Pat Utomi**  30/07/2014 | *Rebasing corruption*  **Minabere Ibelema**  01/06/2014 | *Before we forget the scams*  **Eze Onyekpere**  17/02/2014 | *Jumbo pay: activists move against legislators*  **T. Famutimi**  23/09/2013 |
| *Part of the reasons corruption is crippling Nigeria is abandonment of merit* | *given the resounding issue of corruption in the military, they have a lot to do, to persuade the people that the problem is primarily insufficiency and routing of funds* | *There will be more than enough offences and sections… management of NNPC could be charged and convicted to serve as deterrent* | *Our representatives have lost their moral conscience to reject… the most criminal form of raping its citizens* |

### TABLE 3B: The Guardian results on the theme Lack of Political Will/Commitment.

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| *Chnweizu: Nigerians and their anti-corruption charade*  **Chinweizu**  29/01/2015 | *Olaniyan:What does ‘corruption’ really mean?*  **K. Olaniyan**  05/11/2014 | *Benefits of corruption prevention strategy*   1. **Musari**   29/12/2014 | *Chinweizu:2015:Between liberation and slavery*  **Chinweizu**  08/02/2015 |
| *They want to loot and squander that is why they don’t really want corruption tackled. Secondly they love their noise making against it… he has come to get rid of corruption, only to get even more corrupt than those he threw out?* | *The government should care about combating corruption rather than strenuously attempting to deny or justify it’ ‘Secondly there needs to be a consistency of approach in the fight against corruption* | *Investigating and prosecuting corruption are expensive and time consuming* | *No president can tackle corruption without inviting impeachment simply because corruption is encouraged and protected by the constitution he swore to enforce* |

### TABLE 3C: The Sun results on the theme Lack of Political Will/Commitment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Dimension of corruption in Nigeria*  **S. Alamatu**  12/12/2014 | *How we encourage corruption*  **L. Obijiofor**  08/10/2014 | *THE MALABU OIL SCAM: A SCANDAL THAT WON’T GO*  **S. Oshunkeye**  28/07/2013 | *Re:Rising poverty amid abundance*   1. **Orabuchi**   25/07/2013 |
| *All above instance illustrate how Nigeria has degenerated as a nation. People at the lower cadre or deliberately overlook their acts of financial corruption but direct their energy at those at the top of any given opportunity* | *A weak civil society is not only evidence of a dead society, it is also proof that we are all complicit in the way politicians ransack the treasury* | *… the messy oil deal like phoenix keep rising from the ashes of one presumed death stage, climbing with renewed vigour, to another pedestal* | *The problem is not lack of understanding of the solution rather it is the absence of the will to do the right thing* |

### TABLE 3D: Vanguard results on the theme Lack of Political Will/Commitment.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Corruption cases: The courts are not to blame*  **Chris Momoh**  01/05/2014 | *Corruption in Nigeria: Banks abroad have to rethink how they handled the bad guys*  **K. Olaniyan**  15/09/2014 | *How to tame the monster called corruption*  **E. Anaba**  13/08/2014 | *Stealing is not corruption, it is a crime*  **O. Nwakanma**  08/03/2015 |
| *The Nigerian people have justifiably blamed lawyers and judges for frustrating the anti-graft agencies from successfully prosecuting the politically exposed persons and other members of the ruling class accused of corrupt practices* | *The bad guys accounts defaults with these banks are often shrouded in secrecy* | *Under-enforcement of anti-corruption laws in many countries is responsible for this state of affairs* | *Officials can only get away with stealing from the state because the Nigerian system is too weak and distorted to prevent this* |

Leadership encompasses so many aspects of human life, and one of such is addressing the problem of crimes. But on the contrary, the lack of political will/commitment sets in when there is a lack or loss of efforts and interests on the part of leaders to tackle the problem, in this case corruption as presented in the different tables above. The first column in table 3D, states ‘The Nigerian people have justifiably blamed lawyers and judges for frustrating the anti-graft agencies from successfully prosecuting the politically exposed … accused of corrupt practices.’ And in a separate event it was revealed that ‘under-enforcement of anti-corruption laws in many countries is responsible for the state of affairs’ The assertion is about the direction of the frustration of Nigerian people summarily on judicial corruption and the business as usual mentality of judicial officials to technically block the wheel of progress through various means not limited to delays. Using every means unjustified portrays, that an individual or organisation is non-committal to a cause. On the other hand, law making is not an end to tackling a criminal behaviour in itself, but the foundation to putting an end to such crime. However, implementation is said to be another critical step that gives force to a law, otherwise it becomes dormant. In the case of corruption in Nigeria, below the par implementation of anti-corruption laws has been strongly identified as huge setback to the anti-graft war in Nigeria as evident in the table above. And the fragility of state institutions has led public officials to go undetected after plundering the state because of the exit loopholes that is maintained by a system that favours ‘business as usual mentality’, a concept that connotes maintaining the existing status quo that promotes and allows unhindered looting of public resources by public officials.

The display or expression of lack of will as excuse comes in varying degrees, as portrayed in *The Guardian* table 3B, where for instance it was stated ‘investigating and prosecuting corruption are expensive and time consuming’(Musari,2014); ‘no president can tackle corruption without inviting impeachment simply because corruption is encouraged and protected by the constitution he swore to enforce’(Chinweizu,2015). These two excerpts above imply the two following: one, it implies that it is capital intensive to investigate and prosecute any case of corruption, hence it is impossible to embark on it, because there is no money to execute the war. Two, it portrays that for fear of being kicked out of office, the president would not commit to fighting corruption, hence it has a constitutional backing. For a public official to lean on one of such factors not to fight corruption, because it is an expensive venture to undertake or for fear of being unceremoniously removed because it involves stepping on toes, do not only fail in protecting public interest, but they also fail to improve the living conditions of the people. How? The more deaf ears Nigerian leaders pay to the problem of corruption, the bigger the hardship or suffering on the Nigerian people, due to the diversion of public funds budgeted for public infrastructure to private use. Public officials who would rely on these excuses to win the sympathy of the governed for their leadership failures are in themselves corrupt, trying hard to coat their corrupt behaviours.

For the war against corruption to be a success in Nigeria, would require that leaders exercise self-control and purge themselves of anything characteristic of corruption, because corrupt officials cannot execute the war on corruption, hence that would dampen the anti-corruption spirit. An expression from *Punch,* table 3A, supports it as, ‘our representatives have lost their moral conscience to reject… the most criminal form of raping its citizens’(Famutimi,2013). It encapsulates that, corrupt public officials lack the moral right and commitment to truly champion the war on corruption for sense of guilt. With corrupt leadership, the anti-corruption crusade is not always effective, because certain vested interests are bound to be protected regardless of the seriousness of the allegations. The anti-corruption crusade will hardly be fruitful if it is built on a faulty foundation. Meaning when the processes of selection, recruitment, appointment, and elections are compromised, the impact on the fight against corruption regardless of the assurance from the Nigerian leadership, the outcome to a level will be compromised, as supported in *Punch* table 3A, contending, ‘part of the reasons corruption is crippling Nigeria is abandonment of merit’(Utomi,2014). Those who paid their way through to get to the top without merit, may also have the tendency to exploit the system or engage in other sharp practices to undermine the anti-corruption war, though it is not impossible to for leaders or public officials to turn a new leaf. The establishment of anti-graft agencies or commissions does not absolutely define the political will and commitment to fight corruption, but one of such fundamental steps, but ideally, it is a task that can be undertaken by the conventional police force. It is about the hunger to see to the absolute enforcement of the law to the letter and a complete prosecution irrespective of class and whoever is alleged to be involved, whether it is the public official’s aides, associates, or family members. Leadership in Nigeria is not limited to the national level only, but covers states and local government levels, hence our three tier system of government – where power is shared between the three levels of government mentioned above. Who are those alleged to be involved in the criminal behaviour? The next theme answers who the perpetrators are.

## THEME FOUR: Perpetrators

These are phrases, expressions or identities of those that should be blamed or held accountable for acts of crime committed while discharging their duties. ‘High ranking public officials’, ‘public officials’, ‘politicians’ formed part of the identities of the perpetrators.

### TABLE 4: Punch, The Guardian, The Sun, Vanguard results on Perpetrators theme.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Punch* | *The Guardian* | *The Sun* | *Vanguard* |
| *Civil servants, competing rich people, Nigerian military, public officials, Banks, MDAs, officers of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence* *corps, government officials, political office holders, politicians, industry professionals, top management in private companies, corrupt people, overnight billionaires, senators, members of the house of representatives* | *Highest officials, senior state officials,*  *High ranking public officials, politicians, chief executives, fraudsters, leaders, local government bosses, airport officials, police, trustees of the national purse, MDAs, officers of the Security and Civil Defence Corps* | *Politicians, political leaders, coup makers, business morguls, cronies, army officer, minister of petroleum, Pecos Energy Ltd., Principals at the Department of Petroleum Her nation of scholars, Resources, Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Ltd; Nigeria Exploration Ltd, ENI-AGIP* | *Practitioners in the media, corrupt journalist, president, governors, ministers, civil servants, private sector, former governors, bank chiefs, politically exposed persons, senators, government officials, high ranking state officials, companies, individuals, Nigerian intellectual* |

The table above houses all the identities of the perpetrators as identified by the different newspapers analysed. Across the four dailies and individual articles different terms were used such as, *civil servants, public officials, government officials, politically exposed persons, principals at department of petroleum, army officers, police, high ranking state officials, companies, officers of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence corps, industry professionals, top management in private companies* to describe or identify the perpetrators of corruption. These terms were used interchangeably by the authors across their different articles and newspapers. For example, the use of the terms public official or government official are interchangeable as they both refer to employees that serve public interests and are also under public payroll. But perpetrators of corrupt was not limited to public sector players but covered the private sector according to data gathered. Terms such as: *industry professionals, banks, bank chiefs, top management in private companies, nation of scholars, individuals, business morguls, media practioners, corrupt journalists* to refer to private sector players involvement in acts of corruption which is generally understood to be committed by public officials, but not a surprise as it validates or align with the position of Hopkin (1997) as a secretive transaction between two parties – ‘a public official and an entrepreneur’. In this context, the private sector players ( be it high ranking bank executives, private professionals, and companies) now assume the position of the entrepreneur. To expand further, most times because of the collaboration that exists between the private sector and public sector across all sectors of the society the private sector players most times are not easily detached from acts of corruption as a consequence of their indispensable and highly knitted partnership and therefore end up being complicit eventually. The data also showed that the crime of corruption are mostly committed by top echelons of public officials, such as: former and serving governors of states, and other elected and non-elected top ranking public officials, as particularly identified by *The Guardian and Vanguard* national dailies.

From data gathered, outside the aforementioned private sector players alleged to be perpetrators, private oil exploration companies as mentioned in the table are major economic stakeholders in the Nigerian economy from the perspective of their collaborations with the Nigerian petroleum ministry, and their involvement in oil related corruption cases involving the award of oil block, such as OPL245 for lack of transparency. Data also further revealed the official underestimation of OPL 245 at 447 million barrels (Oshunkeye,2013), the Malabu oil fraud, the subsidy scam, KPMG report which indicted the NNPC (Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation) over financial impropriety running into billions of dollars (Olaniyan,2014). The public/private collaboration cuts across all sectors, not limited to the oil sector. The point being made by the researcher is that, in as much as private businesses partner or collaborate with public sector in offering the needed services, they also by virtue of their professional or business relationship built over the years in Nigeria, in turn provide specialised services in helping public officials loot public treasury, but this does not apply to all alleged cases of corruption. From the data available as shown in the table above, those involved in the acts of corruption in Nigeria directly or indirectly – that is public officials who abuse the power and confidence entrusted in them, and those who are complicit in such acts of corruption are not confined to the public sector, but extends to the private sector. Data also revealed that, corruption is not an act perpetrated by politicians only, but by every public officials, such as, civil servants and members of the Nigerian Force – the police, army and other paramilitary bodies, and should not be viewed as a criminal act indulged in by politicians only but public officials in general and partly the private sector who are complicit.

It is common knowledge that to ensure law and order in society measures are put in place to protect lives and properties, and ensuring that those who are found to have violated the law are subjected to face the consequences, as a way to deter such future action or stop others from engaging in such criminal acts for fear of retribution or to reduce the chances of such acts repeating. Contrary to the above, the atmosphere in Nigeria seems to encourage impunity – a category presented in the tables below to refer to the failures of government to apply the law punish offending public officials for corruption, and at times abandon or close cases for the officials to go unpunished.

## THEME FIVE: Impunity

This has to do with sentences, expressions or phrases depicting the absence of punishment against offenders over acts of crime bordering on corruption. For example, ‘what I see most times are people who are incensed that someone else is doing the stealing and not them’(Jason,2012).

### TABLE 5A: Punch results on the Impunity theme.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *On the inside of corruption*  **Pat Utomi**  30/07/2014 | *Before we forget these scams*  **Eze Onyekpere**  17/02/2014 | *Musings on Nigeria’s corruption rating*  **J.K Randle**  13/12/2012 | *Anti-corruption war: a collective responsibility*  **K. Oladele**  14/11/2013 |
| *The tragedy is that policy failure and other upheavals shake people’s security in the corruptly gained money, it triggered greater corruption to consolidate,* | *NNPC has clearly disobeyed lawfu instructions for a selfish purpose. It has deliberately sabotaged government subsidy policy by ensuring that target beneficiaries do not reap the reward designed by government* | *The current noticeable trend is that many cases either end with a plea bargain or are simply closed without any conviction* | *Virtually nothing moves in our society without one form of corruption or the other, ranging from petty to grand corruption* |

### TABLE 5B: The Guardian results on the Impunity theme.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Chinweizu: Nigerians and the anti-corruption charade*  ***Chinweizu***  *29/01/2015* | *Olaniyan: what does corruption really mean?*  ***K. Olaniyan***  *05/11/2014* | *The public service and current attempt at preventing corruption and promoting productivity: Towards deregulating workers in Nigeria (3)*  ***Dan Mou***  *16/10/2014* | *Endless search for good governance amid impunity*  ***L. NJOKU***  *23/10/2014* |
| The immunity clause 308 which protects and thereby implicitly invites looting by the highest officials | The unimplemented KPMG report on corruption within the NNPC  Unresolved cases of corruption in the Universal Basic Education Commission etc. | Yet it is only workers who ‘violate’ these laws that manage to live above poverty levels in our society | Transparency accountability and good governance have taken flight from the country, leaving behind impunity, corruption, disrespect for rule of law. |

### TABLE 5C: The Sun results on the Impunity theme

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Dimension of corruption in Nigeria*  **S. Alamutu**  12/12/2014 | *How we encourage corruption*  **L. Obijiofor**  08/10/2014 | *The church must fight corruption*  **W. Jibril**  03/11/2013 | *Re:Rising poverty amid abundance*   1. **Orabuchi**   25/07/2013 |
| *…the days of mallam Nuhu Ribadu at the helm of Economic and Financial Crimes Commission EFCC actually threw up how our leaders feasted with impunity on our common wealth which the media also gave adequate and extensive coverage.* | *The culture of corruption has reduced every official business to the brown envelope syndrome in which money is consistently demanded and paid for before any… or political leader will perform their official duty* | *Trust these greedy ministers they will not query the source of the money. They will extol the giver in high heavens. Sometimes those who pay are given special seats.* | *… robbers who eat up peoples resources like caterpillars without any sense of investing back into their society. … they all resort to stashing their stolen raw cash in foreign banks.* |

### TABLE 5D: Vanguard results on the Impunity theme.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Corruption and Nigerian hypocrisy*  **Pini Jason**  03/07/2012 | *Corruption cases: the courts are not to blame*  **Chris Momoh**  01/05/2014 | *A legacy of incompetence and corruption*  **Rotimi Fasan**  13/05/2015 | *Stealing is not corruption, it is a crime*  **O. Nwakanma**  08/03/2015 |
| *What I see most times are people who are incensed that someone else is doing the stealing and not them* | *While many believe the anti-graft was rudderless until there is a commitment from the highest level of government, others argue the courts have been the cog in the wheel of anti-graft war.* | *The energy sector in Nigeria can be characterised as the warehouse of sleaze and corruption, a mad house where people spend what they don’t have or dip their hands into commonwealth.* | *…corruption is a crime against the state. The Chinese for example take it seriously: they put corrupt people before the stake and shoot them.* |

Impunity in this context encompasses expressions or sentences that convey no punishments for corrupt practices; expressions that define or expose government actions or inactions encouraging corruption in the absence of deterrence. The Chinese example as shown in the fourth column of *Vanguard* table 5D, absolutely runs contrary to the Nigerian experience, where impunity according to data reigns. It is not the contention of the researcher that capital punishment, like China should be legislated as a consequence for public officials found to be guilty, but public officials that are found to have abused the public confidence repose in them must not go unpunished. What is the Nigerian experience? The data available speak volume and paint this idea that the government is not bothered by the systemic nature of corruption, which falls short of the expectations of the various global, regional, and national instruments to address the problem. Impunity is not just about public officials abusing their offices without being punished, but it is also about an official knowing that violation of the law will not earn any form of punishment, as evident in *The Guardian, table 5b*, in the fourth column that, ‘yet it is only workers who “violate” these laws that manage to live above poverty levels in our society’(Mou,2014). That, the living standard of these Nigerian officials cannot be afforded by their legitimate earnings, but only possible through breaking of the law to afford such living standard because no fear of punishment for such criminal act. If the lifestyle of majority of public officials in Nigeria are unjustified with their legitimate wages, with or without any extra means of income, then where is the source of such luxurious lifestyle? An insight is given in the fourth column of *Vanguard*  table 5d, stating, ‘the energy sector in Nigeria can be characterised as the warehouse of sleaze and corruption, a mad-house where people spend what they don’t have or dip their hands into common wealth’(Fasan,2015). This further complements the alleged missing $20 billion and unimplemented KPMG report indicting the NNPC (Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation) over corruption. When these officials start to live ostentatiously far more than their earnings it becomes suspiciously tied to looted government funds because of the corrupt nature of the Nigerian society going by international rating and the failure to bring to justice majority of corrupt officials.

From available data, impunity is not just about the intention not to take any action when necessary against public official for their act of wrong doing or criminal behaviour; but it is also the intention to take necessary action when needed and simply putting an end to it ordinarily with whatever reason they deem fit, without punishment as evident in *Punch,* table 5a, third column above, that, ‘the current noticeable trend is that many cases either end with a plea bargain or are simply closed without any conviction’(Randle,2012). Plea bargain is legal, but could lead to reduced or no sentence at all, and dismissal. From available information, it is a pattern to evade punishment. Allowing corrupt public official to get away with corruption sends and establishes a disturbing precedent in Nigeria revealed in *The Sun,* table 5c, second column, that, ‘the culture of corruption has reduced every official business to the brown envelope syndrome …’(Obijiofor,2014). Building a way of life on a faulty foundation could result in a collapsed or failed state, because it comes with a lot of evil. However, this may not happen if the right thing is done – making sure the laws are applied to deal with these cases of graft, as it ought to be regardless of class for justice to be served on any public official and their accomplices that are found guilty of looting, stealing of public money, financial misappropriation, embezzling public funds – these were some of the terms used by the different authors to connote corruption – and this follows as the next theme discussed below, that is, terms or words that were used to imply or suggest corruption.

## THEME SIX: Terms that imply corruption

These are words or concepts that refer directly or indirectly to acts of corruption perpetrated by public officials in the different articles. ‘Financial misappropriation’, looting’ and ‘fraud’ were some of the terms that were used to describe corruption interchangeably.

### TABLE 6: Punch, The Guardian, The Sun, Vanguard results on the Terms that imply corruption.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Punch* | *The Guardian* | *The Sun* | *Vanguard* |
| *Bribe, nepotism, steal, cooked book, graft, embezzlement, kickback, theft, government monies are fleeced through ghost pensioners, looting the public treasury, squandered, heavily indebted, funds mismanagement, scandal, scam, misappropriation, contract inflation, illicit financial flow, overbloated salaries and allowances mediocrity* | *Looting, fraud, scam, bribery, embezzlement, trading influences, illicit enrichment, leakage, fleece, thievery, ill-gotten fund, sleaze, kleptocracy, money laundering, steal, financial recklessness, frittered away* | *Financial misappropriation, financial impropriety, empty the treasury, embezzling public fund, stealing of public money, raid the treasury, amass wealth illegally, school of kleptomaniacs, ransack the treasury, brown envelope syndrome, messy oil deal, foggy circumstances, opaque manner, criminal misappropriation, defrauds, steal, ill-gotten wealth, thieving, cornered heist, others exclusion, looted monies, looted funds, sentiments, patronage expectation, graft* | *Brown envelope, Ghana-must-go bags, steal, filching of public funds, unexplained sudden wealth, out-steal, graft, financial crimes, stolen public money, embezzled public funds, appropriation of the commonwealth for personal gain, public stolen funds, ill-gotten funds, ill-gotten wealth, siphoned off personal benefits, lavish billions allegedly spent on chartered flights, warehouse of sleaze, appropriate, mismanaged, shared, fraud, black economy, leeway, leakages, absolute immunity, dispropriation* |

The terms used by the different authors in their distinct national dailies or newspapers to imply acts of corruption by public officials varied and were context dependent. The terms were also all-encompassing – that is covering both financial and non-financial perspectives. For example they covered stolen, looted or misappropriated funds; and issues that are centred on nepotism. In all the articles, most of the terms used to refer to corruption were used interchangeably all through the articles. For example, terms like: ‘ill-gotten wealth’, ‘stolen funds’, ‘financial misappropriation’, ‘ill-gotten funds’ and ‘looting’ were all used to refer to appropriation of public resources for personal benefits by those who are supposed to be the custodians of public resources by virtue of the trust and confidence reposed in them, but only to fail the public as a resultant effects of but not limited to greed, elites competition, opportunity and institutional weaknesses. Every public official is supposed to be driven by the hunger to serve, change the society for the better, instead the imperfections of the system are exploited to cause hardship on the populace and satisfy their individual desires. The above terms portray a disturbing picture of how insensitive public officials can be in the abuse of their position of authorities.

Outside the general pattern of representing corruption as a criminal behaviour centred on the appropriation of money by public officials, two out of the four Nigerian national dailies sampled, that is *punch* and *The Sun,* there was a slightly more encompassing approach by some few authors that went beyond the use of words that only portray stolen or looted funds as corruption. Words such as: ‘nepotism’, ‘mediocrity’, ‘sentiment’, and ‘others exclusion’. A form of corruption in which public officials favour people who are close to them on the basis of friendship, ethnicity, religion, class, and social group. This was dubbed by Kingston (2007) as ‘parochial corruption’. While the criminal acts of these Nigerian public officials rob of on the society in general as victim, using different terms to imply the Nigerian state or people as the victim of the crime perpetrated by its high ranking officials, data available showed that, they failed to exclude the perpetrators of it (corruption) as part of the society affected by the hardship caused as a result of their actions, as revealed below in the victim’s table.

## THEME SEVEN: Victim

This alludes to sentences, expressions or texts that refer to people that have been affected by corrupt practices. Or the society at the receiving end of the consequences of the acts of corruption perpetrated. In this category is: ‘because corruption affects all, everybody has aduty to report it’(Oladele,2013).

### TABLE 7A: Punch results on the Victim theme.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *On the inside of corruption*  **Pat Utomi**  30/07/2014 | *Before we forget these scams*  **Eze Onyekpere**  17/02/2014 | *Anti-graft war: Acollective responsibility*  **Kayode Oladele**  04/11/2013 | *Jumbo pay: Activists move against legislators*  **T. Famutimi**  23/09/2013 |
| *…their money is from corruption …the anarchy predicted then comes with all as victims* | *Nigerians should demand not just relieving offenders of their mandate… all stolen money must be returned … public apologies and guarantees of non repetition of the crimes* | *Because corruption affects all, everybody has a duty to report it.* | *Over 120 million Nigerians who have no choice but to live impoverish, owe themselves and their future generation the duty to demand probity from the national assembly* |

### TABLE 7B: The Guardian results on the Victim theme

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Benefits of corruption prevention strategy*  **Abosede Musari**  29/12/2014 | *Endless search for good governance and impunity*  **Lawrence Njoku**  23/10/2014 | *Role of Judiciary in fighting public corruption and promoting democracy in Nigeria*   1. **Kuti**   11/11/2014 | *Akinola: Nigeria’s history of corruption*   1. **Akinola**   15/01/2015 |
| *With corruption everyone pays.* | *Unable to feed themselves or help one another, citizens hate those in power, the rich and the wealthy, and at times act out their hatred.* | *People are ready to throw ill-gotten funds on the electorates hence the festooning of sleaze and mass corruption* | *The competition by NPN stalwarts to own private jets… most Nigerians hailed the overthrow* |

### TABLE 7C: The Sun results on the Victim theme.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Dimension of corruption in Nigeria*  **S. Alamutu**  12/12/2014 | *How we encourage corruption*  **L. Obijiofor**  08/10/2014 | *Re: Rising poverty amid abundance*  **A.Orabuchi**  25/07/2013 | *Probes: Beyond the saints and sinners posturing*  **R. Obioha**  28/08/2015 |
| *Until we see this problem of corruption as cutting across all levels of the society and fight it … we may not get the much desired headway* | *Amechi said the citizens must scrutinise and hold political leaders. A few individuals are going away with the money and you have done nothing.* | *90% of the country’s wealth is stolen by 5% of the population* | *Nigerians had wanted an all-encompassing probe that will go back to 1999 when the rot started but Buhari and APC will never hear that* |

### TABLE 7D: Vanguard results on the Victim theme.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Corruption cases: The courts are not to blame*  **Chris Momoh**  01/05/2014 | *Corruption in Nigeria: Banks abroad have to think how they handle the bad guys*  **K. Olaniyan**  15/09/2014 | *How to tame the monster called corruption*  **E. Anab**  13/08/2014 | *Stealing is not corruption, it is a crime*  **O. Nwakanma**  08/03/2015 |
| *The Nigerian people have justifiably blamed lawyers and judges for frustrating the anti-graft agencies from successfully prosecuting politically exposed persons* | *Western press …denounce African corrupt leaders for causing so much suffering for the people* | *Everyone is a victim when some officials appropriate the commonwealth for their personal benefit* | *Most Nigerians today are cynical about the meaning of Nigeria because Nigeria is fundamentally a corrupt state* |

The Nigerian people, citizens, and state from the data above have been portrayed as the victim of the acts of corruption perpetrated by public officials in violation of the trust and confidence the Nigerian people repose in them. Why are they the victims? They have been impacted negatively by the criminal conducts of these public officials; the suffering or hardship of the people is a resultant effect of the corrupt practices engaged in by these public officials – resonating across all sectors of the Nigerian society. That no one is exempted from the pains caused by corrupt acts of public officials, as stated in *Vanguard* table 7d, third column, that, ‘everyone is a victim when some officials appropriate the commonwealth for their personal benefit’(Anab,2014) and further in the first column of *The Guardian,* table 7b, that, ‘with corruption everyone pays’(Musari,2014) Does everyone truly pay for the sins of a few? No doubt, the level of impact differs across individuals, cities, towns and villages, in terms of measuring development and the suffering it has caused to the people. The effects are evident in the deplorable conditions of infrastructures across towns, and cities, and no infrastructural provisions at all, specifically in rural settings, problems of unemployment, out-of-school children, high crime rate, such as kidnapping, armed robbery, and the absence of a welfare state to support the unemployed. It is the contention of the researcher that regardless of the universal nature of the impact of corruption in Nigeria, a tiny percentage of the Nigerian people (i.e. public officials and wealthy business owners) technically are immuned, because they are able to cushion the effects generated with ill-gotten wealth. The researcher’s assertion is supported by the following, ‘ 90% of the country’s wealth is stolen by 5% of the population’(Orabuchi, 2013). What this means is that only 10% of Nigeria’s wealth is utilised for the benefits of the Nigerian people; while 90% of it is looted by 5% of the population. This fraction of Nigerians have amassed wealth to enjoy all the necessities of life, with high patronage for goods and services.

In the light of the themes discussed, lessons have been learnt .To address systemic corruption in Nigeria requires but not limited to committed leadership and a strong political will, but requires a holistic approach that addresses institutional gaps, such that the tendency of creating those opportunities that lure public officials is addressed. Such commitment can only be good enough when perpetrators are brought to justice regardless of their position of authority, side by side with a preventive strategy.

## CONVENTIONAL CRIMES

In this category of crimes, the following five themes were common with the articles that were sampled and read from four distinct national dailies: one, Nigerian government, this implies the activities of Nigerian police and courts in dealing with the said crimes. Two, perpetrators – these are alleged suspects or those convicted to have committed one crime or the other. Three, offence – this has to do with crime committed, or alleged to have been committed. Four, retribution – the punishment for crime committed, or alleged to have been committed. And finally, victim – any individual, who as a result of the criminal behaviour of another (that is perpetrator) suffered any loss. For example, when an individual is robbed of his or her properties – cash or other material belongings as presented below in the table.

### TABLE 1: Punch, The Guardian, The Sun, Vanguard results on the themes: Nigerian Government, Perpetrators, offence, Retribution, and Victim.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Punch***  *Teenager gets six-year imprisonment for phone theft*  **Alexander Okere**  19/09/2016 | ***The Guardian***  *Salesman sentenced to three years imprisonment over N2.3m theft*  **Yetunde A. Ojo**  11/08/2015 | ***The Sun***  *3 men bag 10 months imprisonment, 10 lashes each for theft*  **NAN**  09/08/2016 | ***Vanguard***  *Man 28 sentenced to 6 days community services for stealing pot of soup*  27/10/2014 |
| *An Oredo Magistrates’ Court in Benin …sentenced… Happy Okotie six years imprisonment for stealing* | *A Lagos State Court… has found a salesman, Azeez Williams guilty* | *A Gudu Upper Area Court on Tuesday sentenced three men* | *Somolu Magistrates’… sentenced a 28-year-old man* |
| *Happy Okotie* | *Azeez William* | *Patrick Okoro, Jude Okafor, and Anthony Okoye* |  |
| *Phone theft* | *Conspiracy and stealing* | *Stealing* | *Stealing* |
| *Six years imprisonment* | *Three years imprisonment without option of fine*  *That the convict’s landed property shall be confiscated and disposed of … to restitute crime against the complainant* | *10 lashes, and 10 months in prison* | *6 days community services* |
| *Mrs Tessy Okpebiye* | *Mrs Adenike Balogun* | *Desmond Obelu* |  |

From the above the offences committed by these individuals were all theft – from stealing of money, phone to pot of soup. And they were all prosecuted by the Nigerian government at different state levels area and magistrates’ courts – covering Benin, Lagos, and Abuja, where the various perpetrators were handed their convictions and sentences. From all the individuals involved in the different criminal acts, only one of them, Azeez William was reported a ‘salesman’ while the employment status of other perpetrators were not revealed (this may either be deliberate or not). The thefts committed were in the forms of, stealing of two million naira (N2,300,000), stealing of a pot of soup, and phone. Apart from Azeez William, the employment status or background generally of the perpetrators were not reported, to know if they were employed or unemployed, criminal history or no criminal history.

The perpetrators based on the offences committed were made to serve their different weights of punishment ranging from lashes, community service, three (3) and six (6) years imprisonment respectively for money and phone thefts, thereby creating an atmosphere of deterrence. The victims of these criminal behaviours were named as: Mrs Tessy Okpebiye (phone theft victim); Mrs Adenike Balogun (money theft victim); Desmond Obelu (victim of stealing – no specificity on what exactly was lost to the three perpetrators). Outside the names of the victims, just like the perpetrators – there were no reports about their background information, whether the victims work or are retired, and where they reside. Whether the degree of punishments handed to the perpetrators are proportional or disproportional remain an issue considering for instance, where one perpetrator was sentenced to six years imprisonment for phone theft, and the other to three years for a theft of N2.3m (two million and three hundred thousand naira) though the value and brand of the phone were not provided. But there is the understanding that, the phone would have been less in value – considering the value of regular phones in the market, couple with the fact that, N2.3m is more than $5,000 USD going by exchange rate, and as such the value of the phone would have been less and ought to have been less in punishment.

From available evidence, based on data gathered – these two different crimes have a common denominator of negatively impacting the society, whether at the individual or level of the society generally. Apart from this commonality, lies the disparities based on data, where acts of corruption seem to appear difficult for the criminal justice system in Nigeria, by way of delay and denial of justice and other surrounding factors, unlike conventional crimes where, there were expedited prosecutions. The volume of the articles, and the one-sided or disproportional nature of punishments awarded to conventional offenders by the criminal justice system in Nigeria, were also part of such disparities, creating a further understanding that, the response of the criminal justice in Nigeria, portrays conventional crimes as more threatening and disturbing, against the universally held view of the consequences of corruption.

# CHAPTER FIVE

**DISCUSSION**

This thesis found a significant misbalance in the over all representation of political corruption and conventional criminality in Nigerian media. It is possible to argue that three causal factors led to the misbalance: popularisation of corruption, the issue with judiciary, representation of victims in the media. The main findings are discussed in the sections below.

## Popularisation of corruption

First, this misbalance can be linked to political corruption being over-represented through under-representation of punishments in reported cases of political corruption. While conventional criminality was under-represented through the over-representation of sentences in reported cases. What this means is that, covered cases of conventional criminality by the media were entirely about sentences slammed on conventional offenders for their criminal behaviours, while reverse was the case on political corruption, as the coverage was almost entirely devoid of sentences, but a commentary from different angles – covering the menace of corruption, approaches adopted in foreign jurisdiction in the fight against it, prolonged and delayed prosecution of political criminals.

This, however, in a way seems to have created a sense of suspicion. One of such potential explanations would be located in the socio-legal analysis of legal provisions put in place to tackle conventional criminality and political corruption. Again, in the last two decades the war against political corruption has internationally been championed, through legal frameworks designed to combat the phenomenon, where Nigeria as a state party has replicated these international anti-corruption initiatives to a degree of effect nationally. In this case, the arrest and prosecution of corrupt politicians by the EFCC, where it claims to have secured 471 convictions within a period of four years (2013-2016), while the big fishes are missing. Where in part the framework or legal initiative are comparatively new to the criminal justice system in Nigeria. The absence or missing of top public officials in the arrest, prosecution and convictions secured by the EFCC, further reaffirms or is reaffirmed by the weakness of selective prosecution on the part of EFCC in the prosecution of the war against corruption ( Michael Hezekiah, and Chukwuma,2019). Politicians perceived to have been opposed to Obasanjo’s administration were discriminatorily witch-hunted as against all cases of suspected corrupt public officials. Although, this deviant behavior of selective prosecution was not only limited to the Obasanjo presidency, but a weakness and common practice that ran through other leadership regimes in Nigeria.

The popularisation of corruption and its under-representation of punishment was also further validated by the decision of the late Y’Ardua presidency to challenge and strip EFCC of its prosecutorial powers through the office of the minister of justice and attorney general of the federation, asking the EFCC to seek clearance or authorization before commencing any prosecution, which however, ran against the provision of the law establishing the anti-graft agency (Umar,2015). Was the decision of the government to strip EFCC of its legal responsibilities, one to check their excesses? The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was established by an act of parliament. If for any reason the government intention was to reduce the powers of the EFCC, the legitimate thing to have been done, would have been for the government to approach the legislature for an amendment of the relevant provisions in the act establishing it, instead of total disregard for the rule of law and abuse of power. Does this act to get the EFCC to get authorization from government before any prosecution, as against its legal power to do so fights corruption? It appears counter-productive and compromises the system and also fall short of the ideals of good governance, transparency and accountability. Apart from the internal consequences, it also comes with a lot of external consequences – painting a bigger picture to the outside world that Nigeria does not respect the rule of law; that it lacks the political will to fight corruption; and that Nigeria promotes corruption indirectly through selective prosecution – a deviant behavior that is aimed at protecting certain individual interests against the over interests of the country.

## Problems with the Judiciary

Evidence also suggests that the role of judicial officials forms part of the problem. In a recent survey conducted in Nigeria, magistrates and judges were identified as the third most corrupt public officials behind the police and prosecutors, as a consequence of their penchant for taking bribes from adult Nigerians who had contacts with them (UNODC, 2017). Similarly, in the period 2002-2005 it was stated that not less than six senior judges were remove on offences bordering on corruption while others were being investigated (International Commission of Jurist, n. d. cited in Ayodeji and Odukoya, 2014). In addition, in the period 2006 – 2011, Judges in Nigeria were accused of ‘judgment procurement’ to the tune of N106 billion naira (an amount estimated to be more than $300 million dollars), with as much as 60% accruing to judges from the share (John-Salakov, 2011, cited in Ayodeji, et al.2014). As a consequence, this plays a huge impact on the coverage of political corruption. The result of the survey confirming the judicial arm of government as the third most corrupt in Nigeria says a lot, and was further espoused by the positions of the Internation Commission of Jurist and that of John-Salako – where judges part home with the lion share of corrupt proceeds. When judicial officials are compromised, the judiciary as the hope of the people – turns to hopelessness, because the trust reposed in them disappears. Also, with ranking of judicial officials as third most corrupt in public service in Nigeria, the problem of delays experienced or our court system faces could be somewhat attributed to corruption within it, apart from the known buying of court judgments. As Levi (2006) argues that what is covered in the media partly falls on the degree of influence of ‘political and law enforcement involvement’ , in his article which focused on the construction of financial crimes by the media.

Majority of the articles argue that the criminal justice system has not made any progress in the crusade against corruption, which goes to validate the position of Oguzhan, Dincer and Gunalp (2012) that conviction of public officials is an objective way of measuring crimes related to corruption in the literature review chapter. In one of the articles, the integrity of the judiciary was subtly questioned – ‘the cases involving the former governors, such as, Orji Uzo Kalu of Abia State, Gbenga Daniel of Ogun State, Lucky Igbinedion of Edo State…are still pending in the courts suffering frivolous adjournments’(Musari,2014).The above names are evident in Appendix B2. The aforementioned personalities were all former state governors. The emphasis here is “frivolous adjournment” which makes it look highly suspicious, irrespective of where and how it may be viewed. The researcher is cognisant of the fact that, the above phrase (frivolous adjournments) was not used ordinarily. However, with UNODC (2017) describing judges and magistrates in Nigeria as third most corrupt; the survey conducted by EFCC and the National Bureau of Statistics, unearthed that from bodies where corruption is pervasive in Nigeria, the judicial sector gets the largest share of bribes (Ayodeji, et al. 2014); the dismissal and trial of some judges, frivolous adjournments may be the results of bribes collected.

In a similar pattern, same article had also featured paraphrased interviews by two members of staff of the EFCC (Economic and Financial Crimes Commission), Kayode Oladele and Chile Okoroma – ‘how the courts keep dragging corruption cases endlessly and how defence lawyers collude with their rich clients to delay justice by plugging the loopholes in the justice system. They had called for the overhaul of the justice system’(Musari, 2014). It is a case of fighting a systemic corrupt judiciary.

Unnecessary and unjustified adjournment creates the impression that the courts are acting on external influence, to the advantage of one party. In the same vein, ‘courts have been the cog in the wheel of anti-graft war’ (Momoh,2014). As part of evidence, this excerpt points to the judiciary as a barrier to the part of ridding the system of corruption; not showing adequate will or commitment to combating corruption, considering the slow pace of prosecution and the number of suspects accused of offences bordering on corruption and money laundering, whose fate are still hanging. Every judicial officer has a share of the blame – in terms of the actions or inactions in the administration of justice, in view of the unnecessary adjournment and tactics by others. As part of effort to further understand and address this evil, Ayodeji and Odukoya (2014) reduced corruption in the judiciary into two: administrative and operational corruption. The former has to do with tampering with administrative procedures for personal enrichment. While the latter involves grand practices, such as, looting of public funds, bribery, intimidating acts, and other sharp practices aimed at influencing the impartiality of the judicial procedure. The point being made is that, although accusing fingers are most times directed at the judges or justices, considering the nature of their jobs in making judicial pronouncements, the corrupt judicial system does not end with them but encompasses all the administrative staff – who are part and parcel of the system, hence cases go through administrative processes.

The unscrupulous and unnecessary issuing of restraining orders or injunctions by judges was heavily frowned at by the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN) warning judges of ignoring the judicial ethics of impartiality, and openness in relation to the granting of restraining to a group of senators who were indicted for not following due process in the award of contracts, from being arrested and prosecuted by the Inspector General of Police (IGP), and the Attorney General of the federation (Okeyim, Ejue and Ekanem,2013). Were the senators presumed to be innocent before the injunctions were granted?

In the light of the above question, the Chief Justice of Nigeria’s unambiguous warning to judges to respect and stick strictly to their code of conduct and operational ethics speaks volume and indirectly portrays an atmosphere of suspicion that the judges had compromised while discharging their constitutional duties. This was shown while warning them to uphold the judicial tenets of fair play and transparency when discharging their duties. The nation’s highest judicial official gave such caution putting into perspective that, the said senators were subjected to investigation by a committee that was set up for that purpose, and had their reported submitted indicting their colleagues. However, the court did not deem it right and fair to serve the leadership of Nigerian senate to come show cause why the prayers of the four senators – which asked that the police and the attorney general’s office be restrained from arresting and prosecuting them should not be granted. This gave room for suspicion that, the judge had been influenced. Was the warning of the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN) enough? Although it seems timely, it was not far-reaching and adequate, because the CJN, as the head of NJC (National Judicial Council) and with the NJC having the sole responsibility of sanctioning judicial officers in Nigeria (Obutte,2016) the CJN, asthe chairman of the council could have done better by setting up a panel to investigate the judge in question, as evidence of leadership, commitment, and political will to address or tackle judicial corruption. At the end the committee would have submitted a report based on their findings and make necessary recommendations on the way forward to avoiding a repeat of such in the future, and serve as part of judicial reform plan or a step to kick-starting the needed reform in the judiciary.

To support this further, the 2016 arrest and prosecution of some judges in Nigeria, by the Department of State Services, DSS, as approved by the Attorney General of the Federation, AGF, in what was dubbed ‘sting operation’ – based on countless allegations of corrupt practices, with power to such operation drawn from section 15, sub-section 5 of the constitution of Nigeria, that prevents every agencies of government from corrupt acts. And that, the three organs of government should take necessary steps to rid the system of corruption (Vanguard, November 26,2016). Although there were mixed reactions, but this was a courageous thing to do, hence the dispensation of justice on the ground of affordability or the highest bidder, would to a considerable level reduce, and give hope to all without requesting for favour.

Although it is not absolutely all-negative on the part of the judiciary, at times the law catches up with some public officials. ‘The ICPC last week, secured the conviction of the acting provost of the College of Education (Technical), Gusau, Zamfara State, Dr. Bello Shallah Ahmed. He was sentenced by the high court of justice in Gusau for collecting double Duty Tour Allowance (DTA) for the same trip. The offence which is punishable under Section 19 of the ICPC Act 2000, carries a five year jail term without an option of fine’ (Musari,2014). What is unknown is if the above conviction still remains or has been overturned by a superior court. Secondly, how many politicians have been convicted and sentenced just like the provost above in Nigeria? No idea. To tackle corruption, a strong message of deterrence must be sent to the political class, and judicial officials at the administrative and operational levels - that it is no longer business as usual.

An estimated N106 billion is said to have been looted by judicial officials. A judicial system that has been dubbed the third most corrupt in Nigeria, hardly can the number of judges or justices be counted that have been prosecuted, convicted and jailed for corrupt practices. However, Nigerian courts had at different instances given decisions that promoted corruption, as Ogbu (2011 cited in Okeyim, et al.2013) argues ‘… an Abuja High Court deals a fatal blow to the code of conduct mechanism for fighting corruption when it held, without justification that the code of conduct mechanism is subject to the immunity clause.’ The rot in the Nigerian judicial system was also further exposed when some Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), were arraigned for appeasing the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) officials, were discharged by an Abuja High Court on the very day they were arraigned with no justification. But the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) however appealed against it (Okeyim, et al.2013). It is a matter of yes or no if the Appeal Court could be relied upon for redress, because it could be dismissed, upheld or sent to the lower court for retrial. However, the doubt that, they are all from same corrupt system has been established, though not all judicial officials are corrupt. But between 2002 and 2005 not less than six (6) High court judges and two (2) Appeal Court justices were removed from office on the ground of corruption, while some were under investigation (Ayodeji and Odukoya,2014). It is common to find judges or justices being investigated, relieved of their duties or sacked, but it is uncommon to find judges being convicted and jailed in the Nigerian judicial system, as against the prevailing situation with the common people. Is it that, the allegations of corruption against judicial officials are false?

It is the view of the researcher that, no corrupt judge or justice would want to jail a colleague, for fear of reciprocation at some point in life. It is a strategic thing done to prepare a soft-landing if the unknown happens, so that they can reap from what they have sown. There have been allegation of judgment buying or what some call ‘judgment procurement’ as a matter of high concern in the judiciary. A judge with integrity in public service will not condone impunity on his part when judicial and non-judicial officials are found to be guilty of allegations, or entertain any form of cover up. By integrity, the researcher means: a clean record of public service devoid of any form of taking public funds or materials for personal gain; any form of soliciting and taking of financial/material benefits for personal gain; any form of religious, socio-ethnic considerations or influence in the discharge of duties. This aligns with the position of Dakolias and Thachuk (2000) that judicial impartiality and fairness only exist in an atmosphere of good governance; while the foundation of the rule of law is independence of the judiciary. This implies that, court or judicial decision must not be subjected to the dictates and influence of politicians in the cause of justice delivery, either by the position of authority they occupy, and monetary/material offers. No amount of pressure from politicians and other highly placed individuals in the society should be tolerated by judicial officials to alter the cause of justice, as doing so undermines their oath of office and independence of the judiciary upon which the rule of law is anchored.

The reckless and excessive use of judicial powers poses a problem. A case in hand is a mortifying role played by the judiciary in the annulment of 1993 presidential, when a day to the election, an Abuja High Court presided over by Justice B. Ikpeme, gave an injunction barring the National Electoral Commission (NEC) from conducting the June 12,1993 presidential election. This was done following an application filed by the Association of Better Nigeria (ABN) – a body that prior to the election pronounced illegitimate by a High Court in Lagos, because it aims were to truncate transition to a democratically elected government, and also to ensure continuity of military regime. This occurred in spite of the ouster clause of Decree 13 of 1993, that forbade the jurisdiction of the court from granting any order restraining the conduct of the 1993 June 12 election. In a counter action, Justice Mushood Olugbani, gave an order for the National Electoral Commission (NEC) to go ahead with the conduct of the elections. In the light of MKO Abiola, winning in the elections, the Association of Better Nigeria (ABN) approached an Abuja High Court – where Justice Dahiru Saleh gave an order for the electoral body, NEC not to announce the results of the elections. On the contrary, Justice M. Olugbani of a Lagos High Court issued an order for NEC, to release the results but was however, later annulled (Obutte,2016). In this regard, the contradictions, divisions, and power play in the judiciary to please certain interests. The height of it, was the ridicule and abuse of the judicial system, because a court had already declared a body illegal, and no information to support that, the decision of the court had been appealed against, but surprisingly same organisation that was banned approached same court of coordinate jurisdiction in another city to obtain an order stopping the Nation Electoral Commission (NEC) from announcing the results of election already conducted. By all standards, it exposes the hidden plan of the military to continue to hold unto power, as it operated behind the scene – by continuing to use the judiciary to destabilise Nigeria, as it validates the position of Ayodeji and Odukoya (2014) who saw the military era of Nigeria’s political history, as a period that was inundated with corrupt judicial officers. Judicial corruption is not limited to a particular leadership regime – be it civil or military rule. However, the authors have good grounds to argue such, because the process by which the military came to power in Nigeria was by force – that lacks every democratic characteristics that provide for checks and balances, and anti-graft watchdogs, that can be found in current Nigeria democratic system. Even with the passage of different legislations, and the presence of anti-corruption institutions in contemporary Nigeria’s democratic rule, judicial corruption has not ceased to exist – hence the dismissal of few judges and justices on the ground of corruption.

And a further validation of Foster (2001) argument that, the law is a child of corrupt officials. By this, it implies that in their interpretation and application of the laws, the judges and justices allow their corrupt behaviours to influence their court orders, decisions, and judgments, as against proper interpretation and application of the laws. These corrupt judicial officers, instead of doing the right things, but because of selfish reasons, choose to misuse their office to do what is not proper in the eye of the law. This gained a further reinforcement by the position of Funderbunk(2012) in his contribution to the literature on the causes of corruption, that laws are made by the powerful in the society for their protection of interests. Judicial officers, by virtue of the sensitive position they occupy and their constitutional responsibilities of proper interpretation and application of the laws, remain powerful. The positions of Foster (2001) and Funderbunk (2012) also align or validate part of the results in the light of section 308 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), which protects a tiny section of Nigerian executive political leaders from criminal prosecution

## Representation of victims

Although the victim category encompasses all and sundry, there is the understanding that, the impact of corruption is much more pronounced with the masses, hence the leaders or representatives of the people are better placed not to feel the impact that much, or do not even feel the impact at all. Terms like, ‘citisens,’people’,’ Nigerians’, ‘all’ were used differently in the various articles analysed to refer to the victims of corruption, without stating who the real victims are (that is the masses – who do not occupy any form of political office) from public officials, the perpetrators - who are in charge of governance. A practical example is power supply (electricity) in Nigeria, where a high majority of people have learnt and accepted to live without power – because of constant power failure or interruption, wherein people are compelled to seek for alternatives in order to provide power for their households. But for the political leaders, the power situation is uninterrupted, as majority of them have the ill-gotten funds to almost entirely pay for and enjoy uninterrupted service. Same applies to roads, as they procure pot-holes resistant vehicles to move about. Health, education, housing and other areas are not also left out. The rate at which some Nigerians travel (mostly politicians and other top government functionaries) for health tourism is alarming, while Nigeria’s health institutions continue to struggle at the very expense of millions of Nigerians that lack the resources to seek alternative medical attention abroad.This is supported by Odo (2015) whose contribution to the growing literature on the havoc done by corruption, affirmed, ‘a general rapid deterioration in the living conditions of Nigerians due to wanton corruption in government on an unimaginable scale.’ That being said, it implies that, Nigerians are being denied good life through corrupt behaviours of their leaders unquantifiably. The living standard of people in Nigeria, is such thatmajority of Nigerians in the 21st century still lack access to clean water, good roads, education, and healthcare.

Although Nigerians are seen as the victim of this elite criminality, not all Nigerians feel the impact, as the elite or political class have their own ways of cushioning the effects. Yes, in general, no one can be singled out of this shame considering the international angle and stigmatisation that goes with it – for example, the CPI (Corruption Perception Index) which measures the rate of perceived corrupt practices engaged in by public officials in Nigeria, in terms of bribes paid by foreign business people; and the perception of Nigerians outside their borders, because of corruption caused by a few in government. It appears embarrassing, when you tell someone outside the shores of Nigeria, that you are a Nigerian, and the response you get is ‘Nigeria, a very corrupt country.’This reality and stigma is what Nigerians irrespective of background, class and education experience regularly as a consequence of corruption, even though Nigerians do not live under the same socio-economic conditions.

The media was reactive to print out news about the common people to the public in Nigeria for being arrested, prosecuted, convicted and sentenced without a corresponding discussion on whether the punishments were commensurate with the law. But for corruption, the situation does not appear exciting as the words: ‘convicted’, ‘sentenced’ or ‘jailed’ were rare to find in the data analysed. Those who suffered losses or whose quality of life were worse off (victims) were different when matched with the two distinct crimes. For conventional crimes, the victims were more of individuals, while for corruption it becomes collective in nature with the following terms: ‘everyone’, ‘Nigerians’ ‘people’, ‘citizens’ etc. Here it’s a bit tricky because it encompasses both the corrupt elites, and the commoners – those that bear bunch of the consequences, because the greedy and corrupt public officials deploy their financial muscles to cushion the effects of their criminal acts, by creating a comfortable world for themselves, while the mass of the people live in agony – as their access to quality education, health, clean water, decent housing, good roads, gainful employment became difficult, just to mention a few. But the failure to meet the expectations of the public in the context of basic infrastructure and economic wellbeing has resulted in huge blame game. By impunity, corruption grows. To arrest the situation, public officials found engaging in acts of corruption should be punished to serve as deterrence to others planning to indulge in it, without necessarily being selective in the war against corruption, a factor that has evidently hampered the progress on the fight against corruption due partly to vested interest.

Whether it is the level of impunity or deterrence, when it comes to people committing crime in Nigeria, such arguably is a product of the political will of leaders. Part of what has been shown in the results is the lack of political will/ commitment following the unimplemented KPMG report on corruption in the NNPC (Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation) considering its economic importance – as Nigeria’s coordinating institution in her main export and sale of crude oil. What could have been responsible for the non-implementation of the KPMG report? No reason was given in the results gathered, but something is responsible for it being abandoned. This is in consonance with Foster (2001) in the literature reviewed earlier that, the law is a product of ‘corrupt authorities’ and that such laws are subject to change when they do not align with their personal interests. Drawing from the position of Foster, it appears that, the KPMG report would not have favoured, the authorities, as a consequence it was left abandoned. In addition to the above, Johnston (2012) opines that, pursuing reform in a corrupt environment would encounter the resistance of ‘corrupt interests’. Hagher’s (2011) position further draws attention to another perspective - that the role of foreign companies can never be underestimated because of their request for preferential treatments over their competitors. This dimension seems convincing, because of the high number of multi-national corporations into joint venture with NNPC – in the business of exploration and extraction of crude oil. This also further confirms Tanzi (1998) position which described international corporations as strong contributors to the level of global corruption.

To put into proper perspective, even with the establishments of various anti-corruption bodies in Nigeria, drawing from the UN (United Nations) legal instrument, the success rate has not been encouraging, considering the global ranking of Nigeria as one of the most corrupt countries in the world by TI (Transparency International), World Bank and the IMF, as reported mostly by the media. The success rate by way of government response has not been commensurate with what the Nigerian state has been robbed of – in terms of the number of corrupt officials convicted, stripped of their properties and sentenced to jail. But, however, what could be perceived as success – appears in the form of arrests, media trials, and continuous trials in the courts, with no foreseeable end date. This in a sense corroborates Nossiter (2013) contention in the literature review chapter that, ‘convictions for corruption by top officials in Nigeria are so rare that they are treated as national milestones’.

The identified areas where the media narratives differed in the coverage of political corruption and conventional criminality in Nigeria are discussed below.

## 1.THE SIZE OF ARTICLES AND HEADLINES

The imbalance or lop-sidedness on the one part, were conspicuous in the sizes of articles, for example the word counts were far higher on the articles on corruption, for instance a 2,000 word corruption article, while a 200 word article on conventional crimes, leaving a glaring difference. Two, the headlines also differed, as most conventional crimes captions began with convictions and sentences handed to offenders, for example, offender A, ‘jailed for 14 weeks for stealing a pair of shoes’ or arrests made. While on corruption they were academic, not framed alongside punishments, but done in many ways different or to reflect the effects or symptoms of it. For example, ‘Infrastructural decay: a call to tackle corruption’ – the ways some of the articles were framed. Or at times framed along side the amount of money embezzled.

## 2.POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Further more, corruption was also very much skewed with so much concentration on political leadership, civil servants and military authorities, in terms of how they have used the opportunity and power entrusted to them by the Nigerian people to enrich themselves at the expense of Nigerians. While on the contrary, there were no discussions on followership – as a direct opposite of leadership, in terms of being alive or not to their responsibilities as the governed, because no leader leads a vacuum. On conventional crimes, based on the data available from the years under review, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2013 had reported cases of domestic burglary in ascending order put at: 2,443, 2,710, 2,555, 2,429, 2,968, and 3,160 respectively. For auto theft covering a period 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2013, reported or recorded cases of auto theft in ascending order were: 3,433, 1,265, 1,826, 1,239 and 2,043. The failure of the media not to discuss the threats and the causal factors of these criminal behaviours, other than report convictions and sentences were glaring.

Also, from the articles that were analysed the judiciary in Nigeria was represented as a two-faced institution, in the context of justice delivery. The analysis revealed that the dispensation of justice on conventional crimes were unhindered, sort of easy and frequent. However, replicating such success on cases of corruption became uncommon.

## LIMITATIONS

This research in general was not a smooth ride, because of some challenges faced by the researcher in the cause of this work below:

Lack of access to and absence of central data based on crimes in Nigeria, after necessary and concerted efforts were made by the researcher seemed to have impacted this work, putting into context the aim of the research

The research method adopted was designed to look at news articles in selected national dailies, without primary data from journalists. This as a consequence may have impacted the overall result of this research, considering the value and dimension this could have added.

Financial challenge was also a factor while conducting this research, as the researcher was quite careful with decisions that were going to affect his meagre resources, because the researcher had no external funding or scholarship while conducting this research.

Although the researcher’s choice of newspapers was informed by a report that, the chosen national dailies had the highest readership, but the researcher might have been bias in the sampling technique of the news articles used from the pool of articles and how the themes in the articles were derived.

Corruption being a sensitive topic, the researcher recognised that in the cause of his analysis, a lot of emotions, and subjective traces would have been involved unknowingly, and going by the fact that, the researcher is a Nigerian, and his perception of being a victim of corruption, all had an impact.

# CHAPTER SIX

## CONCLUSION

Nigeria’s response to the two types of criminal conducts -political corruption and conventional crimes is very problematic and raises a number of serious concerns. The first concern is ‘What is the Just Response to Crime?’ And is it possible to achieve it? This work describes just responses as the fairness and proportionality in the application of the law to punish perpetrators of crimes, regardless of their social status and the need for restitution for victims of crimes. It is important that perpetrators of crimes must be brought to justice, irrespective of the position of authority they occupy, influence, and their wealth in society. The operations of the Nigerian system suggest a different approach to justice: an offender can be jailed for six years for phone theft and a public official can be convicted of looting millions of dollars of public funds and granted option of fine less than ten thousand dollars. Achieving a just response to crimes in Nigeria is possible, but partly dependent on the integrity and credibility of leadership in the various arms of government: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.

The sharp practice where conventional crime perpetrators who stole less get more punishment and the perpetrators of corruption, who loot more to get less punishment or none at all, may not in anyway reflect the true position of the anti-corruption and anti-conventional crimes laws in Nigeria; or a weakness of the western championed global fight against corruption. But, partly owed to defective institutions, selective prosecution by anti-corruption agencies, and a protectionist agenda by corrupt judicial officials to shield corrupt public officials from being punished

The central thesis of this research is that, the over-representation of political corruption, and the under-representation of conventional criminality, is deeply an exploitative problem. While the cases of political corruption are over-represented, the punishments for political corruption are under-represented. As seen in various examples in chapter five, conventional criminality is under-represented, but the punishments are over-represented. The under-representation of punishment for perpetrators of political corruption is a product of the manipulative roles money, power and influence play in Nigeria’s criminal justice system, as seen in chapter six, where for example, people buy judgments. That the powerful, influential and wealthy in Nigeria, are most times able to deploy these instruments to buy their way out of problems in the face of guilt, as a result of systemic corruption. As a direct opposite, those who lack these instruments of manipulation, largely bear the brunt of the criminal justice system in Nigeria.

Much has been critically discussed and digested about corruption with public officials – the Nigerian experience of political corruption, and conventional crimes, theoretical views on the two crimes, and their typologies. In addition, the conceptualisation of political corruption, international, regional, sub-regional and national responses, analysis of media contents, legal document and other statistical data. Ultimately, the narrative on the war against corruption in Nigeria is incomplete without an absolute reference to the western world through its 21st century road map to stamp out the phenomenon. Prior to the UN (United Nations) declaration to tackle it, corruption had always been a challenge to the socio-economic development of Nigeria in all facets, without law enforcements, even when the law had spelt out the consequences for such deviant conduct. The dormant nature of our laws points to the fact that, the government was never moved by the unquantifiable consequences such criminal acts rained on the Nigerian people, possibly because they never cared consciously or unconsciously, due to their overriding elitist interests – as perpetrators and beneficiaries. If not for the external pressure, through the UNCAC (United Nations Convention Against Corruption) led by the western world, the status quo would have remained – a practice symptomatic of a failed Nigerian state, and even with the international legal instruments the law enforcements agents and the courts have been elusive to the administration of justice because of the frequency of adjournments. There is nothing wrong with adjournments ideally, but it becomes an issue when it is no longer natural; when it is perceived as a national problem and when it becomes a consequence of those desperate to frustrate the course of justice in order to evade the wrath of law.

But on the contrary, the applicability of the law has witnessed more progress with conventional crimes (though also faced with the challenge of proportionality and disproportionality). With the response from the judiciary on regular basis, through different punishments handed to those convicted, within and out of proportionality, the judiciary had therefore established that conventional crimes were more serious crimes compared to corruption where convicts are scarce. However, the other unimpressive thing about the depiction of conventional crimes by the media, was their reduction of conventional crimes to deviant behaviours that always attract punishment, lacking every sense of academic discourse in terms of causes, different theoretical perspectives by scholars, ways to tackle the problem and any form of academic debate about the crime generally (if any). There is also the failure on the part of the media to link and see conventional crimes as the consequence of the corrupt or thieving elites for siphoning resources meant to perhaps create an enabling environment for investors, in order to generate jobs for the teeming populace and thereafter force down the unemployment rate – hence most of the offenders prosecuted and convicted had the status of unemployed and in a way signals poverty – which in some particular crimes is most times seen to be pushing offenders into engaging in acts of crime.

To solely heap the blame on the political leadership of Nigeria for the socio-economic underdevelopment right from independence might be tantamount to injustice – because no leader leads a void but a people or followers. This research calls for shared responsibility between leaders and followers. However, the media entirely focused on leaders as absolutely responsible for all the challenges the Nigerian state faces. The media might be right looking in the direction of poor policy decisions made, and infrastructural decay while ignoring the actions of the followers. Most times unnecessary internal and external pressure on leaders could make them derail in trying to please or appease so many interests. Conversely, apart from the negatives, the people most times organise rallies, peaceful protest, to register their disenchantment, all these in most of the articles analysed were not captured.

In post-colonial Nigeria (after more than fifty years of independence), from available literature, it is estimated that close to $400b has been plundered from the Nigerian treasury by corrupt public officials. And there seems to be no figures defining strict government responses to corruption, in the context of who, (not just arrest) has been prosecuted, convicted, jailed and properties confiscated. Every serious government with the intention to make a huge leap against crime must consider deterrence – action capable of inculcating fear or discouraging deviant or offending behaviours because of the likely consequences. For those whose assets have been seized as a result of corruption in Nigeria, as reported by the media lacks the transparency – because their identities most times are not revealed or every other detailed information are kept from the public domain. The shocking side of the narrative is that most public officials (whether serving, retired or former political office holders) do also follow the general path of also identifying corruption as one of the problems of Nigeria that requires immediate fixing during media interviews, organised talk shops, projects commissioning, book lunch etc. But are the corrupt officials different from these same individuals with this make-believe corruption-free projected personality? Hypocrisy is so high that, some of these individuals with a history of different positions held while in government are part of the elites in the society – and they can not claim they are not part of the problems, while the powerless are in serious unimaginable agony.

On the contrary, for conventional crime the figures of those prosecuted, convicted, jailed or given option of fines based on analysed data from the four distinct news papers are inexhaustible. Although there were concerns of punishment being disproportional to deviant behaviours, where for example, someone steals a pen of five naira and the person is convicted and sentenced to ten years in prison. The judiciary was further portrayed to be assertive with crimes of the powerless and a double-faced institution of justice, it failed to show reliability and trust in the combat against corruption – considering the number of corruption cases that had remained in courts for years, but known for one thing: continuous and careless adjournments, but known for speedy dispensation of justice when it’s about conventional crimes. Why this simplicity?

Often times, perpetrators of conventional crimes are people who are at the bottom of the ladder in the society struggling as a consequence of poverty, those unemployed or those doing menial jobs – as evident in the data collected. Their socio-economic and financial status put them in a disadvantaged position not to be able to influence a situation in the context of crime committed, couple with the inability of some to employ the services of lawyers to defend them, and sometimes frustrate the legal process, as observed in some data – where lawyers were blamed for delays on cases bordering on corruption. And this seems to be in tandem with the saying, ‘justice delayed is justice denied.’ A former supreme court justice, late Justice Chukwudifu Oputa once said, lawyers ‘after charging their normal and usual fees, charge extra for the judge’ (Iredia, 2011). This assertion supports the idea that, some people sell and buy justice. This is also part of the reasons while cases of corruption hardly end – money and the influence of people in powerful positions.

Largely, the themes discussed point towards the unbalanced representations of the ,two types of offences. In cases of grand corruption, we can observe greater interest and lesser punishment. While in cases of street crimes, we can observe lesser interest and greater punishment. In cases of corruption, the perpetrators wield so much power and influence as a consequence of their political status/positions. They leverage on this to penetrate every facet of government to pursue their individual interests and also use such influence and power to cover their misconduct and shield themselves from prosecution. Or if prosecuted, they may eventually not be convicted because of how powerful and connected they are. But can same be said of perpetrators on the other side of the spectrum? Perpetrators of petty or street crimes, evidence from the data gathered and analysed shows that most of them were either jobless, doing menial jobs, petty traders, or perhaps, those who felt pained that leaders who were elected to fight and represent the interest of the people had suddenly changed to looting public treasury for personal benefits. And this group of perpetrators lack the kind of influence and power enjoyed by politicians and career civil/public servants to manipulate the system to make it favour them

Beyond all is the idea that the Nigerian criminal justice system has responded more to conventional crimes, in terms of the success achieved by way of convictions and sentences secured, even with question marks about, if they were ideally proportional, or disproportional on the other hand. Of note is that these responses were left with no trace of international pressure to tackle them, against the direct opposite of the international support and framework in the war against corruption received in Nigeria but with nothing remarkable about the anti-graft war. But because the Nigerian justice system has somehow become politicised and commercialised, it becomes easy for moneybags, such as, politicians and other government functionaries – who form part of the elites club in the society, most times during problems to buy their way through to evade punishment. When this happens, they tend to redirect their energy and sense of justice to conventional crime offenders to establish their toughness and thoroughness, knowing well that, they (the conventional crime offenders) don’t have the financial firepower to procure the conscience of the judges and other judicial officials, however not in all situations. Apart from the aforementioned, the lack of integrity on the part of judicial officials and the fear of being exposed, somewhat compels them to compromise.

It’s understood that the underlying idea to the decision of the western world to pressurise a country such as Nigeria to combat corruption connects a lot to their values and the urgency to rid the threats posed by corruption to bring about improvement in the living standard of the people, reduce unemployment, fight poverty, bring about infrastructural development, increase opportunities for the teeming populace and have a safer world to live. Of all lies a serious concern – the question of sincerity of the western world and the element of hypocrisy, how? While they have joined forces with other countries of the globe to combat corruption, they have made it extremely complex for the developing world to repatriate their looted funds abroad. The concerns to fight corruption are genuine but the hypocrisy is more.

The Nigerian experience with every institution of the state remains touching. Who should Nigerians trust? Nigerians have seen corruption in the judiciary, the police force, the executive, the legislature, the media, and every aspects of public life. No one can be trusted because of pervasive corruption. However, as the most populous country in Africa, she just cannot give up on the fight against corruption, rather adopt the right strategies and mentality that will put the nation’s interests above individual interests.

Going forward, this research can be broadened beyond its present scope for the future, by way of increasing the sample size to accommodate more newspapers with national spread. Exploring other regional newspapers in Nigeria would be a good idea by drawing a comparison between the views of the newspapers with national coverage those that only cover a particular geopolitical zone or ethnic region. It can also be advanced further in future looking at the representation from two different countries of different crimes by the media, while also measuring the criminal justice systems as well. For example, comparing the depiction of different crimes between Nigeria and its West African neighbour, Ghana, or Nigeria and any other European country. Doing so would bring us to understanding the distinctiveness and similarities between countries. Beyond the differences, it will further expose our system to areas that may need adjustment, and if need be call for quality policy transfer to deepen our criminal justice delivery system regardless of who the suspects or offenders are.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

For the reduction of general crime rate, quick and effective justice delivery on cases of corruption, the researcher recommends as follows:

The need for the enactment of a law by the National Assembly of Nigeria, establishing special courts across the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria, for the trial of corruption cases within 180 (one hundred and eighty) days, as against unimaginable years of delays on cases of corruption in courts. The composition of the special courts should be made up of retired justices and judges, with a thorough security and background checks, whose selection, appointment, and disciplinary processes should be conducted by the National Judicial Council (NJC), headed by the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN). This to a degree would address the syndrome of unnecessary and undue political interference that seems to cause delays in the criminal justice system or kill the prosecution of most corruption cases. In addition, there should also be special and harsh punishments for the members of the special courts as deterrence to engaging in corrupt practices.

The need to enact a law for the establishment of a well funded and supervised National Board on free vocational skills acquisition, with branches across the thirty six (36) states of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) with the responsibilities to design skill programmes, recruitment of skill trainers and design of programme duration – to cater for the needs of out-of-school teenagers, secondary or high school leavers (who may or cannot further their education), for self-employment opportunities in due course, as this would to a large extent address conventional criminality and in general grow the economy.

Government should work towards the establishment of a national benefit scheme for unemployed Nigerians, backed by an act of parliament towards reducing the rate of conventional criminality, with a clause that provides for ineligibility of this benefit for those caught in crime. Such clause would serve as a strong deterrence to people getting involved in crimes.

A national review of Nigeria’s anti-corruption laws, with total assets forfeiture and life imprisonment for convicted public officials without option of fine. Option of fine involve paying certain sum of money in replacement of imprisonment. So, if the financial option if removed the deterrence becomes stronger, because majority of this corrupt officials have the financial capability to pay such fine to avoid going to prison, and encourages more looting.

Review of existing criminal codes to generally address the problem of non-violent crimes, and arising issues of proportionality and disproportionality. With the dynamic and growing nature of the society laws are meant to be reviewed and updated in order to keep up with pace

The removal of the immunity clause of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) because the President, Vice President, Governors and Deputy Governors hide under this clause to perpetrate illegalities that they are never held accountable for.

International collaboration with the Group of Seven (G7) and Group of Twenty (G20) countries, to stem money laundering and repatriate corruption proceeds.

Ensuring the review and strengthening of existing anti-corruption instruments in a way to deter corrupt behaviours in government to produce effective results would go a long way to help.

In conclusion, the national and international efforts put together at addressing the menace of corruption are pointers to its destructive nature and the harm it has caused to the Nigerian populace and world at large. While there is no one single approach at tackling corruption, adherence to the above recommendations do not completely solve the criminal activities of public officials and that of the common people in society, but they usher in hope of reducing corruption and other conventional crimes, if these same breed of public officials decide to put national interest above personal interest, and ensuring a just response to crime regardless of who the perpetrators are.

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# APPENDIX A1

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| *Corruption in the Nigerian media*  **Tonnie Iredia**  29/05/2011  *VANGUARD* **1,181** | *Corruption and Nigerian hypocrisy*  **Pini Jason**  03/07/2012  *VANGUARD*  **992** | *Corruption cases: The courts are not to blame*  **Chris Momoh**  01/05/2014  *VANGUARD*  **854** | *Corruption in Nigeria:*  *Banks abroad have to rethink how they handle the bad guys*  **Kolawole Olaniyan**  15/09/2014  *VANGUARD* **1,597** | *A legacy of incompetence and corruption*  **Rotimi Fasan**  13/05/2015  *VANGUARD*  **1,148** | *The war against corrupt-ion: How has Nigeria fared?*  **Theo**  31/07/2014  *VANGUARD*  **2,238** | *How to tame the monst-er called corrup-tion*  **E.ANABA**  13/08/2014  *VANGUARD*  **979** | *The bogey of fuel subsidies*  **Les Leba**  04/06/2012  VANGUARD  **972** | *Subsidy regime of controversy*  **M.Eboh**  01/07/2014  *VANGUARD*  **3,307** | *Stealing is not corruption, it is a crime*  **O. Nwakanma**  08/03/2015  *VANGUARD*  **1,308** |
| ‘… youth corps member who was having a drink with a male friend… was forcefully separated from the boy by the police and arrested as a prostitute | ‘President Jonathan (former) insisted during the presidential media chat, that there was nothing in law that compelled him to declare his assets publicly’ | ‘The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) has also arraigned some former bank chiefs for financial crimes’. |  | ‘What ever profit there is in the energy sector, or more specifically, that the NNPC (Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation) makes ultimately ends up in the financial black hole…’ | ‘…the Nigerian Government has establishedagencies such as the EFCC, ICPC, the Code of Conduct Bureau, the Federal Character Commission and the Public Complaints Commission’. |  | ‘There will be no need for fuel subsidy if Central Bank (CBN) adopts a naira and people friendly framework …’ | ‘The Federal government budgeted N971.1 billion for payment of subsidy, keeping it at the same level in 2013. | A judiciary that cannot deliver judgment on a simple election dispute is corrupt’ |
| ‘Some journalists beg their way to choice assignments like covering the governors, the presidency and ministers but that obviously cannot accommodate many  Practitioner’  ‘After charging their normal and usual fees, charge an extra for the judge’ | ‘Until recently, who would have believed that a director in the civil service could keep N2 billion cash in his house?  \*some of those civil servants  with torn T-shirts and worn shoes have estates all over Abuja and mansions in their villages’ | ‘The arraignment of former governors… and bank chiefs’ | ‘Every year an estimate $148 billion is siphoned off annually from African states and stashed in developed economies’  ‘over $400 billion is considered to have been lost to high level corruption since independence’ | ‘Long queues of vehicles at filling stations across the country, testimony to the level of corruption and incompetence that has marked the last six years’ |  | ‘A timely example of the evil of corruption is poverty, inequality, insecurity and underdevelopment in many African states’ | ‘A fortuitous reserve based in excess of $60 bn was whittled down to just over $30 bn within 4 years and yet, … not resulted in improvement’ | ‘Fuel subsidy had failed to achieve its objectives and had become a source of massive fraud which must be discontinued in the interest of the Nigerian public’. | ‘…because these institutions are fundamentally weak, complicit,… it is impossible to investigate, sanction and enforce laws that ought to prevent crime against the state’ |
| ‘civil servants in this country work for only eight hours a day and five days in a week, public broadcasters work round the clock daily and through out…yet the renumerati-on package for both categories is the same which is based on the same level system’ | ‘given half a chance they out steal the people they were criticising yesterday oh the smart phrase nowadays is “the hunter becomes the hunted”! In other words, the thief and the ‘catcher’ easily trade place.  ‘In one of my articles in the eighties I propounded a theory that the decibel of the noise of a Nigerian is directly proportion-al to his distance from an opportunity to steal’. | ‘The Nigerian people have justifiably blamed lawyers and judges for frustrating the anti-graft agencies from successfully prosecuting the politically exposed persons and other members of the ruling class accused of corrupt practices and money laundering  ‘Ibori case and Halliburton scandal which have recently questioned the commitment of the country to tackle the menace of corruption’. | The bad guys accounts defaults with these banks are often shrouded in secrecy | ‘What ever profit there is in the energy sector or more specifically that the NNPC makes ultimately ends up in the financial black hole that the corporation has dug for its own good in the sustenance of fabulous lifestyles of official of the petroleum ministry’ |  | ‘Under-enforcement of anti-corruption laws in many countries is responsible for this state of affairs’. |  |  | ‘Officials can only get away with stealing from the state – because the Nigerian system is too weak and distorted to prevent this’.  ‘Indeed, the system… encourage the individual to be corrupt’ |
| Practitioners in the media, corrupt journalists | President ,governors, ministers, civil servants, private sector | Former governors, bank chiefs | Politically exposed persons, public officials | Officials of the petroleum ministry | Senators, ministers, governors | Government officials, high-ranking state officials |  | Companies, individuals | Govt.officials, Nigerian intellectual |
| ‘Anyone who offers me brown envelope will have to explain what it is for and if it is in dollars – the currency of party primaries – we will count its content together to ascertain that it is worthy of its purpose and that it befits my status’ | ‘What I see most times are people who are incensed that someone else is doing the stealing and not them’. | ‘While many believe the anti-graft was rudderless until there is a commitment from the highest level of government, others argue the courts have been the cog in the wheel of anti-graft war’. | ‘The practice has become endemic and has in fact gone on for many years rarely any meaningful or consistent action taken by the international community or government that supposedly regulate the banks’ | ‘The energy sector in the Nigeria can be characterised as the warehouse of sleaze and corruption, a mad-house where people spend what they don’t have or dip their hands into common wealth’ |  |  |  | ‘Head of Dept. of Public Law, at the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies… it has witnessed situations whereby people collect subsidy payments for not supplying petrol, whilst they collect foreign exchange for the purpose’ | ‘…corruption is a crime against the state. The Chinese for example take it seriously: they put corrupt people before the stakes and shoot them’. |
| Brown envelope, Ghana-must-go bags | Steal, stealing, stole, filching of public funds, unexplained sudden wealth, out-steal, graft. | Graft, financial crimes | stolen public money, embezzled public funds, appropriation of the commonwealth for personal gain, public stolen funds, ill-gotten funds, ill-gotten wealth, siphoned off | Personal benefits, lavish billions allegedly spent on chartered flights, warehouse of sleaze | Steal | Appropriate, stolen x2, mismanaged, shared |  | Fraudx4, black economy | Leeway, leakages, stealing x3,absolute immunity, appropriation, appropriate, dispropriation. |
| According to the paper ‘we Punch Nigeria Limited, do not demand or accept gifts or gratification to publish stories, articles and photographs neither do our journalists’ | ‘If we are going to be serious about the war against corruption in Nigeria we must first of all appreciate how pervasive it is and stop playing politics with its eradication’ | ‘the Nigerian people have justifiably blamed lawyers and judges for frustrating the anti-graft agencies from successfully prosecuting politically exposed persons’ | ‘Western press… denounce African corrupt leaders for causing so much suffering for the people’ | ‘Nigeria… as producers of oil they have had to suffer trying to get the commodity in the last three weeks or there about’ | ‘…Nigeria to win the war on corruption three professions are critical… law, computer, accounting’. | ‘Everyone is a victim when some officials appropriate the commonwealth for their personal benefit’ | ‘Nigerians are misled into searching for solutions to fuel subsidy removal’ | ‘The payment of subsidy is not to the advantage of Nigerian masses but only favours few individuals who have constituted themselves into a cabal’ | ‘Most Nigerians today are cynical about the meaning of Nigeria because Nigeria is fundamentally a corrupt state’. |

# APPENDIX B1

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| *Chinweizu: Nigerians and their anti-corruption charade*  **Chinweizu**  29/01/2015  *GUARDIAN*  **1,312** | *Olaniyan: What does ‘corruption’ really mean?*  **K.Olaniyan**  05/11/2014  *GUARDIAN*  **1,695** | *Benefits of corruption prevention strategy*  **Abosede Musari**  29/12/2014  *GUARDIAN* | *The public service and current attempts at preventing corruption and promoting productivity:Towards deregulating workers in Nigeria (3)*  **Dan Mou**  **16/10/2014**  *GUARDIAN*  **3,681** | *Pains, gains of anti-corruption crusade*  **A.Musari**  04/11/2014  *GUARDIAN*  **2,123** | *Endless search for good governance amid impunity*  **LAWRENCE NJOKU**  23/10/2014  *GUARDIAN*  **2,045** | *Role of judiciary in fighting public corruption and promoting democracy in Nigeria*  **Abdul-Fattah KUTI**  11/11/2014  *GUARDIAN*  **831** | *Akinola: Nigeria’s history of corruption*  **A. Akinola**  15/01/2015  *GUARDIAN*  **1,658**  **Akinola** | *Chinweizu: 2015:Between liberation and slavery*  **Chinweizu**  08/02/2015  *GUARDIAN*  **1,665** | *Why the TSA cannot be faulted*  L. **Onyekakeya**h  22/09/2015  *GUARDIAN*  **1,290** |
| ‘The 1999 constitution has entrenched institutionalised lootocracy’ | ‘President Jonathan(former) said that ‘over 70 percent of what are called corruption [offences],even by the EFCC and other anti-corruption agencies, is not corruption but common stealing’. | ‘ICPC chairman, Barr. Ekpo Nta has spoken extensively that it is better to prevent corruption than to waste more of government resources prosecuting offenders’. | ‘Federal, State and Local Governments to pay their workers whatever they can afford to pay without deregulating the workers to do whatever jobs they can’. | ‘Indeed, preventing corruption is one of the tripod pillars on which the ICPC mandate rests, the other two being public enlightenment and prosecution’. | ‘The nation will not forget in a hurry the 2007 general election and the role of the EFCC in stopping aspirants’ | ‘The federal government should pay whatever is owed to Ekiti State Government to ensure continuity in the art of good governance’. |  | ‘If a president – who is sworn to uphold the constitution – attempts to fight lootocracy he would be breaking his oath of office…’ | ‘TSA implementation began in February when the Central Bank of Nigeria issued a circular … to implement the e-Collection Remita platform’. |
| ‘The 1999 constitution is the godfather of corruption through the immunity clause 308 which … invites looting by the highest officials who have brazenly the terrible example that the rest of society emulated’. | ‘The case of the missing $20 bn from the account of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) unresolved oil subsidy scam, the unimplemented KPMG report on corruption within the NNPC, unresolved cases of corruption in the pension fund’ | ‘… that the EFCC has hundreds of cases in different courts nationwide, most of which have passed the plea stage. The cases … such as: Orji Uzor Kalu of Abia State, Gbenga Daniel of Ogun State, Lucky Igbinedion of Edo State, etc’. |  | ‘The ICPC has so seized 56 properties from officers of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence corps in Abuja. The properties are mostly land in the Federal Capital Territory’.  ‘Mrs Bintu owned an estate of 60 buildings (10.9 acres) on airport road, Abuja’. | ‘Corruption was like a bad decayed tooth in the system that must be uprooted for the country to know peace’. | ‘Local govt. bosses travel behaving like Arab Sheiks … they would buy houses in choice area …stash away millions of foreign currencies to foreign accounts’ | ‘… the Babangida era was the case of the nation’s windfall from oil during the gulf crisis – a windfall estimated at about $12 billion – which is yet to be accounted for’. | ‘The 1999 constitution is the godfather of corruption through the immunity clause 308.  (1) which protects and thereby implicitly invites looting by the highe-st office-als’ | ‘Frivolous spending and recklessness perpetrated by MDAs would stop. \*The country saved N500 bn in frivolous spending by MDAs. \*…banks held N2.2 trilion of public sector funds beginning of quarter 2015’ |
| ‘They want to loot and squander that is why they don’t really want corruption tackled.  ‘Secondly they love their noise-making against it… he has come to get rid of corruption, only to get even more corrupt than those he threw out’? | ‘The government should care about combating corruption rather than strenuously attempting to deny or justify it’  ‘Secondly, there needs to be a consistency of approach in the fight against corruption’ | ‘Investigating and prosecuting corruption are expensive and time consuming’. | ‘To deregulate salaries and fringe benefits and direct employers, including federal, state and local governments to pay their workers whatever they can afford to pay without deregulating the workers to do whatever they can … is to institute policies that promote and perpetuate labour strikes, … even public corruption’ | ‘… I know I can do it with a bit more of funding, but like I have always stated use the one you have to justify what you are looking for  \*This morning I was at the National Assembly. It is beautiful and well maintained. If we have that kind of environment at ICPC I can assure you we will work for 24 hours’. | ‘… the country has initiated laudable initiatives to curb corruption, the lawmaker stated more needed to give impetus to laws … in the anti-graft war’. |  | ‘The return of democracy in Shehu Shagari’s era… meant the return of political termite and the democratisation of corruption’ | ‘No president can tackle corruption without inviting impeachment simply because corruption is encouraged and protected by the constitution he sworn to enforce’ |  |
| Highest officials | Senior state officials, high ranking public officials | Politicians, Chief executives, fraudsters | Workers | Officers of the Security and Civil Defence corps, government officials, MDAs and banks | Leaders | Local govt. bosses | Politicians, airport officials, civil servants, trustees of the national purse, police force | Nigerians | MDAs, Chief executives, associates. |
| *The immunity clause 308 which protects and thereby implicitly invites looting by the highest officials* | The unimplemented KPMG report on corruption within the NNPC  \*Unresolved cases of corruption in the Universal Basic Education Commission etc. | ' | ‘Yet it is only workers who “violate” these laws that manage to live above poverty levels in our society’ | ‘We recovered all the monies and made our recommendations to the minister of finance … you are not getting the money again. … ‘The balance are left in central bank. And now we can ask you to provide explanation … of monies … in previous year’. | ‘Transparency, accountability and good governance have taken flight from the country, leaving behind impunity, corruption, disrespect for rule of law’. | ‘… They would buy houses in choice areas where the noveau riches live lifestyle of pleasure and ease’. | ‘But when it comes to the scale of graft by those at the top of governments, it is nothing but greed’. | ‘It is fraud for the godfather of corruption to give the impression that it is against corruption …’ | ‘Successive governments, ministries, continued to operate multiple accounts … and pending of government revenues’ … |
| Looting x3, lootocracy x2, fraud x3 | Scam, bribery, embezzlement, trading in influence, illicit enrichment. |  | Leakage | Fraud, fleece | Looting, thievery. | Ill-gotten fund, sleaze kleptocracy, money laundering | Settling | Fraud x3, lootocracy x4, loot, looting | Steal, financial recklessness, frittered away |
| ‘If Nigerians are at all serious in their endless noise-making against corruption, they must as a first step get rid of the 1999 constitution’ | ‘Nigerians will know corruption when they see it: whether it is in decayed infrastructure, weak and unaccessible health and education systems crumbling and poorly maintained roads, lack of regular and uninterrupted electricity or rampant violent crime’ | ‘With corruption everyone pays’ |  |  | ‘Unable to feed themselves, or help one another, citizens hate those in power, the rich and the wealthy, and at time act out their hatred’. | ‘People are ready to throw ill-gotten fund on the electorates hence the festooning of sleaze and mass corruption’ | ‘…The competition by NPN stalwarts to own private jets and one another in the amount of money stashed… most Nigerians hailed the overthrow’ | Nigerians |  |

# APPENDIX C1

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *On the inside of corruption*  **Pat Utomi**  30/07/2014  *PUNCH*  **1,351** | *Rebasing corruption*  **Minabere Ibelema**  01/06/2014  *PUNCH*  **1062** | *Pain,gains of anti-corruption crusade*  **A. Musari**  04/11/2014  *PUNCH*  **2,123** | *Corruption: Countries that punish graft with death penalty*  **Gbenga Adeniji**  16/11/2012  *PUNCH*  **1,163** | *Transport: Policy inconsistency, corruption ruin gains*  **Rasheed Bisiriyu**  01/10/2013  *PUNCH*  **1,388** | *Before we forget these scams*  **Eze Onyekpere**  17/02/2014  *PUNCH*  **1,104** | *Musings on Nigeria’s corruption rating*  **J.K. Randle**  13/12/2012  *PUNCH*  **1,279** | *Anti-graft war: A collective responsibility*  **Kayode Oladele**  04/11/2013  *PUNCH*  **1,515** | *Jumbo pay: Activists move against legislators*  **T. Famutimi**  23/09/2013  *PUNCH*  **857** | *Nigeria’search for good governance continues*  **N. Akinnaso**  16/12/2014  *PUNCH*  **1,149** |
|  | ‘ICPC boss said recently that the embezzlement of government funds is theft but not corruption’ | ‘The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other related Offence Commission (ICPC) has intensified the preventive approach to curbing corruption, commenced nearly three years ago’ | ‘No court in Nigeria will condemn anyone to death for corruption even if it was the law of the land’ | ‘Successive administrations at federal and state levels have always found reasons to tinker with whatever transport programme their predecessors left behind’ | ‘NNPC has clearly disobeyed lawful instructions for a selfish purpose’. | ‘… The general belief in Nigeria is that the legal system is not effective enough’. | The EFCC act in section 39 provides that officers of the commission cannot be compelled to disclose the source of information or identity of their informants. | ‘In eight years, the National Assembly, with 469 members have expended N1trn of public funds’. | ‘…the Jonathan administration has clearly improved on certain components of good governance,… social inclusion and gender equity …’ |
| ‘Today due to lack of connectedness, you fear whether your own children are going to care for you or not… the only feeling of security … is amass more wealth… all in your personal account’  ‘Corruption requires square pegs in round holes to corruptly …’ | ‘The Nigerian military are asking for more funds… to combat boko haram. And they want their funding to bypass the usual budgetary allocation process’ | ‘ICPC is working on the federal govt. payroll system where it has been found that ministries allegedly inflated the number of personnel in order to obtain money from government coffers’. |  | ‘…Engineering construction corporation under the N50 billion railway transformation contract were reportedly grounded less than five years later’. | ‘The quantum of resources that have been wasted through the NNPC criminal conduct is in trillions’  ‘Reports of various committees on the petroleum subsidy scandal and their damning indictment …’ | ‘Report observes a decline in the cases of fraud from 520 in the second half of 2011 to 503 in the first half of 2012.  \*Same period the value of fraud decreased from $3 billion to $2 billion’ | ‘Looting of natural resources like petroleum products, bunkering etc’. | ‘National Assembly transferred N150 billion at the detriment of the welfares of over 160 million citizens’ | ‘The founding fathers who took over from the British expressed the desire to build ‘a strong and virile’ nation …thwarted by region, ethnic, religious and linguistic differences, which were born with the new nation like congenital diseases’. |
| Part of the reasons corruption is crippling Nigeria is abandonment of merit. | ‘Given the resounding issue of corruption in the military, they have a lot to do, to persuade the people that the problem is primarily insufficiency and routing of funds’ | ‘… I was at the National Assembly to attend a public hearing. I looked at the environment of the National Assembly… beautiful and well maintained ’If we have this kind of environment, we will work for 24 hours’. |  | ‘… that from Lagos to Abuja, Kano to Maiduguri and Onitsha to Portharcourt many of the roads were riddled’. | There will be more than enough offences and sections… management of NNPC could be charged and convicted to serve as deterrent. | ‘… government officers and top management staff in private companies were described as the worst offenders leaving company shareholders and general public to bear the brunt of their profligacy | Because of corruption people are compelled to pay for services that should be free | ‘Our representatives have lost their moral conscience to reject…the most criminal form of raping its citizens’ |  |
| Civil servants, competing rich people, Nigerian | Nigerian military, public officials. | Banks, MDAs, officers of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence corps, government officials | Political office holders, Government officials. | Politicians | Ministry of petroleum resources, NNPC. | Industry professionals, government officials, top management in private companies. | Corrupt people, overnight billionaires, reactionary leaders | Senators, members of the house of representatives |  |
| ‘The tragedy is that policy failure and other upheavals shake people’s security in the corruptly gained money, it triggered greater corruption to consolidate’ |  |  |  | *‘…*the state-owned company was unable to compete with European lines despite heavy investment. Heavily indebted, the NNSL was liquidated in 1995’*.* | ‘NNPC has clearly disobeyed lawful instructions for a selfish purpose.  \* …It has deliberately sabotaged government subsidy policy by ensuring that target beneficiaries do not reap the reward designed by government’. | ‘The current noticeable trend is that many cases either end with a plea bargain or are simply closed without any conviction’ | ‘Virtually nothing moves in our society without one form of corruption or the other, ranging from petty to grand corruption’ | ‘Tweets and facebook quotes on this issue will fill many libraries yet nothing has changed’  ‘It is time to force that change, it is time to step out on the streets of Abuja… protest across Nigeria to call an end to this madness’. |  |
| Bribe, pay-off, nepotism, stole, steal, mediocrity, incompetence | Cooked book,graft, embezzlement x2, kickback x2,stealing, theft x4, | Government monies are fleeced through ghost pensioners. | Looting the public treasury. | Squandered, heavily indebted, funds mismanaged | Scandal x7, scam x3, stolen | Bribes, misappropriation, contract inflation, illicit financial flow, fraud x6, stolen x2 | Looting | Over-bloated salaries and allowances. |  |
| ‘…their money is from corruption and is hidden from investments spark off social anomie.  \* The anarchy predicted then comes with all as victims.’ | ‘For Nigeria, my guess is that the cooked book mechanism is as haemorrhaging as the procurement method, perhaps more so’. | ‘…porous systems have been plugged and funds running into several billions of naira have been recovered for the government’ |  | ‘A vibrant railway system was bequeathed to Nigeria…four decades of neglect was what it required to ‘castrate’ the transport mode…’ experts said  ‘Many agreed Nigeria with its size of population (160 million people) should not expect any meaningful development if it continued to neglect its railway system’. | ‘Nigerians should demand not just relieving offenders of their mandate… all stolen money must be returned … public apologies and guarantees of non-repetition of the crimes’. | ‘It is bad for the economy that the recorded amount of capital from the country outweighs its total foreign direct profile’. | ‘Because corruption affects all, everybody has a duty to report it.  \*Corruption hurts economies, people and governments’. | ‘Over 120 million Nigerians who have no choice but to live impoverish, owe themselves, and their future generation the duty to demand probity from the National Assembly’. | ‘This is especially the case in Nigeria where all these negative factors coexist leading to Nigeria’s poor ratings on all international indices’. |

# APPENDIX D1

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Dimensions of corruption in Nigeria*  **S. Alamutu**  12/12/2014  *SUN*  **1,124** | *How we encourage corruption*  **L. Obijiofor**  08/10/2014  *SUN*  **1,000** | *Thank God, we cracked the atom of corruption*  **J. Ego-Alowes**  22/01/2015  *SUN*  **1,862** | *THE MALABU OIL SAM: A SCANDAL THAT WON’T GO*  **S. Oshunkeye**  28/07/2013  *SUN*  **3,847** | *The church must fight corruption*  **W.Jibril**  03/11/2013  *SUN*  **1,162** | *He who aggregates power aggravates corruption*  **J. Ego-Alowes**  16/04/2015  *SUN*  **1,741** | *Re:Rising poverty amid abundance*  **A. Orabuchi**  25/07/2013  *SUN*  **1,493** | *Buhari: The politics of age*  **T. David-West**  14/10/2014  *SUN*  **2,334** | *Probes: Beyond the saints and sinners posturing*  **R. Obioha**  28/08/2015  *SUN*  **1,129** | *Jonathan: Hard work, many foes, powerful critics (5)*  **R. Egbu**  28/07/2013  *SUN* |
| ‘… the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC actually threw up startling discoveries of how our leaders feasted with impunity on our common wealth,…’ | ‘Rivers State Governor Chibuilke Amaechi once gave chilling insights into how an uncritical civil society can aid politicians to continue to raid treasury’. |  | ‘… justice minister wrote President Jonathan, asking for authorisation to serve as obligator to resolve the issues among all parties involved in the OPL 245 saga’. |  | ‘Gen. Murtala Mohammed, a coup plotter cum dictator ran Nigeria as his personal or gang’s turf. Along the line he was shot dead, and a certain Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo sprang up as the stand-in dictator’. | ‘… government is using kidnappings and assassinations to intimidate and harass their perceived political opponents’. |  |  |  |
| ‘The man that supplies diesel to power the generator set delivers below the expected quantity in connivance with engineer, who gets the cut at the end’  \*It must also be understood from the point of view of morals | ‘You have heard that $50 bn is missing you have done nothing about.  \*It is N8 trillion, it can change Nigeria’. | ‘Coup making is corruption’ | ‘Despite its rich deposit, especially being one of the oil rich blocks in the country, the committee noted that OPL 245 was grossly underestimated a 447 million barrels official record for it’. | ‘The recent case of a convicted army officer who allegedly defrauded a state government to the tune of N150 million and allegedly paid a tithe of N11 million in two instalments to a church’. | ‘Now Yar’Adua was not a particularly distinguished officer … yet he was chosen over and above others, who were his superiors in rank and excellence and made a second in command’  ‘Apart from Obasanjo’s running incapacity to preliminarily qualify, the laws and conventions were accordingly changed to rope him in as a presidential candidate’. | ‘Dr Orabuchi 90% of Nigerian wealth is not controlled by 5% of the population rather 90% of the country’s wealth is stolen by 5% of the population who are called politicians’ | ‘N2.8 billion poppycock; PTF (Petroleum Trust Fund) partial to the North; Expired PTF Drug’ | ‘That is why the alleged Nigeria’s missing billions of naira or dollars are stashed in PDP members houses’. | ‘Our problem is not about big government and funds spent on emolument’.  ‘It has more to do with phantom contracts and bloated figures we put on white elephant projects’. |
| ‘All the above instance illustrate how Nigeria has degenerated as a nation’.  ‘ People at the lower cadre or deliberately overlook their acts of financial corruption but direct their energy at those at the top at any given opportunity. | ‘A weak civil society is not only evidence of a dead society, it is also proof that we are all complicit in the way politicians ransack the treasury’. | ‘The Nigerian politicians stand as saints compared to the abdication of the scholar’  ‘The Nigerian scholar in the face of battle with a long life filled with battles, and scars to show, we … seen a nation or tribe so surrender before a battle that is theirs …’ | ‘… many stakeholders… thought it was  another storm in a tea cup that would soon evaporate and die. But die, it has not, 12 years after’    ‘… the messy oil deal, like phoenix keeps rising from the ashes of one presumed death stage, climbing with renewed vigour, to another pedestal’ | ‘… most church members have been misled into believing that there is nothing wrong in acquiring wealth by hook or crook as long as they pay tithe on such money’.  ‘This undoubtedly explains why everybody now wants to do anything to acquire money’. | ‘Before then … the military had insisted and campaigned that, it is a national institution…’  ‘ However in complete and shameful reversal, the same military which claimed it was nationalistic and faith free sprang up a M. Yar’Adua from no where and imposed him as number 2’ | ‘The problem is not lack of understanding of the solution rather it is the absence of the will to do the right thing’. |  | ‘Buhari… probe certain APC chieftains that some Nigerians are pointing accusing fingers at on corruption allegations’  ‘He should probe some APC states, where the opposition parties are alleging corruption… probe everybody irrespective…’ |  |
| Government officials, politicians, business morguls | Politicians, political leaders | Her nation of scholars, coup makers, politicians godogodos. | Dan Etete (then minister of petroleum);Pecos Energy Ltd; Principals of the department of Petroleum Resources; Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Ltd; Nigeria Exploration Ltd; ENI-AGIP; International Consulting Ltd of Gen. | Christian, army officer | G2 members | Politicians | Politicians, Cronies … | Politicians |  |
| ‘The days of Mallam Nuhu Ribadu at the helm of Economic and Financial Crimes Commiision, EFCC, actually threw up … how our leaders feasted with impunity on our common wealth which the media also gave adequate and extensive coverage’. | ‘The culture of corruption has reduced every official business to the brown envelope syndrome in which money is consistently demanded and paid for before any… or political leader will perform their official duty’. | ‘Governor B. Fashola is the one running one of the odd half a dozen most corrupt governments in Africa. What have we said? Ok let us repeat’.  ‘Fashola … running most‘corrupt government in all of Africa. And his case because the act of it is hidden, disguised by him and or his minder-cabal’ | ‘But contrary to the expectations of many stakeholders … he would not spare anything connected to Gen. S. Abacha his tormentor-in-Chief he spared OPL 245.  ‘But with a caveat: that: M. Abacha cease being a shareholder or director’ | ‘Trust these greedy ministers they will not query the source of the money’.  ‘They will extol the giver to high heavens. Sometimes those who pay are given special seats’. |  | ‘…robbers who eat up peoples resources like caterpillars without any sense of investing back into their society’.  ‘… they all resort to stashing their stolen raw cash in foreign banks’. |  |  |  |
| Financial misappropriation x2, financial impropriety, empty the treasury, embezzling public fund | Stealing of public money, raid the treasury, amass wealth illegally, school of kleptomaniacs, ransack the treasury, brown envelope syndrome |  | Messy oil deal, foggy circumstances, opaque manner, criminal misappropriation | Defrauds, steal, ill-gotten wealth, defrauded, thieving x2 | Cornered heist, others exclusion | Stolen, looted monies, looted funds. | Sentiments, patronage expectation | Loot, graft |  |
| ‘…until we all see this problem of corruption as cutting across all levels of the society and fight it from that point of reasoning, we may not get the much desired headway’. | ‘Amechi said the citizens must scrutinise and hold political leaders’.  ‘A few individuals are going away with the money and you have done nothing. You are morning Madiba who lived up to 95, and he was very angry with Nigeria when he died’. | ‘ … the nation that cannot be moved by, or move scholarship is dead, is calling for undertakers in the form of boko haram and other insurgencies’.  ‘ It is this knowledge creation that is our club fee to be made and remain citizens of the earth’ | ‘The House of Representatives ad-hoc committee … says the huge reserve could fetch Nigeria well over a trillion dollars’ | ‘Most church members have been misled into believing that there is nothing wrong in acquiring wealth by hook or crook as long as they pay tithe on such money’  ‘An army officer who allegedly defrauded a state government to the tune of 150 million naira … is an embarrassment to the body of Christ’. | ‘In fact that Nigeria has fallen this low is due to the power-corruption connection manufactured by the politics of ‘others exclusion’  ‘ In the end and this end is near, it is the politics of exclusion of stolen history that will further spawn Nigeria as a school of corruption’ | ‘90% of the country’s wealth is stolen by 5% of the population’. | ‘Corrupt Nigerians, Buhari phobics’ | ‘Nigerians had wanted an all-encompassing probe that will go back to 1999 when the rot started but Buhari and APC will never hear that’ |  |

## TABLE 1.C

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Man arraigned for allegedly stealing newspaper’s N1.2m*  ***C.* Nkwopar*a***  13/10/2011  *VANGUARD*  ***178*** | *Police arrest fake Lieutenant who specialises in car theft*  07/02/2013  *VANGUARD*  ***329*** | *Woman,35*  *Arraigned for burglary*  20/02/2012  *VANGUARD*  ***208*** | *Robbery suspect explodes, says senators are stealing money*  **Evelyn Usman**  19/03/2013  *VANGUARD*  ***693*** | *How police in Ondo arrested female burglary kingpin*  **D.J. Akure**  12/07/2011  *VANGUARD*  ***805*** | *Man 28 sentenced to 6 days community services for stealing pot of soup*  *27/10/2014*  *VANGUARD*  ***262*** | *Security guard bags 14-weeks imprisonment for burglary*  *27/11/2012*  *VANGUARD*  ***148*** | *Police smash car theft syndicate in Enugu*  **Francis Igata**  *19/03/2015*  *VANGUARD*  ***157*** | *28-yr-old man gets 6-month jail for burglary*  **Onozure Dania**  *26/06/2013*  *VANGUARD*  ***204*** | *Teenager docked over alleged burglary,stealing*  **Onozure Dania**  *29/11/2013*  *VANGUARD*  ***189*** |
| ‘Imo State Police Command has arraigned one Mr. Olayiwola Elijah …Owerri Senior Magistrate Court’ | ‘Operatives of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad,SARS...  have arrested a fake lieutenant…  that specialises in stealing of cars’ | ‘The police prosecutor, Sgt J.Oladoye…said the accuse on Nov.20,2011 broke into an apartment on Wurola Street, Woleola Estate, Osogbo  \*Senior Magistrate Olusola Aluko granted the accused bail in the sum’ | ‘Lagos state police spokes woman… said the following items…one new Samsung split, 2HP air conditioner valued at N77,500; and one 150 KVA power generating set valued at N3.8 Million;another’ | ,Arrested by crack detectives from the command, | ‘A Somolu Magistrates’… sentenced a 28-year-old man to six days of community service’ | ‘An Ilorin Magistrates’ court… sentenced a security guard to 14 weeks imprisonment, | ‘Ndubuisi Orji … has been arrested by operatives of No 3 Police Mobile Unit in Enugu’ | ‘Ikeja Magistrates’ court … sentenced 28-year-old man’ | ‘A 19-year-old … arraigned before the Ikeja Magistrate’ |

## TABLE 3

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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| *Salesman sentenced to three years imprisonment over N2.3m theft*  **Yetunde A. Ojo**  11/08/2015  *GUARDIAN* | *3 men face break-in theft of employer’s N180,000 property*  **NAN**  18/08/2015  *GUARDIAN*  ***235*** | *Court convicts welder over theft of motorcycle*  **NAN**  24/08/2015  *GUARDIAN*  ***190*** | *Police nab man for allegedly killing lawyer, stealing cars*  **Hendrix Oliomogbe**  30/08/2015  *GUARDIAN*  ***276*** | *Saleswoman arraigned over theft of employer’s N832,000 goods*  **NAN**  24/04/2015  *GUARDI-AN*  ***348*** | *Secondary school student arraigned over N20,000 iron rod theft*  **NAN**  29/04/2015  *GUARDIAN*  ***211*** | *3 Konga staff member docked over N9.6m phone theft*  **NAN**  18/12/2015  *GUARDIAN*  ***245*** | *Man 28 in court for stealing police fuel*  **NAN**  28/05/2015  *GUARDIAN*  ***244*** | *20-yr-old docked over alleged theft of friend’s ATM card*  **NAN**  28/04/2015  *GUARDIAN*  ***288*** | *Three suspected Fulani herdsmen arreste-d for stealing motorcycles in llorin*  **Abiodun Fagbemi**  21/01/2015  *GUARDIAN*  ***388*** |
| ‘A Lagos State Court … has found a salesman, Azeez Williams guilty of stealing and sentenced him to three years imprisonment’ | ‘Three men, who allegedly broke into an office … carted away items valued at N180,000 … charged before an Ikeja Chief Magistrates’Court’ | ‘The senior Judge, Mr Garba, convicted Yakubu after he pleaded guilty to the charge.  The prosecutor, CPI. Paul Anigbo, told the court that one Badamasi… lodged the complaint at the Lugbe Police Station’ | ‘The Delta State Police Command has arrested a 33-year-old man,Fest-us Okenedu … in the murder and theft of a honda car belonging to a lawyer, Emmanuel Agwat’ | ‘Yemisi arraigned in an Abule Egba Magistrates’Court in Lagos’ | ‘An 18-year-old student,Tobi Osho … docked at an Abule Egba Magistrates’ Court in Lagos’ | ‘The Insp.Roman Unuigbe, told the Court that the accused committed the offence on Nov.4, at about 6pm at No.36, Cocoa Road, Ogba, Lagos’ | ‘The prose-cutor told the court that the accused …illegally entered the premises of the Ketu Police Statio-n and stole 50 litres of petrol’ | ‘Sunday J…arraigned in a Badagry Chief Magistrates’ Court for allegedly stealing ATM card’ | ‘Kwara State Police Command has arrested three suspected Fulani herdsmen, who specialise in using rearing sticks to snatch motorcycles from unsuspecting people’ |
| *Azeez Williams* | *Atuwase Oluwaseun, Gabriel Mell, and Segun Kolapo* | *Usman Yakubu* | *Festus Okenedu* | *Yemisi Lawal* | *Tobi Osho* | *Ibrahim Maradesa, Oluwatoyin Salau, and Jerry Idenudia* | *‘Okad-a rider’Abiol-a S.* | *Sunday Jerry* | *Abdullahi Gani* |
| Conspiracy and stealing | Conspiracy, burglary and stealing | Theft | Theft and murder | Stealing and causing a breach of peace | Conspiracy and stealing | Conspiracy and stealing | Steali-ng | Stealing | Stealing |
| ‘Three years imprisonment without option of fine  \*That the convict’s landed property shall be confiscated and disposed of forthwith to restitute the crime against the complainant’ | ‘Bail in the sum of N100,000 each and two sureties’ | ‘12 months imprisonment/option to pay a N15,000 fine’ | Arrest | ‘Arraigne-d and granted the accuse bail in the sum of N750,000 with two sureties in like sum’ | ‘Docked and granted bail in the sum of N20,000 and a surety in like sum’ | Bail of N500,000 each, with two sureties in like sum | ‘Bail in the sum of N50,000 with one surety in like sum’ | ‘Arraigned, granted bail in the sum of N50,000 with a surety who must provide evidence of tax payment to the Lagos State Government’ | ‘Arrested  \*Would soon be charged to court’ |
| Mrs. Adenike Balogun | Mr. Biggs Woltop | Badamasi Usman | Emmanuel Agwatu | Mrs Rose Ibini | Ifesowap-o Community Secondary School | Konga | Ketu Police Statio-n | Mr. Adesola Folayegbe | Kareem Masih and Ibrahim Masih  Suleiman A. |

## TABLE 4. C

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| *Man confesses to stealing generator blames ‘difficult’ times*  15/03/2016  *SUN*  ***212*** | *Lagos pastry seller, sister-in-law bag 2 years each for N3.2m theft*  23/04/2016  *SUN*  ***428*** | *Abia police parades prophet who specialises in stealing Toyota Camry cars*  **Chuks Onuoha**  11/08/2016 | *2 men docked in Lagos for alleged break-in,N312,000 property theft*  9/05/2016  ***211*** | *2 men bag 12 strokes of cane for stealing car battery*  17/05/2016  ***190*** | *3 men bag 10 months imprisonment, 10 lashes each for theft*  **NAN**  9/08/2016  ***302*** | *Police arrest 168 suspects in Oyo*  **Oluseye Ojo**  03/11/2016  **1,974** | *Foreign-er dupes salesgirl N976,000 worth of wrapper, shoes*  **NAN**  25/04/2016  ***526*** | *Nigerian Air Force parades 6 for stealing arms*  **Abel BillyGraham**  15/09/2016  ***299*** | *Navy arrest six oil thieves, even as militants threaten*  11/09/2016  ***1,195*** |
| ‘According to the prosecutor… the accused confessed committing the offence’ | ‘The Court finds and holds … that the charge of conspiracy and stealing have been proved beyond reasonable doubt’ | ‘Prophet Chibunnam Onyeweaku was yesterday paraded in Umuahia … by the new Abia State commissioner of Police for allegedly stealing a Toyota Camry’ | ‘Two men who allegedly broke into a house and stole personal effects and money valued at N312,000 were … charged before an Apapa Magistrates’ Court’ | ‘A Jos Magistrates’ Court on Tuesday ordered two men … be given 12 strokes of the cane’ | ‘A Gudu Upper Area Court on Tuesday sentenced three men to 10 months in prison’ | ‘Oyo State Police command to vigorously fight crimes and criminality in the state  \*Men of the command arrested 168 suspects of various offences’ | ‘Hassanat-u Abdullah-i on Monday told a Gudu Upper Area Court, Abuja how … Mah Kamara duped her wrapper and shoes valued N976,000 … arraigned on a one-charge of theft’ | ‘The Nigerian Air Force has paraded six men for allegedly stealing and selling rifles and ammunitions belonging to it’ | ‘The director of information of the Nigerian Navy, Commodore Christian Ezekobe … said that six of the suspects were arrested during a raid’ |
| *Mohammed Sani* | *Oluwakemi Efunkeye and Funmilola Okewole* | *Prophet Chibunnam Onyenweaku and Pastor Princewill Nwabugwu* | *Lukman Ganiyu and Jamiu Yusuf* | *Abubakar Kabiru and Adamu Yakubu* | *Patrick Okoro, Jude Okafor and Anthony Okoye* |  | *Mah Kamara* | *Mr. James E. Dauda, Saul Chamak, Yaro Philimon, Martins Bwara, and Tatula Moses* | *Mr. Enduran-ce Okogba Edirin* |
| *Trespass and theft* | Conspiracy and stealing | Stealing | Felony, burglary and stealing | Conspiracy and theft | Stealing | Fraud, unlawful possession of fake currency, impersonation, armed robbery, ritual | Theft | Stealing | Theft |
| ‘Sentenced to seven weeks imprisonment and an option of N7,000 fine’ | ‘One year imprisonment on the count of conspiracy and another one year on all the charges of stealing’ | Paraded | ‘Granted each of the accused a N150,000 with two sureties in like sum’ | 12 strokes of the cane | 10 lashes, and 10 months in prison | Arrested … still under investigation | ‘Arrested and charged to court’ | ‘Apprehended …handed over to the Department of State Security for further investigation’ | Arrested |
| *Miss Chibu-Ugwusor Lizzy* | Paymaster Bureau de Change |  |  | Foster Lawrence | Desmond Obelu |  | Hassanatu Abdullahi | The Nigerian Air Force | Federal Republic of Nigeria |