An Analysis of Governance Failure and Power Dynamics in International Sport: The Russian Doping Scandal

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# Introduction

A contemporary and recurring theme within sport policy and governance concerns the roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders within international sport. Central to these concerns are questions about who should be responsible for regulating and overseeing international sport? And who is responsible for sanctioning should failures occur? Furthermore, these issues are reflective of broader societal shifts from traditional hierarchical to increasingly networked governance arrangements (Rhodes, 1997). The shift from government to governance has been particularly evident within sport (Dowling et al., 2018; Grix, 2010; Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007; Winand & Anagnostopoulos, 2019). As a consequence, the international sport landscape has witnessed a rapid expansion of systemic governance structures in recent years and has become characterized by complexity and a multiplicity of actors (governmental, non-profit, and commercial) working at supra-national, national and sub-national levels (see Figure 1).

Previous studies have examined the nature and extent of changing governance arrangements within international sport (e.g. Chappelet, 2016; Geeraert Scheerder, & Bruyninchx., 2015; Jedlicka, 2018). Geeraert et al. (2015), for example, highlighted the implications of network governance arrangements on the autonomy of interational governing bodies. More recently, Jedlicka (2018) argued that international sport governance is an inherently political phenomenon that can be understood as a product of international political arrangements. However, few studies have examined underlying patterns of power that underpin the systemic governance of international sport or how these power dynamics lead to certain governing arrangements or particular outcomes (e.g. governance failure). This is surprising given the intense politics that characterize international sport and the series of recent governance failures involving the Fédération Internationale de Football Association, the International Association of Athletic Federation (IAAF) and International Weightlifting Federation. But perhaps the most egregious example of systemic governance failure within international sport is the Russian Doping scandal (henceforth RDS).

The RDS can best be described in three parts. First, the evidence shows that the Russian state devised a comprehensive doping programme utilizing the anti-doping apparatus (RusADA, the Moscow WADA accredited laboratory) and other mechanisms (Ministry of Sport, FSB, NGBs of sport, etc.) to enable selected elite Russian athletes to dope without detection. Second, investigations reveal that where the Russian doping manipulations were deficient in addressing detection via the athlete biological passport, Russian athletes and the Russian Athletic Federation paid bribes to the IAAF to ensure that these positive results were covered up. Third, while the Russian state devised and implemented the doping scheme, the key agents involved in the governance of international sport did more to fuel rather than quell the scandal, prioritising decisions (and non-decisions) that appeared to be more concerned about the interests of Russia and Russian athletes than they were clean sport, leading IOC doyen Richard Pound to refer to the scandal as a lingering issue for international sport (Pound, 2020, p. 3). Appendix 1 summarizes key events surrounding the case. For a more comprehensive overview see the Independent Person Reports (IP1, 2016; IP2, 2016).

Recent studies examining the RDS have focused on specific issues including media coverage (Denham, 2019), international relations (Altukhov & Nauright, 2018), sporting culture (Alexander et al., 2019), and legal implications (Cuffrey, 2018). There are few studies that have adopted a multi-level systems perspectives to investigate how and why the scandal occurred. Read et al. (2019), studied the motivations for the (in)decision-making by key actors such as WADA and the IOC. They argued that decisions were reactive and largely driven by a desire for enhanced legitimacy within international sport. Duval (2017) investigated the specific decisions made by CAS and showed that decisions were varied but favoured IFs who took a stronger approach to Russian athlete eligibility. This study aims to examine the power dynamics between various stakeholders involved in the RDS and to investigate how the power dynamics led to failings in the governance of international sport. To this end, we utilise governance theory and Bergsgard’s (2018) analytical framework of power to understand the case of the RDS. We argue that Bergsgard’s approach enables a multi-dimensional analysis of power relating to the behaviour and actions of key stakeholders involved in the systemic governance (failures) of international sport and helps explain the causes, key events and outcomes of the RDS.

--Figure 1 about here—

# Theoretical framework

While this study is directly concerned with analysing power in international sport, it is helpful to support this analysis with a brief overview of governance as it is the study of governance that generally approaches power as extending beyond and even distinct from the central authority of the state or the dominant governing authority (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010). Our study is guided by governance theory (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010; Grix, 2010) which assumes that the contours of the state-society relationship have fundamentally shifted and can be understood as *“*a new process of governing or “a changed condition of ordered rule” (Rhodes, 2007, p. 1246). Our analysis is therefore more closely aligned with the public administration definitions of political or systematic governance (Rhodes, 1996) rather than organisational governance (e.g. Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007; see Henry & Lee, 2004). Using this theory as a starting point, we argue that the international sport governance field is not hollowed-out but rather is a congested policy space (Skelcher, 2000) that demonstrates characteristics of ‘second wave’ notions of governance insofar as key stakeholders seek to reassert themselves through alternative mechanisms such as asymmetric power relations and the utilisation of the shadows of hierarchy and meta-governing arrangements (Dowling & Washington, 2017; Grix, 2010; Marsh, Richards & Smith, 2003).

In terms of its theoretical conceptualisation, the international sport governance field has been represented by overlapping ideas relating to systemic governance and network governance. The notion of systemic governance was initially coined by Leftwich (1994) as part of his three approaches to governance focusing on political, organisational and systemic governance. While each component has a specific ‘governance’ orientation, they also interact dialetically to influence outcomes. Henry and Lee (2004) applied systemic governance to the international sport context to demonstrate the requirement for competition, copperation and mutual adjustment between stakeholders in policy systems, as well as emphasise the importance of relationships between actors, the distribution of political and economic power, and the rules by which the system are governed (Leftwich, 1993). Ideas about network governance evolved from previous studies focused on policy communities and networks (Rhodes, 1988; Jordan, 1990) that have tended to give focus to stakeholders, interactions and complexity, institutional features, and processes used to manage networks. In its application to international sport, network governance was used to address the complexity of relations between myriad stakeholders (Chappelet, 2016). Network governance has been argued to provide an apposite framework for international sport as it provides a holistic framework to consider both the interests of, and interactions between, the range of different stakeholders involved in the network (Geeraert, Scheerder & Bruyninchx, 2013). In addition to these approaches, Ostrom and his colleagues’ ideas about polycentric governance systems would seem to have utility in analyzing the governance of international sport. While we are unaware of any previous work that applies these ideas to international sport, the key tenets of the framework are highly relevant to international sport insofar as the key focus is on systems “that consist of many centres of decision which are formally independent of one another” (Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961, p. 831).

A central concept within governance theory is that of power, in that to govern, particularly in a polycentric system, requires the ability, regardless of whether it is exercised, of an actor(s) to enact authority over others. Adopting governance as our organising framework steers us towards issues regarding the location of power, the extent to which there has been a shift in the locus of power, as well as the nature and form of relationships that exist between actors. These questions are central to understanding the changing nature of governance arrangements within modern societies and how these arrangements impact and influence sport. Governance theory is employed herein as a broader lens by which to frame our analysis of the RDS. The perspective’s shortcoming is that it more accurately “refers to a proto-theory but remains basically a set of observations looking for a more comprehensive theory” (Pierre & Peters, 2000, p. 7). We therefore supplement this broader perspective with Bergsgard's (2018) conception of power which offers a more concrete analytical framework by which to examine power dynamics and governance failure within international sport.

In combining Lukes’ three dimensions of power (Lukes, 1974) and Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic capital, Bergsgard (2018) analytical framework identifies three inter-related analytical levels: direct/formal, institutionalized structure/informal, and symbolic/discursive. The direct/formal level most closely aligns with pluralist conceptions of power (e.g. Dahl, 1961) which involves the direct and formal exercising of power often through visible and transparent decision-making. This is similar to normative definitions of power which can be simply expressed as (A) has power over (B) to the extent that they can get (B) to do something that (B) would not otherwise do (Dahl, 1961). The second level refers to the institutional structure and informal decisions and power dynamics. Here, Bergsgard emphasizes the importance of structural arrangements, particularly within social fields i.e. networks of social relations, structured systems of social positions within which struggles take place over resources, stakes and access (Bourdieu, 1990), which both enable and constrain the ability of actors to set agendas. This second level of power is evident when (B) is prevented by (A) from bringing to the fore any issues that might be detrimental to (A). The third, level is symbolic or discursive power. This is a deeper-level of power which involves shaping the preferences of actors often through largely invisible means or as a consequence of consistent narrative or storylines. This dimension of power can be formally stated as: (A) socializes and moulds (B) to have the same preferences as (A).

A crucial feature of Bergsgard’s framework is the recognition that each level interacts with and reinforces other levels in the pursuit of specific outcomes. This is particularly important in understanding the structural arrangements and power dynamics surrounding the RDS. The strength of Bergsgard (2018) analytical framework is its account of political and institutional processes and the power-relations within policy networks focusing on “*how* and *why* certain structures emerge, and … what takes place within these structures” (Bergsgard, 2018, pp. 654-655). Importantly, Bergagard’s framework does not aim to offer a full Bourdieusian analysis. Instead, the framework focuses on the conjunction of symbolic power as an example of Lukes’ third dimension of power. We argue that this approach, specifically adopting second wave conceptions of governance alongside Bergsgard’s framework, is valuable as it provides a comprehensive and original conceptual framework to analyse varied dimensions of power in international sport, expose how these dimensions interact, and demonstrate how historical and current structural arrangements in the field influence outcomes.

# Methods

This study is informed by a critical realistic perspective (Bhaskar, 1978) which assumes that reality exists independently and that unobservable structures cause observable events. Consistent with critical realism, we take the view that individuals do not have the ability to control structure, but can shape it and are enabled and constrained by it (Bhaskar, 1998). Our analysis is supported by secondary empirical data collected from January 2014 to June 2019. We specify these dates primarily to clarify our analytical timeframe recognizing that the scandal continues to unfold. The empirical dataset comprised documentation including organisational reports (e.g. IOC taskforce, independent commission reports), press releases, and interview transcripts, as well written testimony from key whistleblowers. The independent commission reports contained detailed testimonial accounts of coaches, athletes and administrators – all of which were included within the present analysis. In total, the dataset included 21 documents comprising of 1907 pages. See Appendix 2 for a full list of data sources. In addition, newspaper reports were also included, particularly where such articles gave details of direct quotes from sports officials. These artefacts have not been included in the table of documents, but details of these sources are referenced throughout the paper. Congruent with the Qualitative Documental Analysis (QDA) approach, we recognize these documents are socially constructed artefacts “provid[ing] a mechanism and vehicle for understanding and making sense of social and organizational practices” (Coffey, 2014, p. 367). Collectively, these documents not only provide a detailed account of the events surrounding the scandal, but they also provide an insight into the intentions and practices of key stakeholders and reveal the underlying power dynamics and governing arrangements within international sport.

All data were subject to QDA which most closely aligned with Altheide (1996). We employed this approach as it enables researchers to go beyond a traditional content analysis to examine contextual matters such as the meaning of the framing and of the language employed with the key documents. The analysis of the documents followed a four stage process. First, all documents were read and coded using the principle of open coding “to examine, break-down and compare the data” the key data (Straus & Corbin, 1990, p. 61). Next, the open coding was critically interrogated through a recursive and reflexive approach that involved the consideration of context, process and emergent meaning – with particular attention to the language used and the socially constructed nature of the text. This process of open coding was followed by an inductive analytical approach with an emphasis on identifying and exploring the power dynamics between various stakeholders and their consequences for international sport. Finally, Bergsgard’s analytical framework was deductively applied to the empirical data to identify instances of Bergsgard’s three levels of power focusing on explaining not only *why* the RDS occurred but *how* certain events occurred and under *what* conditions. In short, while more broadly framed by QDA, our approach to thematic analyses can be said to mirror Charmaz’s (2006) open and focused coding approach. The open coding was detailed and provided a clear impression of the data. The focused coding emphasised those elements of the data that made most analytical sense to Bergsgard’s framework and the overarching aims of the paper.

# The Russian doping scandal

The following analysis emphasises the dynamic processes that influence the structures and relations between stakeholders and considers “the power relations that influence social conditions” (Bergsgard, 2018, p. 662), the processes that legitimise or justify power, and how history constitutes the norms of the field and reproduces the structures of power within it.

## Causes and preconditions

In analysing the causes and preconditions of the RDS, using Bourdieu’s conception of power, it is necessary to consider the field as it represents the space of forces and struggles that guide how agents and groups think, act and take various positions (Bourdieu, 1992). When applied to the RDS, the field reveals the problematic notion of democratic governance (Skelcher, 2005) in overlapping fields of authority such as international sport governance and Russian sport policy. International sport subsumes Russian sport although Russian sport remains distinct and autonomous insofar as it has its own structures and governing arrangements that connect to and interrelate with international structures. In this way, the polycentric structures of international sport expose two overlapping fields, the Russian sport policy field and the international sport governance field. It is these two fields and the interaction between them that have enabled the scandal. Each of these fields represents a socially constructed space heavily influenced by historical social forces and cultural struggles. Thus, in examining the Russian sport policy field, attention must be given to the deep, historical structures of influence that have moulded Russian sport. Similarly, in the case of the international sport governance field, it is important to identify the structural conditions of the field as these conditions shape the norms, beliefs and actions of agents in the field (Bourdieu, 1992).

## The Russian sport policy field

The Russian state and the USSR previously have a well-documented history of exploiting sport to strengthen the symbolic power of the state and reinforce its legitimacy. Under Stalin, the official promotion of elite sport began in the 1930s (Hoberman, 1993) and was refined in the post-second world war era to facilitate Soviet cultural diplomacy (Riordan, 1988), reinforce Soviet identity (Allison & Tomlinson, 2017) and demonstrate superiority of communism over capitalism (Edelman, 1993). Even during the break-up of the Soviet Union, sport played a significant role in reinforcing national authority in the newly formed nations, which was very different to the experience of other communist regimes where elite sport was not viewed to be indigenous and thus provoked apathy and resentment (Riordan, 1993). More recently, under Putin’s leadership, the exploitation of sport to achieve political ends has continued unabated. Sport is used to cultivate Russian nationalism, evoke ideas about Russian supremacy, and ultimately demonstrate Russia’s greatness (Arnold, 2018). These intentions reveal the dialectical nature of the state – sport relationship in Russia. Sport is used as a form of symbolic capital to reassert the power of the state (Bourdieu, 1992). The reproduction of this capital has allowed the state to normalise strategies and values within the Russian sport policy field to win by any means necessary.

Symbolic dominance of this type transcends Bergsgard’s first and second dimensions of power, and in many respects is more enduring than domination based on a transactional exchange (Bergsgard, 2018). Symbolically, being a great power epitomises Russian identity (Prizel, 1998). Sport continues to dominate as an ideological device demonstrating, in Putin’s words, that “either Russia will be great, or it will not be at all” (Shevtsova, 2003, p. 175). These words likely adopted a newfound significance due to Russia’s very poor performance at Vancouver, 2010 and the need for medals at the Sochi, 2014 Games. Thus, the deep social embeddedness of Russia’s greatness (Prizel, 1998), together with notions of American-led, anti-Russian propaganda (Kramer, 2016), the denial of any state involvement in the doping of Russian athletes (Panja, 2019), and the narrative that all nations cheat (Ruiz, 2016) provides a powerful combination to legitimise state-sponsored doping.

Before the 1980s the central government (then the Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union), dictated the structure of the Russian sport policy field and the behaviour of the athletes within it. This included the Russian state’s “production, testing, monitoring and administering of performance-enhancing drugs in athletes” (Riordan, 1993, p. 255) and its intentional strategy to condemn the West’s reliance on drugs, while concealing its own far more extensive doping programme. Such actions illustrate how history constitutes norms and solidifies particular field-level conditions by producing enduring structures that continue to influence behaviour in Russia. The Russian state strategy to dope is not only accepted but is expected. Fundamentally, these field conditions resulted in many Russian athletes being guided by a deep cultural capital that emphasises Russia’s greatness. Athletes know, recognise and give value to the concept of greatness as it is “inscribed in the structure of the distribution” of socio-cultural capital in Russia (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 8). Such ideas are sharpened when coupled with Putin’s politics of victimhood which enable the government to keep citizens in a permanent sense of crises over fabricated foreign threats (Snyder, 2019). In short, greatness, winning and, doing whatever is necessary to achieve these ends, particularly as a victim or underdog is an integral feature of the structural conditions across the Russian sport policy field and a dominant influence on Russian athlete behaviour. Athlete actions though do not merely reflect compliance with the state but rather a deep-set relationship where conduct is consistent with the state’s ideals of ‘proper conduct’ (kul’turnost) (Zeller, 2011, p. 63). Additionally, the state’s symbolic power is reinforced by the first and second dimensions of power, whereby athletes know that if they want to be on the team, they do what the coach and the team requires, therefore; you dope or you leave (Stepanov, 2017). The Russian state also shape the agenda through their ongoing denial of state-led doping and their publicly-shared view that doping is ubiquitous and that all nations conspire in differing schemes looking for a competitive edge. We argue that these intertwining examples of power have proven robust in cultivating a Russian elite sport culture that legitimises whatever is necessary to demonstrate Russian greatness.

## The international sport governance field

The RDS case also exposes the structural conditions in the international sport governance field that have enabled agents to exercise power to prioritise their interests over those of the principal (i.e. the principal-agent problem). Three specific conditions, the autonomy of sport, the lack of true democracy, and the conflicts of interests in the governing of international sport have contributed to and escalated the scandal.

First, the international sport governance field relies on a network of intricate interdependencies predicated on ubiquitous but unequal power often with limited external oversight (Marsh et al., 2003). Here, the notion of *Lex Sportiva* (the autonomy of sport) is firmly rooted in the doctrines of Olympism. In international sport, autonomy is a form of cultural capital, created by sport in the early 1900s and vehemently sustained to this day, to enable sport to manage its own affairs and to protect it from external interference. The principle of autonomy means that the field is entirely reliant upon each agent in the field being accountable and fulfilling their regulatory responsibilities. The RDS exposes the problems with such governing arrangements. For example, between 2010 and 2014, the WADA leadership played on the asymmetries of power in the international sport governance field, using their influence and agenda-setting capabilities to avoid investigating the case. They could maintain this position, with little scrutiny inside or outside the field, until the media, sponsors, athletes and spectators challenged their inaction. Equally concerning is the inaction of other members of the international sport network (including the IOC) who either remained unaware of the allegations or chose to ignore them.

Second, the international sport governance field reflects a ‘polycentric system of governance’ (Ostrom et al., 1961) whereby centres of decision-making are independent from one another. International sport has multiple governing agents at sub-national (e.g. state/county associations, clubs, colleges, schools), national (e.g. NOCs, NGBs), supranational (e.g. continental associations, regional games), and international (e.g. IOC, IFs, WADA, CAS) levels. Polycentric systems are challenged by democracy due to questions regarding which representatives should be involved in what decision-making structures and to whom such bodies should be accountable (Black, 2008). We see this not only in the strategically managed process of co-opting IOC and IF members (Jennings, 1996), but also in WADA co-opting loyal and high-ranking IOC members. More surprisingly, we witness the re-election of certain candidates such as Craig Reedie in 2016, despite widespread criticisms of his leadership (Ruiz, 2016). History shows that the IOC representatives on WADA are likely selected and co-opted because they share the same views as the dominant power(s) in order to function within the overarching hegemon of Olympic sport (Jennings, 1996). More practically, sport representatives tend to remain members for much longer (than governmental representatives), thus accumulating experience and understanding of how WADA works.

The third condition relates to “the competing conceptions of ‘the good’ that should be pursued” (Black, 2008, p. 141) in the international sport governance field. Often, for senior administrators ‘the good’ (somewhat ironically) appears to be a choice between promoting or policing sport. For clarity, WADA’s problem is exacerbated by the co-opted nature of representation, where the Foundation and Executive Boards comprise 50% sport and 50% government appointees. This lack of independence in WADA’s structures stress the inherent conflicts of interest: “It’s likely the entire Russian state-supported doping scandal would have been exposed much sooner… had its [WADA’s] governance not been hamstrung by its own lack of true independence” (Tygart, 2020, p. 7). This lack of independence enables IOC and IFs to use the cultural meanings and ideals of the Olympics and project it as a force for good, one which prioritizes the furtherance of humankind (IOC, 2019). In this way, co-opted agents such as Reedie guide the agenda and direct decisions (or non-decisions) in the field to preserve the norms and values (in this case, the theoretical notion of Olympism and the brand value and revenues associated with it) that are inextricable features of the field. In addition, the attitudes and actions of agents operating in the international sport governance field, especially in IFs, is moderated by the influence of large, dominant nations (such as Russia):

The [IFs] reliance upon Russia creates a real conflict of interest when they must impose sanctions on Russian athletes or national federations. Surprisingly few of the IFs have acted on the basis of the data provided to them by WADA (Pound, 2020).

## Key events, actions and inactions

**The state coordination of the doping programme:** The Russian doping programme comprised five elements: the development of a drug to shorten the window of detectability; a disappearing positive methodology whereby dirty urine was switched for clean; a targeted doping regimen where the Russian Ministry of Sport decided who to save and quarantine; the manipulation of athletes’ analytical results or swapped samples with support from the FSB, the Centre for Sport Preparation and the Russian anti-doping laboratory; and payments to the IAAF to facilitate losing or delaying the investigation of potential doping violations. The programme was elaborate, utilising both governmental as well as anti-doping structures:

The Moscow Laboratory … was a key player in the successful operation of a state imposed and rigorously controlled program, which was overall managed and dictated by the Ministry of Sport. The laboratory was the vital cog in a much larger machine that was state run (IP Report 1, 2016, p.29).

The Russian Ministry of Sport maintained tight control over the programme, using a range of tactics that not only reflect all three dimensions of power but also reveal how the dimensions reinforce one another to achieve certain outcomes (Bergsgard, 2018). First, the Russian state cultivated a robust strategy of legitimacy within the Russian sport policy field by fully utilising all three types of authority as the basis for legitimation (Weber, 1968). For example, the Russian Ministry and the laboratory worked in a system of rules whereby the Ministry dictated what will be done and how, because of its *formal, legal authority* as government. The laboratory staff knew to follow orders because “if they did not, they would no longer be employed there” (IP Report 2, 2016, p. 30). The *traditional authority* of state apparatus such as the Ministry and FSB is emboldened by normative expectations, a deep-seated doxa, that such structures should, first and foremost, support the interests of the Russian state, an understanding that is embedded in the deep structures of influence (Riordan, 1981; 1993). Additionally, the state exploits *charismatic authority* by fashioning leaders that are perceived to have special qualities (e.g. Vitaly Mutko, Minister of Sport). Commonly, these leaders are well-connected in the domestic and international fields and have demonstrated personal devotion to the ruler (Weber, 1968). Thus, the direct and formal exercising of power enables the state to control and manipulate the decision-making agenda.

Here, the Russian state designed and coordinated a sophisticated scheme to deceive—re-purposing domestic structures, developing bespoke devices and paying off international agencies--to facilitate the process and to protect the state by concealing its involvement in the scheme:

It can be made to appear that the laboratory was acting alone. However, …it is correct to place the Moscow laboratory within the ambit of state control…The system was designed so that if its actions were revealed, the Moscow Laboratory could be jettisoned without damaging or revealing other parts of the drug cheating program (IP Report 1, 2016, p. 30).

The design features of the scheme and the ongoing denial of any state involvement in it provide a robust foundation upon which Russia could build its symbolic and discursive power. This was particularly the case at home, with Russian politicians and sport administrators crafting a narrative to shape preferences and reinforce ideas about anti-Russian sentiment, U.S. propaganda and Russia’s ideology of victimhood, and the common assertion that all countries dope.

This [the allegations of and investigations into doping in Russia] cannot be a foundation for building anti-Russia policy… We will strengthen the fight against doping (Vladimir Putin, Russian President, in Kramer 2016).

Russia’s [doping] problems are no worse than any other countries, but whatever we do, everything is bad (Vitaly Mutko, Minister of Sport, in Moscow Times, 2015).

The notion of doping being ubiquitous was not only advanced through direct quotes such as those of Mutko (above), but also by the invisible hand of the state via the cyber espionage group commonly known as *Fancy Bear* (also known as APT28). This group organised several cyber-attacks on WADA, The U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, CAS and IAAF, shortly after the publication of the IP1 Report. These attacks appear to have been targeting athletes with therapeutic use exemptions to help strengthen the narrative that all nations cheat, the only difference being the methods employed. Russian politicians continued to deny any Russian involvement in the cyber-attacks: “How can you prove that the hackers are Russian? You blame Russia for everything, it’s very fashionable now” (Vitaly Mutko in Hartog, 2016). More recently, the ~~U.S.-based~~ Mueller investigation has confirmed that *Fancy Bear* is Unit 26165 and Unit 74455 of the Russian military intelligence agency (Mueller, 2019).

The Russian state used a range of tactics to give it a competitive edge and to achieve Putin’s vision of Russia as a great power. In Sochi, the tactics paid off with Team Russia dominating the medal tables at both the Olympic and Paralympic Games. However, serious allegations of state coordinated doping were expressed with Russia accused of using a number of audacious tactics (e.g. cyber espionage, data manipulation, corruption, bribery, and death threats) to conceal the scheme, normalise athlete behaviour, and quieten its accusers. Such direct acts of power reinforce the symbolic power of the state, pulling on its multiple properties of capital and its motivation to show Russian greatness. Even in the face of significant evidence, global attention and a range of sport-related sanctions, the state remain resolute in their denial of involvement in the scheme and their right to continue participating in international sport.

**Allegations and investigations:** The allegations and investigations and how key actors addressed them expose the deeply politicised nature and asymmetrical power relations that characterise the international sport governance field (Marsh et al., 2003). A striking feature is the initial inability or unwillingness of WADA to investigate the allegations of widespread, state-supported doping violations in Russia. While allegations dated back to 2010, WADA did not investigate until December 2014. The first reports of systemic doping emerged in February 2010 when RUSADA’s Education Officer, Vitaly Stepanov, began communicating with WADA staff about his experiences of a doping culture in Russia. In January 2013 his wife, Yuliya Stepanova, an elite 800m Russian Athletics team member, joined him. Yulia collected video and audio recordings to secure evidence to support the allegations. At a similar time, Darya Pischalnikova, a Russian discus thrower and silver medallist at London 2012, contacted WADA revealing details of systematic doping scheme (Ruiz, Macur & Austen, 2016). Adding to this, UK-based journalists Nick Harris and Martha Kelner were reporting serious concerns to WADA about doping in Russian athletics based on evidence provided by Russian athletics coach, Oleg Popov (Harris, 2016).

WADA’s delayed response can be viewed as an attempt to keep the ‘problem’ of Russian athletics off the agenda, a problem that they would rather not have to deal with. Officially, WADA’s justification for not investigating sooner was based upon its jurisdiction, purpose, and resources. WADA claimed that it had no legitimate power as the WADC did not require compliance from signatories, including governments. Differences in opinion regarding WADA’s purpose were neatly captured by David Howman, the Executive Director of WADA stating that “we don’t want to be the police, we can’t be the police”, and Travis Tygart, CEO of the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, arguing that “[f]or WADA to sit on the side-lines in the face of such allegations flies in the face of WADA’s mandate from sport, governments and clean athletes” (Ruiz, Macur & Austen, 2016, np). The WADA leadership also stressed WADA’s lack of resources to carry-out investigations (WADA, 2015).

Besides these arguments, more insidious field conditions contribute to the deep-structures of influence that guide agent behaviour in the international sport governance field. For example, Russia, and the former USSR enjoy considerable influence within international sport circles since their entry into the Olympics in 1952 (Riordan, 1981). Craig Reedie, in his dual role as WADA President and IOC Vice President, has cultivated close ties with Russian members of the Olympic family such as Minister Mutko and other influential Russian politicians and senior administrators. And, there have been accusations of the WADA President placing greater priority on perception over substance, “Reedie wanted to monitor media traffic to see if allegations were gaining momentum or dying down, so maybe we wouldn’t have to investigate” (Epstein, 2016, n.p.). The definitive reason why Reedie would not sanction an investigation earlier than he did remains unclear. It is possible that the concerns about jurisdiction, purpose and resources were genuine. It is equally plausible that these concerns were not the overriding issue or were merely a narrative crafted to justify inaction and aimed at protecting sport from reputational damage.

The decision to investigate Russia did not appear to require approval from the WADA’s Committee structures. Instead, the decision lay directly in the hands of the President. Such visible (although not necessarily transparent) decision-making reflects the centralized, hierarchical patterns of power within WADA, causing the WADA Investigations Team a major problem as they knew that the President was unlikely to sanction an investigation, unless he was compelled to do so (Robertson, 2018). Consequently, Jack Robertson (Chief Investigations Officer, WADA) introduced the Stepanov’s to Hajo Seppelt and the ARD documentary team. This eventually led to the ARD documentary and played a critical role in changing perceptions about the problem, giving WADA a more supportive global environment, and ultimately compelling the WADA President to act. Ten days after the documentary aired, WADA had created the Independent Commission. This situation and specifically the need for mass public media exposure, reveals the “deep underlying patterns of control” (Dowling & Washington, 2018, p. 2) and the asymmetries of power (Marsh et al., 2003) that dominate the international sport governance network. Governance arrangements such as these reinforce ideas about asymmetrical network governance (Marsh et al., 2003) whereby governance arrangements maintain a hierarchical order, but this order can be disrupted through the use of devices (e.g. the media) to shift the goals and interests of the governing authority.

The findings of the Independent Commission largely corroborated the whistle-blower allegations, without confirming Russian government involvement in the doping programme. Despite the ongoing investigations, WADA President Craig Reedie wrote to the Russian Ministry, to offer support as evidenced in an email from Reedie dated April 30, 2015: “It is my view that the content of the television programmes was based on a period that pre-dates the changes in legislation and the investment in RusADA that have been made” (Harris, 2015). Perhaps the email was an attempt to maintain positive relations with powerful players in international sport or just naivety regarding the strength of evidence that the investigation (and others) was unearthing. Other parts of the same email demonstrate the importance of personal relationships across the international sport governance network, particularly between government ministers and the high ranking sport officials:

I value the relationship that I have with Minister Mutko and I shall be grateful if you will inform him that there is no intention in WADA to do anything to affect that relationship… I assure you that WADA is in no way adverse to all the efforts that are being made in Russia to protect clean athletes (Reedie, in Harris, 2015).

Deeper laying suspicions about the motives and intentions underpinning the WADA President’s actions were heightened when evidence of him sharing a handwritten note with IAAF Vice President, Sergei Bubka emerged, raising awareness of the ARD documentary and stating that “[I] hope no damage will be done”. Reedie’s concern is not focused on the veracity of the documentary or the nature of the problem itself but on maintaining loyalties within the international sport governance field (Daly, 2016).

At the 2015 WADA Foundation Board meeting, Reedie was again either unwilling or unable to allow WADA to further investigate suspicions of a wider doping programme across Russia. In response to the Chair of the WADA Athletes Council, Beckie Scott, Reedie stated that “it would be quite difficult to agree round [sic] the table to investigate all sports all round the world” (WADA, 2015). The sequence of events following this mirror those detailed above. To clarify, there were further allegations of systemic doping across a number of sports in Russia from Grigory Rodchenkov and the Stepanovs. Again, high profile media (CBS 60 minutes and the New York Times) were used as high-impact devices to break the story to the international media, sponsors, athletes and spectators to pressure WADA to act, triggering further WADA- and IOC- led investigations. This time around, the scale of the deceit and the weight of supporting evidence, meant that WADA, the IOC and others had to take punitive action.

**Outcomes and consequences:** On July 24, 2016, the IOC rejected WADA’s recommendation to ban Russia. Instead, the IOC imposed limited criteria for entry on Russian athletes and delegated authority for qualification to the IFs. The IOC maintained that their decision reflected their commitment to natural justice, an argument that fits neatly with notions of Olympism and the symbolic cultural capital that undergirds it. Historically, this narrative is inconsistent with the IOC’s actions in sanctioning nations because of political inference (e.g. Afghanistan, Benin, Iraq, India, and Kuwait). In these instances, the IOC has cared less about natural justice and more about sending a clear message that political interference in sport will not be tolerated. Such inconsistencies add substance to accusations that the IOC’s decision was strongly influenced by Russia’s historical prominence in the international sport governance field, and, more specifically, Thomas Bach’s close relationship with Putin (Gibson, 2016). Another explanation for the IOC’s decision is grounded in the principle of symbolic power and, in particular, the need for the IOC to be seen to demonstrate and reassert its dominance as the supreme authority within the new governing arrangements within international sport.

In short, the IOC’s response can be seen as calculated, designed to re-direct blame and delegate authority (Pound, 2020). Their response was delivered through a narrative focusing on three elements. First, WADA were responsible for the mess, a consequence of delayed intervention, poorly timed recommendations, and incomplete investigations. Second, the IOC decision was inclusive, judicially appropriate and, according to Bach, avoided the ill-conceived "nuclear option… that would have resulted in death and destruction” (Ruiz, 2016). Third, the response enabled the IOC to preserve notions of legitimate authority by delegating the decision to each sport and maintain positive relations with the Russian political establishment. ~~In sum,~~ The IOC’s response not only underlines WADA’s lack of power but also reasserts its own role as a meta-governing actor within international sport (Wagner, 2009). Interestingly, the IOC’s response was supported by all IFs, with the exception of the IAAF and the IWF who issued bans for the respective Russian team. This was unsurprising given the histories of athletics and weightlifting, their relationship with the Russian doping case, and the evidence of doping among Russian athletes in these sports. The IPC also issued a complete ban on the RPC, a decision that was perhaps made easier by the lack of historical relations between the IPC and RPC, and the fact that the Paralympics, while growing in prominence and interest, very much operates in the shadows of the Olympic Games.

Following the Rio Games, the WADA Independent Observers’ report highlighted serious failings in anti-doping processes including 36% of athletes competing in Rio 2016 not being tested including athletes in high risk sports and an overall lack of coordination from the Rio 2016 team regarding anti-doping matters (WADA, 2016). Despite these significant problems, the IOC stated that “[T]he IO report shows that it was a successful Olympic Games with a successful anti-doping program” (Bull, 2016). Later that year, the IOC Disciplinary Commission reports strengthened the perception of the IOC’s firm but fair treatment of Russia stating that the IOC (i) reversed the rule of presumption of innocence for the Russian athletes, and (ii) did not act on Russia itself as the Ministry is beyond the reach of the IOC, thus it was left to UNESCO and WADA to take further measures under the UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport and the WADA Code (IOC, 2017). This narrative demonstrates the IOC’s ‘double-speak’ capabilities and reflects their prioritisation of perception and how to manage the perception of a wide range of stakeholders in the international sport governance field (not least broadcasters, sponsors and fans). These capabilities are supported by the IOC’s symbolic power which enable it to shape the decision-making agenda and how such decisions are framed, which in turn, protects the IOC and preserves their own dominance. Importantly, such manipulations of truth do not suggest a new, post-truth reality, but rather emphasise the enduring structures that have historically guided the IOC’s behaviour (Jennings, 1996).

The WADA IP reports, and the subsequent IOC Disciplinary Commissions eventually led the IOC to take authoritative action in advance of the PyeongChang winter games. They suspended the ROC, excluded Russian politicians and officials from international Olympic events and structures, required a $15M payment to cover costs and a contribution to the new Independent Testing Authority, and provided a pathway for clean Russian athletes to participate as an ‘Olympic Athlete from Russia’. The IOC Executive Board also extended powers to the IOC to invite individual Russian athletes where the “invitation list will be determined, at its absolute discretion by a panel chaired by the Chair of the Independent Testing Authority” (IOC, 2017). This decision enabled the IOC to continue to exclude Russian athletes despite the CAS overturning the IOC bans on 28 athletes because of insufficient evidence.

The IOC’s decision prior to PyeongChang was remarkably different to their inaction prior to Rio. Part of the reason for this may be practical insofar as the IOC had over a year to prepare for the PyeongChang outcome (and consider potential sanctions for a winter games), whereas in Rio (and the potential sanctions for the more prestigious and financially valuable summer games) they had less than three weeks. There was also the imposition of the WADA recommendation at Rio, in contrast to PyeongChang, where the IOC utilised its own structures to frame the problem, review investigations, and to formulate sanctions. The IOC’s coordination efforts provide an apposite example of symbolic relations, where history and hierarchy normalise structures of power, and agents unknowingly comply with the ruling elite as a part of the structural order of the field. This behaviour is entirely counter to their attempt to delegate and diffuse as seen prior to Rio. This is likely because of the significance of the evidence contained within the EDP and the problem of public perception which changed dramatically between July 2016 and December 2017, largely due to the ongoing media reporting of disquiet among a relatively small coalition of clean sport reformers and the Academy Award winning documentary feature, *Icarus.* On this latter point, the world was now watching, and the IOC had to act. However, such actions do not suggest a zero-sum game, but rather reinforce ideas about a positive-sum, asymmetrical exchange relationship (Marsh et al., 2002) that exists between the IOC and the Russian state.

The WADC was also revised in November 2017 in response to the scandal, alongside a comprehensive compliance policy requiring signatories to comply with the WADC and empowering WADA to sanction non-compliance. This change signalled a notable transfer of authority in sport, shifting responsibility away from the IOC and giving it to WADA. While this change minimises the IOC’s problem of promoting and policing sport, the IOC still retains influence through its 50% funding and WADA board representation. However, this change in arrangements and moderate shift in power, cultivated through the IOC membership shaping the agenda, helps the IOC to avoid the messiness of scandals, reduces the potential for reputational damage, maintains strong diplomatic relations across nations, and exercises their authority to ensure that their symbolic power remains unscathed. During this time the athlete community were galvanising their struggle for clean sport, primarily driven by WADA’s lack of openness, lack of integrity, and its ineffective leadership:

WADA’s response to our voice has not been one that encourages discussion, nor is it of the same integrity, or respect that is the standard of the athlete community. The lack of courage to walk in the light leads to ineffective leadership. (Global Athletes, 2018).

In addition, the harshest criticism of WADA was reserved for its softening of the conditions and lifting sanctions placed on RusADA in September 2018 including removing the requirement for Russia to accept responsibility and deferring the requirement for the Moscow laboratory to submit its data files until December 2018. This decision was largely influenced by the back-channels of IOC influence and was problematic for anti-doping agencies, as illustrated by Travis Tygart: “Frankly, it stinks to high heaven” (Bishara, 2018) and Nicole Sapstead (CEO at the U.K. Anti-Doping Agency): “It is pretty much sticking two fingers up at the athletes and the organisations that work tirelessly on their behalf” (Ingle, 2018). The athlete Paula Radcliffe commented:

[WADA’s action] sets a precedent that when sanctions are imposed and conditions made, if the country is politically powerful and/or stubborn enough, then they will be rewarded with a watered-down version of the conditions required for re-admittance (Radcliffe in Reuters, 2018).

On December 9, 2019, WADA attempted to re-assert their authority by imposing new sanctions on Russia as a result of the manipulated data that the Moscow laboratory submitted as part of RusADA’s revised reinstatement conditions. These sanctions included a four year ban on athletes implicated in the doping or data manipulation, a ban on Russian officials attending major sports events or sitting on the boards of any code signatory, a ban on hosting major events, a ban on the Russian flag being flown at major sport events, and payment to cover on WADA’s costs associated with investigating the data manipulation plus a maximum of $100,000 fine. WADA’s decision widened the divisions across the international sport landscape. WADA emphasised that it had used its authority appropriately and that their decision “was the right line to draw” (WADA, 2019), replicating the IOC’s position in balancing natural justice with collective responsibility.

The overriding frustration of the clean sport reformers is the sense that WADA engaged in political skulduggery, while presenting the façade of protecting clean athletes and imposing firm but fair sanctions. The use of power here is an example of truth-shaping, whereby the highest ideals (e.g. justice) are used to obscure the more complex realities of the case and demonstrate the appropriateness of the decision. The strategy appears to be working. Publicly, the IOC have maintained an observational role, going only so far as publishing a statement suggesting that the sanctions were appropriate and that the file should be passed onto the UNESCO Interventional Convention for Doping in Sport. IF’s have been quiet with the exception of the IAAF who have retained the ban of the Russian Athletic Federation. The clean sport reformers coalition continue to be growing in number and in frustration drawing attention to the “broken” anti-doping system and “how Russia played WADA like fools” (Panja, 2019). More recently, this frustration has been exacerbated by the CAS decision in December 2020 in response to RUSADA’s appeal against the 2019 WADA-imposed sanctions. While, as one would expect, the CAS judgement was worded in such as way to suggest an objective and proportionate sanction (reflecting the nature and seriousness of the non-compliance and to ensure that the continuing fight against the scourge of doping is maintained, (CAS, 2020)), the much diluted sanctions from CAS were criticsed as bewildering (INADO, 2020), devastating (USADA, 2020), and “another dark day for clean sport” (Global Athlete/The Athletics Association, 2020, n.p.). It would appear that the only certainty in the future governance of this problem is that division and deceit will endure.

# Concluding remarks

The RDS exposes the ubiquitous yet concentrated nature of power relations across the international sport governance field. The field reinforces both Ostrom and colleagues (1961) early ideas about polycentric governance systems and Marsh et al’s (2003) ideas about asymmetrical power in governance reflecting structured inequality; emphasizing limited democracy and the IOC’s strong executive power; a plurality of stakeholders underpinned by asymmetrical exchange relationships; and maintaining a strong commitment to unity of voice directed by the IOC Executive. Ultimately, there is little evidence of IOC’s authority being hollowed out, but rather re-asserted through alternative arrangements and mechanisms (Marsh et al., 2003), including the political and resource-based influence of the IOC over WADA and IFs, the establishment of special CAS committees, the creation of the Oswald and Schmid Commissions, the revisions to the WADC, and the delegation of new powers to WADA. Through these mechanisms, the IOC governed so that individual and institutional conduct across the field is consistent with the IOC’s overarching objectives (Raco & Imrie, 2000). When there are disagreements or disputes, such as WADA’s recommendation regarding Russia’s participation in the Rio, 2016 Games, the IOC are willing and able to directly assert their authority to achieve outcomes that reflect their interests.

Our final remark concerns the problematic characteristics of the international sport governance field. These characteristics played an important role in moving the case from one that was about systemic cheating, to another that was not only about systemic cheating, but also about abuse of power and governance failure. Here, the lack of democracy, conflicts of interest, and the normative constitutional rule of *Lex Sportiva* in international sport provide an ideal set of conditions to enable the scandal to unfold. The case of the RDS also suggests that rather than seeing international sport as either a unitary or federated model of governance (O’Bolye, 2016) that international sport may be seen to accord with the principles of the polycentric system of governance (Ostrom, 1961; Ostrom, 2010; Carlisle & Gruby, 2019) as it gives explicit attention to the problematic notion of democratic governance, as authority is dispersed across separately constituted bodies with overlapping jurisdictions that do not stand in hierarchical relationship to each other (Skelcher, 2005, p. 89). Within this polycentric system, it is clear that the international sport governance field’s priority was managing perceptions. Their actions shadowed the changing circumstances of the case, a form of adaptive preference formation (Elster, 1983), where desires are trimmed to the circumstances of the case (see Figure 2) (Lukes, 1974). The response of the international sport governance field, influenced by the reality of non-sport international/diplomatic relations, had to be perceived as rational and fair. Further, the fact that the field can manage such situations with limited interference or oversight, insulates it from the norms of hierarchical authority and emboldens self-interest, where agents (such as the IOC) put their own interests above those of the principal (athletes). Here, the IOC carefully constructed storylines and narratives to justify its (in)action, usually emphasising the failure of others, the importance of natural justice and the proportionality of IOC action, together with the unreasonable expectations of principals who are critical of IOC (in)action.

**--Figure 2 about here—**

In evaluating the utility of Bergsgard's three-dimensional framework, whilst limited in its selective use of Bourdieu’s conceptualization of power, it offers strong explanatory value in unpicking the varied exercise of power in the RDS. In sum, the framework illuminates the IOC’s fear of losing Russia from the Olympic Games, and the implications that the fallout from the RDS may have for revenues (marketing and media), event attractiveness and the reputation of the Olympic Games. The framework also reveals how WADA was poorly positioned, politically and structurally, to take on such a major sport and diplomatic power. Indeed, the unwillingness of the WADA President to act required other WADA employees to secure media attention (the ARD documentary) in order to compel him to act. The framework was also helpful in articulating attempts by stakeholders to control the agenda surrounding the scandal and the sanctions imposed. Finally, the framework helped to locate the various normative ideologies of Russia, WADA, the IOC, and clean sport advocates as presented throughout the case. Here, Russia perpetuated an ideology or mythology of greatness despite being the underdog and victim. WADA, after the initial investigations, continued to promote ideas concerning clean sport as an unambiguous objective. The IOC used ideologies concerning natural justice and proportionality to justify the sanctions imposed on Russia. Clean sport advocates (e.g. Global Athletes, the Clean Sport Collective, and FairSport) cultivated ideas about new movements, athlete rights and rebalancing power to ensure that sport remains clean and fair. Indeed, if sustained, the athlete movement could provide a more resilient response to the lack of external oversight of the international sport governance field and embolden the struggle for outcomes that prioritize clean sport rather than other interests, Further, the position of athletes would likely be strengthened if other key stakeholders (e.g. broadcasters, sponsors, and spectators), took a closer interest in the decisions of the IOC and the motives that underpin their decisions.

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
Weber, M. 1968. *On charisma and institution building*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Zeller, M. 2011. “Our own Internationale”, 1966. *Kritika:* *Explorations in Russia and Eurasian History*, 12(1), 53-82.

# Figure 1: *The international sport governance field*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Regulatory agencies such as WADA, CAS, Swiss legal system, Other courts | | | |
| ANOC, ASOIF, AIOWF | | | |
| UN, UNESCO, EU, etc.. | IOC | International Federations (IF)  & Continental Associations | International marketing & media |
| National governments | NOCs | National Federations (NF) | National marketing & media |
| Regional/local governments | OCOGs | Clubs | Regional/local marketing & media |
| Professional leagues, Universities, Colleges and Schools | | | |
| Athletes, Coaches, Parents, Fans | | | |

# Figure 2: *The IOC’s adaptive preference formation in relation to RDS*



# Appendix 1: *Key milestones in the Russian doping scandal*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Time** | **Event type and description** |
| Feb, 2010-2014 | **Initial allegations.** Vitaly Stepanov reports allegations of systemic Russian doping to WADA. Ongoing allegations of Russian doping from variety of sources. |
| Feb, 2014 | **Winter Games, Sochi, Russia.** Russia dominate the medal table at Olympic Games (13 gold, 11 silver, 9 bronze) and Paralympic Games (30 gold, 28 silver, 22 bronze). |
| Dec, 2014 | **Media attention.** German broadcaster ARD airs *The Doping Secret: How Russia Makes its Winners.* |
| Dec, 2014 | **Investigations.** WADA announce creation of Independent Commission (IC) to investigate allegations (Pound Commission, chaired by Richard Pound). |
| Nov, 2015 | **Sanctions.** WADA IC publishes report finds widespread doping in Russian athletics and suspends RusADA with immediate effect. |
| Feb, 2016 | **Suspicious deaths.** Vyacheslav Sinev former RusADA Chair (3/2/16) and Nikita Kamaev former RusADA Executive Director (14-2-16) found dead after suggestions that they were to publish insights into their work at RusADA. |
| May, 2016 | **Media attention.** Further reports on CBS 60 minutes documentaty (8-5-16) and in New York Times article (12-5-16) alleging widespread state sponsored doping across multiple sports in Russia. |
| May, 2016 | **Investigations.** WADA announce creation of Independent Person (IP) to investigate allegations of state sponsored doping at Sochi 2014 and across multiple sports. |
| July, 2016 | **Recommendations.** Provisional IP report finds institutional manipulation of the doping process in Russia before, during and after the Sochi 2014 Games. WADA recommends that the IOC ban Russia from Rio, 2016. |
| July, 2016 | **Sanctions.** TheIOC ignores WADA’s recommendation and delegates decision on sanctions to IFs. IAAF already implemented total Russian ban (June 2016). IWF and IPC also impose total Russian ban. |
| July, 2016 | **Clean sport reformers response.** NADOs and athletes criticise the IOC failing to exercise their authority. |
| July, 2016 | **Investigations:** The IOC create Discplinary Commissions to continue to review the case post Rio, 2016. |
| July, 2016 | **Summer Games, Rio, Brazil.** 278/389 Russian athletes compete. Russia finishes 4th in the medal table (19 gold, 17 silver, 20 bronze). |
| Dec, 2016 | **Investigations.** Second IP report finds more than 1000 athletes across multiple sports involved in state coordinated coordinated programme. |
| Aug, 2017 | **Media attention.** Netflix distribute documentary film ‘Icarus’ providing insights of laboratory director, Grigory Rodchenkov |
| Dec, 2017 | **Sanctions.** TheIOC suspends the ROC with immediate effect, Russian athletes with no documented doping violations can compete as Olympic Athlete from Russia. |
| Feb, 2018 | **Winter Games, PyeongChang, South Korea.** 168 athletes compete. OAR finish 13th in the medal table (2 gold, 6 silver, 9 bronze). |
| Feb, 2018 | **Clean sport reformers response.** NADOs and athletes are more supportive, generally viewing the sanctions as appropriate. |
| Feb, 2018 | **Sanctions.** The IOC lifts the ban on ROC. |
| Sept, 2018 | **Sanctions.** WADA changes the roadmap. Russia not required to accept findings of McLaren report. Lifts sanctions on RusADA on condition that the Moscow laboratory data is given to WADA. |
| Sept, 2018 | **Clean sport reformers response.** NADOs and athletes criticise the change to the roadmap as not in interest of clean sport. |
| Jan, 2019 | **Data.** WADA accesses Moscow laboratory and secures access to Moscow laboratory data. |
| Jan-Nov, 2019 | **Investigations.** WADA implemented forensic analysis of Moscow data and concluded that the data were neither complete nor fully authentic. |
| Sept, 2019 | **Sanctions.** WADA imposed various sanctions for a four year period including a ban for Tokyo 2020 on all Russian athletes with recorded doping violations. |
| Sept, 2019 | **Clean sport reformers response.** NADOs and athletes criticized the sanctions as lenient, farcical and largely superficial. |
| Dec, 2019 | **Sanctions:** Russia submits an appeal to CAS. The case is expected to be heard in May/June 2020. |
| April, 2020 | **Summer Games, Tokyo 2020.** The summer Games is postponed to summer 2021 as a result of the Coronavirus pandemic. |

**Appendix 2: *Overview of Data Sources***

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Author** | **Year** | **Document** | **Pages** |
| Tygart, T | Feb, 2020 | Testimony to Senate Commerce Committee | 10 |
| WADA Intelligence and Investigations Dept. | Nov, 2019 | Final Report to the CRC regarding the Moscow Data | 62 |
| AthletesCAN, Athletes Germany, USOPCAAC, New Zealand Athletes Federation, Global Athlete | Oct, 2019 | Letter to Thomas Bach, IOC President | 2 |
| WADA | Jul, 2019 | Progress of the Anti-Doping System in light of the Russian Doping Crisis | 41 |
| IOC | Jun, 2019 | Olympic Charter (rev. 26 June, 2019) | 106 |
| Mueller, R.  U.S. Department of Justice | Mar, 2019 | Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election (Mueller Report) | 448 |
| Global Athlete | Nov, 2018 | Statement by Global Athlete on criticism of WADA by world’s athletes and other anti-doping reformers | 2 |
| WADA | Apr, 2018 | Code Compliance by Signatories | 69 |
| Schültke, A., & Seppelt, H | Feb, 2018 | Russia is still remaining doping country. No changes at all: Interview with Grigory Rodchenkov [published transcript] | 8 |
| IOC Disciplinary Commission | Dec, 2017 | IOC Disciplinary Commission’s Report to the IOC’s Executive Board (Schmid report) | 30 |
| Stepanov, V | Oct, 2017 | Written testimony of Vitaly Stepanov [submitted to IOC Schmid Disciplinary Commission] | 33 |
| UNESCO Conference of Parties to the International Convention against Doping in Sport | Sept, 2017 | Review of the national anti-doping policy of the Russian Federation in the context of the Policy Advice Project | 94 |
| U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce | Feb, 2017 | Ways to Improve and Streghten the International Anti-Doping System | 207 |
| McLaren, R | Dec, 2016 | The independent person 2nd report (Mclaren/IP report 2) | 151 |
| WADA | Sept, 2016 | Report of the Independent Observers – Games of the XXXI Olympiad, Rio de Janeiro 2016 | 55 |
| Multi NADO | July, 2016 | Letter to Thomas Bach, IOC President | 5 |
| IOC | July, 2016 | IOC Statement – Russian Athletes in the Olympic Games Rio 2016 | 3 |
| McLaren, R | July, 2016 | The independent person report (Mclaren/IP report 1) | 95 |
| WADA (Independent commission) | Jan, 2016 | The independent commission report #2 (IC report 2) | 95 |
| WADA (Independent commission) | Nov, 2015 | The independent commission report #1: final report (IC report 1) | 335 |
| WADA | Nov, 2015 | Foundation Board minutes of meeting | 56 |
|  |  | **Total** | **1907** |

1. College of Business, University of Colorado, Colorado Springs, Austin Bluffs Parkway, Colorado Springs, CO 80918, USA, email: [sharris2@uccs.edu](mailto:sharris2@uccs.edu) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Cambridge Centre for Sport & Exercise Sciences, Andglia Ruskin University, Cambridge, UK [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. School of Sport, Exercise & Health Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK; Department of Cultural and Social Studies, Norwegian School of Sport Sciences, Oslo, Norway [↑](#footnote-ref-3)