

A Multidimensional Trust Evaluation Model for MANETs

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Abstract

Effective trust management can enhance nodes' cooperation in selecting trustworthy and optimal paths between the source and destination nodes in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). It allows the wireless nodes (WNs) in a MANET environment to deal with uncertainty about the future actions of other participants. The main challenges in MANETs are time-varying network architecture due to the mobility of WNs, the presence of attack-prone nodes, and extreme resource limitations. In this paper, an energy-aware and social trust inspired multidimensional trust management model is proposed to achieve enhanced quality of service (QoS) parameters by overcoming these challenges. The trust management model calculates the trust value of the WNs through peer to peer and link evaluations. Energy and social trust are utilized for peer to peer evaluation, while an optimal routing path with a small number of intermediate nodes with minimum acceptable trust value is used for evaluation of the link. Empirical analysis reveals that the proposed trust model is robust and accurate in comparison to the state-of-the-art model for MANETs.

Keywords:

Trust management model, social properties, recommendation management, peer to peer evaluation, link evaluation

1. Introduction

A mobile ad hoc network or MANET comprises autonomous wireless nodes (WNs) communicating with one another without the assistance of access-points or backbone infrastructures. These WNs act as intermediate nodes, configure dynamically and cooperate with each other to forward data transmissions from the source through a pre-selected routing path to the destination [1, 2, 3]. MANETs are widely employed for military operations, personal area network applications and emergency rescue operations [4]. Such wireless networks are time-varying due to the frequent mobility of the WNs. Thus, link failure, network security and quality of service (QoS) are open challenges for researchers [5, 6, 7, 8].

Existing methods for securing routing protocols in MANETs may not be appropriate or may compromise QoS. Many of these approaches propose cryptography models to secure MANETs. However, such models are irrational, as the authors have assumed that all the WNs in MANETs are trustworthy, and those models may allow for a very simple denial of service (DoS) attack[9]. To mitigate these limitations and also improve the overall performance of the routing protocols, researchers have used the social concept of trust management to secure WNs. Trust models in MANETs [10, 11, 12, 13] monitor the cooperation of WNs through packet forwarding to evaluate the trustworthiness of WNs. However, only monitoring node cooperation cannot represent the complexity and subjectivity of trust metrics [14, 15, 16]. While this approach can be used to find routes with a certain degree of confidence, it may not secure WNs from various types of network attacks. In addition, it omits the consideration of dynamic characteristics of MANETs and does not offer the opportunity to collect multi-source information [12, 17]. Including multiple trust attributes of WNs from social network analysis [18] such as friendship, honesty, level of cooperation, reputation and community of interest relationships to establish and manage trust in a distributed fashion can enhance monitoring of the behaviour and cooperation of WNs and consequently, improve evaluations of trustworthiness [19, 13]. Therefore, multidimensional factors such as social information and QoS should be considered when managing trust-based routing in MANETs.

Trust in distributed systems has been introduced as the degree of subjective belief in a particular node's behaviour [20]. Thus, similar to human behaviour, a node, called the *evaluating node*, assesses the behaviour of another node, called the *evaluated node* based on the level of trust derived

38 from direct experiences or historical interactions between the two nodes in
39 MANETs. The other nodes in a society can also recommend evaluated nodes
40 based on past interactions, and these nodes are called *recommending nodes*.
41 The trust value evaluated through this human behaviour process is random,
42 and rises and decays over time. Thus, the behaviour of WNs in MANETs is
43 similar to the human behaviour model, where some nodes have never previ-
44 ously interacted with certain other nodes, and these nodes become acquainted
45 with each other for interaction with other nodes based on a certain trust level
46 which has developed over time [21]. However, the interactions of these nodes
47 exhibit different types of misbehaviour, which include selfishness by avoiding
48 participation in routing activities when taking into consideration limitations
49 in certain resources such as energy, and dishonesty in assessing or provid-
50 ing trust information [20]. These types of misbehaviour can break the basic
51 functionality of the MANET system.

52 This paper presents a trust management framework with a multidimen-
53 sional trust metric, considering social and QoS properties to mitigate mis-
54 behaviour of WNs in MANETs. Social properties include the frequency of
55 interactions, honesty and closeness centrality, while QoS properties include
56 nodes energy consumption. The paper also measures the effect of social
57 properties on the routing performance of the network. Trust evaluation is
58 conducted in two ways; peer to peer and link evaluation. In peer-to-peer
59 evaluation, the trust value of two nodes is evaluated by considering social
60 parameters and nodes' energy when they interact during packet forwarding
61 activities. On the other hand, link evaluation assesses the selection of a trust-
62 worthy path among different available paths. The main contribution of this
63 work is outlined below:

- 64 • Firstly, the proposed framework utilises a multidimensional trust metric
65 considering social properties and nodes' energy, and then evaluates the
66 trust relationship among nodes. As the trustworthiness of the network
67 is increased through this trust framework, overall network efficiency
68 will improve.
- 69 • Secondly, peer-to-peer evaluation and link evaluation are employed to
70 evaluate the trustworthiness of the WNs in the network. In peer-to-
71 peer evaluation, the trustworthiness of neighbour nodes is evaluated
72 to determine whether to interact with them or not, which is based on
73 social and QoS properties. Link evaluation selects a trustworthy path
74 from a source node to a destination node based on an optimal trust

75 combination, where each intermediate node on the path has a mini-
76 mum acceptable trust value. This two-stage evaluation can enhance
77 the accuracy of the model and have a positive impact on improving
78 network performance.

79 The rest of the work is ordered as follows. Section 2 discusses related
80 works; Section 3 illustrates a scenario where the trust model evaluates the
81 trust values of WNs of a MANET; Section 4 provides a detailed discussion
82 of various trust factors which are considered in evaluating the trust value of
83 a WN; Section 5 presents the simulation results; and finally, conclusions and
84 suggestions for future directions for improvement are provided in Section 6.

85 2. Related Works

86 Trust and reputation management plays an important role in the success-
87 ful achievement of transactions between nodes in MANETs, where coopera-
88 tion is essential to perform network activities.

89 Recently, researchers have noted the significance of using the trust man-
90 agement concept from social networks in building and analysing trust rela-
91 tionships among nodes [22]. Trust and reputation models would promote
92 confidence in the integrity of MANETs services and reinforce the benefits of
93 this technological revolution.

94 Over recent years, several trust and reputation models have been pro-
95 posed to enhance security in MANETs, with the aim of empowering nodes
96 to assess their neighbours' behaviours directly or through recommendations
97 from other nodes in the network [12, 23, 24, 16, 24, 25, 26]. However, most ex-
98 isting trust models quantify and predict trustworthiness among nodes based
99 on a simple or single trust evaluation metric. This single measure may not be
100 capable of satisfactorily assessing the trustworthiness of nodes in many sce-
101 narios of dynamic MANETs [27, 28, 26]. A multidimensional trust evaluation
102 method that considers different network requirements and social properties
103 of trust to quantify and predict nodes trustworthiness is still a challenging
104 problem for MANETs. Absence of considering the quality of communication,
105 selfishness behaviours, malicious intent, the absence of fixed infrastructure,
106 limited resources and physical failures can mean that resulting trustworthi-
107 ness scores are extremely inflated and noisy, which makes it difficult for nodes
108 to find a trustworthy partner to achieve the required task.

109 In [23] the authors propose a trust-based reputation system to evaluate
110 the trustworthiness of nodes in MANETs. Only a single trust metric is used

111 to evaluate the trustworthiness of nodes, based on the cooperation of nodes
112 in packet forwarding. The model, therefore, omits some important eval-
113 uation metrics, including energy, delay and social properties in evaluating
114 nodes trustworthiness. Meanwhile, [16] propose TRUNCMAN, which is a
115 trust-based routing model utilized by the authors to isolate non-cooperative
116 nodes during route discovery activities and safeguard the network against
117 many network layer attacks, including black and grey hole attack (dropping
118 packets). The proposed protocol includes two phases: the Suspicion Phase,
119 which checks the activities related to route request broadcast and acknowl-
120 edgement; and the Detection Phase, which provides details of the detection
121 of non-cooperative nodes. Isolation and propagation of malicious behaviours
122 targeting the attacker nodes in the network is broadcast as social welfare.
123 Similarly, this model also evaluates the nodes trustworthiness only based on
124 packet forwarding, omitting consideration of the dynamic characteristics of
125 MANETs, as well as the quality of paths and social network properties. Our
126 previous work in [12] studied the problem of dishonest recommendation in the
127 presence of attacks related to the recommendation, including bad-mouthing
128 and ballot-stuffing attacks, to develop an effective filtering algorithm of rec-
129 ommendations in MANETs. The model considers some social trust factors
130 to filter out dishonest recommender nodes, and includes: majority opinion
131 by all recommender nodes; the personal experience of the evaluating node;
132 and service reputation, which evaluates the consistency of cooperation in
133 packet forwarding and provides recommendations. Recommendations are
134 clustered, filtered, and selected based on the three factors listed above. How-
135 ever, although the model considers some social attributes, the energy and
136 time-varying properties of WNs are not considered.

137 Some existing trust models considering multidimensional properties for
138 building trust relationships between nodes in MANETs [29, 30, 27] do not
139 consider social trust relationships between nodes. Yunfang [29] proposes
140 a combination of policy and reputation-based approaches structured into
141 an adaptive trust management framework, thereby addressing the issue of
142 firm/objective security as well as subjective security. However, the basis of
143 this work depends completely on the assumption that trust is transitive, and
144 it is not clear how a more realistic transitivity model can be incorporated
145 into the trust management system.

146 The authors in [27] propose a multi-dimensional model to evaluate the
147 trustworthiness of nodes in a MANET from multiple perspectives (i.e. di-
148 mensions). These dimensions include collaboration trust, behavioural trust,

149 and reference trust derived from multiple sets of misbehaviours and different
150 types of observations. However, network requirements and social trust rela-
151 tionships are not considered when evaluating the trustworthiness of nodes in
152 the network.

153 Yu et al. also consider the problem of proposing a composite trust met-
154 ric [31, 32]. They present a trust model with multiple decision factors, in
155 which two types of trust; security trust and quality trust, are incorporated
156 in evaluating the trustworthiness of nodes in MANETs. Analytic Hierarchy
157 Process (AHP) methodology is used to combine these two trust types. This
158 work uses transmitting trust and energy trust to evaluate the security trust of
159 nodes, while it uses delay trust and delay jitter trust to evaluate the quality
160 of trust. Furthermore, social network properties were omitted in evaluating
161 the trustworthiness of nodes in the network.

162 Authors in [28] propose a light-weight trust-enhanced model for multi-
163 path routing in MANETs. They focus on the concept of a trust inference
164 model, where each node has a trust value for its neighbour, and these form the
165 basic building blocks of this model. Multi-dimensional trust attributes are
166 incorporated to address the complexity of the trust relationships between
167 nodes based on historical experience. These attributes are weighted using
168 fuzzy AHP scheme based on entropy weight measure. The model incurred
169 a small additional overhead in order to provide considerable security mea-
170 sures for the routing protocols in MANETs. In this model, QoS and social
171 attributes were not considered for the calculation of trustworthiness values.

172 Wang et al. in [32] propose a multidimensional trust-based model to
173 solve the problem of decision making in service composition and binding
174 for service-oriented MANETs. The authors propose two trust dimensions:
175 competence, which refers to a service providers capability to adequately serve
176 the received request; and integrity, which refers to the degree to which a node
177 complies with the prescribed protocol. They conduct extensive simulations
178 to test the performance of their proposed trust model against a non-trust-
179 based scheme and an existing single-trust-based scheme. Their results show
180 that the proposed algorithm can outperform the existing single trust-based
181 model by effectively filtering out malicious nodes conducting various attacks,
182 as well as penalizing attackers with loss of reputation, which may lead to
183 user satisfaction. In addition, their model is efficient, with linear run time
184 complexity, achieving a close-to-optimal solution.

185 From the discussion above, it is obvious that evaluating trustworthiness
186 based on composite factors, which include network requirements and social

187 trust properties, is still an open and challenging problem. With the prolifer-
188 ation of powerful mobile devices and wireless technology, nodes can provide
189 and receive services, which accelerates the transformation from traditional
190 MANETs to a new era of service-oriented MANETs [32]. However, most of
191 the existing trust models fail to consider social relationships among MANET
192 nodes, as well as the mobility issues which affect these relationships [33].
193 The above models lack simultaneous consideration of malicious nodes, social
194 behavior, and QoS requirements [34]. For example, selfish behaviour which
195 is considered as non-malicious may lead to packet-dropping due to buffer
196 overflow or expiration of Time-to-Live in the routing protocol. On the other
197 hand, A node which is good socially may misbehave maliciously by provid-
198 ing dishonest recommendations and confusing the trust model. Therefore,
199 it is vital to address the conflict in the nodes' behaviours together with the
200 QoS requirements in the network. Moreover, not considering these factors
201 can make these models unsuitable for service-oriented MANETs. Although
202 some models consider some social ties, there is no clear analysis given on
203 how these social ties could help in improving the trust models accuracy, and
204 the performance of the network. As a result, this may lead to inaccurate
205 quantification and prediction of trustworthiness, and consequently, mislead
206 nodes in the decision-making procedure. To address the aforementioned is-
207 sues within the current literature, we propose a feasible trust model which,
208 unlike existing trust protocols for MANETs, deals with scalability, hetero-
209 geneity, mobility, and social relationships.

210 **3. The Proposed Multidimensional Trust Model**

211 The proposed trust model, along with the MANET architecture, is illus-
212 trated in Figure 1. The MANET architecture contains various categories of
213 WNs, as discussed in 3.1, while the trust model incorporates the Bayesian
214 statistical function to evaluate the social trust values of these WNs, as ex-
215 plained in Section 3.2.

216 *3.1. A MANET Architecture*

217 In the proposed scenario, the MANET comprises three types of WNs:
218 these are termed the evaluating node, evaluated node, and recommending
219 node. Figure 1 illustrates a node WN_1 which is evaluating the trustworthi-
220 ness of a neighbour node WN_2 at time t , while the other k neighbour nodes
221 $WN_{k_1}, WN_{k_2}, WN_{k_3}, \dots, WN_{k_n}$ also provide a recommendation for WN_2 at

222 the same time t . In this case, WN_1 and WN_2 are called evaluating and eval-
 223 uated nodes respectively, whereas $WN_{k_1}, WN_{k_2}, WN_{k_3}, \dots, WN_{k_n}$ are the
 224 recommending nodes and n is the number of recommending nodes.




Figure 1: A MANET architecture at time t with the proposed trust model. The trust model computes the trust value of each WN using the social trust component and node energy. A node WN_1 evaluates the trustworthiness of a neighbour node WN_2 at time t (direct trust), and the other neighbour nodes $WN_{k_1}, WN_{k_2}, WN_{k_3} \dots WN_{k_n}$ also provide recommendations for the WN_2 at the same time t (indirect trust).

225 The trustworthiness of a node can be evaluated by summing the direct
 226 and indirect trust values. The direct trust value is found using previous
 227 direct interactions between the evaluating and evaluated WN, and the indi-
 228 rect trust value is calculated using the trust value suggested by the recom-
 229 mending nodes based on their trustworthiness with the evaluating WN. The
 230 direct trust value is accurate and is invulnerable to dishonest recommenda-
 231 tion. However, an indirect recommendation can be vulnerable, due to the
 232 dishonest recommendations of the other neighbour nodes, and in such recom-
 233 mendations, it is equally important to understand the selfishness/malicious
 234 behaviour of WNs in the network. The issue of dishonest recommendation
 235 and the cost of the extra messages exchanged by the recommending nodes
 236 for the performance and energy of the proposed model, besides the problem
 237 of data sparsity, were discussed in [12, 35, 36].

238 The proposed trust model aims to secure the optimal routing path of
 239 a source-destination (S-D) pair using peer to peer (P2P) evaluation and
 240 link (L) evaluation. The energy and social trust of WNs are utilized for
 241 P2P-evaluation, whereas the optimal routing path, having a lower number
 242 of intermediate nodes with minimum acceptable trust value, is used for L-
 243 evaluation. In P2P-evaluation, a WN evaluates the numerical score of the
 244 behaviour (mainly selfishness and maliciousness) of its neighbour WNs prior

245 to developing a trust relationship. The P2P trust value utilizes direct and in-
 246 direct trust values, and suggests that the evaluating node selects the next hop
 247 or evaluated node to relay/forward the information. Meanwhile, the L trust
 248 value is evaluated based on the optimal routing path and trustworthiness of
 249 intermediate WNs on the path between the S-D link.

250 If WN_i and WN_j are evaluating node and evaluated node respectively,
 251 using the four trust factors of frequency, intimacy, honesty and energy during
 252 the interaction, the trust value $T_{ij}(t)$ of WN_j is assessed by WN_i at time t
 253 and the trust value $T_{kj}(t)$ of WN_j is assessed by WN_k at time t and received
 254 by WN_i with a weight factor, where $k = 1, 2, 3, \dots, n$, and n is the number of
 255 recommending nodes. Mathematically, the trust value of WN_j assessed by
 256 WN_i is calculated by

$$T_{ij}(t) = w_D T_{ij}^D(t) + w_I T_{kj}^I(t) \quad (1)$$

257 where $T_{ij}^D(t) = w_f T_{ij}^f(t) + w_h T_{ij}^h(t) + w_{int} T_{ij}^{int}(t) + w_e T_{ij}^e(t)$ is calculated via
 258 the direct method and $T_{kj}^I(t) = w_f \sum_{k=1}^n T_{kj}^f(t) + w_h \sum_{k=1}^n T_{kj}^h(t) + w_{int} \sum_{k=1}^n T_{kj}^{int}(t) +$
 259 $w_e \sum_{k=1}^n T_{kj}^e(t)$ is calculated via the indirect method, w_D and w_I are the di-
 260 rect and indirect trust weight and $w_D + w_I = 1$, while w_f, w_h, w_{int} and w_e
 261 are the weight values for the four factors and $w_f + w_h + w_{int} + w_e = 1$.

262 3.2. Bayesian Statistical Function

263 Similar to [37], the proposed trust model employs the Bayesian statisti-
 264 cal approach to evaluate social trust value, which obeys beta distribution.
 265 Beta distribution and Bayesian inference techniques are utilized in this pa-
 266 per because they represent a less resource-intensive method of evaluating the
 267 trustworthiness of a node within two values, α and β , which is simple to store
 268 and compute in the MANET system with constrained resources. Moreover,
 269 this approach forms a way to evaluate the accumulated number of experi-
 270 ences (i.e. interactions) a node can have during its network activities, and
 271 enables the combination of experiences from different sources, including di-
 272 rect experiences and recommendations received from others, because of the
 273 addition property of the beta function. Therefore, it reflects the dynamic na-
 274 ture of trust, which is dependent on the accumulated number of experiences,
 275 and captures the uncertainty property of trust because the beta function can
 276 give only a probabilistic estimation of future trust. Using gamma function,
 277 beta distribution $f(p|\alpha, \beta)$ can be defined by equation (2)

$$f(p|\alpha, \beta) = \frac{\Gamma(\alpha + \beta)}{\Gamma(\alpha)\Gamma(\beta)} p^{\alpha-1} (1-p)^{\beta-1} \quad (2)$$

278 where α and β are the aggregated positive observation when a node for-
 279 wards packets and the aggregated negative observation when a node drops
 280 packets, p is the probability, $p \in [0, 1]$ for $\alpha, \beta > 0$; $p \neq 0$ if $\alpha < 1$ and
 281 $p \neq 1$ if $\beta < 1$. Consider that the new positive and negative interactions
 282 between WN_i and WN_j are evaluated as ρ and σ respectively. Then, after
 283 each observation, $\alpha = \rho + 1$ and $\beta = \sigma + 1$ where $\rho, \sigma > 0$. The mean and
 284 standard deviation of $f(p|\alpha, \beta)$ can be expressed by equations (3) and (4).

$$E(p) = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta} \quad (3)$$

$$S(p) = \frac{\alpha\beta}{(\alpha + \beta)^2(\alpha + \beta + 1)} \quad (4)$$

285 Let $T_{ij}(t)$ equal the trust value at time t for interactions between WN_i
 286 and WN_j , which changes over t in the dynamic environment of the MANET.
 287 At the beginning (i.e., $t = 0$) of the trust relationship between these nodes,
 288 $\alpha = \beta = 1$ which result in $T_{ij}(0) = 0.5$ calculated by equation (3). For $t > 0$,
 289 the WN_i calculates $T_{ij}(t)$ for WN_j by aggregating the positive and negative
 290 interactions between these nodes using equations (5) and (6) and then use
 291 equation (3) to calculate the trust value.

292 In order to give higher priority to recent interactions and to reduce the
 293 influence of previous interactions over t , we include a decay factor μ . Consider
 294 the new positive and negative interactions between WN_i and WN_j as ρ_{new}
 295 and σ_{new} respectively between the time interval t_1 and t_2 . Thus, ρ and σ
 296 after time t_2 can be calculated by equations (5) and (6).

$$\rho = \rho_{new} + \rho\mu \quad (5)$$

$$\sigma = \sigma_{new} + \sigma\mu \quad (6)$$

297 On the other hand, when there is no new interaction existing between
 298 WN_i and WN_j during the time interval $[t_1, t_2]$, ρ and σ after time t_2 can be
 299 calculated by $\rho = \rho\mu$ and $\sigma = \sigma\mu$.

300 4. Evaluation of Trust Factors

301 4.1. P2P trust factors

302 The P2P trust factor is evaluated by evaluating WNs. Considering four
303 components of trust, an evaluating WN_i estimates the trustworthiness of an
304 evaluated WN_j . These four trust components are discussed in the following
305 subsections.

306 4.1.1. Frequency based social trust factor

307 The frequency based social trust factor refers to the connection between
308 two interacting WNs. The higher the frequency of interaction, the stronger
309 the friendship. Many studies utilise the frequency factor to understand the
310 strength of the routing protocols in MANETs and mobile social networks
311 [38]. The frequency-based social trust factor is estimated by evaluating the
312 number of interactions between both the evaluating and evaluated nodes.
313 A high frequency of interactions indicates that the WN_i and WN_j have a
314 strong relationship. Frequency based social trust evaluation, $T_{ij}^f(t)$, can be
315 calculated using the variances of all experiences between nodes. Consider
316 that node WN_i has positive and negative interaction with node WN_j at
317 time t . Using the beta standard deviation (S_{ij}), mathematically, $T_{ij}^f(t)$ is
318 expressed using equation 7.

$$T_{ij}^f(t) = 1 - \sqrt{12S_{ij}} = 1 - \sqrt{12 \frac{\alpha_{ij}\beta_{ij}}{(\alpha_{ij} + \beta_{ij})^2(\alpha_{ij} + \beta_{ij} + 1)}} \quad (7)$$

319 The value of $T_{ij}^f(t)$ lies between $[0, 1]$. At $t = 0$, $\alpha = \beta = 1$: that is,
320 the interaction between WN_i and WN_j nodes is zero (i.e., the number of
321 interactions $N_{ij} = 0$). For example, WN_i interacted with WN_j at time
322 $\{0, t_1, t_2 \dots t_{10}\}$, and N_{ij} ranges from 0 to 68. The value of $T_{ij}^f(t)$ is shown in
323 Table 1.

324 4.1.2. Honesty-based social trust factor

325 The honesty based trust value, $T_{ij}^h(t)$, can be used to identify an attacker
326 node by analyzing irregular behaviour. Honesty is a social property which
327 can be calculated from the positive (successful) and negative (failed) inter-
328 actions of nodes [27]. $T_{ij}^h(t)$ defines the level of honesty of the evaluated WN
329 to the evaluated/recommended WNs. Let the positive and negative interac-
330 tions between WN_i and WN_j be evaluated as α_{ij} and β_{ij} respectively and

Table 1: Frequency-based trust value

<i>Time</i>	N_{ij}	T_{ij}^f
t_0	0	0
t_1	5	0.4467167
t_2	12	0.595939
t_3	19	0.6663576
t_4	26	0.7094014
t_5	33	0.7391797
t_6	40	0.7613517
t_7	47	0.7786867
t_8	54	0.7927211
t_9	61	0.8043848
t_{10}	68	0.814278

331 the initial value be $T_{ij}^h(0) = 0.5$. This means, at time $t = 0$, the wireless
332 nodes WN_i and WN_j have no interaction. $T_{ij}^h(t)$ changes with time. Posi-
333 tive interactions raise $T_{ij}^h(t)$, while negative interactions lower $T_{ij}^h(t)$. In this
334 model, $T_{ij}^h(t)$ can be calculated by expectation of beta function as in equation
335 8.

$$T_{ij}^h(t) = \frac{\alpha_{ij}}{\alpha_{ij} + \beta_{ij}} \quad (8)$$

336 Table 2 shows the effect of **positive** (α_{ij}) and **negative** (β_{ij}) interactions
337 on $T_{ij}^h(t)$. The evaluation shows that the honesty based trust factor is also a
338 very important parameter for defining the trustworthiness of nodes.

339 4.1.3. Intimacy-based social trust factor

340 Intimacy refers to the time an evaluating node WN_i and an evaluated
341 node WN_j have spent communicating between two WNs. The higher the
342 value of spent time, the higher the value of intimacy [39, 38, 40]. In this
343 model, the intimacy based social trust value T_{ij}^{int} measures the level of inter-
344 action experiences in terms of time. It can be calculated by the number of
345 interactions between WN_i and WN_j over the maximum number of interac-
346 tions between WN_i and any neighbouring node WN_k over the time period.
347 Mathematically, T_{ij}^{int} can be calculated by equation (9),

$$T_{ij}^{int}(t) = \begin{cases} 0.5 & \text{for } d = D \\ \frac{d}{D} & \text{else} \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

Table 2: Honesty based social trust factor

α_{ij}	β_{ij}	$T_{ij}^h(t)$
1	1	0.5
5	1	0.8333333
5	3	0.625
8	3	0.7272727
15	3	0.8333333
15	10	0.6
20	10	0.6666667
25	20	0.5555556
40	20	0.6666667
80	20	0.8

348 where $d = \alpha_{ij} + \beta_{ij}$ is the accumulated positive and negative interactions
349 between WN_i and WN_j and $D = \sum_{k=1}^n \alpha_{ik} + \beta_{ik}$ represents the accumula-
350 tion of interactions between node WN_i and any neighbouring node WN_j .
351 $T_{ij}^{int}(0) = 0.5$ when $t = 0$ and $T_{ij}^{int}(t)$ changes with the t when the nodes'
352 interaction increases. Table 3 gives an example of the intimacy factor and
353 how its value changes according to the number of interactions between the
354 evaluating node and other encountered nodes.

Table 3: Intimacy-based social trust factor

N_{ij}	N_{kj}	T_{ij}^{int}
5	7	0.7142857
10	17	0.5882353
20	44	0.4545455
38	60	0.6333333
50	100	0.5
50	280	0.1785714
51	400	0.1275
80	550	0.1454545
90	720	0.125

355 4.1.4. Energy-based QoS trust factor

356 The WNs in the MANET environment are energy-constrained nodes and
357 each interaction between the two WNs WN_i and WN_j reduces the nodes'

358 energy. Thus, energy is one of the critical trust factors. In conventional
 359 trust models, WNs select neighbour WNs with the highest energy based
 360 trust value T_{ij}^e , and thus the WN with the highest energy dies quickly in the
 361 MANET. Therefore, the trustworthiness of a WN can be evaluated in two
 362 ways. Firstly, it can keep good nodes alive for more time, as the evaluation
 363 does not depend only on the trust value. Secondly, observing the node en-
 364 ergy assists in identifying attacker nodes, as selfish WNs continue to have
 365 high levels of energy, while malicious WNs spend more energy in performing
 366 attacks. In the proposed model, $T_{ij}^e(t)$ indicates the remaining energy level
 367 of a WN after each trust update interval t performed by the evaluating WN_i
 368 about the evaluated WN_j . The energy factor is calculated as in Eq. (10):

$$T_{ij}^e(t) = \frac{E_{ij}(0)}{E_{ij}(t)} \quad (10)$$

369 where $E_{ij}(0)$ and $E_{ij}(t)$ are the level of current energy and consumed
 370 energy at time t respectively for node WN_j . It is assumed that all the nodes
 371 have the same initial energy. Receiving and transmitting packets are the only
 372 types of communication which are considered for energy consumption. This
 373 means that node energy changes with interaction over time t . The value of
 374 the energy factor starts at 1, which refers to a situation where nodes have a
 375 full battery, and gradually decreases over time as nodes involve themselves
 376 in more communications. Nodes continue to be effective in performing inter-
 377 actions so long as the energy factor is not reduced.

378 4.2. Path Trust Evaluation

379 In path evaluation methods, a source node chooses the shortest path
 380 which also meets energy and social trust value requirements. The trust value
 381 of the relaying nodes is evaluated by both direct and indirect methods, and
 382 then two composite metrics are employed to evaluate the L trust value be-
 383 tween the S-D pair.

384 4.2.1. Minimum-based trust factor

385 In the MANET, the source node evaluates the trust values of all the links
 386 between the $S - D$ pair. A link which includes nodes with a trust value less
 387 than a specified trust threshold is discarded, as the link is not considered
 388 to be trustworthy. The trust threshold value is identified as 0.4 because
 389 the optimistic scheme is used, in which all nodes are initially trusted and
 390 expected to be well-behaved. The initial trust value is 0.5 at time $t = 0$,

391 which is above the trust threshold. Then, the source node selects an optimal
 392 routing link which includes intermediate WNs with minimum trust values.
 393 Mathematically, the minimum trust value, $T_{ij}^m(t)$, at time t of a link L can
 394 be calculated by equation (11).

$$T_{ij}^m(t) = \min\{T_{ij}|i, j \in L; j \text{ is the next hop relay node}\} \quad (11)$$

395 The evaluation $T_{AF}^m(t)$ is explained using Figure 2, where the source WN is
 396 A and the destination node is F . Table 4 shows the example of the minimum-
 397 based trust factor and product based trust factor evaluation methods with
 398 the available links from nodes A to F , as indicated in Figure 2. Although
 399 there are five possible paths to the destination, the minimum trust value of
 400 the path ($A \rightarrow B \rightarrow D \rightarrow F$) which is based on the trust values of the
 401 intermediate nodes (B, D) = (0.90, 0.70) is 0.70 (path # 1). This path is the
 402 most trustworthy path between the $S-D$ pair. In the product method, paths
 403 2 and 5 have trust values of 0.38 and 0.36 respectively. These values are less
 404 than the trust threshold and thereby considered untrustworthy. However,
 405 the trust values of the intermediate nodes of these two paths (i.e. path #
 406 2 and path # 5) are higher than the trust threshold and these intermediate
 407 nodes should be included. Meanwhile, our method gives a minimum value
 408 for path trust of 0.50, which is considered a trustworthy path because this
 409 value is greater than the trust threshold.

Table 4: Minimum-based trust factor and product-based trust factor for calculating path trust

Path #	$A \rightarrow F$	Trust value	Minimum method	Product method
1	$A \rightarrow B \rightarrow D \rightarrow F$	(0.90, 0.70)	0.70	0.63
2	$A \rightarrow C \rightarrow E \rightarrow F$	(0.75, 0.50)	0.50	0.38
3	$A \rightarrow C \rightarrow D \rightarrow F$	(0.75, 0.30)	0.30	0.23
4	$A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow D \rightarrow F$	(0.90, 0.80, 0.30)	0.30	0.22
5	$A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow E \rightarrow F$	(0.90, 0.80, 0.50)	0.50	0.36

410 4.2.2. Closeness centrality-based social trust factor

411 The closeness centrality metric T_{ij}^c measures the degree to which an eval-
 412 uated WN is adjacent to the evaluating/recommending WNs. This metric
 413 is inversely proportional to the sum of the minimum distances between the




Figure 2: A MANET architecture at time t where node energy is indicated by battery level.

414 evaluated WN and every other WN in the MANET [28, 32] or hop count or
 415 transmission delay (due to distance only). This network parameter is widely
 416 used in social networks, describing the efficiency of transmission between an
 417 S-D pair. Mathematically, T_{ij}^c can be calculated by equation (12).

$$T_{ij}^c = \frac{1}{\sum_d \min(WN_i, WN_j)} \quad (12)$$

418 In the proposed model, closeness centrality is considered as a measure of
 419 the number of hops between an S-D pair. Applying the minimum method,
 420 an overall trust value is given to each link, and consequently the link with
 421 the maximum trust value is the most trustworthy link. Let us consider
 422 the previous example presented in Table 4. Firstly, the minimum distance
 423 method is applied, resulting in giving each link between the S-D pair overall
 424 trust values of 0.70, 0.50, 0.30, 0.30, and 0.50 for paths 1 to 5 respectively.
 425 Secondly, links 3 and 4 are discarded, as the trust value for the link is less
 426 than the trust threshold. Thirdly, WN_a appraises links 1, 2 and 5, as their
 427 trust value is higher than the trust threshold. Closeness centrality $T_{ij}^c = \frac{1}{2}$ for
 428 links 1 and 2 and are considered, as they have minimum hop count. Finally,
 429 the trust value of link 1 is higher than the trust value of link 2. Thus, 1 is
 430 the most trustworthy link.

431 5. Simulation and Results

432 NS2 was used to conduct the simulation for the proposed trust model.
 433 This simulator supports MANET architecture through extension of the DSR
 434 routing protocol and allows the evaluation of network components like nodes,

435 routing, packets and transport/application layer protocols. The proposed
 436 trust model was included in the MANET architecture, wherein the WNs
 437 sent the transmission using the DSR routing algorithm.

438 In the simulator, MANET architecture was created whereby 50 WNs were
 439 located randomly in the $700 \times 1000 \text{ m}^2$ area. A percentage (e.g. 10 to 50%)
 440 of these WNs were considered to be misbehaving nodes which dropped trans-
 441 mitted packets at rates of between 50% and 80%. Also, it was considered that
 442 the 15 S-D pairs communicated with each other, and every source generated
 443 2 packets/second (1 packet=512 bytes) for transmission with a Constant Bit
 444 Rate (CBR) and a pause time of 60 seconds to their intended destination.
 445 The simulation time was considered to be 8.33 minutes. All newly-added
 446 WNs were assumed to be trustworthy with $T_{ij} = 0.5$. The threshold trust
 447 value was $T_{ij}^{thres} = 0.4$ [41]. The parameters used for configuring the MANET
 448 are shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Network Configuration Parameters

Parameter	Value
Nodes	50
Area	700 m X 1000 m
Speed	10 m/s
Radio Range	250 m
Movement	Random waypoint model
Routing Protocol	DSR
MAC	802.11
Source-destination pairs	15
Transmitting capacity	2 Kbps
Application	CBR
Packet size	512 B
Simulation time	500 s
Trust threshold	0.4
Fading timer	10s
Deviation threshold	0.5

449 In the trust model, the selfish nodes drop packets at various percentages,
 450 and these nodes generate jamming/collision. It was assumed that 50% self-
 451 ish nodes were present in the MANET. Bad-mouthing and ballot-stuffing
 452 attacks targeted the recommending system by providing dishonest recom-

453 mendations for the nodes evaluated in the MANET [42]. In these attacks,
454 the recommending system dispensed false recommendations by degrading or
455 promoting trust value of the evaluated node. It was considered that 20% of
456 the recommending nodes were each of these types.

457 In the simulation, we evaluated three of the QoS parameters, namely
458 network throughput, packet loss and energy consumption for the existing
459 WN, together with misbehaving nodes. The performance of the proposed
460 MANET architecture with the trust model is tested under three cases:

- 461 • Case 1: a DSR routing algorithm with no trust relationship between
462 WNs (denoted as DSR);
- 463 • Case 2: a DSR routing algorithm with trust relationships between two
464 WNs based on packet forwarding rate (denoted as TDSR); and
- 465 • Case 3: a DSR routing algorithm with an energy and social trust-aware
466 trust model (named as proposed).

467 In all cases, the trustworthiness of a node was evaluated.

468 5.1. Effect of Misbehaving Nodes on the Performance Metrics

469 Performance metrics such as the throughput, packet loss and energy con-
470 sumption of the network were evaluated in the presence of various percentages
471 of misbehaving nodes (10% to 40%).

472 Figure 3 shows that the overall throughput of the MANET declines lin-
473 early with the appearance of misbehaving nodes. In this case, the throughput
474 achieved by the proposed method is highest, while the throughput acquired
475 by the TDSR is moderate compared to DSR.

476 The effect of various percentages of misbehaving nodes on packet loss is
477 illustrated in Figure 4. The percentage of packet loss rises almost linearly
478 with the percentage appearance of misbehaving nodes for the proposed trust
479 model, TDSR and DSR. In this case, the proposed trust model outperforms
480 TDSR and DSR, whereas the performance of TDSR is moderate compared
481 to DSR.

482 Figure 5 illustrates the effect of misbehaving nodes on energy consump-
483 tion for the proposed trust model, TDSR and DSR. The energy consumption
484 rises almost linearly with the percentage appearance of misbehaving nodes.
485 In this case, WNs in the proposed model consume less energy compared to
486 TDSR and DSR.




Figure 3: Effect of misbehaving nodes on throughput. An increased percentage of misbehaving nodes reduces the overall throughput of the network for all the three types of routing algorithms.




Figure 4: Effect of misbehaving nodes on the packet loss of MANET WNs. For the proposed trust model, TDSR and DSR algorithms, the percentage of packet loss rises almost linearly with the percentage appearance of misbehaving nodes.




Figure 5: Effect of misbehaving nodes on energy consumption. The energy consumption rises almost linearly with the percentage appearance of misbehaving nodes.

487 *5.2. Effect of Misbehaving Nodes on Trust Level*

488 Figure 6 illustrates the trustworthiness, also called trust level, of good,
 489 moderate and bad WNs while attacker nodes coexist with them, for the
 490 proposed model and TDSR. Figure 6 (a) shows the trust level for a good node
 491 (node 30), which rises with time as the number of favourable interactions with
 492 nodes in the network increases. The trust level for the TDSR is higher than
 493 that of the proposed trust model. This is because TDSR only uses packet
 494 forwarding when evaluating trust value. On the other hand, the proposed
 495 trust model includes some social factors to calculate the trust value of an
 496 evaluated node. Figure 6 (b) shows the trust level for moderate nodes (node
 497 17), which rises with time as the number of favourable interactions with nodes
 498 in the network increases. The trust level achieved for both trust models
 499 is less than that for good nodes, as illustrated in Figure 6 (a). Figure 6
 500 (c) shows the trust level of a bad node (node 13). It is obvious that the
 501 trustworthiness of bad nodes is the lowest. However, the trust level is higher
 502 for TDSR compared to the proposed trust model, as bad nodes require energy
 503 resources to conduct such attacks, and also the intimacy of nodes can be low.

504 *5.3. Effect of Social Trust Factors and Energy on Trust Value*

505 The consequence of social trust factors such as frequency of interaction,
 506 honesty and intimacy, and energy consumption between the pair of nodes for
 507 trust value is illustrated in Figures 7 and 8. Figure 7 shows that trust value
 508 changes as the number of interactions increases for frequency of interaction,




Figure 6: Effect of misbehaving nodes on the trust level of nodes. (a) good node, (b) moderate node, (c) bad node

509 honesty and intimacy between the pair of nodes. When the frequency of in-
 510 teraction is zero, i.e., no interaction, the trust value is also zero, and this value
 511 rises dramatically with increases in interaction and reaches near to 1. Also,
 512 the social value increases with the number of honest interactions. Initially,
 513 the trust value is not zero, but rather starts from some trust value. However,
 514 the trust value fluctuates with the social trust factor called intimacy, which
 515 deals with the time spent between two nodes. Thus, this social trust factor
 516 has less effect on trust value with increase in the number of interactions be-
 517 tween the pair of nodes. Figure 8 demonstrates the effect of energy on trust
 518 value. When the number of interactions with the evaluated node rise, energy
 519 consumption also increases, and thus the trust value declines linearly.

520 5.4. Proposed Trust Model versus Service-based Trust Model

521 The performance of the proposed trust model was compared with the
 522 service-based trust model [31] keeping the same network settings. The effect
 523 of simulation time and some attacker (bad) nodes on the number of trans-
 524 mitted packets both for the proposed trust model and service-based trust
 525 model were studied. Figure 9 (a) illustrates the effect of simulation time
 526 on the transmitted packets for various simulation times in the presence of
 527 30% attacker nodes. In contrast to the service based trust model, our pro-
 528 posed model transmitted more packets. The performance degradation for
 529 the service-based trust model is due to the selection of attacker nodes in the
 530 routing path between source and destination. The proposed model outper-
 531 formed this model significantly for the entire simulation time and reached
 532 3200 packets towards the later phase of the simulation time, whereas the




Figure 7: Trust values in relation to the number of successful interactions between evaluating node and evaluated node




Figure 8: Trust Values as a function of successful interaction between evaluating node and evaluated node for QoS trust value




Figure 9: Effect of (a) time (b) number of misbehaving nodes on the packet transmission

533 service-based trust model had reached almost 300 packets towards the end
 534 of the simulation. Figure 9 (b) illustrates the effect of some bad nodes in the
 535 network on the number of transmitted packets. The proposed model per-
 536 formed better than the service-based trust model in the presence of attacker
 537 nodes who drop transmitted packets intentionally. In both models, the num-
 538 ber of transmitted packets decreased with the appearance of bad nodes in
 539 the MANET. With the arrival of 40% attacker nodes, the number of trans-
 540 mitted packets dropped to just above 2600, from initially more than 3600
 541 for the proposed trust model. In the service-based trust model, the number
 542 of transmitted packets was deficient, and stood at less than ten packets at
 543 40% of bad nodes. In summary, the performance of the proposed trust model
 544 compared positively to the service-based trust model.

545 6. Conclusion

546 In this work, a multidimensional trust model was proposed and analyzed
 547 to secure nodes' routing in MANETs based on social properties and QoS
 548 factors. A trust model based on one trust metric may not reflect the actual
 549 behaviour of nodes and may thus be unable to evaluate the trustworthi-
 550 ness of nodes. Depending on social as well as QoS properties, the proposed
 551 trust model evaluates the trustworthiness of wireless nodes in the network.
 552 A node's trustworthiness is evaluated by peer-to-peer evaluation and link
 553 evaluation. In this trust evaluation model, the performance of the network
 554 is evaluated using average throughput in the network, packet loss and en-
 555 ergy consumption in the presence of malicious/dishonest nodes. It has been

556 found that the proposed trust model improves the overall performance of the
557 network.

558 In future, the proposed model can be expanded through additional so-
559 cial properties for identifying node behaviour such as changing identities,
560 malicious behaviour and legitimate new nodes. In addition, adaptive weight-
561 ing factors can be incorporated to prioritize the effect of these factors over
562 time. Besides this, the proposed model can be compared with other models
563 which utilize both social and QoS factors to validate its robustness over other
564 models available in the literature.

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